Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2012
Abstract
We study cooperation in economies of indefinite duration. Participants faced a sequence of prisoner’s dilemmas with anonymous opponents. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the individual level. We report that (i) grim trigger does not describe well individual play and there is wide heterogeneity in strategies; (ii) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation; (iii) coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience. We discuss alternative methodologies and implications for theory.
Recommended Citation
Camera, G., M. Casari, and M. Bigoni (2012). Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment. Games and Economic Behavior 75, 570–586. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.009
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
Elsevier
Comments
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Games and Economic Behavior. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Games and Economic Behavior, volume 75 (2012). DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.009