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## About the Contributors

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Introduction

e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work, is Chapman University's electronic journal of undergraduate student research, and will feature recent scholarly research and creative work by Chapman's undergraduates from across the curriculum, essays as well as work in a variety of other media. We invite you to read, peruse, or just take in our offerings from the best of our undergraduate students' work, and hope that you will be stimulated, intrigued, and enlightened, and that you will look forward with anticipation to future issues.

From the perspective of the editors at e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work, we hope to accomplish several goals at once with this electronic journal. First, e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work provides our students an opportunity to distribute their best work. e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work also provides the greater Chapman community with a select sample of the significant research Chapman students conduct, reflecting the academic mission at the heart of the University. Finally, e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work provides a means whereby outside scholars and interested others can access research relevant to their scholarship and other interests, enlarging the compass of our academic and creative endeavors across the virtual globe, thus providing a window onto our community.

The fundamental mission of e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work is to present its readers with the best and most interesting undergraduate student work, which may include shorter pieces alongside more lengthy scholarly work. Contributions to e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work may be made directly, or through faculty recommendation. Scholarly and other work published in e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work will have undergone review for substance and currency through faculty screening, with a subsequent editorial staff review for quality, style, and fit. e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work will also request contributions to themed issues, such as this inaugural issue featuring those student essays selected for presentation during a recent campus event honoring retired four-star general in the United States Army and former Secretary of State Colin Luther Powell.

e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work invites its readers' comments. Letters to the Editor regarding the content of any current issue can be sent to Gordon Babst gbabst@chapman.edu, placing "e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work - reader comments" in the subject line. Selected reader comments and student responses will appear in the subsequent issue.
Some specifics about *e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work*

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*e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work* will be distributed electronically to the entire Chapman community.

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**Executive Editor:** Gordon A. Babst, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Political Science, Chapman University. Future issues of *e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work* will include a student editorial staff.

Some specifics about Chapman University

The mission of Chapman University is to provide personalized education of distinction that leads to inquiring, ethical and productive lives as global citizens.

Chapman University, founded in 1861, is one of the oldest, most prestigious private universities in California. Chapman's picturesque campus is located in the heart of Orange County - one of the nation's most exciting centers of arts, business, science and technology - and draws outstanding students from across the United States and around the world. Known for its blend of liberal arts and professional programs, Chapman University encompasses seven schools and colleges: Wilkinson College of Humanities and Social Sciences, George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics, Lawrence and Kristina Dodge College of Film and Media Arts, Schmid College of Science, College of Performing Arts, School of Law and College of Educational Studies.
On Shaky Grounds: Reasons behind the failure to adhere to the "Powell Doctrine" in the 2003 Iraq invasion

Sasha Anderson

Why did we go to war with Iraq and what are we still doing there? This question is one of our most pressing foreign policy issues and continues to be hotly debated by politicians, journalists and citizens. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was executed in a strikingly different fashion than the strategy used in an earlier conflict with Iraq, the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991. Rather than follow a strategy consisting of clear goals, overwhelming force and a predetermined exit strategy, the US military blundered into Iraq in 2003 without a way to measure victory and without a plan for how to extract themselves from the conflict. This murky strategy in no way resembles the policy that became known as the "Powell Doctrine" that was so well implemented in Iraq in the 1990s. Though the two conflicts involve the same opposition and similar motivations, the Powell Doctrine was not followed in 2003, potentially due to lack of US and international support, a changing media environment, the ambiguity of the phrase "war on terror," and the political ambitions of George W. Bush.

The Persian Gulf War was a model implementation of the "Powell Doctrine." This doctrine, coined for Powell's impressive use of it, outlines a formula for the proper assessment of threat, advocates the use of overwhelming force when invasion is approved, and provides for a clear exit strategy tied to a specific definition of victory agreed upon before aggression is initiated. The roots of this policy lie in Powell's experience in the Vietnam War, where he was able to observe first-hand the mistakes of the US government during his two tours in the country (Powell 148). The repercussions of invasion without a clear plan and without the necessary numbers to take control of a region became clear to Powell in Vietnam. He later described conflict in Vietnam as a "halfhearted half-war, with much of the nation opposed or indifferent, while a small fraction carried the burden" (Powell 148). In response to this observation, Powell went on the argue that "war should be the politics of last resort, and when we go to war, we should have a purpose that our people understand and support; we should mobilize the country's resources to fulfill that mission and then go in to win" (148). Instead, Vietnam lost thousands of American lives, failed to achieve clear success, and left United States citizens disillusioned with the military (Campbell 1998). Shortly after this conflict, confidence sank so low that there was talk of dismantling much of the military. The scramble to keep a strong military force intact led to a policy of reluctance that was championed by Powell and ostensibly remains today (Campbell 1998).
Sasha Anderson

From this on-the-ground experience, Powell went on to serve under Caspar Weinberger, who was the original advocate of clear planning and overwhelming force. Weinberger was able to pass on to Powell six major tenants that would serve as the foundation for Powell's foreign policy strategy. Powell himself clearly states the roots of his beliefs in his biography *My American Journey*, in a passage outlining an address at the National Press Club. Powell describes these tests to be:

1) Commit only if our or our allies' vital interests are at stake. 2) If we commit, do so with all the resources necessary to win. 3) Go in only with clear political and military objectives. 4) Be ready to change the commitment if the objectives change, since wars rarely stand still. 5) Only take on commitments that can gain the support of the American people and the Congress. 6) Commit US forces only as a last resort (303).

This strategy for the use of military force was followed effectively by the first Bush administration during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, where Powell served as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Though debate remains about whether the US should have stayed longer in the Gulf, it is generally looked upon as a success. The US had the support of the international community and was able to quickly exit once the terms for victory were met (Sifry 492). Rather than linger to fight new, small battles, troops were recalled after the 100th hour and Iraq began its retreat out of Kuwait.

The first condition that needs to be established, according to the Powell Doctrine, is whether a given situation constitutes a threat to national security. As they were positioned on the border of Kuwait, Iraqi forces would have been able to push the conflict into Saudi Arabia, destabilizing the entire region (Sifry 19). This was a threat to a Saudi Arabia and had the potential to destabilize the region, and thus member states of the United Nations were in support of an attack to push back the Iraqi forces as there was no way to tell if Saddam had intentions to drive his force into Saudi Arabia. The United States was also personally concerned with strategic oil interests and international concern for the independence of Kuwait, which led to the decision that the situation was indeed a threat to security (Sifry 22). Leading up to the release of US troops, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 660 condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and called for immediate Iraqi withdrawal.

After identifying the invasion of Kuwait to be a significant threat to the U.S., Colin Powell and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney came before the Senate Armed Forces Committee to show them the merit of an invasion and to ask for their support in the effort (Powell 493). The backing of the United Nations was also gained in the Security Council meeting that voted to approve the use of "all necessary means" (UN Resolution 687). This decision passed with a vote of 12-2 in favor of the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Many other countries committed soldiers to the attack.

Once the need to intervene was established and the general American public and world at large were in favor of intervention, large quantities of troops were assembled in order to quickly force back the Iraqi troops with as few Western casualties as possible. In the region there eventually built up "539,000 American troops in the Gulf along
with 270,000 Allied troops from more than two dozen nations, the largest deployment of land troops and air power since World War II" (The History Place). This is an overwhelming amount of force given that Kuwait is only about 2/3 the size of the state of Vermont. The military also planned an attack using all forms of offense, not just responding with less troop-intensive air strikes. Though many in power, including the president, repeatedly asked if air strikes would suffice, Powell and others were adamant that more force would be needed. As Powell put it "we were planning a full campaign - air, land, sea, and space - to remove the decision from Saddam's hands" (Powell 476).

After amassing an overwhelming force, President Bush and his military advisors continued with Powell Doctrine strategizing by deciding that Iraq's retreat from Kuwait would be the measure of victory in Operation Desert Storm (Powell 520). Powell recommended that troops be removed once it was clear that the Iraqi forces had been sufficiently controlled and were on their way out. In hindsight, Powell reflected that "we were fighting a limited war under a limited mandate for a limited purpose, which was soon going to be achieved. I thought that the people responsible ought to start thinking about how to end it" (Powell 519). This was done in response to Powell's fear that the military and US government would continue to find small battles that would keep US forces in the region indefinitely. Instead, the conflict was called to an end on the one-hundredth hour of war. President Bush clearly stated that the mission had been achieved by saying, "Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated, our military objectives are met" (qtd. in Powell 523).

There it was, the neat, clean, 100-hour war in which the United States was able to meet a clear military objective with the support of the international community and then to withdraw from conflict. So how has the United States come from this successful beginning to an ongoing war that, with President Obama's recent withdrawal announcement, may last seven years (Baker)? The uses of military force against Iraq in 1990 and 2003 share very similar motivations, both strategic and ideological. It seems strange that a conflict with the same country and with some overlapping motivations was handled so differently. These similarities included the strategic need for oil, the threat of Saddam Hussein, a fear of weapons of mass destruction, and an ideological focus on the intolerability of Iraq's actions in the region.

Both invasions were clearly a struggle over oil resources, with Iraq claiming historical ties in order to conquer strategic regions of Kuwait (Sifry 17). As for America, we are the top consumer in the oil industry, and logically have a stake in making sure that these resources remain available to us at a balanced, market-driven price (EIA). Daniel Yergin, the head of a leading energy research firm, proposes three reasons why the oil argument cannot be discarded (Sifry 23). The first is that the use of oil has been directly tied to the emergence of modern capitalism and business. Oil has remained among the greatest industries for decades and its changes are not just reported in the business section, but rather it is the talk of front page news stories. This shows the extent to which the global economy is tied to oil and how fluctuations in that market have far-reaching effects that echo into all aspects of our lives. Because of this centrality, Yergin proposes the second reason for oil as a motivation to be its role in geopolitics and global power. The use of oil in combat machinery makes it an indispensable resource for any nation...
aspiring to achieve regional or global dominance. The fact that the United States has to import a large share of its oil means that we are inevitably tied to the conflicts that arise over oil, and hence our involvement in Kuwait in 1990 and Iraq in 2003. The final reason it is so clear that oil does indeed need to be viewed as a motivation for both conflicts is the fact that modern American life is structured around oil. It allows us to build decentralized suburbs and to drive rather than build public transportation. This has led some to call us a "Hydrocarbon Society," in which oil makes possible the way we live, work, travel and even to how we date (Sifry 25). Oil has become such an integral part of American society that Yergin makes the claim that we are a "civilization that would collapse if the world's oil wells suddenly went dry." Clearly then, our society has a need for oil and is inevitably going to be concerned whenever there is conflict surrounding this resource.

Another similarity between the two conflicts is that both George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush harbored a hatred of Saddam and hoped to see him removed from power. Some of this antagonism may be valid, given the grave human rights abuses conducted in Iraq. But there are many other authoritarian regimes that exist in the region, yet Saddam was a particular enemy of both presidents. In his speech announcing the start of the Persian Gulf War, Bush sensationally spoke of Saddam's actions, saying, "Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities -- and among those maimed and murdered, innocent children" (Bush 1991). George W. Bush also spoke of Saddam in sensationalized terms, implicating his regime in an "axis of evil" in his 2002 State of the Union address. He then went on to imply he had a personal grudge against Saddam due to the conflict during his father's presidency (Fisher).

From this personal animosity, both built ideological platforms on which to base their wars. In 1990, Bush famously stated "we will not let this aggression stand" and went on to lay the groundwork for continuing US concern with Iraq by saying, "there will be a lasting role for the United States in assisting the nations of the Persian Gulf, our role then is to deter future aggression" (qtd. in Tuathail 133). This speech became the slogan "this will not stand" symbolizing a moral stance against the actions of Iraq. His son created a similar slogan, the "war on terror" which was used to evoke the same feeling of emotional patriotism. Both campaigns were constructed to win the support of the American people and elicit an emotional response to the issue. On March 18, 2003, in his ultimatum speech to Saddam, Bush stated that "the regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda," thus linking Iraq to the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 (Bush 2003).

Finally, in both wars the threat of weapons of mass destruction was used as a motive to enter into conflict with Iraq. In 1990, Bush was concerned with Saddam's stockpile of chemical weapons and sought to "curb the proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missile and, above all, nuclear technologies" (The History Place). A UN weapons inspection team had been involved in the area for years and it was known that Saddam has chemical and biological weapons, and it was anticipated that he would try and seek nuclear technology (Ritter 105). In addition, the UN had passed resolution 687, demanding that Saddam actually destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction so...
that the economic sanctions may be lifted (Ritter 104). In the beginning of the next decade, the large concern from
the presidency was the supposed presence of nuclear weapons. Colin Powell testified in front of the UN on
February 5, 2003 saying that Saddam did indeed have nuclear technology, but the evidence for this conclusion was
later found to be falsified (Leung). This motivation was highly vocalized in the months leading up to the war, but
lost steam as reports came in discounting the credibility of intelligence information, and has not been used as a
justification in the more recent years of the ongoing war (Leung).

Given the similarities of the conflicts and rhetoric surrounding them, why was the strategy of the Persian Gulf War
not used in the war in Iraq? Why was the 2003 conflict not ended after the fall of Saddam? Colin Powell himself
had been pulled back into the government to serve as Secretary of State under the second George Bush. Yet, he
was unable to apply the same principles to the second conflict in Iraq. The first tenet of the Powell Doctrine, a clear
threat to national security, was based on shaky facts and the implementation went downhill from there.

At the outset, the goal was to establish a clear need to invade by convincing the American public, as well as the
international community, that Iraq was indeed building nuclear weapons and that this technology was a threat to
our security. Following the Iraqi defeat in the Persian Gulf War, the United Nations passed resolution 687 to
require Iraq to disclose its weapons stockpile and how they were produced (Ritter 31). In fact, the UN economic
sanctions in response to the invasion of Kuwait were extended until Saddam handed over the weapons (a first sign
of the lingering effect of invading bodies that Powell and others feared). In response, Saddam sought to conceal a
good portion of his chemical, biological and potential nuclear weapons supply and to claim that he was developing
a program for nuclear enrichment, not for building nuclear weapons, and that materials for this purpose had been
destroyed (Ritter 34). The economic sanctions continued and Iraq was driven to poverty and hunger, so much so
that they signed onto the "oil for food" (UN Resolution 986) agreement in which Iraq sold two billion dollars in oil
every six months to pay for food and medicine (Ritter 149). Multiple conflicts between the UN inspections team
and Iraq took place and the United States eventually settled into a containment strategy under the Clinton
administration. But, the question of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was to be reawakened in light of

In order to make the case for Iraq's possession of nuclear weapons, then Secretary of State Colin Powell came
before the UN Security Council representing the United States' position. He began by making the case that Iraq had
been evading weapons inspections for the last twelve years and that action needed to be taken by the UN Security
Council in order to establish their authority (Powell 2003). He then went on to make the infamous claim that tubes
found in Iraq were for enriching Uranium and had been obtained from Africa. But Powell himself admitted that it
was not certain that the tubes were not merely being used for conventional weaponry. He stated, "these tubes are
controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for enriching uranium.
By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes, and we all know that there are differences of opinion. There
is controversy about what these tubes are for" (CNN). Powell also testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in September 2002 that Saddam had attempted to obtain uranium from Niger. President Bush then went on to make that same claim in an infamous sixteen word sentence in his 2003 State of the Union Address.

It is now generally accepted that this intelligence was falsified by various intelligence bodies within the administration to provide an excuse for entering Iraq (Leung). In fact, a new intelligence bureaucracy, the Office of Special Plans, was created specifically to generate information in support of the invasion of Iraq. One of this office's main goals was to establish the link between al-Qaeda and Iraq by pulling information from "raw" officer reports (Borger). Many of the officials working for the office were untrained in intelligence and pressed for time, so the information passed on to those in charge was based on guesses at best and outright fabrications at the worst. Often the information was "passed on to the national security council and the president without having been vetted with anyone other than political appointees" (Borger). In addition, the then CIA Director, George Tenet, stated after the invasion that "his agency was under pressure to justify a war that the administration had already decided on" (Borger). We now know that much of the intelligence used was falsified in order to create the claims the president was looking for. It is interesting to explore to what extent Secretary Powell was aware of the false nature of the information, as his testimonies, along with those of other high-ranking officials, laid the groundwork for a convincing war with Iraq. The use of this false information could have been due to the fact that Bush had been attempting to construct a solid reason for removing Saddam from power prior to the 9/11 attacks (Barstow).

Potentially, Bush felt that Iraq had not been properly dealt with in the Persian Gulf War. Though the implementation of the Powell Doctrine in this operation was near to perfect, many criticized George H.W. Bush for pulling out too soon and not further weakening Iraq so that Saddam would not continue to be a threat in the future. This explanation for divergence from previous strategy stems from two motives, the personal and the political. Those less personally critical of George W. Bush have claimed that from a defensive military standpoint, it would have been smarter to have defeated Saddam the first time around when we were already involved in the area. This criticism may have spurred Bush to fight Iraq for the second time to in a sense deal with unfinished business. The other, more personal critics, claim that Bush was fulfilling a personal vendetta against Saddam leftover from his father's presidency (DeFrank). Evidence used for this argument is found in a speech given at a fund-raising dinner in Houston Texas wherein Bush stated "after all, this is a guy that tried to kill my dad at one time." This offhanded statement "made some wonder whether the impulse for war reflected careful considerations of national security or was instead a family grudge match" observed Louis Fisher in a 2003 issuing of Political Science Quarterly.

From this shaky beginning, the United States government continued to ignore the outlines of the Powell doctrine. The use of the phrase "war on terror" made victory an ambiguous notion. What exactly does the defeat of terror look like? When can we state that the US has sufficiently dealt with terror? This led to an underwhelming use of force. Rather than flood the area, topple Saddam, and withdraw, the plan committed a very low number of troops in comparison to the Gulf War. On December 21, 2002, an estimated 200,000 troops were approved to be deployed to the Gulf region, with British and Australian troops to follow (Brunner). War was then declared on
March 19 alongside the campaign Operation Iraqi Freedom. This operation involved an airstrike to overthrow Saddam. It is interesting to note here that George Bush Senior asked several times in the planning stages of the Persian Gulf War if an airstrike would be sufficient, and Colin Powell, along with others, explained that just using air forces would not be enough strength to quickly and thoroughly eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Yet, in contrast to accepted military wisdom, the first offense in the 2003 Iraq war was solely an air affront. This move was to be indicative of the entire war, in which not enough force has been used to take complete control of the situation. After a second round of air strikes on Baghdad, ground troops finally came in the southern border of Iraq from Kuwait. At that point, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said on March 20 that "what will follow will not be a repeat of any other conflict. It will be of a force and a scope and a scale that has been beyond what we have seen before" (Brunner). Yet, the use of force was not overwhelming. It is true that the offense against Iraq was unlike any other conflict, but not in that it used an incredible amount of force.

Three days after declaring war, the Bush administration was warned by several former generals that there needed to be more troops in Iraq if we wanted to successfully seize and hold the area, but their comments fell on deaf ears (Tristam). Rumsfeld had to field feedback that said the US had still not deployed enough ground troops by March 30, 2003. And, after the fall of Baghdad on April 9, the US continued to fight the insurgency rather than withdraw. On May 1st, Bush declared "major combat operations in Iraq have ended" thus officially ending the war (Tristam). Yet, the fighting carried on and American lives continued to be lost. Situations kept arising that "required" us to stay and deal with Iraq's problems, the largest of which being the al-Qaeda resurgence in response to the US invasion. During the Persian Gulf War, opportunities also arose after the first 100 hours for further intervention into Iraq, but we chose to leave because of a clear goal. In 2003, the "war on terror" was so adaptable to any action that the resurgence was fought rather than troops withdrawn. Al-Qaeda established a group in the region and began to impose "Taliban-like repression on Iraqis" in the places where they had overtaken (Tristam). Operation Desert Scorpion was launched on June 15, 2003 and marked the continuation of fighting that persists to this day.

This lingering is a divergence from the last part of the Powell Doctrine: a clear exit strategy. Because we lack solid criteria for victory, there is no way to decide on an exit strategy, except to set arbitrary withdraw dates that correspond to no specific accomplishment in the region. The United States continues to play around with withdraw dates while adding to the laundry list of tasks to accomplish in Iraq, something that Colin Powell had always feared. Powell was heavily influenced by Fred Ikle's book *Every War Must End* wherein he writes that "fighting often continues long past the point where a 'rational' calculation would indicate that the war should be ended" (qtd in Powell 519).

It is hard to understand why the 2003 invasion of Iraq was not conducted according to the clear and previously successful guidelines of the Powell Doctrine. One possible explanation is the fact that we now receive news media in almost real-time, which makes it harder to keep military plans opaque to the American people and to the rest of the world. This was already beginning to be a problem in Kuwait, and Powell himself admits "in this new media
environment we had to learn how to make the people understand and support what we were doing” (Powell 530). This problem is exacerbated by the current rapid expansion of technology, where most households have more televisions than people and the use of the internet is widespread. Information no longer takes days or even weeks to be circulated. Instead, the American public, and those around the world, are able to almost instantaneously to see and hear what is going on in conflict zones and with those in power. This leads to a hard-sell as far as conflict goes, particularly with the war in Iraq and the ever-shifting reasons given for going to war. American skepticism made it hard for President Bush to commit an overwhelming amount of troops, since the war was not largely supported and because he could not hide behind lagging media response. The confidence of the American people was rattled with the discovery of faulty intelligence information regarding weapons of mass destruction and media coverage of the lies certainly hurt the case for intervening in Iraq (Fisher). The international community was also able to watch the actions of the US government leading up to the invasion of Iraq, and subsequent military actions, and was as skeptical as the American public. The disapproval of the international community added to the opinions the Bush administration had to combat in order to deploy forces to Iraq, thus leading to an inability on the part of George Bush to muster an overwhelming military force.

Potentially, Bush’s personality itself played a role in the continuing intervention in Iraq. Operation Desert Storm is generally regarded as a success, and George W. Bush may have wanted to leave the presidency with an equally successful military operation to his name. There certainly has been talk of Bush carrying on the family legacy, though to what extent Bush’s stubborn nature and ego played a role in the military strategy is hard to accurately estimate. Many Americans felt "his rationale for war was confused by poorly reasoned statements and claims of Iraqi programs that rested on nonexistent facts" which he used to continue the conflict rather than set criteria for victory and withdrawal (Fisher 391).

Furthermore, the phrase "war on terror" is so ambiguous as to cover a range of military actions. There is no way to concretely measure the defeat of terror, and thus it is easy to continue fighting small battles in Iraq under the guise of fighting "terror." This has lead to the lingering effect of military intervention, wherein it is easy to continually find one more thing to do before withdrawal, rather than set a concrete deadline on conflict. Analyst David Fisher feels "Bush never tired of repeating that a link existed between Iraq and al-Qaeda" (Fisher 390). George Bush and his advisors could have set the toppling of Bagdad and the removal of Saddam from power as the deadline, and would have been able to end the attack on Iraq after a couple of weeks. Instead, we decided to address the resurgence of terrorist operations in the region, set-up an interim government and attempt to construct a new political society in the country. These tasks are very large and relatively hard to evaluate, and so the United States has become enmeshed in a murky campaign to fix Iraq that continues to this day.

Finally, what is known is that Colin Powell left the position as Secretary of State after George W. Bush's first term in office, potentially in response to the administration's failure to adhere to Powell's personal military strategy. Many speculate that the decision was both a voluntary and involuntary decision. A Washington Post interview mused that "as secretary, he [Powell] was repeatedly outmaneuvered by the Pentagon and was never able to persuade
the administration to adopt that approach in Iraq, or to accept the State Department's plans for post-invasion occupation in Iraq." The article then went on to cite a government official who felt, ""the decision was made to keep Rumsfeld and drop Powell because if they would have kept Powell and let [the Rumsfeld team] go, that would have been tantamount to an acknowledgment of failure in Iraq and our policies there." Powell himself was privy to the decision making that lead to the strategy that was implemented in 2003 in stark contrast to Powell's traditional strategy. He may be able to further shed light on the reasons for this divergence, as his resignation shows his frustration with the Bush administration's unwillingness to use the Powell Doctrine the second time around, regardless of its previous efficacy. The strategy of the 2003 war in Iraq leaves us to question to what extent Colin Powell was coerced into representing a strategy that was against his better judgment due to the pro-war sentiments of the administration.

Bibliography


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*e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work* invites its readers' comments. Letters to the Editor regarding the content of any current issue can be sent to Gordon Babst gbabst@chapman.edu, placing "e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work - reader comments" in the subject line. Selected reader comments and student responses will appear in the subsequent issue.
The Powell Doctrine of Foreign Policy: International Development as Homeland Security

Katherine Blaisdell

Introduction

Despite mixed response by voters to the idea of sending tax dollars to other countries for any purpose, administrations since Franklin Roosevelt have used foreign aid as part of their economic and foreign policy. The Bush administration and the Department of State under Colin Powell's leadership were no exception, and even raised foreign aid levels. However, many (see, for example, Mertus, 2008) argue that the Bush administration's primary goal was creating a strategic power balance and stable world system, with alleviation of poverty and disease being just a side effect to be used for public relations advantages. In his most recent public writings (coauthored with former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and published in the Wall Street Journal), former Secretary of State Powell stated, "Our country's economic health and security are inextricably linked to the prosperity and security of the rest of the world" (2009). However, once this link is established, policymakers must assess how, and whether, foreign aid can contribute to that global prosperity and security.

Both the idea of humanitarian aid and that of strategic economic assistance have proponents and skeptics, and there is a narrow school of people who believe that foreign aid in any form is a faulty proposition. Powell is a strong proponent of both forms of foreign aid; in announcing a seminal new foreign aid program, the Millennium Challenge Account, he called the MCA "a challenge to America to use our great power for good, and a challenge to developing nations to empower their people to build a better future." This statement is perhaps the foreign aid counterpart to the Powell Doctrine of military force: intervention for humanitarian reasons with overwhelming force that betters the US security position. This paper will make an effort to lay out enough information to assess this foreign aid doctrine, and to come to a conclusion about the efficacy and responsibility of Secretary Powell's foreign aid policy.
Context: The Purposes of Foreign Aid

Since the speeches of Truman and Marshall announcing the Marshall plan after World War II and of Kennedy announcing the founding of both the Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Peace Corps (Baltimore, n.d.), U.S. policymakers have drawn on humanitarian sentiments to draw support for foreign aid. Humanitarian-based aid claims solidarity with the recipients, and calls on the generosity and fellow-feeling of the populace. This argument draws upon the moral convictions of those being convinced to support the project, suggesting that it is the ethical imperative of rich, democratic nations to give sustenance and civil rights to the struggling inhabitants of third-world countries. The idea is often also connected to American exceptionalism, contending that the U.S. has a particular duty to bring its wealth and worldview to others. Lancaster and Van Dusen (2005), foreign policy professors at Georgetown University, argue that this motivation is most apparent when the receiving nation-state is both poor and lacking in any ready strategic position. However, disaster assistance - which made up more than $380 million of US foreign aid budgets in the early 2000s (USAID, 2002) - also fits into this category of humanitarian aid, as it is neither long term strategic development assistance nor likely to be directly tied to security. Furthermore, humanitarian assistance can have the benefit of solidifying diplomatic ties, while, it is hoped, eliminating suffering.

On the other hand, international assistance can be a principally strategic part of foreign policy. Radelet (2003), a senior fellow at the Center for Global Policy, notes that, although USAID was created in part to ensure that political and security-based projects were kept distinct and well separated from humanitarian aid and development assistance, that line blurred as the agency was asked to provide more and more aid in post-conflict zones, until finally Congress gave the State department formal control of the agency during the Clinton administration. A 1994 Congressional Budget Office report, written about the same time, argued that foreign aid funding should be increased as a primary focus of security policy (Hanlon). This report provides a case for increasing the U.S. foreign aid budget from Cold War levels as a method of enhancing U.S. security. It lays out not only strategic arguments for foreign aid, but also ways to appropriate the money for that aid and how to allocate it, and assumes in analyzing the security benefits that other states will increase their input proportionately. However, the report also contends that foreign aid would accomplish some of the security goals of defense spending, going so far as to suggest that additional funds for foreign aid could be drawn from the Department of Defense budget.

Such a report is most useful in noting that foreign aid decisions are often made - even by a Democratic Congress under a Democratic administration - for geostrategic (and economic) reasons, and that there are clear arguments for increasing foreign aid as a way to improve the security position of the U.S. For example, the author of the CBO report suggests that increased foreign aid is a much cheaper way for the U.S. to maintain its position in the world than the alternatives: broad-scale humanitarian disaster and/or conflict. He argues that present action is preferable to possible permanent damage. He also makes the case that a less impoverished world populace would be more likely to respect the international systems that keep peace; stability helps to embed the rule of law as a
global norm. Radelet (2003) also points to the strategy of paralleling military power with 'soft power', sending the message that the US has the capability to operate at all levels in the world system.

There are also those commentators who argue that foreign aid is not effective policy in any case. These opinions range from World Bank analysts who contend that foreign aid moneys have been worse for developing countries than large oil reserves (Djankov, et al, 2005) to pundits who make it quite clear that foreign aid spending is wasteful, counterproductive, and even unconstitutional (Bonta, 2001). However, the most reasonable of these thinkers confine themselves to the contention that foreign aid has not worked well in particular cases thus far, and the more extreme ideologues (like Bonta) also tend to argue for such isolationism that foreign policy as a whole becomes moot, and so including them in a conversation about foreign policy decision making seems less than helpful.

Distinction: The History of U.S. Foreign Aid and What Made Powell’s Foreign Aid Policy Different

The first seeds of U.S. foreign aid were planted during the Great Depression, when Franklin Roosevelt created the Economic Stabilization Fund to provide loans to stabilize foreign currencies as a way of creating greater world economic stability and a more favorable trade position for the U.S. (Bonta 2001, 28). Following World War II, Truman implemented America’s best known foreign aid plan to ensure that post-war Europe would be a stable trading partner and diplomatic ally with the U.S. (Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005). Kennedy would follow that plan with the creation of USAID to consolidate foreign aid programs, and from that time through the 1970s, aid was directed mostly to poor countries in need of either stabilization after conflict or capitalist development as a Cold War strategy (Baltimore, n.d.). The decades that followed were a time of precipitous decline in foreign aid in the wake of corruption scandals, and most aid made available during the 1980s primarily encouraged trade with growing U.S. transnational corporations and came with restrictions such as the Gag Rule, prohibiting aid from going to institutions that provided abortions or abortion counseling (Baltimore, n.d.). The Clinton administration placed a greater ideological emphasis on foreign aid, but spent much of that effort moving aid around and removing Reagan’s restrictions.

The foreign aid policy of the Bush administration might have been on track to look similar to that of Reagan’s and G.H.W. Bush’s, but September 11 provided the impetus to change both the goals of foreign aid and the way it was administered (Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005). Both Lancaster and Van Dusen, in their analysis of the state of foreign aid (2005), and McArthur (a retired U.S. foreign service officer), in her report on President Bush’s FY2003 budget requests (2002), note that on the whole, foreign aid to Middle East states increased dramatically after 2001. The latter article observes that Secretary Powell made no mention of the foreign aid amounts in presenting the plan to Congress, but instead spoke more broadly of foreign policy, including coupling aid for allies with "smart sanctions" of less friendly states. The following table briefly shows the change in foreign assistance levels from Clinton administration levels (1999-2001) to Bush administration levels (2002-2007).
Figure 1 Summary of Assistance to All Countries in millions, historical $US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>7,419.8</td>
<td>5,907.2</td>
<td>6,451.1</td>
<td>8,419.1</td>
<td>10,125.6</td>
<td>11,207.5</td>
<td>10,052.3</td>
<td>9,610.2</td>
<td>11,940.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Agriculture</td>
<td>3,085.2</td>
<td>1,941.4</td>
<td>2,070.9</td>
<td>1,433.1</td>
<td>2,625.4</td>
<td>2,150.5</td>
<td>2,317.7</td>
<td>2,033.0</td>
<td>1,835.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>1,516.7</td>
<td>2,486.0</td>
<td>1,857.1</td>
<td>2,340.3</td>
<td>2,184.0</td>
<td>4,026.3</td>
<td>5,037.2</td>
<td>5,374.5</td>
<td>5,656.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Defense</td>
<td>649.9</td>
<td>685.2</td>
<td>711.7</td>
<td>612.1</td>
<td>2,365.0</td>
<td>5,187.9</td>
<td>5,972.0</td>
<td>4,567.3</td>
<td>2,312.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>416.8</td>
<td>1,132.5</td>
<td>2,215.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Economic</td>
<td>14,677.5</td>
<td>12,702.4</td>
<td>12,896.0</td>
<td>15,226.2</td>
<td>19,308.5</td>
<td>27,481.2</td>
<td>28,167.9</td>
<td>26,884.2</td>
<td>28,915.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
<td>3,913.8</td>
<td>4,876.4</td>
<td>3,941.8</td>
<td>4,797.1</td>
<td>6,661.6</td>
<td>6,145.6</td>
<td>7,330.7</td>
<td>12,260.3</td>
<td>13,024.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Adapted from US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook].

a State Department programs include the Global HIV/AIDS initiative and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Both programs fall under the "global gag rule," discussed below.

b Total Economic Assistance is defined by Greenbook, and includes both MCC moneys and such funding as Department of Defense and State Department programs.
The other region which received relatively high levels of aid during Powell's tenure as Secretary of State is Africa (Radelet, 2003). Smith (2004), a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, notes, however, a number of interesting juxtapositions with the administration's stated goals of humanitarian assistance, two items in particular. On the causative end of aid, she points out that the administration has raised aid levels and opened diplomatic channels mostly with states that have begun exporting oil to the US. On the effect end, she notes that the administration coupled this aid - ostensibly for the fight against HIV/AIDS - with a reinstatement of the rule precluding aid from passing through organizations that provide abortion counseling.

The core of Powell's foreign aid policy, however, was the brand new Millennium Challenge Account. Powell himself announced and commented on the MCA in a June, 2003, article in the *Washington Post*. In that piece, he explicates the humanitarian goal of ending poverty, while alluding to the security benefits for the US of such aid. He also notes that the $5 billion annual commitment (as yet unmet) would represent the largest increase in foreign aid since the implementation of the Marshall Plan under President Truman. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, the organization created to manage the MCA, proclaims on its website that it "is based on the principle that aid is most effective when it reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in people. MCC's mission is to reduce global poverty through the promotion of sustainable economic growth" (*Millennium Challenge Corporation, "About MCC").

The website also lays out the basic principles of the MCC's operations, the central point of which is that states must earn their aid by meeting certain qualifications. These indicators, shown in Figure 2, below are developed and measured by such organizations as the research arms of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and the UN's Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (*Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Indicators").

**Figure 2**

*Millennium Challenge Corporation Selection Indicators*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties</td>
<td>Ruling Justly</td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>Ruling Justly</td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>Ruling Justly</td>
<td>World Bank Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>Ruling Justly</td>
<td>World Bank Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Ruling Justly</td>
<td>World Bank Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption</td>
<td>Ruling Justly</td>
<td>World Bank Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immunization Rates</td>
<td>Investing in People</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Expenditure on Health</td>
<td>Investing in People</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls' Primary Education Completion Rate</td>
<td>Investing in People</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Expenditure on Primary Education</td>
<td>Investing in People</td>
<td>UNESCO and national sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Startup</td>
<td>Economic Freedom</td>
<td>IFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>Economic Freedom</td>
<td>IMF WEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Policy</td>
<td>Economic Freedom</td>
<td>Heritage Foundation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each country has a 'scorecard' for these indicators, with graphs showing their change over the last several years, available to the public on its website. What most distinguishes MCC from USAID, which manages most of the US's foreign aid, is that its aid agreements are tied to finite, development-based contracts. Whereas AID may administer security-related aid and may fund the same programs in a given country for years at a time depending on the foreign policy goal of the project, MCC runs like a business, making deals with states to receive aid for a specific period of time and assuming progress in certain benchmarks. Such a system allows for strategic development assistance while maintaining the appearance, and perhaps functions, of openness and clear investment planning, highlighting these features as the focal strategy of Powell's foreign aid policy.

Secretary Powell’s decisions on foreign policy are best described in his own words. As he was preparing to leave office, he wrote a piece published in Foreign Policy magazine in early 2005. In the article, he continues the sentiments expressed in his 2003 Washington Post commentary, this time from the perspective of outgoing Secretary of State. He draws upon the political capital of a freshly elected George W. Bush and former president Kennedy, and lays out a series of arguments and strategies for foreign aid, including incentives for political allies; free market democracy; and policies to combat illegal transnational migration, disease, and black markets. This article is more detailed and academic than some of the work published during his time in office, but equally supportive of the foundations of Bush administration strategic aid policies. Furthermore, it presumes that, like much of the information on the MCA, the alternative to the problem of aid with no conditions is to attach strings to each piece of aid.

Assessing Powell’s Foreign Aid Policy: The Case of The Millennium Challenge Account

Because the Millennium Challenge Account is the greatest change in foreign aid policy made under Secretary Powell, its programs make a functional case study for assessing that policy. The newness of the MCA means that there is still little literature published on the specific goals stated in implementing the policy, and the MCC website provides information that is detailed but self-affirming, emphasizing successes and highlighting data to support positive conclusions. However, an analysis can use a comparison between both the purposes of the MCA (as outlined by Secretary Powell) and the prospects for the MCC’s structure and its results (as analyzed by development and public policy scholars) with current economic development indicators.
There were three basic purposes outlined by Colin Powell for the MCA at its inception. First, the creation of the MCA would both improve and supplement the system of foreign development assistance by implementing an aid system based on the principles of the free market. The second goal is to create incentives - again emphasizing the free market system - for greater civil rights and liberties, effective governance, human development, and "economic freedom". The third is the achievement of development goals, including stable economies, health/disease alleviation, (limited) environmental protection, and poverty reduction (Powell, 2003). These purposes are broad, but perhaps achievable in the long term.

The first purpose, the bolstering of the US foreign aid system, seems the most achievable. In his Foreign Policy article, Powell (2005) described the new relationship between foreign aid agencies under his control as one of complimentary efforts, with "USAID pushing from one end and MCA pulling from the other." Whereas USAID has served, in the last two decades at least, as an agency serving the particular foreign policy goals of each administration, the MCC is structured to be independent and serve only development purposes, although its governing board is still chaired by the Secretary of State, and its Chief Executive Officer appointed by the President. Furthermore, USAID operates on an inherently political basis, doling out aid for emergency humanitarian or long term strategic purposes, but the MCA is designed to be a competitive process.

This feature would serve as an answer to critics of foreign aid policy (such as Radelet, 2003) who argue that it is too often corrupted from the outset by legislative earmarks and corrupted in its production by going through dictatorial or unstable governments. However, there seems to be no clear mechanism in place for preventing Congress from targeting their constituencies when budgeting for the MCA, rather than allowing countries' proposals to guide appropriation of funds. Radelet (2003) points out that allowing earmarks into the process to the extent that they are present in other foreign aid budgets would severely undermine both the legitimacy and the efficacy of the MCA. Furthermore, although the country selection process is designed to be open and based on performance indicators, there is room for choice to be made among nearly-equal countries.

The incentives system, the second purpose of the MCA, makes a great deal of sense from the perspective of free market economics. It creates a fairly basic trade for very poor states: accomplish certain things for your people and your economic system, and gain more money to put into your people and your economic system. As Powell points out, USAID is still available to "push" states which lack the financial wherewithal for even that simple tradeoff. The immense complexity of measuring countries' performance along the indicators makes determining who will gain the incentives challenging. Radelet (2003) points out the particular difficulty of determining what to do with states that meet the qualifications in time to sign compacts but then slip during the contracted term. There is room in the MCC's operations to adjust indicators, which will be helpful in keeping them relevant, but also opens the system up to potential biases or loss of rigor in the selection process.
Incentivizing those standards has had mixed results. The MCC’s status reports (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2009) show the total funding for the country and highlight bright spots in the results of agreements, but they give no details on the particular program budgets or the wider budgets of recipient governments. The result is that the fungibility of these funds is invisible and difficult to assess (Radelet, 2003), meaning that with aid input from the U.S., countries are able to shift their own moneys to unrelated and potentially corrupt purposes with no mechanism for redress by the MCC. Furthermore, basing an aid system on the free market system and incentivizing protections of a free market presume that this kind of capitalism is the most useful and beneficial to developing economies. However, Chua (2004), an international business law professor at Yale Law School, points out that exporting American-variety free market democracy in the way one might export silicone chips or debt packages can have dire consequences for the receiving country. While this is a minority opinion in the literature, it is a worthy criticism to note given that free market ideology is a central focus of the MCA.

Development goals, however, are the most obvious purpose for foreign assistance and of the MCA in particular, and also in some ways the easiest to measure. The first of these broad goals, as outlined by Powell (2005), is health, especially in terms of disease reduction. He spends particular time emphasizing the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which is notable in part because so much of his other foreign aid policy was directed at increasing aid to Africa, ostensibly to help with HIV/AIDS. The restriction known as the global gag rule, preventing aid of any kind from going through organizations that do any work related to abortion, reinstated by the latter President Bush, has been a countervailing force to much of the funds directed toward the AIDS pandemic. Ghana, which according the MCC became eligible for MCA funding and began receiving MCA funds in 2007, demonstrates this trend. The 2008 UNAIDS report indicates that Ghana, which according to the MCC increased health expenditures to meet MCC guidelines, has experienced a rise in AIDS prevalence since 2005. Lesotho, which just began receiving 'threshold' funds[2] at the end of 2008 according to the MCC, has experienced the same phenomenon.

Numbers on hunger, an indicator that demonstrates both poor health and poverty, are mixed. Madagascar is in its third year of compact implementation with the MCA, but according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2008), the prevalence of malnutrition in Madagascar has risen to 37%. Access to clean water, which is tied to both community development and the prevention of disease, is at only 65% in Benin, which has been receiving MCA compact funds since 2006. That means that one-third of the population of Benin has no improved water source, and MCA funds have been primarily focused on economic projects (MCC). Zambia, too, has been receiving threshold funds since 2006, but only 58% of its citizens have access to improved water sources, and its threshold program is focused on improving border management (MCC). Although these programs are all somewhat new, it is curious to note that moneys are going to programs that do not seem to be addressing their worst health problems.

Environmental protection, though less emphasized by development economists, is one of the features of progress noted by Powell. He particularly noted his work on forest conservation efforts in the 2005 article, for reasons of both environmental stewardship and human livelihood. However, only four countries of all those receiving aid
from the MCA did not engage in deforestation in the years leading up to that article[3]. However, the only related criterion for MCA assistance, "Resource Management," is an average of access to improved water and sanitation, child mortality, and proportion of protected eco-regions (SEDAC, 2009).

The final category, poverty alleviation, is the most difficult to quantify, because steady economic development takes time to demonstrate. Of note, however, is the fact that all of the MCC’s countries have experienced modest or significant per capita income increases over the last ten years (World Bank, 2009). In a few cases, for countries like Honduras and Tanzania that have been receiving MCA money for several years, this growth in income might be partly explained by MCA programs, which would point to success. However, very few of the chosen countries were not already on the rise when they began MCC threshold agreements or compacts. From one perspective, this information is a positive sign that the MCC chose countries where its programs were likely to be successful. From another, however, it seems that the MCC chose countries where its money would look like it was making a dramatic impact, either so that its global reputation would be solid or so that it could continue to garner funding increases from Congress.

As a whole, the Millennium Challenge Account is effective at what it has set out to do in the short term. As a set of particular policy goals in Secretary Powell’s overall policy doctrine, it is more or less functional: in terms of following a given set of criteria and encouraging free market democracy (a theme, if not an explicit goal, in Powell’s writings), the MCC does what it is supposed to do. Apart from stated goals and measurable development indicators, the success expected from the MCA is demonstrated by the fact that, as President Bush has left office, the new administration, which, in the range of mainstream foreign policy is the opposite of the Bush administration, has taken complete ownership of the MCA. As of early March, the front page of the MCC’s website read, "Achieving Obama’s pledge; advancing Clinton’s vision." Nowhere mentioned on the main pages are Secretary Powell or the Bush administration, who created the MCA.

Conclusions

Secretary Powell’s vision for foreign aid works well in the context of his world view. It embodies true compassionate conservatism, emphasizing the power the US has to make poorer countries over in its own likeness and maintaining a power structure in which the US continues to be able to use its military and financial might to end suffering. Like the Powell Doctrine for military force, this ideology has some clear strategic advantages, not least of which is its congruity with the sense that the US has both a sound moral vision for the world and the means to create that vision. However, there are some pragmatic difficulties with such a foreign policy, and foreign aid cannot hope to accomplish the goal of poverty elimination or universal health without support from other aspects of foreign policy.
One of the most striking ways in which foreign aid is insufficient to these problems is the way in which it must compete with the other economic policies of the US. Radelet (2003, p. 160) makes this point quite succinctly in his assessment of the MCA: "If the United States is serious about helping low-income nations establish a base for robust private-sector activities, sustained economic growth, and poverty reduction, it must rethink some of its other policies affecting these nations." Basically, the US bases its foreign aid policy around the idea of promoting development through open competition and free markets, but bases all of its other economic policies on maintaining a superior economic position in the world, and these forces are competing with each other, and not very freely at that.

For example, the US's own agricultural subsidies put it fairly low on its own assessment of economic freedom. Radelet makes note of a 2002 Oxfam report on cotton subsidies. It points out that Burkina Faso, Benin, and Mali all lose more than 1% of GDP annually due to US cotton subsidies. All three of those states are supported by the MCA; two are in the process of receiving and implementing compact funds, and the third has completed a threshold agreement and is now eligible for compact funds. However, the total assistance invested by the MCA is less, according to the Oxfam (2002) report than those countries lose annually due to cotton subsidies. That fact means that, if the US were to stop subsidizing its cotton farmers (none of which recipients are below the poverty line), it could stop sending money to West Africa entirely and those countries would still be better off. Foreign aid cannot function in the face of these kind of subsidies. The Secretary of State does not control domestic agriculture policy, and he or she does not even have total control of US foreign policy, but shaping foreign aid policy that is counteracted by other policy is a waste of time and energy, not to mention taxpayer dollars.

Trade agreements do fall, at least in part, under the purview of the Secretary of State, and they are also often deeply destructive to foreign economies. One example is the US-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), made between the US and six states in Central America. Writing on her experiences in Nicaragua, Wahlberg notes:

While agriculture contributes only 2% to the GDP of the US, it contributes 17% to the GDP of Central America on average, and in Nicaragua it represents 32%. Moreover 36% of the labor force in Central America is employed in agricultural activities, whereas the agricultural sector in the US employs only 2% of the labor force. Finally the US is Central America's most important trading partner, about 40-50% of Central American exports go to the US. Meanwhile, Central America accounts for only about 1% of total US trade.

An economist will say that trades do not occur when they do not benefit both parties, but such a vastly unequal relationship means that there is immense pressure for the small Central American signatories to accede to the preferences of the US, even if such a decision means that their long term interests are not benefited. The result is that, as with subsidies, foreign aid programs designed to promote free enterprise are hindered by trade
agreements that dampen them. In short, trade agreements provide another means by which well-crafted, well-intentioned foreign aid policy can be expected to fail.

All this might provoke the response that foreign aid should be abandoned entirely, and the resources used elsewhere. Once in San Francisco, during a discussion about the value of foreign aid, a conservative judge asked me, "Did Truman get us in too deep in foreign aid with the Marshall Plan? I mean, what do you say to the guy sleeping on the street down in the Tenderloin when he asks you for a dollar, and you say, 'Sorry, I already sent my dollar to Darfur'?" However, I think that, given Colin Powell's stance on Darfur and other conflicts, he would disagree with that conclusion as fiercely as I do. The problem, rather, is that foreign aid needs to be thought of and implemented as one aspect of a coherent foreign policy and not just a public relations expediency. Powell wrote in 2005, "Humanitarian assistance is a stop-gap measure." If foreign aid is done right, humanitarian assistance will never again be necessary except in the case of disaster.

**Bibliography**


Katherine Blaisdell


[1] The use of a discrete list of indicators developed and measured by third parties is an effort, according to the MCC, to make sure the selection process is transparent. However, the use of this particular set of indicators, emphasizing economic and political rather than human development, may confirm Mertus’ (2003) argument that human rights norms are still not deeply embedded in U.S. foreign policy.

[2] The MCC has two categories of agreements with recipient countries. Compacts, which are normally signed for three- to five-year terms, are for states that have qualified fully. Threshold grants are made to states in the process of making improvements to become eligible for compacts.

[3] The World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2007) lists net deforestation from 1990 to 2005. The only countries on the MCC’s Countries list showing a negative number, indicating a net increase in forested area, are Kyrgyz, Moldova, Morocco, and Rwanda.
The Powell Doctrine of Foreign Policy

[4] The Washington Post article discussing the announcement of Powell's resignation as Secretary of State suggests that this lack of ability to shape foreign policy in the face of far-right conservatives in the administration is one of the reasons he resigned. See Allen (2004).

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Colin Powell, Torture and Terror

Jonathan Cohen

This paper will address evidence linking the former Secretary of State, General Colin Powell, to the hotly-debated torture program of the George W. Bush (GWB) administration. The evidence in this paper suggests that the policies and practices of torture in the War on Terror were planned and authorized by General Powell and other senior officials in the GWB administration.

To be sure, the senior officials of the GWB administration uniformly reject allegations of torture. President Bush has repeatedly denied torture allegations, for instance, once claiming that "The United States does not torture. It's against our laws, and it's against our values. I have not authorized it - and I will not authorize it." However, these claims have been contradicted by recently published reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross and ABC News. Senior GWB administration officials authorized interrogation methods that a majority of Americans consider to constitute torture. General Powell and other senior GWB administration officials have used the term "enhanced interrogation techniques" to describe submersion in water to the point of drowning, sleep deprivation, forcibly-prolonged standing, slapping, and confinement in boxes among other techniques. They have also used the term "combined interrogation techniques" to described the use of several "enhanced" methods in combination. Ultimately, the debate on the torture program of the George W. Bush Administration, and General Powell's role therein, rests on questions of law.

The legal opinions at issue originate from the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel. The opinions were authored by attorney John Yoo, who is currently under investigation for professional misconduct and faulty legal reasoning. The torture program of the GWB administration was justified by at least two of Yoo's opinions on the methods that could be used in interrogations, both of which have been repudiated and withdrawn. The first memo in question was dated August 1, 2002, and it defined torture as "only extreme acts" causing pain similar in intensity to that caused by death or organ failure. The memo stated that for "alternative procedures" to be considered torture, and thus illegal, they would have to cause pain of the sort "that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body function will result." The second legal memo in question was dated March 14, 2003, and it defined such practices as acceptable "so long as military interrogators did not specifically intend to torture their captives." The legal justification for the torture program of the George W. Bush Administration is questionable, at best.
Evidence has recently surfaced to suggest that General Powell participated in high-level discussions of the George W. Bush administration torture program as a member of the National Security Council Principals Committee. This evidence surfaced in reports from ABC News in 2008 and 2009, and the reports indicate that General Powell attended hundreds of meetings during his term as Secretary of State between 2001 and 2005. The members of the committee included other high-level George W. Bush Administration officials such as Vice President Cheney, former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, General Powell and other officials authorized CIA torture sessions on high-value detainees that "pushed the limits of international law," as well as those authorized by the Justice Department.[7] These reports have been corroborated by other reports originating from the International Committee of the Red Cross.[8]

The ABC News reports on the NSC Principals Committee suggested that its members "not only discussed specific plans and specific interrogation methods, but approved them."[9] Senior GWB administration officials authorized "specific details of how high-value al Qaeda suspects would be interrogated by the Central Intelligence Agency."[10] An ABC News report characterized NSC Principals Committee discussions on "enhanced interrogation techniques" as "almost choreographed - down to the number of times CIA agents could use specific tactics."[11] Another report suggests that "CIA officers would demonstrate some of the tactics" to the members of the Principals Committee.[12] The Principals Committee was thus deeply involved in the authorization and implementation of the torture program.

The NSC Principals Committee was also involved with a global network of secret Central Intelligence Agency prisons. A 2009 report by the International Committee of the Red Cross exposed the specifics of this involvement. The Red Cross report detailed the stories of prisoners and details of "suffocation by water," "prolonged stress standing," "beating by use of a collar," "confinement in a box" and other methods.[13] The Red Cross report concluded: "The allegations of ill treatment of the detainees indicate that, in many cases, the ill treatment, either singly or in combination, constituted cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment."[14] In every case, General Powell and the other members of the NSC Principals Committee approved these "extremely specific" measures unanimously.[15]

General Powell was in present at the National Security Council Principals Committee when it authorized the "Golden Shield" for Central Intelligence Agency interrogators. The "Golden Shield" legal opinion from the attorney John Yoo in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department justified the most extreme methods used at the Central Intelligence Agency "black sites." The "Golden Shield" memo claimed that "certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to [constitute]... torture."[16] The Principals Committee unanimously approved the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" on high-value suspects. They also authorized "combined interrogation techniques" for recalcitrant suspects. Although the "Golden Shield" legal opinion that protected CIA interrogators was withdrawn, General Powell and the other members of the NSC Principals Committee continued to authorize torture. [17]
General Powell has commented through an aide that there were "hundreds of [Principals] meetings" but that he was "not at liberty to discuss private meetings."[18] And although General Powell has denied discussing torture with the other members of the NSC Principal's Committee, he has admitted to having participated in discussions about the "methods that could be used to extract information."[19] Otherwise, General Powell has repeatedly declined to comment on the ABC News reports on the interrogation program or private discussions in Principals Committee meetings. The evidence currently available suggests that General Powell, as a member of the NSA Principals Committee, has had a part in authorizing the most extreme interrogation methods used by Americans in the War on Terror.

While General Powell played an instrumental role in the development and authorization of the torture program of the George W. Bush administration, other evidence suggests that he may also have been a voice of dissent inside the administration. This understanding is informed by a classified memo leaked to the press that revealed a debate inside the GWB administration regarding the applicability of the Geneva Convention to suspected terrorists.

On January 25, 2002, General Powell reportedly "hit the roof" when he received a inaccurate and factually erroneous memo that White House counsel Alberto Gonzal es had written to President Bush. General Powell and other State Department officials were "horrified," according to Newsweek.[20] The Gonzales memo assumed a radical conception of presidential authority and was pointedly against the application of the Geneva Convention to detainees from Afghanistan. Gonzales argued in the memo that the United States did not need to apply the Geneva Convention to prisoners from Afghanistan because it was a "failed state" that was "not capable of fulfilling its international obligations."[21] It argued that the imperatives of the War on Terrorism "render obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning enemy prisoners."[22] Further, Gonzales argued that by applying the Geneva Convention to al Qaeda and the Taliban, the "U.S. will continue to be constrained" by its treaty obligations, military regulations, and international law.[23]

This resulted in an impassioned January 26 counter-memo that General Powell sent to the White House decried the legal reasoning and strategic implications of Gonzales' legal arguments. It took the form of a formal request to the GWB Administration asking that it reconsider its position on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to Afghanistan.[24] His request raised salient objections to the Gonzales memo and offered an improved briefing for President Bush on the applicability of the Geneva Convention to the conflict in Afghanistan. In the request, General Powell strongly urged Gonzales to "restructure the [Gonzales] memorandum" to "give the President a much clearer understanding of the options available to him and their consequences."[25] General Powell encouraged Gonzales to "make clear the President's choice[s]," commenting that the memo from White House counsel Alberto Gonzales "[did] not squarely present the President the options that are available to him."[26]

General Powell argued in the January 26 counter-memo that the Gonzales memo was "inaccurate or incomplete in several respects," citing "important factual errors."[27] He commented that the Gonzales recommendation was "contrary to the official U.S. government position" and that it might be construed as hypocritical to label
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Afghanistan a "failed state" given that "the United States and international community have consistently held
Afghanistan to its treaty obligations and identified it as a party to the Geneva Conventions."[28] General Powell
also argued that nature of conflict between the U.S. military and non-state actors does not "render obsolete" the
Geneva Convention because the "[Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War] was
intended to cover all types of armed conflict and did not by its terms limit its application."[29] Finally, General
Powell pointed out that it would be redundant to claim that the "U.S. will continue to be constrained" by its treaty
obligations and international law because the United States complies with "universally recognized standards."[30]
General Powell believed that the Gonzales legal arguments were misleading to President Bush and that they could
threaten American interests if discovered. The tone of General Powell's response imply that he believed that the
standards of the Geneva Conventions should be deemed inviolable, even if Afghanistan was a "failed state."
General Powell clarified two options for President Bush:

Option 1: the Geneva Convention on the treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) does not apply to the conflict on
"failed State" or some other grounds. Announce this position publicly. Treat all detainees consistent with the
principles of the GPW [Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners at War];

and

Option 2: Determine that the Geneva Convention does apply to the conflict in Afghanistan, but that members of al
Qaeda as a group and the Taliban individually or as a group are not entitled to Prisoner of War status under the
Convention. Announce this position publicly. Treat all detainees consistent with the principles of the GPW [Geneva
Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners at War].

The strongest evidence to contradict the assertion that General Powell supported the GWB administration torture
program is implicit in the two options he proposed for President Bush. General Powell pointedly included in both
options the imperative that the United States "treat all detainees consistent with the principles of the GPW
[Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners at War]."[31] Neither option allows for torture.
General Powell then elaborated upon the benefits and costs of each option in a detailed summary. While he
admitted that Option 1 provided "maximum flexibility," he pointed out that it would "reverse over a century of
U.S... support [for] the Geneva Convention," and "undermine the protections of the law of war for our troops."[32]
He clearly preferred Option 2. However, over the objections of General Powell, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other officials in the GWB Administration successfully persuaded President Bush to refuse
'Prisoner-of-War' status to Taliban and al Qaeda detainees from Afghanistan.[33]

The evidence currently available seems contradictory. On one hand, General Powell was an early voice of dissent in
the George W. Bush administration, authoring an impassioned counter-argument to the first of the "torture
memos" that he received from White House counsel Alberto Gonzales on January 25, 2002. On the other hand,
General Powell's voice of dissent afterwards faded into the chorus of the National Security Council Principals
Committee, which unanimously authorized torture in secret Central Intelligence Agency prisons across the world.
Efforts to understand General Powell's apparently shifting position on torture become further complicated by other evidence.

A 2004 report on the prison abuses at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison has connected General Powell to a questionable CIA practice associated with the internment of "ghost detainees" in foreign prisons.[34] The term "ghost detainee" was used by the George W. Bush Administration to describe persons in U.S. custody whose identity has been kept hidden by obfuscating their true names to keep their detention anonymous and secret. Many "ghost detainees" were proven to be innocent.[35] The Washington Post has reported that "ghost detainees were regularly locked in isolation cells on Tier 1A [of Abu Ghraib] and that they were kept from international human rights organizations." [36] U.S. Army Major General Antonio Taguba wrote in an official report that this practice was "deceptive, contrary to Army doctrine, and in violation of international law."[37]

This illegal practice was orchestrated by top U.S. military commanders and CIA agents. At least one of these orders came from the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez, who illegally ordered military guards to hide a prisoners from Red Cross inspectors and to remove his name from official rosters.[38] This cooperation between the Army and the CIA culminated in an arrangement between top military intelligence officials at the Abu Ghraib prison and the Central Intelligence Agency "to hide certain detainees at the facility without officially registering them" in violation of international law.[39] This established link between Central Intelligence Agency agents and top military officials raise questions about General Powell's involvement with the a search for three innocent "Ghost detainees" in the Abu Ghraib prison in 2003.

The evidence suggests that General Powell was aware of this illegal arrangement between the U.S. Army and the Central Intelligence Agency. General Powell, acting as Secretary of State, was involved in a search for three falsely-imprisoned Saudi medical personnel at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in 2003. It seems that CIA officers interned three Saudi medical personnel who had been working for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. The CIA officers placed them with false names in Abu Ghraib, preventing several attempts to locate them. A Saudi General, the commanding officer of the falsely imprisoned men, failed to locate them because their names were not in the official prisoner registry database. The US Embassy in Riyadh likewise failed to locate the prisoners. However, "shortly after the search for the Secretary of State [General Powell], a JIDC [Joint Interrogation and Detention Center] official recalled that CIA officers once brought three men together into the facility" and they were soon released.[40] A former aide to General Powell has also argued that the Central Intelligence Agency regularly held innocent detainees in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay "in hopes they could provide information for a mosaic of intelligence."[41]

From the evidence that can currently be brought to bear on this issue there emerges a picture of contentious debate on the issue of torture within the GWB administration. Reliable reports reveal an unexplained shift in General Powell's position on torture during his tenure as Secretary of State. This shift saw General Powell rejecting torture in an impassioned memo in January 2002 but later authorizing torture repeatedly as a member of the
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National Security Council. These reports also highlight connections between General Powell and the CIA torture program from its inception in Afghanistan, implementation in the global network of secret prisons administered by the Central Intelligence Agency, in Guantanamo Bay, and finally in the scandal at Abu Ghraib.

A caveat must be added to this discussion of evidence. There exists a possibility that the evidence used in this investigation was leaked to the press by General Powell himself. This would not be unprecedented. Some have suggested that General Powell used his public popularity to advance his own agenda in the news.[42] New York Times columnist William Saffire has noted that General Powell "doesn't zip his lip as well as a team player does when he loses."[43] Additionally, a New York Times editorial remarked that "everyone in Washington" assumed that General Powell was Bob Woodward's key source for *Bush's War.*[44] In another example, three days after he "hit the roof" after reading the January 25, 2002 memo from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the Gonzales memo was leaked to the Washington Post. It is impossible to be sure if the evidence currently available informs an accurate understanding of General Powell’s role in the torture program of the GWB administration.

It remains unclear what his motivations and aims were—if he believed that using torture in the War on Terror would promote American interests or if he was striving to bring moderation to the GWB administration. Crucial evidence remains classified.

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[14] Ibid.


[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

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Ibid.


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[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

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Are Approval Ratings an Accurate Reflection of Success? Effects of Media Coverage on Public Opinion of Colin Powell

Michaela Dalton

This paper will focus on issue salience, priming, and bias in order to determine the extent of the impact of media on those who are exposed to them, particularly in relation to coverage of former Secretary of State Colin Powell. Many studies explain these occurrences in relation to the presiding president, but little has been done in the way of observing the approval of the cabinet members. We would expect that in low-information environments, approval ratings are relatively constant and track the president; however, trends in Powell's rating do not support this idea. His ratings fluctuate and are independent of President George W. Bush's. To address this issue, the present study looks into the media coverage of former secretary of state Powell, using specific examples of tactics, tones, themes, and other variables present in the news. In doing so, it attempts to identify the specific characteristics of Powell's coverage, in general and in relation to Bush, that cause the interesting variations in public opinion polls.

It is important to understand how the news media influence citizens and what methods they use to do so. There are three functions of the mass media, the first of which is surveillance (Leighley 2004). This means that the media are responsible for placing issues on the public agenda and are crucial for political success as they provide publicity and policy information. In presenting these certain issues, they also help to interpret events by putting them into context. Through this function of interpretation, the media help to shape opinion on certain issues. The third function is socialization, which teaches basic values and support for democracy; this is important because young people acquire most of their information from the mass media, and are thus influenced by it as they develop their own beliefs (Leighley 2004). So the effects of the media can impact the behavior of voters. Research has identified such examples as the "CNN effect," through which the media are able to stir up public opinion with extensive news coverage and dramatic pictures. In recognizing the potentiality of the media's sway, there should be concern about the possible negative results of their influence, such as bias.

Bias is defined as "the opposite of accuracy, balance, and fairness" (Simon, Fico & Lacy 1989; Streckfuss 1990). Accuracy refers to observing only the facts of the matter, while balance is achieved by giving equal amounts of coverage to all parties and fairness results when all perspectives are presented with no one being more favorable than others (Simon, Fico & Lacy 1989; Streckfuss 1990). Fears of bias are not unfounded because opinions on political matters are widely divergent, and so political news bias can have a large impact due to its intent, relevance, and influence (D'Alessio & Allen 2000). According to a 2002 study by the Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press, 47% of participants believed the news media to be politically biased in their reporting, while only 35% disagreed. Although this large percentage suggests that the media is biased in one direction or another, whether the research supports this claim is questionable.

On the one hand, journalists, as a whole, tend to identify themselves as liberal (D'Alessio & Allen 2000; Lee 2005), so it appears it would follow that stories are chosen and candidates are covered according to the political beliefs of reporters and editors (Levite 1996). These claims were made by many political figures such as Vice Presidents Spiro Agnew and Dan Quayle, as well as by presidential candidate Bob Dole (D'Alessio & Allen 2000). However, despite numerous studies, a clear link between reporters' political views and news coverage is yet to be discovered (Black, Steele & Barney 1999; Dennis 1997). This does not necessarily mean that the media is conservatively biased as many others have claimed. Media critic Michael Parenti (1996) identifies the functions of the news media as increasing profit for owners and investors, and promoting corporate economic dominance. For Parenti (1996) and other media observers like Alterman (2003), conservative voices dominate those of the liberal journalists, and any coverage that does not unanimously support this agenda is viewed as evidence of a liberal bias. Claims that the media is conservatively biased, however, are also rejected by research findings that news content does not reflect any significant or consistent partisan or issue favoritism (Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt 1998; Dennis 1997).

Despite findings that no ideological bias dominates the news media, the issue of media effects is still relevant because issues like salience and priming come into play. In essence, salience is "the extent to which a stimulus, or referent object in the surrounding situation, stands out from other stimuli, or from other aspects of the situation" (Augoustinos and Walker 1995). Spiro Kiousis (2004) asserts that salience can be internally or externally evident; the former refers to the internal qualities of the object while the latter refers to the external importance placed on it in relation to other issues. He argues that salience seems to be governed by both internal and external characteristics and presents the three dimensions of salience as attention, prominence, and valence. The most common is attention, which is externally grounded and entails media awareness of an object by sheer volume of stories and coverage. Prominence, also externally grounded, refers to the positioning of a story-placement, size, other aesthetic devices-within a media text to convey its importance (Kiousis 2004). The last dimension Kiousis (2004) addresses is valence, which is internally grounded in that it does not emphasis objects (issues, candidates, etc.), but those objects' attributes (description, qualities, etc.).

Understanding salience is important because research shows that the media can influence the importance people ascribe to issues. By giving prominence to certain issues, the news media subtly shape opinion about what is the most important issue facing the country or community (Iyengar & Kinder 1987). Danny Hayes (2008) argues that salience is actually extremely important because people are highly resistant to persuasion and it is difficult to change their minds. With relatively well-established views, people interpret information in a way that is consistent with their beliefs and they ignore messages that conflict with them. Therefore, it is much easier to make certain issues more salient to viewers and readers (Hayes 2008). Because people experience little direct interaction with the political world, their perceptions of issue relevance are highly malleable (e.g. Iyengar and Kinder 1987; McCombs and Shaw 1972). When it comes time to make a decision, like voting, they rely on their memory to
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provide relevant considerations (Kelley and Miler 1974) because they cannot take a consensus of all the information they have on the subject (Simon 1955). The most accessible information are often the issues or candidate characteristics that receive news attention (Zaller and Feldman 1992).

Along with this is the idea of priming, the activation of knowledge stored in long-term memory following exposure to a stimulus (Althaus & Kim 2006) that influences what issues citizens consider when making political assessments and decisions (Kelleher & Wolak 2006). Research shows that increasing a construct's accessibility alone does not necessarily produce knowledge activation; it is one of two factors, the second of which is the construct's applicability to the relevant task (Higgins 1996). Those issues that receive more coverage and are considered most important carry more weight than other issues—they are more accessible, less likely to change, and better understood than other issues (Krosnick 1990; Kelleher & Wolak 2006). Because priming alters the criteria used to evaluate political issues, events, and leaders, it has tremendous influence on election outcomes, public support, and approval ratings.

Most important of the three to this paper is approval ratings. A study by Pan and Kosicki (1997) observed priming effects in relation to approval ratings of George H.W. Bush from 1990 to 1992, during which media coverage of the president focused on one of two things: the Gulf War issue, which contributed positively to his performance ratings, and the economy, which contributed negatively. The study shows that as each issue dominates the coverage, positive approval ratings coincide with more positive issue coverage and negative approval ratings coincide with more negative issue coverage. Pan and Kosicki (1997) argue that "this clearly recognizable positive or negative underpinning concerning Bush...might be the underlying force that moved people toward either a positive or negative direction in their evaluations of Bush." Therefore, increase in issue salience and valence are subject to priming and may be two factors in forming evaluations (Pan & Kosicki 1997).

It is a well-established idea that priming does affect approval ratings. Thus, Kelleher and Wolak (2006) set out to determine which components of presidential evaluation are most vulnerable to priming effects. To do so, they identify two components—economic evaluations and character assessments—that are considered "easy" issues because even less politically involved citizens rely on them to evaluate the president; and two "hard" issues—domestic policy preferences and foreign policy assessments—that are less familiar and less likely to be primed. Findings show that economic health and presidential character are easy for all people to consider in their judgments; matters of domestic and foreign policy, however, are much more difficult. Policy issues are usually much more specific, and it may be challenging to draw implications (Kelleher & Wolak 2006). Identifying the economy as good or bad is much more straightforward than doing the same for hard issues such as policies, education reform, and foreign affairs decisions. It has been shown that positive evaluations of domestic and foreign policy performance translate to higher presidential approval, and policy assessments are less likely to be primed in evaluations (Goidel, Shields, & Peffley, 1997; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). Therefore, the specific category of issues addressed may affect how people perceive politicians.
Studying media effects on approval ratings is important and relevant. American presidents depend on public opinion to win support for their legislative and international initiatives, which are therefore important resources in attaining power and influencing Washington (Burden & Mughan 2003). On a gubernatorial level, approval has been shown to affect elections and help gain more support from the legislature (Cohen & King 2004). Because favorability ratings can have a large impact, there is a great need for further research on the topic, especially in areas that are lacking enough information, such as the effects of priming on evaluations of people other than the president. The present study regarding Colin Powell will be a start to explaining the connection between approval and media among the president's cabinet members.

Data and Methods

Most studies that observe media or priming effects choose candidates or presidents as case studies. To demonstrate application of the present theories, this paper will focus on neither candidate nor president, but on former secretary of state Colin Powell. Because Secretary of State is the first cabinet member in both the line of succession and order of precedence, it is arguably one of the most important of the secretaries. Colin Powell, specifically, was identified by a 2001 PEW survey to be the most visible Bush appointee, and so it makes sense to track his coverage, because it will be followed more than most, if not all, of the former Bush cabinet members. In order to observe the effects of priming on approval ratings, I collected approval ratings of the past secretary of state and former president George W. Bush during months where ratings are available for both, as well as New York Times newspaper articles covering Powell's performance while in office from 2001-2005. The New York Times Company owns an additional eighteen newspapers, a radio station, and over fifty websites. As the national newspaper of record, its viewership is large, and most people will get information either directly from the newspaper or indirectly from another news source that gets its content from the New York Times. All articles that were published in months when ratings are available and contain "Colin Powell" were reviewed and coded based on, among other variables, characteristics and issues discussed, techniques used, and overall tone. In the analysis, news coverage that did not substantially address the topic at hand was not included in the data set.[1] Content analysis on relevant articles was performed and grouped according to month so that trends in newspaper articles could be compared to trends in monthly favorability polls. The overall goal of this process is to observe the effects that media have on the way citizens view politicians; in other words, how priming influences public opinion and approval ratings.

By choosing Powell specifically, I am able to address a key variable that needs further research, and that is the role of association with the presiding president. Poll data was converted into graphs to show the progressions of approval over time not only for former secretary of state Powell but also for former president George W. Bush. As a result, conclusions can be drawn regarding the impact that Bush's approval had on Powell's approval, and the hybrid effect of both media and political association on favorability.
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Hypothesis

Priming has been shown to have significant impacts on approval ratings (Pan and Kosicki 1997). While media play a crucial role in this, there are other variables to be considered. I propose that favorability shifts not only according to media coverage of the politician in question, but also those with whom he or she interacts and is associated. Therefore, Colin Powell's approval ratings will fluctuate as issue salience varies and as Bush receives more positive or negative coverage. Certain aspects of Powell's personal life and career, as well as his relationship with Bush, will be accessible, and because priming alters criteria used to evaluate political situations (Kelleher & Wolak 2006), they will alter public opinion in various ways. Regarding media coverage of Powell and his relationship with Bush, along with monthly favorability rating polls, I have developed five hypotheses:

H1 The media will exert a temporal bias in their coverage of Powell's years as secretary of state; during the middle months, he will be passed over much more so than at the beginning and end.

H2 News articles that specifically distinguish between Powell and Bush or other Republicans will have more positive tones.

H3 Colin Powell and George W. Bush will be clearly separated when it comes to situations of aggression and force.

H4 Powell will have the most favorable ratings when news does not associate the two.

H5 Low approval ratings will coincide with negative media coverage.

Except for when major events happen, there is little coverage of cabinet members during their term. I hypothesize that in this study, it is in the beginning and end periods that coverage of Powell will increase in both quantity and quality.

The unfavorableness of the Bush administration is mirrored in public opinion ratings for many government officials such as Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney. Whether articles address these previous cabinet members or the former president, the specific stressing of a separation with Powell will lead to more positive tones for Powell.

Bush is criticized as being aggressive and forceful in military and international affairs (Pape 2005). Powell, however, is much more moderate in his political views and has executive and military experience that makes him more deliberate. Therefore, articles in which Powell is portrayed as moderate in the use of force and aggression will specifically draw a distinction between the former president and secretary of state.

Former president Bush is fairly unpopular; his favorability, during the months of focus, averages 62.6% as opposed to Powell's 78%, and so associations with him would be negative for Powell. I hypothesize that Powell's approval will go up when news deliberately distinguishes him from Bush.

When it comes time to make a decision, the most accessible information are usually issues and characteristics that receive the most media attention (Zaller and Feldman 1992). If coverage of Powell is predominantly negative, then
people will most likely remember these negative qualities in making their evaluations. Therefore, I hypothesize that overall negative public opinion regarding Colin Powell will result when news addresses Powell in a negative tone and also discusses his faults and failures.

Results

The mere amount of news articles in major US publications reflects the claim made by Hypothesis 1 in that the beginning and end months-minus September of 2001 after the attacks on the World Trade Center Towers in New York City -coincide with larger numbers of articles. Running any number of crosstabs with this data can help to test this hypothesis because it notes the prevalence of coverage at the beginning and end of Powell's career under the Bush administration. This seems to be the case with many of his characteristics. Integrity or honesty is only addressed in the first two and last two months ($r=.38$, $p<.01$); likewise, the variable labeled "not being forceful enough" is present in the first three and last two months ($r=.22$, $p<.05$).

Figure 1

Other instances of this occur in an article's drawing comparison of the present to the past. Throughout the first year of Powell's term, references were made to the past, especially in the context of his service in the Persian Gulf War and under the first Bush administration as seen in a number of New York Times articles, such as "Powell's Complex Record" (Rubin 23) and "The Bush All-Stars" (Editorial 18). The last year or so-seen in February and November of 2004 article data-also witnessed these references to the past, except in these cases, they looked back
on Powell's service under first administration of George W. Bush, from which he was resigning. Regardless, it is important to note that various variables show the same pattern.

In order to determine which tones applicable to Hypothesis 2 were present in these articles, I ran a crosstab between positive tone toward Powell and "separate from Bush." The data showed that when Powell was specifically differentiated from Bush and his other close cabinet members, more articles had positive tones toward Powell and negative tones toward former president Bush (Figure 2, 3).

**Figure 2**

<table>
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<th>powell.positive</th>
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<tr>
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**Figure 3**

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>% within</td>
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<tr>
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More specifically, 36.7% were positive toward Powell under this condition, as opposed to 30.9% of all articles. Similarly, 46.7% of these articles expressed a negative tone toward Bush, while his overall negative tone was 22.7%. This gap is even larger, and so it seems that there must be significance to the large differences in both.

In order to determine if Hypothesis 3 is correct in asserting that Bush and Powell will be separated regarding aggression, I ran a crosstab between month and "separate from Bush and other Republicans," including "not aggressive enough" as a layer. Although I can make no significant conclusions about monthly occurrences, data shows that 61.1% of articles that suggest Powell is not pressing or forceful enough separate him from Bush (r=.34, p<.01).
This occurrence is especially common in November of 2004, just after Powell announced his resignation. In "Colin Powell's Redeeming Failures" (Isaacson 27), there is discussion of disappointment by Bush loyalists in Powell’s lack of support for the Bush strategies that led to occupation of Iraq, and his role in the Bush administration is described as a "push for a little bit more realism." Powell is noted to be a counterweight to Donald Rumsfeld's drive to win (Safire 29) and the "voice of reason in foreign policy" (Kristof 29). Most of these comments are positive, which can explain Powell's high ratings. Of the articles that address these two variables, 44.4% have an overall negative tone toward Bush. A favorability poll taken just after he announced his resignation determined his rating to be 87%, which is just short of his post-9/11 high. Therefore, although many might consider "not pressing enough" to be a negative quality, newspaper articles reveal that it was actually a positive variable because it was used to contrast with Bush.

Articles that separate Powell from Bush were the starting point for determining how dissociation with Bush affects approval (Hypothesis 4). The months with the highest percentage of this occurrence are August 2003, October 2003, December 2003, and November 2004. However, favorability ratings taken at these times range from 70 to 74, which is not particularly high compared to Powell’s usual ratings (Figure 5).
But once again, data analysis for November 2004 goes against the norm; 64% of these articles separate Powell from Bush, and Powell has an all time high rating of 88%. Because it is only evident in this month, Hypothesis 4 is not supported.

A crosstab between month and overall negative tone toward Powell was performed to test Hypothesis 5. Presence of negative tones is much more common during the months that offer lower favorability ratings (p<.1), which fall between August of 2003 and February of 2004 of this data set (Figure 6).

**Figure 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month * powell.negative Crosstabulation</th>
<th>powell.negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month January 2001</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within powell.negative</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2001</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within powell.negative</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2001</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within powell.negative</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within powell.negative</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2003</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within powell.negative</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2003</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within powell.negative</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2003</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within powell.negative</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2003</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within powell.negative</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2004</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within powell.negative</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2004</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within powell.negative</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A second crosstab with "failed duties"-which includes lack of success, disappointment in performance, and overall tones of regret-yielded interesting findings (r=.42, p<.01).

Over the course of Powell's first three years as secretary of state, no New York Times articles indicated that the secretary of state had somehow failed in his responsibilities. However, there is a gradual increase in themes of failure in late 2003; 12.5% of articles in October 2003, 25% in December 2003, 33.3% in February 2004, and 32% in...
November 2004. Through October and December, there is a definite drop in Powell's respective ratings of 70% and 74%, which were at 81% in April of 2003 (Pew). Additionally, just as his rating was lowest in February 2004 (65%), the percentage of failed duty incidents was 33.3 and that of negative tone incidents was 44.4, both of which are the highest of all other months (Figure 7).

![Bar Chart](image)

**Figure 7**

The only thing that cannot be explained by this is the fact that in November 2004, 32% of articles addressed Powell's failure, but his favorability ratings were at 87%, one of the highest they had ever been. This gap can be explained by the content and timing of the news articles, which are written during the month that Powell resigns. The fact that they were written at this time makes them the exception to the rule because of such special circumstances. Most articles that refer to his failure do so in a reminiscence of his time as secretary of state, and so it makes sense that the scope of Powell's performance reached both success and failure. For example, "Imagining How Powell Might Still Have a Job" (Purdum 4) denotes disappointment that Powell missed out on succeeding Clinton, and "Powell at the Exit: A Debate Over His Legacy" (Vinson 28) claims that he has been one of the lease effective modern secretaries of state. Aside from this exception, overall negative tones and suggestions of failure have a significant impact on favorability ratings.

**Discussion**

By using content analysis of *New York Times* articles that address Colin Powell, many connections were made between certain tactics and overall tones or favorability ratings. First, it is clear that a temporal bias exists in the coverage because the number of articles and number of specific details within those articles are higher at the beginning and end of Powell's time in office. This suggests, in accordance with priming research, that approval
ratings will most likely be higher or lower than normal at these times, depending on whether coverage is positive or negative.

Simply separating Powell from Bush in coverage does not have a consistent effect on approval. Instead, it is when this separation is taken into consideration with other factors that conclusions can be drawn. For example, November 2004 ratings are among the highest for Powell, and there are many instances in which journalists draw a distinction between Bush and Powell. Because these results do not match up with the other months, it seems that another variable is at work. November's articles predominantly, in separating the two, yield negative tones toward Bush, and so it makes sense that in this case favorability would be higher. Another example is demonstrated through observations of tone. When an article specifically cites a distinction between the two, overall positive tones toward Powell increase and overall negative tones toward Bush increase. Therefore, most articles that separate the two tend to speak more highly and offer a positive image of Powell, while looking down on Bush.

Separation between the two also has a strong relationship with aggression and force. When Powell is described as lacking force or not utilizing pressure in his foreign affairs, news clearly alludes to a separation from former president Bush. Given the previous finding, this suggests that when news mentions Powell as lacking aggression, it is not negative, but instead positive because articles that distinguish between them are more likely to favor Powell.

These observations defined the two biggest predictors of lower ratings for Powell to be mention of failed duties and negative tones. The months in which he is least favorable coincide with the months that most often address these issues. This shows a distinct pattern and suggests that negative media coverage, due to the effects of salience and priming, can have a significant impact on approval ratings.

Powell's public opinion ratings cannot be explained as a matter of whether he receives coverage and whether he is associated with Bush, but in relation to coverage of specific issues. In other words, attention and prominence—the two externally grounded dimensions of salience—are not present, but the internally grounded valence is. Patterns in the news show that issues are selectively made salient by the media. As demonstrated in this study of Powell, certain variables influence tones, which impact approval ratings. As a result of priming, individuals specifically recall what stands out in coverage when making evaluations. Though Powell's ratings were not directly affected by the amount of coverage he received—both alone and in comparison with Bush—, they were influenced by Bush's presence within the specific variables that received focus (e.g. separation from Bush, situations of aggression and force, etc.). Overall findings show that Bush, through these variables, was oftentimes used as a contrast to Powell in order to highlight Powell's success and competency. Therefore, the way the president is addressed in relation to the cabinet members is extremely important in predicting their favorability ratings. Given this information, it would be interesting for future studies to investigate in what way public opinion and approval impacted foreign policy making.
Bibliography


Are Approval Ratings an Accurate Reflection of Success?


Michaela Dalton


[1] 19 of January 2001’s 32 articles were excluded; 6 of July 2001’s 15 articles were excluded; 4 of September 2001’s 18 articles were excluded; 5 of December 2002’s 16 articles were excluded; 10 of April 2003’s 23 articles were excluded; 2 of August 2003’s 6 articles were excluded; 4 of October 2003’s 12 articles were excluded; 4 of December 2003’s 8 articles were excluded; 6 of February 2004’s 15 articles were excluded; and 7 of November 2004’s 32 articles were excluded.

The total number of articles included in this data set is 110; 67 total were excluded.
About the Contributors

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