"Compromise Becomes the First Casualty": The Effects of the Expanding Role of the National Security Council and Mitigating the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1970

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The Nixon Administration vastly changed the nature of foreign policy-making within the U.S. bureaucratic offices. This change was especially evident in the process of shuttle diplomacy during the time, especially within the realm of moderating peace in the Middle East. The Nixon Administration never executed the terms of their initial Arab-Israeli peace plan, called the Rogers Plan, which Secretary of State William Rogers formulated and negotiated in 1969, and the administration ultimately reformulated the plan into a cease-fire agreement after an increase of Israeli military aggression in 1970. Within the Nixon Administration, the mitigation of the Arab-Israeli conflict became complicated due to the competitive relations between foreign policy-making executive bureaucracies. The expanding authority of National Security Advisor (NSA) Henry Kissinger and his role of authority as the head of the National Security Council (NSC) within the U.S. federal government complicated the Nixon Administration’s efforts to implement the Rogers Plan and alleviate the crisis between Arabs and Israelis due to the implications of the tensions and policy dysfunction created by bureaucratic politics within the Nixon Administration.

Previous scholars have adopted differing approaches in their research of the Rogers Plan. Some have focused on the role that the politics within the executive branch of the U.S. government, while others examined issues relating to global politics, especially in relation to the environment of détente between the American and the Soviet governments and issues of diplomacy within the Cold War era. According to Craig Daigle, in his work *The Limits of Detente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973*, the failure of Rogers to implement peace in the Middle East was a result of tensions caused by the U.S.’s desire to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union. Daigle framed the Rogers Plan within the rational choice context as well as an analysis of Cold War ideology, and analyzed the plan as a competition over national interests between the United States and the Soviet Union. He stated that the Nixon Administration’s presentation of the Rogers Plan was not meant to truly implement peace in the Middle East, but was intended as a barometer for Soviet objectives in the region. The plan concurrently served as a means to free the U.S. of the effort of more fruitless negotiations with the U.S.S.R., while maintaining the legitimacy of American interests in the region. Nevertheless, these policies aimed primarily toward obtaining superiority of U.S. political power over the Soviet Union, thus, those negotiating did not consider the interests of the states impacted by the plan. Due to this, Middle Eastern nations did find the conditions of the plan favorable and in turn, did not implement these policies. Golda Meir, the prime minister of Israel, did not approve of the Rogers Plan, and claimed that a “psychological change” must be made in the regimes of other Arab nations, such as Egypt, before peace plans could be made. On the other hand, Arab nations considered the Rogers Plan too pro-Israel, and the Egyptian government and Palestinian groups claimed that allowing Israel to maintain even partial control over Jerusalem could be deemed a pacification of expansionism. Therefore, the obsession of the foreign policy-makers in the United States on maintaining peace with the Soviets created additional tension within the Middle East and lead to a lack of success in their stated goals. Daigle also dismissed the idea that conflict between Kissinger and Rogers caused dysfunction in policy-making in the Middle East, but he did cite documental
evidence that indicates that the stance of the National Security Council differed from the State Department, which caused the NSC to create policy that drifted away from the goals of stated in the Rogers Plan.\textsuperscript{4}

Salim Yaqub, on the other hand, made the argument in “The Weight of Conquest: Henry Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Conflict” that Henry Kissinger’s pro-Israel stance combined with the president’s preference for the opinions of his National Security Advisor largely influenced the Nixon Administration’s policy in the Middle East. Yaqub applied the perspective of personality politics to the lack of application of the Rogers Plan, where he attributed the failure of the peace plan to Nixon’s growing reliance on Kissinger’s advisement. Despite Kissinger’s lack of authority or control in Middle Eastern matters in 1969, Kissinger openly shared his opinions on the Arab-Israeli conflict with Nixon. According to Yaqub, Kissinger, influenced by his experience as a Jew, favored the Israeli side of the conflict and persuaded Nixon into taking a more pro-Israel stance.\textsuperscript{5} Much of this argument relies on the influence of Kissinger’s personal advisement, and Yaqub draws upon the example of when Rogers reported to Nixon in 1970 that Egypt was willing to accept the Rogers Plan’s compromise if Israel could be persuaded to implement their end of the deal. Nonetheless, Nixon still favored Kissinger’s opinion that the U.S. would not pressure Israel into accepting an agreement that might cause the nation to become embittered toward the state.\textsuperscript{6}

Other scholars blamed the Nixon Administration’s failure to create an effective peace plan on other external forces. William Quandt, a member of the NSC during this time, claimed in his book Decades of Decisions that the failure of the first overarching peace plan came from the utilization of negotiations by the Soviet Union and the U.S. to create a peace plan. The concept of “linkage,” or the diplomatic framework where certain nations act as representatives for other nations at a negotiating table as a lawyer might represent their “clients”, was essential to the legitimacy of the talks between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. According to Quandt, these nations upheld different agendas than their respective nations and, therefore, did not formulate an agreement that best fit their “client” nations.\textsuperscript{7} After the represented nations reacted in accordance to this unpopular peace plan, the U.S. then readjusted their diplomatic initiatives in order to take on more modest approaches. This was followed by a shift in executive power away from State Department officials who focused on regional issues, as those opinions dominated during the formation of the faulty initial plan.\textsuperscript{8} In Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Crisis, Charles Smith also faulted the Nixon Administration’s inability to draft and execute a significant Arab-Israeli peace plan on Israel’s drastic reactions against the first Rogers Plan, a more drastic and ambitious plan than the later cease-fire agreement. The initial plan garnered such striking public reactions from Israeli politicians and Prime Minister Golda Meir, leading to Israel’s decision to increase their air strikes on Egypt rather than an advent of peace. On top of this, Kissinger’s “globalist” vision focused on Cold War issues rather than Rogers’ “regionalist” perspective that focused on Middle Eastern issues, which lead to the creation of a modest cease-fire instead of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace plan.\textsuperscript{9} Unlike previous research, this paper will investigate the role that Kissinger’s increasing influence as the NSA within foreign policy-making bureaucracies complicated the execution of the State Department policy known as the Rogers Plan.\textsuperscript{10}

Nixon’s early goals for his administration focused on the re-distribution of power within his cabinet, specifically within the foreign policy-related members. A main factor of this power distribution was his delegation of multiple tasks and responsibilities to the National Security Council, which would have traditionally been delegated to the State Department.\textsuperscript{11} With this transition of power and responsibility came an increased reliance upon the leadership of the NSA. This contrasted the typical mode of upper-level executive decision-making of previous presidents who relied heavily upon their Secretaries of State, even among those presidents who served in office after the National Security Act created the NSC in 1947. This shift in power among these federal bureaucracies came, in part, due to the types of people Nixon appointed to these perspective positions, which in turn shaped what functions differing departments took within the course of his administration. A New York Times article from
January 1, 1969 examined the possible implications of the choice of appointees to foreign policy positions. The article focused on the role of the State Department in Nixon’s upcoming term as commander-in-chief, and predicted that the president-elect would take a much more active role in foreign policy making during his time in office due to his early composition of his cabinet and bureaucratic appointees, especially in regard to the State Department. According to the article, Nixon initially advised his cabinet leaders to choose their “second-level” associates based on who they trusted instead of choosing them based on political affiliations, which brought more power to the upper echelons of the State Department since the more experienced undersecretaries would not be forced to delegate power towards lower-level bureaucrats due to a lack of experience or knowledge in foreign policy as weaker politically appointed undersecretaries did during the Johnson and Kennedy Administrations. The reporter asserted that the NSC and the State Department’s perspective roles were evident through Nixon’s choice of individuals to lead these organizations. The choice of Rogers as Secretary of State showed Nixon’s reliance on the State Department for counsel on international affairs, as the article stated that “it has long been assumed that the Secretary of State would be less of a policy innovator... than a trusted counselor to the president- a relationship that has already been demonstrated between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Rogers.” The writer also predicted that Rogers’ experience working as an effective litigator would lead the State Department towards mitigating and negotiating its way through crises. William Rogers, who obtained training as a lawyer and served as an assistant district attorney before World War II, then worked as both a deputy attorney general and the attorney general under President Eisenhower. Through these endeavors, he had not obtained much knowledge of foreign policy. Rogers was also an important member of the Republican Party since the 1950s, and worked at the United Nations while at his private practice. This meant that Rogers, for Nixon, was a safe pick as the president’s first-term Secretary of State. Nonetheless, despite Rogers’ relative lack of experience in foreign policy that would serve to undermine his actual influence as a form of “counsel” to Nixon, Nixon gained a valuable asset for negotiations in choosing Rogers as the head of the State Department due to his experience in mitigating conflicts.

Kissinger reinforced the idea that Secretary Rogers’ intended role in the executive branch constituted mainly negotiating rather than advising, and he stated within his autobiography, “[Nixon] said he was looking for a good negotiator, rather than a policymaker.” This proved to be true in the Arab-Israeli case, as Nixon initially emphasized the State Department’s role in negotiating peace in the Middle East through Secretary Rogers, while he grew more dependent on Kissinger’s advice. Additionally, the New York Times article predicted Kissinger’s role within foreign policy making to be influential, as “Mr. Nixon has also assigned a strong role in foreign policy formation to the National Security Council and his assistant, Henry Kissinger, an articulate ‘idea man’ from the academic world.” Kissinger grew up in Germany in a Jewish household in Germany, but escaped from the Nazi regime and moved to the United States in 1938 where he received a PhD in political science from Harvard. After obtaining his doctorate, Kissinger held a professorial position at Harvard, served in various government agencies, and had worked for the NSC prior to Nixon’s election. Kissinger’s academic stamina eventually proved to be influential in his growing importance throughout his time in the Nixon Administration. Moreover, the instatement of a Secretary of State such as William Rogers, who lacked the foreign policy experience, the strong personality, and the intellectual background of other members of the administration, such as Kissinger, reveals the relative lack of empowerment of the State Department as a force to create innovative policy within the administration. Through the acquisition of Rogers as the head of the State Department, Nixon granted a larger share the role of guiding U.S. foreign policy to other leaders and other departments. Furthermore, since Nixon valued his own understanding and leadership on foreign policy issues, he relied more heavily on NSC advisement than State Department implementation. Nixon’s dependence on the NSC distanced the president’s from a reliance on a vast, intricate bureaucracy, like the State Department, for advisement, and allowed him to make decisions based on the opinions of a smaller, select group of individuals. Due to these personal differences, and differences
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in the departments of the objectives and roles of the NSC and the State Department, the power within the U.S. executive foreign policy-making bureaucracies shifted within the course of Nixon’s tenure as president.

Nixon’s means of increasing the NSC’s power within the executive branch went beyond establishing a strong department head, as his policy-making became heavily reliant on the role of advisement. He also ordered an excessive amount of National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) and National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) from the NSC’s Senior Review Group (SRG). Because of this, information regarding foreign policy decisions filtered through the policy agenda and geopolitical perspective of the Council and ultimately Kissinger before it reached Nixon’s desk; therefore, Kissinger became an essential decision maker within the process of analyzing political issues, and, therefore, his overall perspective on issues such as the Middle East and the Cold War context vastly shaped the policy output of the U.S. at the time. Additionally, Nixon utilized the NSC to readjust channels of power within the executive branch; for example, he made the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) directly accountable to the NSC. Thus, Kissinger, as the NSA, gained control of information provided by numerous intelligence-oriented bureaucracies, and became the primary means of presenting such intelligence to President Nixon.

In this way, Kissinger gained immense control within the Nixon Administration because of the president’s empowerment of the NSC in analyzing data that pertained to foreign relations, which he then presented potential policy decisions to Nixon. Although the National Security Act of 1947 created the NSC in order to “advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies,” Nixon’s wide reliance on such advisement to aid his own decision-making coupled with the President’s intense focus on foreign policy issues caused the influence of this group to grow immensely. As he became more involved in foreign policy than previous Cold War era leaders, Nixon left larger bureaucratic organizations like the State and Defense Departments less influence over policy. The NSC, by default, gained political clout under this new informal power hierarchy, since they had influence over Nixon’s decisions through their direct advisement. Thus, Kissinger became more influential than former National Security Advisors during Nixon’s presidency, as his empowerment granted him influence over foreign policy in unprecedented ways.

The NSC became influential during the Nixon Administration as well, and Kissinger took advantage of the strengths of this group since, according to him, it could “avoid the endless internal negotiations that stultify larger organizations.” The NSC, because of its size, acted decisively and promptly in its provision of advisement and information, as the organization lacked numerous dissenting voices larger bureaucracies faced. This became problematic in creating diplomacy regarding the Arab-Israel crisis. Since the State Department held official control within the Middle East while the NSC held a large amount of unofficial control of the president’s decisions through its increased role in advisement issues, conflict and tension between these two agencies came into fruition within the process of formulating policy. Therefore, because State Department-negotiated plans became subjugated to stringent dissection and analysis by the NSC, the Council through its advisement of the president, played a vital role in his acceptance or rejection of the State Department’s proposed analysis and policies. The early delegation of roles for foreign policy-making among the agencies and members within the Nixon Administration ultimately set the stage for interdepartmental competition for influence and authority. Similarly, the early division of power within the Nixon executive formed the basis for the administration’s competence and failure in creating cohesive policies. These predetermined roles guided the creation of policy to alleviate the Arab-Israeli crisis, and set the foundation for the expansion of NSC power within the creation of policy for the Middle East.

The NSC’s first meeting set the official guidelines and boundaries for the policy influence held by the organization within the realm of their own role in advisement and its relation to the State Department and other foreign policy-

oriented bureaucracies. During this meeting, the President stated that the CIA director would provide briefings at future NSC meetings, and other cabinet members would occasionally present reports as well, equipping the NSC with a wide nexus of information by which to make their analysis. Additionally, Nixon set limitations on NSC membership and listed guidelines to formalize the way in which the group would conduct its meetings. These conditions revealed Nixon’s initial intentions regarding the formation of policy and the flow of power within his administration, as he emphasized the NSC’s authority in policy advisement, and further stated that the president made final policy decisions alone. Nixon claimed that the “NSC was not a decision-making body,” and further stated, “I will make the decisions. To do this, I will need all points of view. I will then deliberate in private and make the decision. In this process, I might talk to individuals prior to finalizing my decision.” In this way, the president gave advisement the final authority in the creation of foreign policy, and granted the NSC the authority in the creation of comprehensive advisement. The organization’s wide purview in the creation of foreign policy, thus, was established through its access to a wide network of information, provided by the briefings of other cabinet officials, and through the President’s reliance on the advisement of well-informed parties to make policy decisions. The NSC, with Kissinger as the head of the group, became the established leader in advisement for the president due to the insulation of the group. Nixon claimed that “he did not want detailed debriefings in the respective departments following an NSC meeting, adding that he was conscience of the struggles for power within and among agencies and that leaks to the press had become a habitual vehicle for this in-fighting.” Therefore, while the NSC had access to information from the CIA, the Treasury Department, the Defense Department, the State Department, and other executive entities, the conclusions and analysis of the NSC became available only to those attending the meetings. This emphasis on an insulated entity for policy analysis, coupled with Kissinger’s personal influence of Nixon, would provide the NSC a means to gain an immense amount of influence over foreign policy.

During the course of this meeting, the president also granted official authority over the mitigation of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the State Department. Within the course of the meeting, Nixon granted the State Department the power of proposing solutions for the Arab-Israeli conflict, while he requested advisement and briefings from the CIA Director and the Defense Secretary. The State Department officially then held the authority over policy creation within the Nixon Administration. This was evident through the creation of diplomatic relations and negotiated policy by the Secretary of State and Undersecretary Sisco to create the Rogers Plan. On the other hand, while the president empowered the State Department to make policy proposals, his emphasis on advisement and his own decision-making provided the NSC the availability to curtail its power of advisement into a power of policy-making. The organization became powerful through Nixon’s utilization of it as his main source of culminated knowledge on foreign policy issues. The NSC also monopolized intelligence, as other departments shared their knowledge to the organization, which they then passed as their own. For example, other departments often debriefed issues to the NSC that pertained to the Arab-Israeli crisis. During one meeting alone the director of the CIA reported on Soviet intentions and Fedayeen movements in the region, the Secretary of Defense discussed the strategic position of the U.S. in the Middle East, and had the Secretary of State provided information on the proceedings of the Two Power and Four Power talks, all pursuant to the president’s request. The NSC meetings, therefore, became a means to exchange information, and then have the incoming information processed by Kissinger and other Council members. After other agencies provided information regarding the U.S. position in geopolitical issues, the Special Review Group (SRG), a subsection of the NSC analyzed these reports, and the NSC then took these accounts into consideration to provide comprehensive advisement to the president. The NSC, through this procedure, became a mechanism for creating policy; its direct contact with the president provided an avenue for Kissinger to leverage greater influence in the Nixon Administration in general, and in the creation of U.S. policy towards the Arab-Israeli crisis in particular.
Nixon’s objectives, beyond his endeavors to re-organize the executive branch, were largely focused on the realm of international affairs, as he wanted his administration to be more adept in global politics than his domestically focused predecessor, Lyndon Johnson. With the Vietnam War in the forefront of the American public’s mind, Nixon attempted to avoid direct military engagements as a means of intervening in international politics. Instead, the Nixon Administration emphasized the need to negotiate diplomatic agreements with the Soviet Union on a global scale (a concept known within his administration as “linkage”) and to provide military and economic assistance to ideological allies. Therefore, when negotiating peace in regional conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East, the U.S. often perceived regional powers, such as Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, in terms of the Cold War conflict, morphing allies and enemies out of a state’s perceived alliance to either the United States or the Soviet Union. This global affairs perspective was organized in reference to Soviet and U.S. tensions, which complicated the execution of negotiations for diplomatic agreements, as well as influenced the very framework by which the administration would organize diplomatic negotiations.

Within this administrative context, members of the Nixon executive speculated the best course of action regarding the organization of negotiations for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. The two options proposed by the Nixon cabinet were to either hold a four-power talk, including the U.S., the Soviet Union, France, and Britain, or to hold a two-power talk, including only the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Initially, Kissinger told Assistant Secretary of State Sisco that the four powers talk was acceptable “in principle,” as long as the president approved of that avenue of negotiation. However, he insisted that Rogers propose the idea of two party talks to the French, while still pursuing the idea of four power negotiations. According to the ideology of the Nixon Administration, two-power talks were preferable in order to maximize the protection of national interests within the era of détente relations with the Soviets; however, an exclusion of French and British interests might have offended the European allies. The official documents discussing this debate made it clear that Rogers considered the inclusion of the French and the British at the negotiating table as necessary due to Rogers’ repeated request to Kissinger for the inclusion of the Europeans in negotiations. On the other hand, Kissinger and Nixon seemed more apprehensive about the four power talks, without at least holding separate two power talks with the Soviets. The president, within the course of a meeting regarding this issue, responded to the proposal of a four-power negotiation by stating, “The real powers are the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.” In a similar manner, Kissinger, at the same meeting, asserted that talks with the Soviets would “prove more fruitful” than talks with that included the Britain and France as well. Nonetheless, Kissinger conveyed concern to Nixon that these talks would put the U.S. in a tactically deficient position, stating, “If we were specific we would be in a major brawl with Israel... And if we shied away from pressing Israel... the negotiations would again grind to a halt.” The State Department held separate two-power and four-power talks regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict to resolve this tension of opinions.

Much of Kissinger’s disagreement with State Department policy during the timeframe of Nixon’s first term as president came from his divergence from the policies proposed by Secretary Rogers. Nixon initially placed Rogers in charge of managing the conflict in the Middle East, which formed one of the first foreign policy initiatives of his administration. Rogers organized and controlled negotiations that pertained to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as announced the peace plan, later known as the “Rogers Plan,” on December 9, 1969 after months of deliberation with the Soviets within the “Two-Power Talks” (the “Four Power” talks proved to be less influential within the negotiating process). This plan called for Arab nations to officially recognize the state of Israel under the presumption that Israel would be bound to rescind their claims to lands gained in the Six-Day War, specifically in the Sinai Peninsula, to settle the Palestinian refugee crisis amicably, and to make permanent arrangements with Arab States in regard to the Gaza strip. Rogers drew from United Nations Resolution 242 (UNSCR 242) as the basis for the plan, which the UN published in November 1967 following the conclusion of the Six-Day War. This resolution illustrated stipulations for peace previously proposed in UNSCR 242, including the return of lands gained

in war in exchange for recognition of legitimacy, without an indication of which demand would be met first. In his December 1969 speech, Rogers made bold claims in regard to Arab-Israeli peace, where he stated that his plan would provide a “just and lasting peace,” as it would not simply amend the Arab-Israeli conflict temporarily, but end tensions between Israel and the Arab nations. He also stipulated that it would foster development toward creating amicable relations between the Palestinian refugees and the state of Israel.42 This plan, however, proved too ambitious to create “lasting peace,” and instead led to lowering expectations for the mitigation of the conflict.

Rogers presented this plan as something that he perceived as a “balanced and fair approach.” even though this rhetoric portrayed a sense of idealism, which contrasted the ultra-realist ideology that became prevalent between Kissinger and other policy leaders later in the Nixon Administration.43 Rogers, in contrast to other individuals in the administration, did not hold visibly preferential opinions regarding the Arab-Israeli crisis, as he did not openly show overwhelming support for either the Arab or the Israeli side of the conflict. His approach to policies similarly tended to reflect an equitable approach to disseminating the conflict. This perspective reflected the “even-handed” approach to Middle Eastern diplomacy former UN Ambassador William Scranton espoused a year earlier in December 1968 during a trip to Israel where he asserted, “It is important for the United States to deal with all countries in the area and not necessarily espouse one.”44 Although this angered the Israeli government, this idea became an initiative taken up by many bureaucrats involved in U.S. policy-making, including Secretary Rogers.45

The State Department’s openness to work with various parties involved in the conflict is also reflected in Rogers’ pursuit of diplomatic solutions with the Soviets in the Two-Power Talks, as well as in the State Department’s analysis of U.S. interests in the Middle East. In a memo sent from the secretary of state to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on December 17, 1969 that estimated the current position of the Soviets in the Middle East and predicted their future stances in the region, Rogers asserted, “a complete US-Israel versus Soviet-Arab polarization could entail a dangerous rise in tension in the area” which would not be beneficial to the pursuit of peace between the Arab and Israeli states.46 While Rogers claimed that such a polarized alliance in the Middle East could become detrimental to the possibility of Arab-Israeli peace, and that providing economic aid to Arab states probably would not endanger the balance of regional influence between the two superpowers, he also claimed that if the Arab nations became solely allied with the Soviets the U.S.S.R. would be significantly materially drained. Though this seems like a material advantage to the U.S. in the Cold War, this statement, taken in the context of détente relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., implied that the ideological division of the Middle East that would inevitably result from an overwhelming U.S. support for Israel could potentially shatter the desired balance of power between the Americans and Soviets. Thus, Rogers’ focus on “even-handedness” relied mainly on taking regional issues into consideration over Cold War geopolitical considerations. The implications of this conflict on the issues among Middle Eastern states, for all intents and purposes, were a more important focus for Rogers’ negotiations than building U.S. power within the atmosphere of détente relations with the Soviets. However, Rogers’ approach was constructed within the realm of diplomatic negotiations between superpowers, and excluded the states actually affected by the proposed plan from the negotiating table. The Secretary also rendered a somewhat pro-interventionist attitude (or at least pro-interventionist in cases of imposing diplomacy) in his December 9 speech announcing the Rogers Plan. While he recognized the power to implement peace remained with the governments affected by the plan, Rogers claimed that it was the “duty” of the United States and the Soviet Union, as third parties and the major world powers, to provide a “realistic framework” for peace negotiations.47 Thus, Rogers, while verbally admitting that diplomacy remained in the hands of the nations affected by the plan, implied that the U.S., as a world superpower, intended to be intensely involved in the peace-making process in the Middle East. Although this approach to diplomacy was typical for many among Nixon’s administration, Rogers’ practice of excluding pertinent nations from diplomatic talks, coupled with the Secretary’s

comparative lack of knowledge and experience in Middle Eastern politics, contributed to ignorant negotiations between the Soviets and the U.S., and factored into the Arabs and Israelis eventual rejection of the proposed plan. Ultimately, he came into the Two-Power Talks with unrealistic and uninformed perceptions about the Arab-Israeli crisis, and, the plan’s introduction to the Arab and Israeli parties resulted in unfavorable responses, especially among Israeli politicians. Since the plan excluded the voices of the parties subject to the plan, the negotiations proved ineffective, and the idea of “linkage” proved inefficient due to Rogers’ relative inexperience in foreign policy.

Kissinger, despite his well-known expertise in Cold War international relations, was also initially unaware of the many diplomatic issues in Middle Eastern policy-making when he first entered the office of National Security Advisor, and his only knowledge about the region came from a three personal trips to Israel to visit former Harvard students and colleagues working in the region. Nevertheless, he quickly developed policy approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict, specifically regarding the conflict’s affects on the region and fit and the wider arena of Cold War strategy. Furthermore, he adhered to his newly found strong opinions about the conflict within his role as advisor to the President. The State Department’s stances concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Johnson Administration differed immensely from the policy stances of the Nixon Administration, especially within the realm of “unofficial” planning among bureaucrats. The differences between the State Department’s proposed policy under Johnson and the Nixon Administration’s actions in the Middle East revealed this clear shift in policy. On January 30, 1969, Harold Saunders sent Kissinger a memorandum that accompanied a group plans that State Department developed during the Johnson Administration and the early months of the Nixon administration. He stated that official channels had not yet cleared these documents, but that the proposed policy was “well on its way” to becoming formalized policy. He also claimed that these plans should be viewed as “illustrative of our efforts to figure out where we want to come in on an Arab-Israeli settlement.” These rough plans clarified how the wider bureaucracy analyzed and reacted to the conflict, and revealed consistent though from non-political lower-level members of the State Department about solutions for the area beyond the politics of higher-level political appointees. These bureaucrats were not members of a politicized administration; rather, they held more allegiance to their specific department than to a specific party or administration. The differences between these plans in comparison to Kissinger’s outlined plans reflected the impending differences and political competition between the larger bureaucracy of the State Department and the political influence of the NSA.

Within these plans, the State Department recommended a possible allocation of land between Israel and its Arab neighbors to be proposed within negotiations, and represented this redistribution of land through various maps. According to the State Department, their intended policy followed the “principles and provisions set forth in Security Council Resolution 242.” This proposed plan for land reallocation thus included the return of lands that Israel gained in the 1967 War from its Arab neighbors. The first map represented a proposal of land negotiations between Egypt and Israel, and reflected the transfer of the Sinai Peninsula from Israel to Egypt, on the basis of this land remaining demilitarized. This plan would, effectively, become the plan accepted in 1979 in the Camp David Accords; however, this plan would have been less palatable during the Nixon Administration, especially by Kissinger. His skepticism regarding the Arab states in general particularly Egypt, coupled with his emphatic support for Israeli retention of lands gained in the 1967 War, made the NSA less willing to adhere to the State Department’s advisement regarding this land redistribution.

The second map represented the allocation of land in Eastern Israel to Jordan, pushing Jordan’s border past the Dead Sea and Bethlehem towards Jerusalem. Similarly, this plan granted Jordanian rule over various areas in northeastern Israel and Gaza, and advocated for an access road between Jordan’s borders in the east toward the Gaza strip in the west, in order to enable unobstructed access to Jordan’s citizens. The third map divided the city

of Jerusalem, and conceded rule of the eastern side of the city to Jordan. Furthermore, the legal analysis of the State Department, as portrayed in these documents, asserted that the stipulation for Arab recognition of Israeli legitimacy in return for the return of Arab territories from Israel did not extend to a formal political declaration from Arab nations that Israel was a legitimate state. Thus, Israel would not have obtained the desired public recognition as a state as other policy-makers thought the UNSCR 242 inferred. These plans would have likely been unfavorable to Kissinger, who thought that a plan that included a return of borders to their position before the 1967 War would “lead to a blowup with both sides.” The difference between Kissinger’s opinion regarding land allocation to the Arab states, which would be reflected in his later advisement of his department, other bureaucrats, and the president, highlighted the competition that was present between the NSC and the State Department.

According to State Department legal analysts, the language of UNSCR 242 and the nature of international law only implied that Arab states would be forced to deal with Israel as a legitimate state within their diplomatic relations. Thus, these stipulations for the return of land would not be followed by a public means of reciprocation from Arab states, which, to a supporter of the Israeli state such as Kissinger, seemed like it put Israel to a disadvantage. The unofficial plan also outlined resolutions regarding demilitarization and the means towards an amicable relationship between various groups involved in the conflict; supporters of Israeli national interests, however, perceived plans such as these to be a weakening of the state of Israel through diplomatic means. The plan called for the demilitarization of the Sinai from both the United Arab Republic (UAR/Egypt) and Israel, from the mandated region of Palestine, and from Gaza. Additionally, the plan called for giving Palestinian individuals within the Israeli state, through the aid of the UN, the option to either be resettled into a neighboring repatriated country, or to live in Israel with the protection of the Israeli state. It also called for the Israeli government to pay reparations to Palestinian individuals who chose to stay within Israel’s borders and to publicly state that Palestinians would not face discrimination. Thus, the state of Israel would be forced to assert that they had been in the wrong with their treatment of the Palestinian people, and would lose monetary power and power over individuals within their borders. This weakening of the perceived power of Israel was something that Kissinger directly combated within his time in the Nixon Administration. His disagreements with the proposed State Department plans proved that he not only disagreed with policy-makers specifically, but his opinions largely differed with the State Department as a whole.

Kissinger’s views regarding the crises differed immensely from Secretary Rogers and of the State Department due to his perspectives on the regional and geopolitical role the U.S. should play in the conflict. He was less concerned about balancing Israeli and Arab interest, and instead chose to support Israeli interests in his policy advisement, which led to conflict between the State Department and the NSC. Kissinger viewed the general concept of diplomacy as a means of balancing power and keeping peace through strength; to him, diplomacy was a tool to maintain U.S. power, in a similar manner to utilizing military buildings a means to protect a nation’s security:

- The balance of power, a concept much maligned in American political writing- rarely used without being preceded by the pejorative ‘outdated’- has in fact been the precondition of peace. A calculus of power, of course, in only the beginning of policy; it cannot be its sole purpose. The fact remains that without strength even the most elevated purpose risks being overwhelmed by the dictates of others.

Under this perspective, Kissinger focused less on “even-handedness” than on the best means to maximize U.S. power in the Middle East, and, according to Kissinger’s policy advisement during this time, the best means of maximizing U.S. power was through its support of Israeli state interests.
Documents that referred to the Arab-Israeli issue between 1969-1970 were largely produced for advisement on issues such as balancing power between the United States and the Soviet Union, providing arms funding to Israel, and approaches to negotiating terms of peace. These documents along with Kissinger’s autobiography reveal the NSA’s protective stance towards Israeli interests. Kissinger advocated against American interference through negotiations in the Arab-Israeli crisis to a certain extent, because certain factors in Middle Eastern politics, such as Soviet interests, Egyptian military power, and Fedayeen activity, made the region “not ready for a comprehensive American initiative.”

Kissinger’s rhetoric also alluded to an underlying disapproval for policies that proved strict or unfavorable for the state of Israel. In a memorandum to Nixon dated September 10, 1969 which was an outline for a meeting with the NSC to provide guidance for the State Department negotiations with the Soviet Union to create a plan for peace in the Middle East, Kissinger stated that “Israel will not be satisfied even if we win Nasser’s commitment to direct negotiations… Only strong US pressure, if that, has a chance of moving Israel away from that position.” However, he did not ultimately advocate for “strong U.S. pressure,” and instead supported a stance of non-interference, not solely because such action would necessarily be beneficial to promoting regional peace between the two conflicting factions, but because of a perceived danger in the disruption of Israeli-U.S relations.

He also claimed in this memorandum that a settlement calling for Israel’s retreat from lands gained in the 1967 War, would not likely be accepted by the Israeli government, as it left nothing for the state to utilize in negotiations. If Israel submitted to these terms at all, Kissinger asserted that the facets of the plan allowed Arab nations to narrowly define their means of recognizing a legitimate Israeli state. According to Kissinger, this would “have given the Arabs and the Soviets what they want- and isolated Israel.” Furthermore, Kissinger believed that the support of Israeli national interests, to an extent, benefitted the United States in a wider geopolitical context. According to Kissinger, the role of the NSA was not to advise on “tactical issues,” but to focus on “long-range matters.” Thus, he focused his attention to what he deemed as more long-term issues, such as balancing global power influenced his perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although Rogers’ focused on promoting regional peace through negotiations of an Arab-Israeli peace plan, Kissinger focused on balancing global power, as he believed that a certain amount of support for the Israelis benefitted the U.S. in the race for power in the Cold War. Furthermore, he stated that the relations became a dangerous point of policy in the U.S.- Soviet power struggle, as he claimed “the region became the focal point of Cold War rivalry, which both acerbated local conflict and posed the danger that outside powers could be dragged into major confrontation.” In this way, he asserted that the pursuit of a balance of power between the two states best offered the protection of regional interests, as it limited the possibility of a Vietnam-like Cold War conflict in the region.

Kissinger also thought of Arab states as “traditional regimes, discredited by defeat, [that] came under the sway of radical ideology- Pan-Arabism and socialism,” and he also considered these states to be under the influence of the Soviet Union. This perspective of Soviet interest among the Arab states caused Kissinger to distrust Egypt in particular, since the state received support from the USSR. He stated that he “preferred an Israeli-Jordanian settlement…rather than Israeli- negotiations, in which we would be asked to bail out a Soviet protégé,” and claimed that the Egyptians wanted the U.S. to abandon their support for Israel with very little trade-off on their part. Egypt’s perceived ties to the Soviet Union strengthened Kissinger’s already existent alignment with Israeli interests, as combatting the UAR against Israel translated into combatting Soviet interests in the Middle East. Therefore, he supported Israel because of his conception of the Arab-Israeli conflict within two frameworks: the Cold War and the regional issue.

Moreover, Kissinger perceived the precepts of UNSCR 242 to be unattainable and impractical. In fact, the first time that the National Security Advisor heard other foreign policy leaders presenting to him the “sacramental language of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, mumbling about the need for a just and lasting peace within...
secure and recognized borders” he stated that he “thought the phrase so platitudinous that I accused the speaker of pulling my leg.”

Kissinger believed that the states involved would not easily accept the precepts of the resolution. According to Kissinger, the Arabs and the Israelis viewed UNSCR 242 fundamentally in different ways, specifically in issues of Israel return of territory. He claimed, “This gulf in perceptions- in which, as in all tragedies, both sides represented a truth- is what had given the Arab-Israeli conflict its bitter intractability. When truths collide, compromise becomes the first casualty. Agreements are achieved only through evasions.”

In his opinion, the lack of consensus between those involved in the conflict regarding the proper means to employ a given resolution made the process of negotiating peace based on UNSCR 242 nearly impossible.

To a certain extent, Kissinger advocated against American interference through negotiations in the Arab-Israeli crisis. He asserted that this kind of interference would hurt U.S. interests in the region; he “did not think that manhandling our closest allies would achieve the lasting gratitude of Nasser or those who admired him.” This idea was reiterated in a memorandum from Kissinger regarding later Arab-Israeli issues, in which he clearly utilized a lack of action in the Middle East to support Israeli national interests. In 1971, a few months after Rogers aided the acceptance of an Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire, Kissinger stated in a memo to President Nixon, “A confrontation with Israel now would virtually end chances of any negotiated Arab-Israeli arrangement for the next year or so...”

Kissinger, in this way, took a stance of non-interference, not because such action would necessarily be beneficial to promoting regional peace among the two conflicting factions, but because of a perceived danger in the disruption of Israeli-U.S.

Nonetheless, not all of these documents do reflect a strong disagreement with the policies of the State Department. In a memorandum to the president, dated July 19, 1969, an agreement, outlined between the NSC and the State Department, limited the impact of Israel’s acquisition of nuclear technology and weaponry through negotiations with Golda Meir to halt some forms of nuclear testing. This document outlined a form of camaraderie between the departments, including the State Department and the Defense Department, and, therefore, much of the language largely supported of the ideas of the various bureaucracies. Similarly, in this document, Kissinger neither opposed intervention in Israeli affairs, nor does he take a significant pro-Israel stance. In regard to the proliferation of nuclear arms, Kissinger, as well as the NSC, advocated for arms control and intervention in Israeli policies. While the NSA showed a preference for allowing the state of Israel to conduct its own business in regard to negotiations over issues of settling conflict with Arab nations, and further supported the provision of smaller arms to Israel’s military, Kissinger favored U.S. diplomatic involvement in Israeli affairs in order to maintain a controlled nuclear world and control the proliferation of advanced weaponry. Furthermore, his treatment of Israel within his policy advisement reflected a standard of intense support for the state’s interests, but only when such support did not interfere with a valid state interest of the U.S., such as nuclear arms control.

Kissinger’s relationship with other members of the NSC, the State Department and other foreign policy related bureaucracies, contributed significantly to the creation of American policy for the Middle East regarding Israeli-Arab relations. As made evident through these interactions, Kissinger’s growing influence in the executive branch enabled him to enforce his foreign policy goals within this crisis. Kissinger’s relationship and correspondence with other lower-level bureaucrats reflected his expansion of power within the State Department. He wrote in his autobiography that the State Department acquired their role in brokering an Arab-Israeli peace plan because of the immense talent of the “intense, gregarious” character of Joseph Sisco, the Undersecretary of State who was in charge of the Middle East; an individual who “turned out to be living proof of what imaginative leadership could achieve in the State Department even under a President determined to conduct his own foreign policy....with a talent for stratagems that are the lifeblood of Middle East diplomacy, sometimes offering more solutions than there were problems.” Kissinger imparted more responsibility to Sisco than he granted to Secretary Rogers. This
confidence was further reflected in his correspondence with Sisco, as he kept in contact with him regarding the negotiations and the terms of the US peace plan. Kissinger advised Sisco on topics ranging from the terminology used in addressing the Jordanian government, to the practical application of a peace plan considering the national interests of Israel. Additionally, he conversed more broadly with Sisco on policy issues than he typically did with Rogers. For example, at one point he even asked Sisco on his perspective regarding the political situation in Korea and Nixon’s public relations. Nixon recognized this relationship as well, and he even asked Kissinger and Sisco to draw up contingency plans that contrasted State Department plans in anticipation of the possibility of the Arabs and the Israelis reacting badly to the Rogers Plan. Sisco became a close advisor of Kissinger, and the relationship he held with the NSA lacked the ideological and adversarial tension that existed between Rogers and Kissinger, and Kissinger utilized Sisco in order to gain relations within the State Department without deferring to the Secretary of State. After Kissinger became Secretary of State in Nixon’s second administration, he made Sisco his Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, where he became Kissinger’s “indispensable collaborator and a close friend.”

Kissinger’s preference for Israeli national interests was evident in his interactions with other bureaucrats, as he often wished to avoid any appearance of anti-Israeli sentiment within the espousal and creation of foreign policy within the U.S. government. He actively advocated against propositions for policy initiatives that he viewed as endangering the relationship between the U.S. and Israel. Prior to the final deliberations of the Two Party talks, Kissinger privately asked Sisco why Israel should be compelled to comply with a peace agreement that would be negotiated by non-involved nations based on the UNSCR 242. According to Kissinger’s conceptualization of diplomacy, the procession of these negotiations undermined the legitimacy of the state of Israel, and, therefore, jeopardized the relationship between the U.S. and its ally. This desire to support the nation of Israel even extended to the micro-managing of speeches so they would not take on any seemingly anti-Israeli implications through their language. For example, Kissinger debated the phrasing of segment of a speech with Undersecretary Sisco, stating that the Jordanian King blamed Israel for tension in the Middle East, so far as to make sure that the phrasing of the speech made it “perfectly plain that it is his view and not ours.”

Robert Anderson, an aid to Kissinger who served as an advisor on Middle Eastern issues, similarly corresponded with Kissinger on Israeli interests. In a telephone conversation on February 1969, he relayed a conversation that he had with an Israeli minister regarding the consolidation of relations between nations. Anderson told Kissinger of the Israeli interest in negotiating certain terms regarding the return of land in relation to UNSCR 242 and their interest in strengthening relations with the U.S. He explained that, if the US took into consideration the Israeli interests in regard to territorial concerns into consideration, relations might be strengthened between the two countries. This correspondence revealed the existence of a separate process of creating policy through the NSC and Kissinger, which existed separately from the State Department’s process of negotiations and deliberations with the Soviet Union that would lead to the Rogers Plan. While the existence of this policy-making was not a devious undermining of State Department policy, it did reflect that Kissinger, along with the National Security Council, pursued separate policies from the State Department.

These unofficial channels of influence bypassed the official power of Rogers and his negotiations. Rogers, according to Kissinger, lacked sufficient experience and capability in creating effective policies, which lead Kissinger to take power for himself and his office. Kissinger and Rogers, with divergent political ideologies and perspectives on the Middle East, also worked toward different goals in this area. Though not openly confrontational, Kissinger held doubts from the beginning of Nixon’s presidency about Rogers’ ability to lead, claiming that “It was probably
unfair to appoint to the senior Cabinet position someone whose entire training and experience had been in other fields.”

Similarly, he admonished the appointment of Rogers:

This is a particular problem for a Secretary of State. He is at the head of an organization staffed by probably the ablest and most professional group of men and women in public service. But the reverse side of their dedication is the conviction that a lifetime of service and study has given them insights that transcend the untrained and shallow-rooted views of political appointees.

According to Kissinger, Nixon’s Secretary of State lacked relevant familiarity with issues of international relations and qualifying skills to run a department as fundamentally necessary and extremely talented as that of the State Department. Moreover, Nixon, according to Kissinger, contributed to this conflict, since “like other Presidents, [Nixon] was not above feeding the rivalry inherent (despite ritualistic protestations to the contrary) between the office of the Secretary of State and security advisor in order to enhance his own control.” His opinion regarding the ineptitude of Secretary Rogers, in addition to his essential disagreements with State Department opinions of Middle Eastern issues, ultimately culminated to a lack of regard for State Department policy.

The Israeli government immediately rejected the proposed peace plan Rogers announced its precepts in a speech on December 9, 1969, and the Israeli cabinet further rejected “any attempt to enforce a solution” by December 22. By January 1970, the Israelis and the Egyptians dismissed the terms of the Rogers Plan (the only nation to accept its terms was Jordan), and the Israelis escalated their bombing campaign of the mid-section of Egypt. This peace plan generally upset the wider Israeli public. According to an Israeli newspaper after the secretary made his speech announcing the plan,

Israeli circles appeared especially distressed by Mr. Rogers’ reference to points which, in Israel’s view, should be subjects of direct negotiations with the Arabs. They said the U.S. has always maintained that it wants to help bring the two parties together... But now that America has made public its plan for Israeli withdrawal, it appears to be turning away from its previous policy, they said.

Although this bombing campaign was part of the ongoing War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel, this escalation caused the Egyptians to seek Soviet assistance. Consequently, the U.S. readjusted the means by which they proceeded to relieve tensions in the Middle East, and the State Department also reformulated the proposed Rogers Plan in order to accommodate these occurrences. This eventually resulted in a ceasefire agreement, deemed “Rogers Plan B.” To facilitate the mitigation of this new plan, the U.S. negotiated not only with the Soviets through Ambassador Dobrymin, but spoke directly with the nations involved: Undersecretary Sisco talked with Egyptian Prime Minister Nasser while President Nixon talked with Israeli Foreign Minister Eban.

Although these events changed the scope of the crisis that the U.S. was attempting to mitigate, these changes in policy goals provided the opportunity for the NSC to acquire more power while the State Department endeavored to negotiate a solution. The members of the foreign policy related organizations within U.S. executive were forced to make decisions regarding issues such as the provision of military aid to Israel, the maintenance of relations with the Egyptian state, and the diplomatic mitigation of the imminent conflict in the months following the Israeli’s initial attack upon the state of Egypt. Through these diplomatic negotiations, Rogers attempted to uphold some tenets of his original plan within his negotiation for a cease-fire; however, these attempts for diplomatic peace were undermined by the decision to increase military aid to empower the Israeli state. Therefore, the State Department led negotiations were met with the NSC’s competing policy for providing Israel with arms, which contributed to the interdepartmental competition for dominance in this policy-making field.

Much of the concern leading to the NSC’s recommendations regarding military aid to Israel were based in the fear of Soviet encroachment and aggression in the region. As the conflict within the Middle East became more actively militarized, the possibility of indirect conflict with the Soviets increased. According to Kissinger, “Israel’s foreign policy had become indistinguishable from its defense policy” and Israel needed military provision in order to avoid...
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encroachment from its neighbors.\textsuperscript{90} The provision of aid, therefore, provided the U.S. a means by which to bargain with Israel. In a memo attached to a SRG policy analysis, Harold Saunders, a NSC member who specialized in Middle Eastern affairs, addressed the question: “What if Israeli attacks trigger Soviet retaliation?”\textsuperscript{91} Because of this fear, the NSC, along with Kissinger, focused on more practical, “reliable” solutions to combat this possibility. The U.S. government combined negotiations with Arab parties, the Soviets, and the Israelis with the agreement to aid the Israelis with weapons, which both undermined and enabled the negotiation process.

Nixon, during this time, came to approve most Israeli requests for aid, including the provision of Phantom planes that Israel used to bomb Egypt.\textsuperscript{92} However, by March 1970, the Nixon Administration announced that they would hold military aid that Israel had requested, which included 100 Skyhawk jets and 25 Phantom jets, “in abeyance”,\textsuperscript{93} and Rogers in his announcement of the abeyance of aid claimed that the US would provide Israel economic aid instead of military aid, unless the Soviets started to provide the UAR with weaponry in which case the US would return to providing the Israelis with military assistance.\textsuperscript{94} By July 4, the Nixon Administration provided military aid to Israel in the form of electronic countermeasure equipment, and the Israelis later negotiated an assurance of military aid and military sales from the U.S. in accordance to their adherence to the later ceasefire agreement.\textsuperscript{95} In fact, the Nixon Administration pursued diplomatic discourse with the intention of eventually providing military aid to Israel. The State Department-produced talking points for the diplomatic negotiations for a cease-fire explicitly asserted: “States line [of negotiation] is essentially that Israel should find a way to accept our military assistance as compensation for the standstill violations and to get on with the talks.”\textsuperscript{96} Furthermore, the administration held the belief that “Israel’s receptivity to U.S. suggestions on its negotiating position and tactics will depend partly on Israel’s assurance that the U.S. is making good on its promise to continue to meet Israel’s security needs.”\textsuperscript{97} The SRG conjectured that these arrangements could eventually even lead to a final Israeli peace agreement to end the War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel,\textsuperscript{98} though this proved ineffective when Egypt and Israel started combatting in 1973.\textsuperscript{99} Though these military assistance plans combatted the practical implications of theoretical Soviet involvement in the region, the administration was forced to hold a difficult balance between trying to appear impartial in order to mediate the conflict while providing assistance to the Israelis during the months of negotiation.

Due to the ongoing tension between the Arabs and the Israelis during the months following the announcement of the original Rogers Plan and the Israeli aggression toward Egypt, the Nixon Administration made some attempts to pacify the concerns of the Arabs. The following negotiations and policy-making after Israel’s increased bombing of Egypt became more contentious as the U.S. walked the line between redeeming their relationship with the Israelis and appeasing Arab interests. Because of this tension, the competition between factions of the government that sought the protection of Israeli interests versus the factions that supported more even-handed policies became more pronounced. While the White House at this time was still largely concerned with Soviet incursion, the State Department attempted to bridge the gap and build amicable relations in the Middle East by appealing to Arab interests, while still maintaining supremacy against the Soviets through the diplomatic relations. Thus, Sisco recommended the redrafting of documents concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to make them “be more specific on issues of concern to the Arabs.”\textsuperscript{100} This attempt by Sisco and the State Department portrayed the divergent goals of the two bureaucratic entities. Though both the State Department and the NSC worked toward similar goals of maintaining peace in the region while protecting American interests, the two departments utilized different tactics to fulfill these goals. Similarly, the earlier ideological conflict between Kissinger and Rogers, the official policies of the two departments during these later negotiations show the difference between the goals of the bureaucracies that the two leaders headed.
Nevertheless, the NSC made some concessions that the U.S. needed to address some Arab concerns during this time. The increasing activity of the Fatah movements in Jordan and in Palestine forced the Nixon Administration to acknowledge Palestinian issues in their pursuit of peaceful settlements. The SRG’s analysis, which proposed a process for the pursuit of an effective cease-fire through diplomatic negotiations, suggests that the State Department explore the Palestinian issue during the course of their talks to the UAR, Jordan, and Israel, since “Sadat is not likely to sign an agreement before the Palestinians are satisfied.”101 Because of this, the NSC further investigated the implications of non-governmental Palestinian entities to the U.S. government’s pursuit of Middle Eastern peace through a SRG analysis. The Administration conducted extensive studies of the Palestinian groups, where they analyzed their goals, their doctrines, and their tactics. Within the SRG’s proposition of multiple means by which the U.S. could approach the issue of Fatah movements, the group acknowledged the possibility of implementing formalized negotiations with the Palestinians, by stating, “While continuing to hold out for the rectification and against shifting the negotiations to the four powers, we could explore a ‘Palestinian option’-i.e. the possibility of an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian settlement.”102 Even under Kissinger’s adamantly pro-Israel leadership of the NSC, the Council still considered the implications and justifications of Palestinian issues.

Ultimately, Sisco sent unofficial representatives to negotiate with Fatah leadership, and notified the SRG, of such actions, under the impression that “despite Fatah’s stated position that it opposes Security Council Resolution 242 and the U.S. Government peace initiative, certain Fatah officials might be prepared to accept a peace settlement on these terms if the prospects for successes were good.”103 This further exemplified the State Department’s adherence to their pursuit of peace through negotiations, as proved by their willingness to comply with non-traditional political forces, even forces not directly related to the U.S. global interests. However, The SRG’s suggestion insinuated that, at least on some level, the two departments could work together without the competition for policy control. Yet, the SRG’s statement was only one policy suggestion among many, and did not necessarily indicate Kissinger’s opinion on the subject of non-governmental Palestinian organizations such as Fatah. Therefore, the concurrence of NSC and State Department policy opinions in this case, while revealing that the potential for inter-department unity could have persisted in some means, does not prove that both of the governmental organizations practiced the implementation of a clearly united policy.

Nonetheless, the Nixon Administration began to present itself to be very supportive of Israeli interests in the public eye. On July 1, 1970, President Nixon indicated a strong support for Israel in a television interview, and he sent a letter to Prime Minister Meir later that month stating that the U.S. government “would not force Israel to interpret our formula the Arab way.”104 This tension between bureaucratic forces supported even-handed diplomacy and those in support of Israeli initiatives became augmented due to the shift toward pro-Israeli foreign policy.

Due to this, bureaucratic infighting became strikingly apparent during the negotiation of the cease-fire agreement. This was most evident in the case of the professional relationship between Joseph Sisco and Henry Kissinger. While the official documents written by Sisco indicated adherence to the policies of the State Department, and thus the policies of Rogers, other documents revealed Sisco’s slight divergence from the decisions and the leadership of the Secretary of State. For example, at one point National Security Council member Saunders sent a note to Kissinger, telling him that Sisco sent a redrafted speech to the White House, despite Rogers explicitly telling him not to send the document, and asked him to “protect [Sisco] with the Secretary.”105 The redrafted document was a potential speech for Nixon to give in the case of the successful acceptance of an Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire by relevant parties, which Rogers did not want the White House to see until they effectively negotiated a cease-fire agreement.106 In this case, Sisco rejected the authority of the Secretary of State in order to adhere to the authority of the NSC and the White House. Furthermore, Kissinger’s increasing reliance on Sisco for opinions on policy possibilities during the negotiations for the cease-fire agreement revealed his deference for Sisco’s opinion over
the opinion of the Secretary of State. The strengthening of this professional relationship represented the strengthening of this unofficial means of power for both Sisco and Kissinger, which provided them with the opportunity to bypass this governmental hierarch. This inevitably played into the competition and conflict between the two bureaucracies throughout the latter half of Nixon’s first term, especially after the escalation of Israeli bombing after the announcement of the first Rogers Plan.

Egypt, Jordan, and Israel finally accepted Rogers Plan B, negotiated and written by the State Department in June, after the Nixon Administration convinced political leaders from these perspective countries to accept its terms by August 1970. The UAR accepted these terms unconditionally, and the Israelis eventually accepted the cease-fire after assurances of military assistance and the sale of U.S. aircraft to Israel. The terms of the plan strictly related to the termination of military aggression, and did not include previous stipulations from the first Rogers Plan regarding the alleviation of political tensions in the region. This ceasefire agreement dictated that the UAR and Israel “will observe an effective ceasefire as at 2200 hours GMT, Friday August 7,” which included both infantry attacks and aerial bombardment. Additionally, it created a region of 100 kilometers wherein neither side could develop to a military capacity, and the agreement further asserted that each nation could either utilize its own “national means” or invoke the power of the UN to enforce the ceasefire. The U.S. added further “agreements” for Israel, claiming that Israel should not produce new missiles, missile-emplacement structures, or missile facilities in the agreed-upon 100-kilometer zone, which placed some informal limitations on the technical advancement of the Israeli military institution. The U.S. had also agreed to additional “Four Powers” talks with the UK, France, and the Soviet Union following the cease-fire between the UAR and Israel to negotiate a new, “gradualist” peace solution and present it to the disputing parties.

Nonetheless, following the acceptance of this plan the US amended its military assistance. The U.S. government considered aiding the Israelis essential to maintaining the cease-fire lines and, thus, prepared the Israeli military for the possibilities of the Egyptian invasion of the Sinai or missile strikes into Israel. Due to this, the new U.S. assistance package to Israel included more reconnaissance aircrafts and electronic countermeasure equipment (i.e. communications jammers) in order to monitor both the Egyptians and the Soviets per the NSC’s request. Thus, the State Department-led negotiations resulted in the appeasement of military tensions coupled with the continuance of US military aid to Israel. These conditions did not lighten political tensions between the Arab and Israeli parties, and this tension would ultimately lead to a war between the UAR and Israel in 1973.

The development of U.S. policy creation within the context of the Arab-Israeli Crisis in 1969-1970 revealed effects that accompanied the expansion of the power of Kissinger, and, by extension, the power of the NSC within Nixon’s first term as president. The Nixon Administration brought about a procedural change within its foreign policy-related organizations, under which the importance of NSC advisement became more influential than it had been before. However, the increasing influence of the NSC did not prove to directly undermine or eliminate the importance of State Department negotiations; rather, NSC analyses and actions served as competition to the policies and agendas presented by the Department of State. Due to this, the administration faced the implications of this change in bureaucratic power through its failure to create a comprehensive, innovative policy for the improvement of Arab-Israeli relations.

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2 Daigle, The Limits of Détente, 56-7.
3 Daigle, The Limits of Détente, 49.
8 Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, 93, 103-104.

Various models have been utilized for the analysis of bureaucratic policy-making. One of the most simplistic models regarding the process of making governmental decisions is the rational choice model. The rational choice model emphasizes the role of political organizations in adopting policies to optimize benefits and securities in areas of national interest. Under such a model, government implementing various policies to strategically pursue a certain desired target could define foreign policy. However, the process of policy-making, especially regarding the formation of foreign policy, in a large, bureaucractized government such as the United States in the Cold War era is much more complex than a simple, linear relation between the prescribed goal and the efforts to obtain that goal. In *Essence of Decision*, Graham Allison asserts that United States foreign policy should be examined through the lens of organizational roles and through the perspective of the rules of political bargaining that are prevalent at the time of the formation of policy. Under Allison’s proposed models, bureaucratic decisions are based on bureaucratic competition, role-playing within the members of the bureaucratic hierarchy, and by the practice of political negotiating within the government. Halperin’s work, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, added to the more multi-faceted approach to analyzing the creation of foreign policy within the U.S. On the highest level of executive politics, the president makes the decision to reach out for advisement from various heads of departments based on obligations, personal preference, and based on what assets the individual brings to the conversation. According to this prescribed model, the organizational hierarchy, and the relations formed therein, are more relevant to an analysis of lower-level bureaucratic implementation. High-level bureaucratic decision making, on the other hand, takes on a more personalized character, due to the overwhelming power and discernment given to the president. This model can clearly be seen in Nixon’s policy-making, especially in regard to NSA Kissinger’s influence in the early Nixon Administration.

11 Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, 92.
13 Grose, “Realignment at the State Department”.
16 Grose, “Realignment at the State Department”.

20 William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, 73.

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“Speech of Secretary of State William Rogers on Middle East Peace.”


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65 Kissinger, White House Years, 343.
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76 Kissinger, White House Years, 365.
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81 Kissinger, White House Years, 27.
82 Kissinger, White House Years, 27.
83 Kissinger, White House Years, 348.
84 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 92, 95.
85 “Israelis Express Shock and Dismay over Secretary Rogers’ Policy Speech.”
86 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 312.
88 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 98-99.
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90 Kissinger, White House Years, 343.
92 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 97.
93 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 98.


101 “Talking Points on Diplomatic Courses.”

102 “Middle East Policy Options (NSSM 103),” October 10, 1970, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-048, National Security Council Files, Nixon Foundation.


