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We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, teams with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.


This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Experimental Economics, volume 22, issue 1, in 2019 following peer review. The final publication is available at Springer via DOI: 10.1007/s10683-018-9592-1.

Peer Reviewed



Economic Science Association



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