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The Powell Doctrine of Foreign Policy: International Development as Homeland Security

Katherine Blaisdell

Introduction

Despite mixed response by voters to the idea of sending tax dollars to other countries for any purpose, administrations since Franklin Roosevelt have used foreign aid as part of their economic and foreign policy. The Bush administration and the Department of State under Colin Powell’s leadership were no exception, and even raised foreign aid levels. However, many (see, for example, Mertus, 2008) argue that the Bush administration’s primary goal was creating a strategic power balance and stable world system, with alleviation of poverty and disease being just a side effect to be used for public relations advantages. In his most recent public writings (coauthored with former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and published in the Wall Street Journal), former Secretary of State Powell stated, “Our country’s economic health and security are inextricably linked to the prosperity and security of the rest of the world” (2009). However, once this link is established, policymakers must assess how, and whether, foreign aid can contribute to that global prosperity and security.

Both the idea of humanitarian aid and that of strategic economic assistance have proponents and skeptics, and there is a narrow school of people who believe that foreign aid in any form is a faulty proposition. Powell is a strong proponent of both forms of foreign aid; in announcing a seminal new foreign aid program, the Millennium Challenge Account, he called the MCA “a challenge to America to use our great power for good, and a challenge to developing nations to empower their people to build a better future.” This statement is perhaps the foreign aid counterpart to the Powell Doctrine of military force: intervention for humanitarian reasons with overwhelming force that betters the US security position. This paper will make an effort to lay out enough information to assess this foreign aid doctrine, and to come to a conclusion about the efficacy and responsibility of Secretary Powell’s foreign aid policy.
Context: The Purposes of Foreign Aid

Since the speeches of Truman and Marshall announcing the Marshall plan after World War II and of Kennedy announcing the founding of both the Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Peace Corps (Baltimore, n.d.), U.S. policymakers have drawn on humanitarian sentiments to draw support for foreign aid. Humanitarian-based aid claims solidarity with the recipients, and calls on the generosity and fellow-feeling of the populace. This argument draws upon the moral convictions of those being convinced to support the project, suggesting that it is the ethical imperative of rich, democratic nations to give sustenance and civil rights to the struggling inhabitants of third-world countries. The idea is often also connected to American exceptionalism, contending that the U.S. has a particular duty to bring its wealth and worldview to others. Lancaster and Van Dusen (2005), foreign policy professors at Georgetown University, argue that this motivation is most apparent when the receiving nation-state is both poor and lacking in any ready strategic position. However, disaster assistance - which made up more than $380 million of US foreign aid budgets in the early 2000s (USAID, 2002) - also fits into this category of humanitarian aid, as it is neither long term strategic development assistance nor likely to be directly tied to security. Furthermore, humanitarian assistance can have the benefit of solidifying diplomatic ties, while, it is hoped, eliminating suffering.

On the other hand, international assistance can be a principally strategic part of foreign policy. Radelet (2003), a senior fellow at the Center for Global Policy, notes that, although USAID was created in part to ensure that political and security-based projects were kept distinct and well separated from humanitarian aid and development assistance, that line blurred as the agency was asked to provide more and more aid in post-conflict zones, until finally Congress gave the State department formal control of the agency during the Clinton administration. A 1994 Congressional Budget Office report, written about the same time, argued that foreign aid funding should be increased as a primary focus of security policy (Hanlon). This report provides a case for increasing the U.S. foreign aid budget from Cold War levels as a method of enhancing U.S. security. It lays out not only strategic arguments for foreign aid, but also ways to appropriate the money for that aid and how to allocate it, and assumes in analyzing the security benefits that other states will increase their input proportionately. However, the report also contends that foreign aid would accomplish some of the security goals of defense spending, going so far as to suggest that additional funds for foreign aid could be drawn from the Department of Defense budget.

Such a report is most useful in noting that foreign aid decisions are often made - even by a Democratic Congress under a Democratic administration - for geostrategic (and economic) reasons, and that there are clear arguments for increasing foreign aid as a way to improve the security position of the U.S. For example, the author of the CBO report suggests that increased foreign aid is a much cheaper way for the U.S. to maintain its position in the world than the alternatives: broad-scale humanitarian disaster and/or conflict. He argues that present action is preferable to possible permanent damage. He also makes the case that a less impoverished world populace would be more likely to respect the international systems that keep peace; stability helps to embed the rule of law as a
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global norm. Radelet (2003) also points to the strategy of paralleling military power with 'soft power', sending the message that the US has the capability to operate at all levels in the world system.

There are also those commentators who argue that foreign aid is not effective policy in any case. These opinions range from World Bank analysts who contend that foreign aid moneys have been worse for developing countries than large oil reserves (Djankov, et al, 2005) to pundits who make it quite clear that foreign aid spending is wasteful, counterproductive, and even unconstitutional (Bonta, 2001). However, the most reasonable of these thinkers confine themselves to the contention that foreign aid has not worked well in particular cases thus far, and the more extreme ideologues (like Bonta) also tend to argue for such isolationism that foreign policy as a whole becomes moot, and so including them in a conversation about foreign policy decision making seems less than helpful.

Distinction: The History of U.S. Foreign Aid and What Made Powell’s Foreign Aid Policy Different

The first seeds of U.S. foreign aid were planted during the Great Depression, when Franklin Roosevelt created the Economic Stabilization Fund to provide loans to stabilize foreign currencies as a way of creating greater world economic stability and a more favorable trade position for the U.S. (Bonta 2001, 28). Following World War II, Truman implemented America’s best known foreign aid plan to ensure that post-war Europe would be a stable trading partner and diplomatic ally with the U.S. (Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005). Kennedy would follow that plan with the creation of USAID to consolidate foreign aid programs, and from that time through the 1970s, aid was directed mostly to poor countries in need of either stabilization after conflict or capitalist development as a Cold War strategy (Baltimore, n.d.). The decades that followed were a time of precipitous decline in foreign aid in the wake of corruption scandals, and most aid made available during the 1980s primarily encouraged trade with growing U.S. transnational corporations and came with restrictions such as the Gag Rule, prohibiting aid from going to institutions that provided abortions or abortion counseling (Baltimore, n.d.). The Clinton administration placed a greater ideological emphasis on foreign aid, but spent much of that effort moving aid around and removing Reagan’s restrictions.

The foreign aid policy of the Bush administration might have been on track to look similar to that of Reagan’s and G.H.W. Bush’s, but September 11 provided the impetus to change both the goals of foreign aid and the way it was administered (Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005). Both Lancaster and Van Dusen, in their analysis of the state of foreign aid (2005), and McArthur (a retired U.S. foreign service officer), in her report on President Bush’s FY2003 budget requests (2002), note that on the whole, foreign aid to Middle East states increased dramatically after 2001. The latter article observes that Secretary Powell made no mention of the foreign aid amounts in presenting the plan to Congress, but instead spoke more broadly of foreign policy, including coupling aid for allies with "smart sanctions" of less friendly states. The following table briefly shows the change in foreign assistance levels from Clinton administration levels (1999-2001) to Bush administration levels (2002-2007).
Figure 1 Summary of Assistance to All Countries in millions, historical $US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>7,419.8</td>
<td>5,907.2</td>
<td>6,451.1</td>
<td>8,419.1</td>
<td>10,125.</td>
<td>11,207.</td>
<td>10,052.</td>
<td>9,610.2</td>
<td>11,940.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Agriculture</td>
<td>3,085.2</td>
<td>1,941.4</td>
<td>2,070.9</td>
<td>1,433.1</td>
<td>2,625.4</td>
<td>2,150.5</td>
<td>2,317.7</td>
<td>2,033.0</td>
<td>1,835.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department a</td>
<td>1,516.7</td>
<td>2,486.0</td>
<td>1,857.1</td>
<td>2,340.3</td>
<td>2,184.0</td>
<td>4,026.3</td>
<td>5,037.2</td>
<td>5,374.5</td>
<td>5,656.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Defense</td>
<td>649.9</td>
<td>685.2</td>
<td>711.7</td>
<td>612.1</td>
<td>2,365.0</td>
<td>5,187.9</td>
<td>5,972.0</td>
<td>4,567.3</td>
<td>2,312.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>416.8</td>
<td>1,132.5</td>
<td>2,215.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Economic b</td>
<td>14,677.5</td>
<td>12,702.4</td>
<td>12,896.0</td>
<td>15,226.2</td>
<td>19,308.5</td>
<td>27,481.2</td>
<td>28,167.9</td>
<td>26,884.2</td>
<td>28,915.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
<td>3,913.8</td>
<td>4,876.4</td>
<td>3,941.8</td>
<td>4,797.1</td>
<td>6,661.6</td>
<td>6,145.6</td>
<td>7,330.7</td>
<td>12,260.3</td>
<td>13,024.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Adapted from US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook].
a State Department programs include the Global HIV/AIDS initiative and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Both programs fall under the “global gag rule,” discussed below.
b Total Economic Assistance is defined by Greenbook, and includes both MCC moneys and such funding as Department of Defense and State Department programs.
The other region which received relatively high levels of aid during Powell's tenure as Secretary of State is Africa (Radelet, 2003). Smith (2004), a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, notes, however, a number of interesting juxtapositions with the administration's stated goals of humanitarian assistance, two items in particular. On the causative end of aid, she points out that the administration has raised aid levels and opened diplomatic channels mostly with states that have begun exporting oil to the US. On the effect end, she notes that the administration coupled this aid - ostensibly for the fight against HIV/AIDS - with a reinstatement of the rule precluding aid from passing through organizations that provide abortion counseling.

The core of Powell's foreign aid policy, however, was the brand new Millennium Challenge Account. Powell himself announced and commented on the MCA in a June, 2003, article in the *Washington Post*. In that piece, he explicates the humanitarian goal of ending poverty, while alluding to the security benefits for the US of such aid. He also notes that the $5 billion annual commitment (as yet unmet) would represent the largest increase in foreign aid since the implementation of the Marshall Plan under President Truman. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, the organization created to manage the MCA, proclaims on its website that it "is based on the principle that aid is most effective when it reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in people. MCC's mission is to reduce global poverty through the promotion of sustainable economic growth" (Millennium Challenge Corporation, "About MCC").

The website also lays out the basic principles of the MCC's operations, the central point of which is that states must earn their aid by meeting certain qualifications. These indicators, shown in Figure 2, below are developed and measured by such organizations as the research arms of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and the UN's Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Indicators").

**Figure 2**

**Millennium Challenge Corporation Selection Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties</td>
<td>Ruling Justly</td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>Ruling Justly</td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>Ruling Justly</td>
<td>World Bank Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>Ruling Justly</td>
<td>World Bank Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Ruling Justly</td>
<td>World Bank Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption</td>
<td>Ruling Justly</td>
<td>World Bank Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immunization Rates</td>
<td>Investing in People</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Expenditure on Health</td>
<td>Investing in People</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls' Primary Education Completion Rate</td>
<td>Investing in People</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Expenditure on Primary Education</td>
<td>Investing in People</td>
<td>UNESCO and national sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Startup</td>
<td>Economic Freedom</td>
<td>IFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>Economic Freedom</td>
<td>IMF WEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Policy</td>
<td>Economic Freedom</td>
<td>Heritage Foundation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each country has a 'scorecard' for these indicators, with graphs showing their change over the last several years, available to the public on its website. What most distinguishes MCC from USAID, which manages most of the US's foreign aid, is that its aid agreements are tied to finite, development-based contracts. Whereas AID may administer security-related aid and may fund the same programs in a given country for years at a time depending on the foreign policy goal of the project, MCC runs like a business, making deals with states to receive aid for a specific period of time and assuming progress in certain benchmarks. Such a system allows for strategic development assistance while maintaining the appearance, and perhaps functions, of openness and clear investment planning, highlighting these features as the focal strategy of Powell's foreign aid policy.

Secretary Powell's decisions on foreign policy are best described in his own words. As he was preparing to leave office, he wrote a piece published in Foreign Policy magazine in early 2005. In the article, he continues the sentiments expressed in his 2003 Washington Post commentary, this time from the perspective of outgoing Secretary of State. He draws upon the political capital of a freshly elected George W. Bush and former president Kennedy, and lays out a series of arguments and strategies for foreign aid, including incentives for political allies; free market democracy; and policies to combat illegal transnational migration, disease, and black markets. This article is more detailed and academic than some of the work published during his time in office, but equally supportive of the foundations of Bush administration strategic aid policies. Furthermore, it presumes that, like much of the information on the MCA, the alternative to the problem of aid with no conditions is to attach strings to each piece of aid.

Assessing Powell's Foreign Aid Policy: The Case of The Millennium Challenge Account

Because the Millennium Challenge Account is the greatest change in foreign aid policy made under Secretary Powell, its programs make a functional case study for assessing that policy. The newness of the MCA means that there is still little literature published on the specific goals stated in implementing the policy, and the MCC website provides information that is detailed but self-affirming, emphasizing successes and highlighting data to support positive conclusions. However, an analysis can use a comparison between both the purposes of the MCA (as outlined by Secretary Powell) and the prospects for the MCC's structure and its results (as analyzed by development and public policy scholars) with current economic development indicators.
There were three basic purposes outlined by Colin Powell for the MCA at its inception. First, the creation of the MCA would both improve and supplement the system of foreign development assistance by implementing an aid system based on the principles of the free market. The second goal is to create incentives - again emphasizing the free market system - for greater civil rights and liberties, effective governance, human development, and "economic freedom". The third is the achievement of development goals, including stable economies, health/disease alleviation, (limited) environmental protection, and poverty reduction (Powell, 2003). These purposes are broad, but perhaps achievable in the long term.

The first purpose, the bolstering of the US foreign aid system, seems the most achievable. In his Foreign Policy article, Powell (2005) described the new relationship between foreign aid agencies under his control as one of complimentary efforts, with "USAID pushing from one end and MCA pulling from the other." Whereas USAID has served, in the last two decades at least, as an agency serving the particular foreign policy goals of each administration, the MCC is structured to be independent and serve only development purposes, although its governing board is still chaired by the Secretary of State, and its Chief Executive Officer appointed by the President. Furthermore, USAID operates on an inherently political basis, doling out aid for emergency humanitarian or long term strategic purposes, but the MCA is designed to be a competitive process.

This feature would serve as an answer to critics of foreign aid policy (such as Radelet, 2003) who argue that it is too often corrupted from the outset by legislative earmarks and corrupted in its production by going through dictatorial or unstable governments. However, there seems to be no clear mechanism in place for preventing Congress from targeting their constituencies when budgeting for the MCA, rather than allowing countries' proposals to guide appropriation of funds. Radelet (2003) points out that allowing earmarks into the process to the extent that they are present in other foreign aid budgets would severely undermine both the legitimacy and the efficacy of the MCA. Furthermore, although the country selection process is designed to be open and based on performance indicators, there is room for choice to be made among nearly-equal countries.

The incentives system, the second purpose of the MCA, makes a great deal of sense from the perspective of free market economics. It creates a fairly basic trade for very poor states: accomplish certain things for your people and your economic system, and gain more money to put into your people and your economic system. As Powell points out, USAID is still available to "push" states which lack the financial wherewithal for even that simple tradeoff. The immense complexity of measuring countries' performance along the indicators makes determining who will gain the incentives challenging. Radelet (2003) points out the particular difficulty of determining what to do with states that meet the qualifications in time to sign compacts but then slip during the contracted term. There is room in the MCC's operations to adjust indicators, which will be helpful in keeping them relevant, but also opens the system up to potential biases or loss of rigor in the selection process.
Incentivizing those standards has had mixed results. The MCC's status reports (*Millennium Challenge Corporation*, 2009) show the total funding for the country and highlight bright spots in the results of agreements, but they give no details on the particular program budgets or the wider budgets of recipient governments. The result is that the fungibility of these funds is invisible and difficult to assess (Radelet, 2003), meaning that with aid input from the U.S., countries are able to shift their own moneys to unrelated and potentially corrupt purposes with no mechanism for redress by the MCC. Furthermore, basing an aid system on the free market system and incentivizing protections of a free market presume that this kind of capitalism is the most useful and beneficial to developing economies. However, Chua (2004), an international business law professor at Yale Law School, points out that exporting American-variety free market democracy in the way one might export silicone chips or debt packages can have dire consequences for the receiving country. While this is a minority opinion in the literature, it is a worthy criticism to note given that free market ideology is a central focus of the MCA.

Development goals, however, are the most obvious purpose for foreign assistance and of the MCA in particular, and also in some ways the easiest to measure. The first of these broad goals, as outlined by Powell (2005), is health, especially in terms of disease reduction. He spends particular time emphasizing the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which is notable in part because so much of his other foreign aid policy was directed at increasing aid to Africa, ostensibly to help with HIV/AIDS. The restriction known as the global gag rule, preventing aid of any kind from going through organizations that do any work related to abortion, reinstated by the latter President Bush, has been a countervailing force to much of the funds directed toward the AIDS pandemic. Ghana, which according the MCC became eligible for MCA funding and began receiving MCA funds in 2007, demonstrates this trend. The 2008 UNAIDS report indicates that Ghana, which according to the MCC increased health expenditures to meet MCC guidelines, has experienced a rise in AIDS prevalence since 2005. Lesotho, which just began receiving 'threshold' funds at the end of 2008 according to the MCC, has experienced the same phenomenon.

Numbers on hunger, an indicator that demonstrates both poor health and poverty, are mixed. Madagascar is in its third year of compact implementation with the MCA, but according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2008), the prevalence of malnutrition in Madagascar has risen to 37%. Access to clean water, which is tied to both community development and the prevention of disease, is at only 65% in Benin, which has been receiving MCA compact funds since 2006. That means that one-third of the population of Benin has no improved water source, and MCA funds have been primarily focused on economic projects (MCC). Zambia, too, has been receiving threshold funds since 2006, but only 58% of its citizens have access to improved water sources, and its threshold program is focused on improving border management (MCC). Although these programs are all somewhat new, it is curious to note that moneys are going to programs that do not seem to be addressing their worst health problems.

Environmental protection, though less emphasized by development economists, is one of the features of progress noted by Powell. He particularly noted his work on forest conservation efforts in the 2005 article, for reasons of both environmental stewardship and human livelihood. However, only four countries of all those receiving aid
from the MCA did not engage in deforestation in the years leading up to that article[3]. However, the only related
criterion for MCA assistance, "Resource Management," is an average of access to improved water and sanitation,
child mortality, and proportion of protected eco-regions (SEDAC, 2009).

The final category, poverty alleviation, is the most difficult to quantify, because steady economic development
takes time to demonstrate. Of note, however, is the fact that all of the MCC's countries have experienced modest
or significant per capita income increases over the last ten years (World Bank, 2009). In a few cases, for countries
like Honduras and Tanzania that have been receiving MCA money for several years, this growth in income might be
partly explained by MCA programs, which would point to success. However, very few of the chosen countries were
not already on the rise when they began MCC threshold agreements or compacts. From one perspective, this
information is a positive sign that the MCC chose countries where its programs were likely to be successful. From
another, however, it seems that the MCC chose countries where its money would look like it was making a
dramatic impact, either so that its global reputation would be solid or so that it could continue to garner funding
increases from Congress.

As a whole, the Millennium Challenge Account is effective at what it has set out to do in the short term. As a set of
particular policy goals in Secretary Powell's overall policy doctrine, it is more or less functional: in terms of
following a given set of criteria and encouraging free market democracy (a theme, if not an explicit goal, in Powell's
writings), the MCC does what it is supposed to do. Apart from stated goals and measurable development
indicators, the success expected from the MCA is demonstrated by the fact that, as President Bush has left office,
the new administration, which, in the range of mainstream foreign policy is the opposite of the Bush
administration, has taken complete ownership of the MCA. As of early March, the front page of the MCC's website
read, "Achieving Obama's pledge; advancing Clinton's vision." Nowhere mentioned on the main pages are
Secretary Powell or the Bush administration, who created the MCA.

Conclusions

Secretary Powell's vision for foreign aid works well in the context of his world view. It embodies true
compassionate conservatism, emphasizing the power the US has to make poorer countries over in its own likeness
and maintaining a power structure in which the US continues to be able to use its military and financial might to
end suffering. Like the Powell Doctrine for military force, this ideology has some clear strategic advantages, not
least of which is its congruity with the sense that the US has both a sound moral vision for the world and the
means to create that vision. However, there are some pragmatic difficulties with such a foreign policy, and foreign
aid cannot hope to accomplish the goal of poverty elimination or universal health without support from other
aspects of foreign policy.
One of the most striking ways in which foreign aid is insufficient to these problems is the way in which it must compete with the other economic policies of the US. Radelet (2003, p. 160) makes this point quite succinctly in his assessment of the MCA: "If the United States is serious about helping low-income nations establish a base for robust private-sector activities, sustained economic growth, and poverty reduction, it must rethink some of its other policies affecting these nations." Basically, the US bases its foreign aid policy around the idea of promoting development through open competition and free markets, but bases all of its other economic policies on maintaining a superior economic position in the world, and these forces are competing with each other, and not very freely at that.

For example, the US's own agricultural subsidies put it fairly low on its own assessment of economic freedom. Radelet makes note of a 2002 Oxfam report on cotton subsidies. It points out that Burkina Faso, Benin, and Mali all lose more than 1% of GDP annually due to US cotton subsidies. All three of those states are supported by the MCA; two are in the process of receiving and implementing compact funds, and the third has completed a threshold agreement and is now eligible for compact funds. However, the total assistance invested by the MCA is less, according to the Oxfam (2002) report than those countries lose annually due to cotton subsidies. That fact means that, if the US were to stop subsidizing its cotton farmers (none of which recipients are below the poverty line), it could stop sending money to West Africa entirely and those countries would still be better off. Foreign aid cannot function in the face of these kind of subsidies. The Secretary of State does not control domestic agriculture policy, and he or she does not even have total control of US foreign policy, but shaping foreign aid policy that is counteracted by other policy is a waste of time and energy, not to mention taxpayer dollars.

Trade agreements do fall, at least in part, under the purview of the Secretary of State, and they are also often deeply destructive to foreign economies. One example is the US-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), made between the US and six states in Central America. Writing on her experiences in Nicaragua, Wahlberg notes:

> While agriculture contributes only 2% to the GDP of the US, it contributes 17% to the GDP of Central America on average, and in Nicaragua it represents 32%. Moreover 36% of the labor force in Central America is employed in agricultural activities, whereas the agricultural sector in the US employs only 2% of the labor force. Finally the US is Central America's most important trading partner, about 40-50% of Central American exports go to the US. Meanwhile, Central America accounts for only about 1% of total US trade.

An economist will say that trades do not occur when they do not benefit both parties, but such a vastly unequal relationship means that there is immense pressure for the small Central American signatories to accede to the preferences of the US, even if such a decision means that their long term interests are not benefited. The result is that, as with subsidies, foreign aid programs designed to promote free enterprise are hindered by trade
agreements that dampen them. In short, trade agreements provide another means by which well-crafted, well-intentioned foreign aid policy can be expected to fail.

All this might provoke the response that foreign aid should be abandoned entirely, and the resources used elsewhere. Once in San Francisco, during a discussion about the value of foreign aid, a conservative judge asked me, "Did Truman get us in too deep in foreign aid with the Marshall Plan? I mean, what do you say to the guy sleeping on the street down in the Tenderloin when he asks you for a dollar, and you say, 'Sorry, I already sent my dollar to Darfur'?" However, I think that, given Colin Powell's stance on Darfur and other conflicts, he would disagree with that conclusion as fiercely as I do. The problem, rather, is that foreign aid needs to be thought of and implemented as one aspect of a coherent foreign policy and not just a public relations expediency. Powell wrote in 2005, "Humanitarian assistance is a stop-gap measure." If foreign aid is done right, humanitarian assistance will never again be necessary except in the case of disaster.

**Bibliography**


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[1] The use of a discrete list of indicators developed and measured by third parties is an effort, according to the MCC, to make sure the selection process is transparent. However, the use of this particular set of indicators, emphasizing economic and political rather than human development, may confirm Mertus' (2003) argument that human rights norms are still not deeply embedded in U.S. foreign policy.

[2] The MCC has two categories of agreements with recipient countries. Compacts, which are normally signed for three- to five-year terms, are for states that have qualified fully. Threshold grants are made to states in the process of making improvements to become eligible for compacts.

[3] The World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2007) lists net deforestation from 1990 to 2005. The only countries on the MCC’s Countries list showing a negative number, indicating a net increase in forested area, are Kyrgyz, Moldova, Morocco, and Rwanda.
The Washington Post article discussing the announcement of Powell's resignation as Secretary of State suggests that this lack of ability to shape foreign policy in the face of far-right conservatives in the administration is one of the reasons he resigned. See Allen (2004).