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Prior literature has observed a “hidden return to incentives” where principals receive more cooperation from agents when formal incentives are available but not used than when not available. Previous experiments are replicated using a gift-exchange rather than a trust game. Hidden returns to incentives are not observed, and in fact the results show the opposite. Suggestions for future research are provided.


This article was originally published in Theoretical Economics Letters, volume 7, in 2017. DOI:10.4236/tel.2017.75101

Peer Reviewed



The authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.



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