In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology e.g., suicide attacks when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti-terrorism measures.
Arce, Daniel G., Dan Kovenock, and Brian Roberson. "Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies." Naval Research Logistics (NRL) 59.6 (2012): 457-469.
Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Political Theory Commons
This article was originally published in Naval Research Logistics, volume 59, issue 6, in 2012. DOI: 10.1002/nav.21500