Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2016
Abstract
We explore gender biases towards delegation in a modified (delegation) dictator game. Under compulsory delegation and no (gender) revelation no significant gender differences are observed for choices made by principals. Male agents share little with the recipients, meanwhile, female (agents) are not responsive to the incentive scheme and return less to the dictator. However, a clear dichotomy in female behavior is observed under gender revelation. As principals, females behave similar to their male counterparts and appoint as agents those who return more to them. On the other hand, as agents’ females show greater redistributive concerns relative to their male counterparts in the early periods even though it is detrimental to them over time. This results in both male and female principals delegating more to male agents over time.
Recommended Citation
Bottino, E., García-Muñoz, T., & Kujal, P. (2016). Gender biases in delegation. ESI Working Paper 16-22. Retrieved from http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/200
Comments
Working Paper 16-22