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Migration is a prevalent social concern in the Middle East/North Africa. In addition to emigration, the countries struggle to incorporate immigrant and transiting populations. This article examines the influence of ethnodoxy—the linking of Arab and Muslim identity—on public opinion on immigrants and migration in the MENA region. Using original surveys of Egyptian and Moroccan Muslims from February and May–June 2023, it shows the more ethnodoxic respondents are, the more likely they are to hold anti-immigrant views. These results are consistent with the principle that social identity complexity encourages tolerance and change acceptance. Thus, this study contributes to the growing literature on comparative race and ethnic politics and to the understanding of religion's role in political attitude formation.

Keywords: *Middle East, Islam, public opinion, immigration.*

Migration is a prevalent social concern in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA). On one hand, African migration to and through North African countries has stirred tensions. "North Africa remains a major transit hub and point of departure for migrants from the subregion and those from sub-Saharan Africa trying to make their way to Europe and beyond" by legal and illegal transit networks (McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou 2021:73). On the other hand, many MENA states face population outflows due to war, authoritarianism, and economic upheaval. Economic opportunities spur migration within the region. Internally and regionally displaced populations bear their own challenges. As such, countries facing domestic difficulties also grapple with incorporating substantial population flows with the attendant potential cultural and economic challenges. This study examines public opinion on identity and migration in the Arab world.

Individuals can hold multiple identities at the same time, many of which can inform their political attitudes. Gender, ethnoracial community, and religion, for instance, have all been linked to political preferences. These identities inform citizens' understanding of the social structure and their place in it (Hartstone and Augoustinos 1995; Lock and Funk 2016). In some cases, these identities flow together; the overlap makes identity simpler. In theory, the more complicated and cross-cutting identities an individual holds, the more tolerance he will evince toward diversity, outgroups, and change (Brewer and Pierce 2005; Roccas and Brewer 2002). Simpler identities, on the other hand, have been associated with less tolerance and openness to change.

This study focuses on a particular relationship of ethnic and religious identity. Ethnodoxy is the belief that a religious and ethnic community are (supposed to be) co-extensive (Avetyan 2017;

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Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry 2012). This study focuses on the belief that Arabs are "the real Muslims," because "Islam was revealed to the Arabs" and that Arabs are at heart Muslims (Manji 2003:135, quoting an anonymous speaker), by looking at Arab Muslim ethnodoxy in Egypt and Morocco. Prior research on Russian Orthodox ethnodoxy has linked it to xenophobia and outgroup prejudice (Barry 2019; Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry 2012). It follows from these literatures that ethnodoxic Muslims in these communities would be less supportive of immigration, which necessarily brings in outsiders and which could change the demographic characteristics of the community.

This proposition is tested using surveys of Muslim populations in Egypt and Morocco conducted in February and May–June 2023. The results reveal that ethnodoxic respondents are more likely to agree with anti-immigration statements. Anti-immigrant sentiments are also more common among those who would privilege Islam in society and less common among those who value religious diversity. These results are consistent with the principle that social identity complexity encourages tolerance and change acceptance while ethnodoxy discourages them. Thus, this study contributes to the growing literature on comparative race and ethnic politics, to the understanding of religion's role in political attitude formation, and the drivers of public opinion in the MENA.

Ethnodoxy, Tolerance, And Migration

Ethnodoxy refers to the linkage of an ethnic group identity with a particular religious identity; usually it is the predominate religion in the ethnic group (Avetyan 2017; Barry 2019). Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry (2012:639) define it as "an ideology that rigidly links a group's ethnic identity to its dominant faith." These religions do not have to be indigenous to the area or the people. Rather, it is a question of numerical or sociological significance.

Several studies have linked ethnicity, religion, and nationalism on this basis. Sen and Wasow (2016) even include religion as a possible element of racial identity in their "bundle of sticks" theory of race. For example, being Greek and Russian Orthodox is linked to Greek and Russian identity, respectively (Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry 2012). Catholicism is linked to being Polish, Irish, Italian, and Latino (Calvillo and Bailey 2015; Form 2000; Grzymała-Busse 2015). Ethnic Copts who convert out of the Coptic Church are treated as less Coptic (Mahmood 2012); the same is alleged for Armenians and Armenian Orthodoxy (Avetyan 2017). Judaism is seen as both an ethnicity and a religious group, such that descent can supersede belief in assertions of membership (Gonzalez-Lesser 2020; Hahn Tapper et al. 2023). Even in diverse spaces, exthnodoxy has been identified. For instance, Allen (2023:1) quotes, "there is no disjunction between the Black Church and the Black community." The geographical spread here demonstrates the wide applicability and relevance of ethnodoxy belief.

The idea of an Arab–Muslim ethnodoxy is even evinced outside the Middle East. For instance, white Muslims can be "racialized" despite whiteness because they are Muslim (Khattab and Modood 2015). In the United States, MENA-origin people are legally white, but they are often not seen as white, particularly if they are Muslim (d'Urso 2024). Ethnodoxy, then, can be asserted both from within and without the focus community.

In practice, ethnodoxic religion can maintain social importance even as certain religious behaviors or even religious belief rates decline, because religion is embedded in the national or ethnic identity (Avetyan 2017). This identity connection can even increase the political sway of the religious leaders (Grzymała-Busse 2015). Thus, ethnodoxy reasonably has political salience as well as religious relevance.

Ethnodoxy is distinct from territorial nationalism or ethnic nationalism. Ethnodoxy does not have to occur within a state, and it can transcend the state. For instance, in his application of Russian ethnodoxy, Barry (2019) notes a distinction between ethnic and civic Russianness. Ethnodoxy can also divide ethnic communities for which multiple religious traditions are present.

While Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry (2012) find that Russian Orthodox ethnodoxy is positively associated with Russian nationalism, ethnodoxy is theoretically and empirically distinct from nationalism. It is also distinct from ethnoreligion because ethnodoxy "focus[es] particularly on the binding and mutually dependent relationship between religion and ethnicity" (Barry 2019:228). Ethnodoxy implies not just that religion contributes to the ethnicity but that both are implicated in each other.

Some researchers have appended social group policy preferences into their explanations of ethnodoxy. For instance, they report that ethnodoxy naturally incorporates a threat response: "Ethnodoxy is a belief system that rigidly links a group's ethnic identity to its dominant religion and consequently tends to view other religions as potentially or actually harmful to the group's unity and well-being and, therefore, seeks protected and privileged status for the group's dominant faith" (Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry 2012:644). Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry (2012:650) argue that "ingroup values are correlated with exclusionary and protectionist orientations," so ethnodoxy, as a particularization of the ingroup would be associated with such attitudes too. They find Russian Orthodox ethnodoxy correlated with negative attitudes toward "Western churches" in Russia and ethnic prejudice. Scholars have postulated that the doctrinal and traditionalist nature of religion, particularly one tied to social or group status, contributes to xenophobia (Barry 2019). Ethnodoxic beliefs have also been linked to nationalism, which indicates positive ingroup preferences (Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry 2012; Ridge 2023c). Thus, although ethnodoxy is an assertion of relative group identity on different dimensions, its promotion of out-group animosity or fear could inform negative views of diversity or diversifying programs. The protectiveness and exclusionary attitudes would incline against immigration. Given the extensive literature showing that cultural threat perception, even beyond economic threat perception, promotes anti-immigrant sentiment (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014), ethnodoxic respondents could readily hold anti-immigrant beliefs.

Ethnodoxic sentiments magnify the boundaries between groups. Such clear boundaries can promote ingroup affection and outgroup disaffection, especially when they are infused with social significance (Marques et al. 1998; Tajfel and Turner 1979). As individuals hold a "collective" self, which is to say a self-conception defined in terms of group memberships and interactions (Hogg and Reid 2006:9), the individuals' conception of his ingroups impacts not only his perception of himself but also his sense of how he relates to other people and they to him (Roccas and Brewer 2002). Furthermore, any group harm could be identified as an attack on an ethnic and/or on a religious dimension. The dualization would magnify the sense of group threat. Thus, ethnodoxic citizens could be more reactive then to any perceived threat from religiously or ethnically diversifying immigration.[1]

Another argument for anticipating a link between ethnodoxy and anti-immigrant sentiment comes from the literature on social identity complexity. Social identities "provide a sense of coherence and placement in society" (Lock and Funk 2016). Social identity complexity reflects the extent to which "a person is simultaneously a member" of multiple "social categories" (Roccas and Brewer 2002:89). The experience is subjective and may not reflect the realities of group overlap or disjunction (Brewer and Pierce 2005). Complex social identities are theorized to reduce out-group animosity because the in-group becomes too small (Roccas and Brewer 2002). Multiple identities will also reduce bias by reducing "the magnitude of the ingroup-outgroup distinctions" by forming "cross-cutting distinctions" (Brewer and Pierce 2005:430). In their study, identity complexity's effect on tolerance seems to derive from reducing outgroup disaffection rather than reducing ingroup affection. Similarly, complex identities and social orders can also

[1]Conversely, during emigration, ethnodoxy can maintain the connection to the source community (Calvillo and Bailey 2015; Yang and Ebaugh 2001). Due to available data, examining this element must be left to future research.

make it more difficult to assign privileges and favoritism, even to the ingroup (Hartstone and Augoustinos 1995).

Ethnodoxy, by its nature, is about simplifying identities. The religious and ethnic identity are being conceived of as one identity. Furthermore, once ethnodoxic principles are established, the ethnic and religious identities can be mutually reinforcing (Barry 2019). The identities then would not likely be unjoined without external influence. This simplification can impact their interpersonal attitudes. Researchers have found that individuals with more complex social identities are more tolerant toward outgroups (Roccas and Brewer 2002). That would include immigrants. Thus, this literature is also consistent with the proposition that ethnodoxic respondents hold more anti-immigrant beliefs.

It is recognized that ethnicizing religion is contrary to the doctrinal teachings of some religions. Despite a biblical injunction, for example, "someone can doctrinally endorse Christianity's 'neither Greek nor Jew' principle and, at the same time, believe that Greeks are innately Christian whereas Jews cannot be even if they try" (Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry 2012:644). Among Muslims there is principle of the Islamic *umma*, which is the idea of one, unified Muslim community (Sediqe 2019). One of the Egyptian survey respondents invoked this principle. The Arab Egyptian man (YOB 1990) stated, "Islam is a moderate religion that does not distinguish between individuals based on color or race. Following other religions under the protection[2] of the Muslims inside their country, they have rights and protections, and they have obligations."[3] When given the chance, he expressed skepticism toward a social benefit from religious diversity but was low on anti-immigrant sentiment (E: −0.49, IP: 0.37).[4] Another Arab Egyptian man (YOB 1988) wrote, "Islam does not make distinction among the races, and a Western Muslim in some cases can be better than an Arab Muslim."[5] He scored low on ethnoreligious linkage and expressed pro-immigrant views (E: −0.51, IP: 0.37). Although prophets and important figures in the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim traditions migrated, were exiled, or took refuge—which could incline adherents toward toleration—ethnodoxy could still cut against the religious precepts.

Some Muslims, though, demonstrate a "founder's privilege" that treats Arabs as just better Muslims because the Prophet Muhammed was from Arabia (Manji 2003:136). Arabic texts and prayers recall this history. Not all Muslims endorse this view. An Arab Egyptian man (YOB 1989), argued, "Islam began among the Arabs, but those who have influenced religious discourse are from all parts of the world. Muslims are attracted generally [by] arranging the study of the religion and going deeper in it. He has acceptance in joining the true religion. Thanks."[6] He favored protecting Islam in Egypt but also accepted religious diversity as socially beneficial (E: −0.80, IP: 0.37). Thus, religiosity might reduce the ethnodoxy effect or amp it up depending on whether religiosity leads to *umma* or leads to founder's privilege.[7]

[2]The word used here, *dhimma*, is undergirded in the historical circumstance in which non-Muslims paid taxes and experienced social restrictions in exchange for not being killed.

[3](original Arabic) الإسلام دين وسطي لا يفرق بين احد طبقا للون او عرق . اتباع الديانات الاخري في ذمة المسلمين داخل بلادهم لهم كل الحقوق والحمايه وعليهم الواجبات.

[4]The parenthetical numbers indicate the ethnodoxy (E) and Islam privilege (IP) scores for the respondent. More is said on these below.

[5](original Arabic) الاسلام لا يميز بين الاعراق والمسلم الغربي في بعض الاحيان يكون افضل من المسلم العربي

[6](original Arabic) "الاسلام بداء فى العرب لكن من لهم تأثير على الخطاب الدينى من كل أنحاء العالم والمسلمون ينجذبون عموما لم درس الدين وتعمق فيه عنده القبول فى توصيل صحيح الدين وشكرا"

[7]As the Morocco survey included a question about frequency of prayer, the potential interaction was preliminarily considered in that case (Appendix C). The religiosity–ethnoreligious linkage interaction is significant for the employment and conflict items. Among those who rarely pray, ethnodoxy has a positive effect; among those who pray daily, ethnoreligious linkage has no effect. With respect to crime attribution, the effect of ethnodoxy is greater among those who pray more frequently. The null interaction in the other models could reflect countervailing effects at the individual level. This must be left for future research.

MIGRATION IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST

Migration is a salient issue in the MENA. Due to conflicts in the region, there are substantial displaced populations. They are often displaced internally or to other MENA states. Still, in Arab Barometer VII (AB7), most respondents had lived in their area for more than 20 years; only 15.4 percent reported a residence period of 1–10 years.[8]

Historically, Arab emigration targeted Arab states, like the GCC countries, as temporary workers (Fargues 2008; Tsourapas 2018). However, large diasporas have formed in the United States and Europe (Tsourapas 2018), including current migrant workers or their descendants (Fargues 2008). Migration to and from are thus salient forces.

According to Arab Barometer VII, 31.4 percent of respondents had thought about emigrating. The highest rates were in Jordan (48), Sudan (46), and Tunisia (45). The lowest were in Egypt (13) and Kuwait (14). Thirty-four percent of Moroccans had contemplated leaving. Among those that contemplate emigrating, economic reasons are, by far, the most common stated motive to do so (59.6 percent). Educational opportunities and security reasons are a distant second and third, respectively (9.5 percent and 8.3 percent). Several respondents criticized the political economy circumstances in their countries. For instance, an Amazigh Muslim man (YOB 1972) wrote, "Corruption is eating away at the Arab peoples, and it must be fought by all means" (E: −0.79, IP: 0.32).[9] An Arab Muslim Moroccan man (YOB 1999) explained, "The West is generally seen as a place of equal opportunity and that is true. In Arab countries, opportunity is not available to everyone equally. Even if you obtain a good education, it can take a lot before you find a permanent job. In Saudi Arabia, for example, they say that a lucky person has W, which means he has wasta that got him what he has. That is only one point in a sea of darkness in which Arab countries are floundering" (E: −0.58, IP: 0.32).[10] Although this outlook did not make him personally anti-immigrant—he scored low on anti-immigrant sentiment—it exposes why citizens may see emigration as an economic issue. The emigrant population has made MENA a major remittance-receiving region (McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou 2021:73). However, remittance reliance risks remaking the domestic economies in dependency on foreign economies. Emigration also introduces the risk that some emigrees will not return, depriving the country of some young workers and their future participation in the state and society.

One respondent specifically addressed Arabs' migratory experience. The Muslim Arab Egyptian woman (YOB 1962) pointed out that Egyptians face restrictions when traveling or migrating, even within the MENA: "Moving between Arab countries would be easier without visas and without discrimination."[11] She herself expressed pro-immigrant views (E: −0.66, IP: 0.37). A sense of experiencing bias may be highly relevant; in this case it may be motivating her greater tolerance. Pan-Arab unity and Middle East/North African politics are presently insufficient to produce the visa-free travel regime she desires.

[8]The rate in Egypt was 7.2 percent and the rate in Morocco was 13.8 percent, so many people are not themselves migrating.

[9]الفساد يخر الشعوب العربية و يجب محاربته بشتى السبل. (original Arabic) Corruption and the state's apparent response to public corruption is associated with anti-democracy sentiment in the Middle East (Ridge 2022, 2023b).

[10]ينظر للغرب عموما انه مكان تتساوى فيه الفرص و دلك امر صحيح" (original Arabic)
في الدول العربية الفرص غير متاحة للجميع بالتساوي
حتى ان كنت حاصلا على تعليم جيد فيمكن ان تعني كثيرا قبل ان تجد عملا قارا
في السعودية كمثال يقولون على الشخص المحظوظ على انو لديه واو ومعناها ان لديه واسطة اوصلته لما هو عليه
"كانت تلك فقط نقطة من بحر الظلمات التي تتخبط فية الدول العربية
Wasta is using intermediaries to accomplish objectives ranging from resolving interpersonal disputes to getting jobs to obtaining permits. It is often seen as corrupt and can undermine citizens' interest in democracy (Ridge 2023a).

[11]الانتقال بين الدول العربية يكون اكثر سهولة بدون تأشيرات وبدون تفرقة (original Arabic)

At the same time, these countries have seen a rise in migration to and through their countries by emigrants from neighboring and southern countries. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM 2024a):

> Morocco is not only a country of origin but also transit and destination that deals with a complex and challenging context of migrations. In this context, Morocco made strides in improving its migration and integration policy by developing and implementing a National Strategy on Migration and Asylum (SNIA), launching two regularizations campaigns in 2014 and 2017, and developing a new counter-trafficking law (with IOM's support), with pending laws on migration and asylum.

In 2020, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs estimated about 103,000 international migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, were living in Morocco (IOM 2024b). Large segments, particularly of the irregular migrant population, come from sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Guinea, Nigeria, and Mali). Refugees from Yemen and Sudan are also present (IOM 2024b). In AB7, most Moroccans reported that Sub-Saharan migrants are discriminated against "not at all" (32.8 percent) or to "a small extent" (24.2 percent); however, responses to "a medium extent" (27.0 percent) or "a great extent" (13.3 percent) were common.

The immigrant population in Egypt is larger in real and relative terms. Per the IOM (2022:2), "overall estimate of the number of migrants in Egypt is 9 million, with 80 percent of this population belonging to one of the four main countries of origin: Sudan, Syria, Yemen, and Libya." The next largest tranches are other Arab states; however, more than 130 countries are represented in these estimates. Thus, the immigrant population is largely co-ethnic and co-religionist, but not singularly. Most are identified as migrants, rather than asylum seekers; by far the largest share of asylum seekers are Syrian. The IOM also estimates that most immigrants in Egypt stay for many years, primarily for work (formally or informally), education, or asylum-seeking.

Many migrants intend temporary presence. Some migrants travel to Europe with the assistance of smugglers operating in criminal networks; this has been linked to increased regional human trafficking, rights abuses, and possibly modern slavery (Ventrella 2017). Others have settled in North Africa, often without legal status. Furthermore, "the Middle East continues to be one of the largest destinations for refugees, most from countries within the subregion" (McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou 2021:81). Migrants, especially black migrants, "are blamed for many social ills," including crime (e.g., drugs, prostitution, rape, theft), disease, and taking jobs from nationals (King 2023). Still, the public does not see this as discrimination. In AB7, 41.7 percent of respondents identified no discrimination "at all" against black people in their country; 19.2 percent said only "to a small extent." The rates in Egypt were much higher; 82.3 percent reported none at all and 5.3 percent said to a small extent. The rates in Morocco were 32.5 percent and 22.9 percent, respectively. Responses were very similar with regard to colorism—privilege for light-skinned individuals. 41.3 percent of respondents identified no discrimination "at all" against "dark skinned people" in their country; 18.6 percent said only "to a small extent." The rates in Egypt were much higher; 85.6 percent reported none at all and 3.7 percent said to a small extent. The rates in Morocco were 28.8 percent and 24.4 percent, respectively.

While Morocco "has become a champion of migration within the AU [African Union], disseminating a model across the continent promoting migration as a path to development and combatting preconceived ideas painting it as a security problem" (King 2023), many populations still see migration as a socioeconomic threat to the host communities. This is born out in the 7th wave of the World Values Survey. Globally most respondents wanted their governments to "prohibit people coming here from other countries" (9.7 percent) or "place strict limits on the number of" immigrants (45.6 percent). Respondents were more open to immigration "if there are jobs available" than an open-door policy. MENA respondents were even more likely to support restrictive policies. For instance, in Egypt, 8.2 percent wanted their governments to "prohibit people coming

here from other countries" and 55.0 percent chose "place strict limits on the number of" immigrants. Morocco was more open to migration; 4.6 percent wanted their governments to "prohibit people coming here from other countries" and 37.8 percent chose "place strict limits on the number of" immigrants. This could reflect the relatively lower migrant stock.

Many Moroccans (36.7 percent) and Egyptians (49.4 percent) disagreed that immigrants filled useful jobs in their countries. Similarly, many Moroccans (36.0 percent) and Egyptians (42.9 percent) thought immigration increased crime rates or the risk of terrorism (39.7 percent and 49.8 percent, respectively). They saw it as increasing unemployment (55.0 percent and 65.2 percent, respectively). This is consistent with public support for conditioning migration rates on employment opportunities. By contrast, many Moroccans (61.8 percent) and Egyptians (41.9 percent) agreed immigrants strengthened cultural diversity and that immigration helps poor people establish new lives (47.2 percent and 58.1 percent, respectively). Migration, though, could cause social conflict: 43.2 percent of Moroccans and 51.5 percent of Egyptians agreed.

Large migrant flows in the Middle East and North Africa then take many shapes and come with their own challenges. Supporting immigration reflects a willingness to change up group members, in terms of residents of the country, and risk the changes it may bring toward the ingroup. For instance, the group may lose social status, experience disruptions stemming from the diversification, or see the identity-group linkages challenged. Given the salience of migration as an issue for the MENA and the variation in individuals' Arab–Muslim ethnodoxy scores, it is a fruitful location to examine the relationship between ethnodoxy and immigration attitudes.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

To assess ethnodoxy an Arabic-language survey of 543 Egyptian adults was conducted February 21–22, 2023. A survey of 513 Moroccan adults was fielded May 9–19, 2023, and 129 additional responses were gathered in June 17–21, 2023.[12]

The surveys were fielded on Qualtrics panels. The survey was timed not to overlap with a Muslim or Coptic holiday. In the consent, they were told the anonymous survey was about public opinion, it was written by a researcher at the University of Chicago, and would take about six minutes; they were also told they could skip questions or stop at any time. The mean survey time in Egypt was 5.8 minutes (median 5.1 minutes) and the mean survey time in Morocco was 8.25 minutes (median 7.03 minutes). It is a convenience sample, but quotas were set for age brackets and sex based on the Arab Barometer VI demographics. The sample is more educated than the general population and more urban (Table 1). As such, the answers themselves are not taken as measurements of a population opinion profile and are not shown. This analysis focuses on the results from the Muslim portion of the sample ($n = 531$ and $n = 627$).[13]

[12]This was because a large number of responses in the first sample were collected on Fridays, which is religiously salient. However, the effect of ethnodoxy is not significantly different among those who took the survey on a Friday and those who took the survey on other days of the week.

[13]Respondents self-identified their religious and ethnic group. These religious groups were included in Arab Barometer VII, and the population shares are in line with those measurements. In AB7, almost all Muslims identified themselves as Sunni, a Sunni fiqh school, or "Just a Muslim"; 0.1 percent said Alawi and 0.2 percent said other; it is thus likely that these respondents were Sunni. In AB7, all the self-identifying Christians identified as Catholic. In AB5, almost all Egyptian Muslims identified as Sunni, a Sunni fiqh school, or "Just a Muslim"; in AB5, 80 percent of Christian sect respondents identified as Coptic Orthodox and 18.4 percent as Catholic, and 1 percent as Armenian Orthodox. 0.2 percent of respondents (across religions) identified as other. Similarly the ethnicity options expanded on the Arab Barometer VII responses. In AB7, all Egyptian respondents in that survey chose Arab. In AB7, 70.9 percent of Moroccans identified as Arab, 28.0 percent as Amazigh/Berber, 0.6 percent as Tuareg, and 0.6 percent as other. Thus, these results are in line with the prior evaluations.

Table 1: Sample demographics

	Egypt	Morocco
Percent Muslim	97.8	97.7
Percent Christian	1.8	0.3
Percent None	0.2	1.2
Percent Other		0.6
Percent Arab	97.1	66.8
Percent Amazigh		30.7
Percent Coptic	2.4	0.3
Percent Other	0.6	1.6
Percent Tuareg		0.6
Mean year of birth	1986	1984
Median year of birth	1990	1988
Percent male	51.0	51.6
Percent female	49.0	48.4
Percent with higher education	86.0	59.8
Percent urban residence	88.6	88.0
Percent suburban residence	5.3	9.0
Percent rural residence	6.1	2.8
Percent income sufficient to expenses	77.0	66.5

These countries are both Arab and Muslim majority countries in North Africa. They are differently diverse, though. Morocco has a larger ethnic minority group, the Amazigh. Egypt has a well-known if small religious minority, the Coptic Christian community. Egypt has a recurrently tense relationship with Islamist groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood, and the military plays a high-profile political role. Morocco has a parliamentary monarchy that claims descent from the Prophet Muhammed, and it recently had an Islamist-party-headed government. According to AB7, very few Egyptians report receiving remittances from family abroad (96.8 percent said they do not); some Moroccan households do (70.2 percent do not). Thus, these are distinct contexts in which to evaluate the relationship between Arab–Muslim ethnodoxy and attitudes toward migration.

Following Ridge (2023c), a four-question scale for Arab Muslim ethnodoxy is used. Respondents reported their agreement with the following sentences: (1) Arabs are spiritually richer and stronger in their faith than Western peoples, (2) Only in Arab countries can one find the true Islam, (3) An Arab who converts to another religion (e.g., Christianity) is no longer truly Arab, and (4) A non-Arab will never be truly Muslim, even if he goes to mosque. A factor score was extracted to measure ethnodoxy. The score ranged from −1.22 to 1.86 with a mean of 0.00 and a median of −0.10. The standardized Cronbach's alpha was .70 in Egypt and .65 in Morocco.

Separately, a factor score was extracted for a desire to prioritize Islam in the country. This is referred to as Islamic Privilege. It reflects agreement with statements: (1) Islam should enjoy a privileged position in society and (2) The state should protect the Muslim faith of the Egyptian/Moroccan people. The score ranged from −5.19 to 0.32 with a mean of 0.00 and a median of 0.32. The standardized Cronbach's alpha was .68 in Egypt and .65 in Morocco. Including this score alongside ethnodoxy distinguishes respondents' support for the religion generally from their belief in the co-extensiveness of the Muslim and Arab communities. Notably, some ethnodoxy studies have proposed that ethnodoxic beliefs cause respondents to promote religious-ingroup privileges—Karpov et al. find they load together in factor analysis, but that is not found here. The scores, though, are minimally correlated at ($r = .04$ in Morocco and .10 in Egypt). The questions

in the ethnodoxy and IP scales built on questions used by Karpov et al. (2012) and described in Ridge (2023c).

Respondents were also asked about their opinions on several statements pertaining to immigration. Multiple questions were used to capture the varieties of (anti-)immigration beliefs reported above. They were asked how true it is that "Immigrants increase crime rates in Egypt," "Immigrants fill useful jobs in Egypt," and "Immigrants in Egypt lead to social conflict." A higher score indicates agreement with that phrase. These questions have been previously asked by the World Values Survey. They also reflect the concerns North African citizens express about immigration (King 2023). Economic concern does not have to lead to anti-immigrant attitudes. Respondents may be open to immigrants, conditional on their economic utility (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015), although they may still take culture-threat-based concerns to heart (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). These are analyzed separately based on reported strong agreement (4) to strong disagreement (1). A factor score was also created from those three items wherein higher scores reflect anti-immigration responses. The standardized Cronbach's alpha was .67 in Egypt and .66 in Morocco.

These three factor scores were calculated independently based on the responses to the listed questions. They were extracted using the *psych* package and oblimin rotation (Revelle 2023). The key independent variable is ethnodoxy. Migration attitudes are the dependent variables.

The models also include the Islamic privilege score. Respondents' agreement that "Religious diversity strengthens Arab societies" is included to distinguishes immigration attitudes from general diversity attitudes. As an indicator of nationalism, their agreement that "The world would be better if more countries were like" Egypt or Morocco, respectively, is included. Ethnodoxy has been linked to nationalism, and nationalism might drive immigration attitudes, so it is included to account for that possibility.

Demographic covariates are introduced additively to the models for ethnicity (Arab is the reference category),[14] age, sex, residence (urban is the reference category), higher education, and whether the household's income is sufficient to its expenses.[15] Ridge (2023c) finds that ethnodoxy is more common among the less educated and those with sufficient incomes. As these demographics could connect to ethnoreligious beliefs and to immigration attitudes, they are appropriate covariates. For the individual immigration statements, ordered logistic regression models are used. For the immigration factor, an OLS model is used.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

These data can be used to evaluate the relationship between ethnodoxy and immigration beliefs and preferences (Tables 2–3). The results are quite similar across the two countries. Individuals who linked Islam and Arab ethnicity hold less favorable views of immigration in general (Model 4). General anti-immigrant sentiment is lower in Egypt among those who would protect and privilege Islam in Egypt. In Morocco, it is lower among those who see value for Arab countries from religious diversity. The predicted probability of holding anti-immigration beliefs at a given level of ethnodoxy is shown in Figure 1.

The patterns can be evaluated also with respect to the particular beliefs about immigration. The questions targeted beliefs about the effect on crime and social order in Egypt and Morocco and whether immigrants do useful jobs. Individuals who more strongly link being Arab and being

[14]There were too few non-Arab Egyptians in the sample to test between-group differences. In the Morocco sample, (non-)Arab-ethnodoxy interaction terms are largely not significant. The exception is the crime question, wherein the relationship is marginally stronger for Arab Moroccans (Appendix B).

[15]The Morocco survey included a question about prayer frequency to assess religiosity. The findings are robust to its inclusion. It is only marginally and negatively significant for the immigration factor model (Appendix C).

Table 2: Immigration attitudes among Egyptian Muslims

	Increase crime	Fill useful jobs	Cause conflict	Anti-immigrant sentiment
Ethnodoxy	0.86***	0.12	0.95***	0.44***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.05)
Islamic privilege	−0.18	0.26*	−0.22*	−0.10*
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.05)
Diversity is beneficial	0.09	0.46***	0.02	0.03
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.04)
Nationalism	−0.05	0.08	−0.11	−0.03
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.04)
Ethnicity: Coptic	1.10***	0.57***	1.15***	0.55
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.38)
Ethnicity: Other	−0.12***	1.31***	−12.59***	−0.33
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.61)
Male	0.47**	−0.04	0.13	0.18*
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.08)
Year of birth	0.00***	0.02***	0.01***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Sufficient income	0.10	0.35	−0.03	0.04
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.09)
Higher education	−0.11	0.25	0.28	−0.03
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.11)
Rural residence	0.22	0.10	0.34	0.10
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.16)
Suburban resident	−0.25	0.04	0.06	−0.06
	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.17)
1|2	4.84***	27.44***	17.59***	
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	
2|3	6.53***	30.36***	19.36***	
	(0.11)	(0.60)	(0.11)	
3|4	7.79***	33.41***	20.52***	
	(0.16)	(0.56)	(0.16)	
(Intercept)				−0.35
				(5.81)
AIC	1323.59	983.16	1309.82	
Number of observations	530	530	530	530
R^2				.17
Adj. R^2				.15

***$p < .001$; **$p < .01$; *$p < .05$.

Muslim are more likely to believe that immigration causes crime and social conflict (Models 1 and 3). Immigration risks increasing diversity in the country, and these individuals with the simpler group identities are more likely to identify a threatening outcome from that scenario. The ethnoreligious linkage scores did not significantly predict the economic response.

Overall, these findings are consistent with the prediction above that ethnoreligious linkage reduces openness to immigration. The null findings on the employment model could indicate that respondents are more concerned about the sociocultural impact of migration than the economic

Table 3: Immigration attitudes among Moroccan Muslims

	Increase crime	Fill useful jobs	Cause conflict	Anti-immigrant sentiment
Ethnodoxy	0.51***	−0.06	0.54***	0.24***
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.04)
Islamic privilege	0.00	0.20*	−0.06	−0.03
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.04)
Diversity is beneficial	−0.23**	0.26***	0.00	−0.06
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.03)
Nationalism	−0.17*	0.21*	0.00	−0.05
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Ethnicity: Amazigh	−0.04	−0.11	−0.11	−0.03
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.07)
Ethnicity: Coptic	−1.46***	−0.88***	13.28***	0.24
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.60)
Ethnicity: Other	−1.59***	−0.12***	−0.98***	−0.56
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.30)
Ethnicity: Touareg	−0.27***	−1.63***	−0.49***	−0.15
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.48)
Male	0.01	0.30	0.00	−0.03
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.07)
Year of birth	0.00***	−0.00***	0.02***	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Sufficient income	0.11	0.03	−0.18	−0.03
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.07)
Higher education	0.48**	0.22	0.01	0.06
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.07)
Rural residence	−0.12***	1.18***	−0.34***	−0.22
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.20)
Suburban resident	0.31	−0.36	0.64*	0.26*
	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.12)
1|2	4.83***	−6.80***	32.38***	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
2|3	6.44***	−5.40***	33.89***	
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.10)	
3|4	8.22***	−2.55***	35.55***	
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.14)	
(Intercept)				−10.72*
				(4.77)
AIC	1629.94	1361.75	1653.26	
Number of observations	623	624	624	623
R^2				.09
Adj. R^2				.07

***$p < .001$; **$p < .01$; *$p < .05$.

Figure 1
Ethnodoxy and anti-immigration beliefs



Figure 2
Effect of ethnodoxy on immigration crime attitudes



impact. The qualitative responses below are consistent with this principle. Respondents are aware of the economic costs and benefits of population transfers, and they know people migrate to and from their countries. Many respondents, though, expressed concern about law and order and stability in their communities. The predicted probability of strongly disagreeing (1) to strongly agreeing (4) with the statements about crime at a given level of ethnodoxy is shown in Figure 2.

The desire to privilege and protect Islam and optimism toward religious diversity were also significant predictors. In Egypt and Morocco, those who would privilege Islam were more likely to think immigrants performed useful jobs (Model 2); in Egypt, though, they were also more likely to think immigration caused conflict (Model 3). In both samples, those who saw religious diversity as beneficial were more likely to say immigrants fill useful jobs (Model 2).

In Morocco those who saw religious diversity as beneficial were less likely to think immigration causes crime (Model 1). Nationalist sentiment was only a significant predictor in Morocco; nationalists were more likely to think immigration increases crime (Model 1) while also being more likely to believe immigrants can fill useful jobs (Model 2).

In the MENA findings, this seems to be a question of immigration and immigrants as an idea rather than immigrants as people. Karpov et al. suggest that ethnodoxic Russians evince more ethnic prejudice and less religious tolerance. Intolerance opens the door for respondents to also

desire social distance. These results, though, show that ethnodoxy is not necessarily associated with desiring social distance from immigrants.

The survey included a battery for their response to several kinds of potential neighbors, building on the Arab Barometer questions. The answers ranged from strongly like (1) to strongly dislike (5). These questions were randomized in order. They included neighbors who are "people of a different religion," "people of a different race or color," "people with a lower social status," "immigrants or foreign workers from the Gulf," and "immigrants or foreign workers from sub-Saharan Africa." It thus includes religious and racial diversity as well as immigrants from different backgrounds. For each item, the respondents' distance score is calculated by their rating for that item minus their average score for the battery.

OLS models for the distance scores reveal that ethnodoxy does not significantly predict social distance preferences, except for the Egyptian model for sub-Saharan African immigrants (Appendix D). In that case, the implication is apparently that ethnodoxic respondents are more welcoming to these individuals.[16]

We might consider this divergence a distinction between accepting a person at the individual level, at least the existence of the person, and endorsing something that would increase the presence of that group, or any other outgroup for that matter. Ethnodoxy is tied to the concerns about social disorder, these results suggest, more so than questions of economic participation or competition. This is reminiscent of Ivarsflaten and Sniderman's (2022) discussion of the varieties of inclusivity espoused by non-Muslim Europeans toward Muslims. Celebrating diversity was not high on Europeans' agenda, even if they tolerated it. Immigrants can come and do useful jobs, and they can live next door. However, those most prone to perpetually other these immigrants are the most concerned that immigrants will pose a threat to social cohesion. For those respondents, anti-immigrant sentiment can linger.

In addition to these direct questions about religion, society, and perceptions of immigration, the survey included an open-ended space in which respondents could share anything else they wished to say. Although many wrote nothing or commented on religion or ethnicity generally, some used the space to expand on their feelings on immigration and diversity. While some endorsed diversity, others invoked the economic and security concerns familiar to immigration debates.

Several respondents took the opportunity to endorse tolerance. For instance, multiple individuals quoted an Egyptian aphorism: "Religion is for God and the homeland is for everyone."[17] That everyone could even extend to immigrants, although it could also be construed as all citizens. Respondents even appealed to Islam as an endorsement of diversity. An Amazigh Muslim woman (YOB 1992) responded, "There is no difference between the Arab and the non-Arab except piety—we made you into peoples and tribes so that you may know each other. Indeed, the most honorable of you with Allah is the most pious of you" (E: −1.22, IP: 0.32).[18] She is quoting Qur'an Sura al-Hujarat 13. Fittingly, she scored very low on ethnoreligious linkage and anti-immigrant sentiment. These responses offer cultural language for pro-immigrant frames.

Some respondents specifically defended immigration as an economic boon to the country or to the migrant. An Arab Egyptian man (YOB 1991) wrote, "Immigrants to Egypt, especially the Syrians, made a breakthrough in the Egyptian economy by working. This indicates that the failure

[16]Based on the above information, such individuals are likely Sudanese Muslims. As some Sudanese are considered Arab due to intermarriage, this group may have some sociocultural overlap. Furthermore, co-religionist immigrants can have an easier time being accepted, even across racial lines (Yang and Ebaugh 2001; Form 2000; Marti 2008; Calvillo and Bailey 2015).

[17] الدين لله والوطن للجميع (original Arabic)

[18] لافرق بين عربي و اعجمي الا بالتقوى – وجعلناكم شعوبا و قبائل لتتعارفوا ان اكرمكم عند الله اتقاكم (original Arabic)

is not from the Egyptian government alone but also the people, lazy and not looking for opportunities well."[19] He expressed pro-immigrant and pro-religious diversity sentiments in the direct questions and very low ethnoreligious linkage (E: −1.31, IP: 0.37). Another, an Arab Egyptian man (YOB 1992), stated, "Immigration, from the perspective of its associates, is a means of survival. Maybe this is not true, but sometimes it is their only hope in order to have a decent life."[20] He gave moderate immigration answers but opposed religious diversity for Arab states (E: −0.83, IP: −0.52). They could at least accept migration as natural if not wonderful. A Muslim Amazigh Moroccan man (YOB 1966) wrote, "As for religion, it is a personal matter between the individual and his Lord, and he shares with the individuals of his community in that. As for migration, it has been afflicting man since his beginning, and it is in his nature" (E: −1.22, IP: 0.32).[21] He endorsed religious diversity while scoring low on ethnoreligious linkage.

Other respondents expressed reservations toward immigration in very general language, but several pointed to (perceived) illegal immigration. An Arab Egyptian woman (YOB 1999) wrote, "I wish immigration would decrease and that the economy of the country would improve and that love prevails between Muslims and non-Muslims."[22] She avowed only moderate immigration sentiments in the direct questions; she also did not endorse a value to religious diversity or express an ethnoreligious linkage (E: −0.51, IP: 0.37). Her opposition to diversity then extends across ethnic lines but not religious divisions or the border. An Amazigh Muslim man (YOB 1963) asked "why is sub-Saharan African immigration authorized in my country Morocco" (E: 1.86, IP: 0.32).[23] Unsurprisingly, he was high in anti-immigrant sentiment and ethnoreligious linkage, despite endorsing religious diversity. Another Muslim Amazigh man (YOB 1967) wrote, "The existing relationships between the religions must be examined by religious scholars. Also, there must be laws put in place that are appropriate to the immigration situation in my country."[24] He scored very low in privileging Islam in Morocco, which could mean the examination he wanted was a deprioritization of the current official religion, Maliki Islam (E: 0.16; I: −2.33). Emphasizing irregular migration highlights migration as a symbolic threat to the country.

Some made their support for immigration—or even displaced communities—conditional on law and order. For instance, an Arab Egyptian man (YOB 1974) indicated, "It was incumbent on us, with the changes and successive crises that are happening and which have proven [it] to us in the highest degree, to change our opinions about others who are different from us in race and religion. The principle is cooperation as long as there is no action from the other that can be described as crimes. I believe that that must be our understanding now."[25] He saw religious diversity as valuable and expressed pro-immigrant sentiments in the direct questions (E: −0.66, IP: 0.37). Similarly, an Amazigh Muslim Moroccan man (YOB 1961) wrote, "In my opinion, the governments' concern with citizens' peace, stability, security, and standard of living are more

[19] المهاجرون الى مصر خاصة السوريون قاموا بعمل طفرة فى الاقتصاد المصرى. (original Arabic)
"وهذا يدل على ان التقصير ليس من الحكومه المصرية وحدها بل الشعب ايضا متكاسل ولا يبحث عن الفرص بشكل جيد.
[20] الهجرة من منظور اصحابها هي طوق نجاة لهم وربما هذا غير صحيح لكنه احيانا يكون املهم الوحيد من اجل معيشة كريمة (original Arabic)
[21] بالنسبة للدين فهو مسألة شخصية بين الفرد وربه ويتسشارك مع افراد مجتمعه في ذلك. (original Arabic)
اما بالنسبة للهجرة فهي كانت مصابة للانسان مند نشأته وهي من طبعه.' (original Arabic)
[22] "اتمنى لو تقل الهجرة" (original Arabic)
وان يتحسن اقتصاد البلد
وان يسود الحب بين المسلمين وغير المسلمين"
[23] (original French) pourquoi l imigration sud saharien est autorisée dans mon pays le maroc
[24] يجب اعادة النظر في العلاقات القائمة بين الاديان من طرف فقهاء الدين كما يجب وضع قوانين تناسب وضعية المهاجرين ببلدي (original Arabic)
[25] وجب علينا مع التغيرات التى يمر بها والازمات المتلاحقة والتى أثبتت للجميع أننا فى أشد الاحتياج لتغيير نظرتنا للاخر (original Arabic)
المختلف عننا فى العرق والعقيدة وان الاصل هو التعاون طلما لا يوجد من الاخر افعال يمكن وصفها كجرائم, اعتقد انه ذلك يجب ان يكون مفهومنا حاليا, شكرا

important than any religious, ideological, or geopolitical concern."[26] He scored very low on ethnoreligious linkage and endorsed religious diversity (E: −1.22, IP: 0.32). This focus on crime is consistent with the high factor loading for that component (Appendix A).

Some respondents also opined on the domestic economic situation. The region suffered greatly under the economic strain of the pandemic, inflation, and wheat import impediments due to the war in Ukraine. Although they did not explicitly state that this should mean restrictions on immigration, economic turmoil has been invoked in anti-immigration movements (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; King 2023). An Amazigh Muslim woman (YOB 1985) appealed to substantial economic difficulties. She reports, "Unfortunately Morocco is currently facing a lot of economic crises, and that has destroyed the government's capacity. Thus, you find the Moroccan street suffering to preserve its strength and trying very hard to maintain its Muslim faith."[27] She nonetheless accepted religious diversity and immigration (E: −0.58, IP: 0.32). Conversely, one Arab Muslim Moroccan man (YOB 1980) who did express strong anti-immigrant sentiments expressly mentioned "the economic situation in Arab countries, in light of the deterioration in the standard of living for the majority of Arab citizens, especially in North African countries" (E: −0.58, IP: 0.32).[28] Immigrants from poorer countries seeking jobs or transiting to wealthier countries are seen as an economic threat or burden, even in countries that themselves have citizens' emigrating due to their own standard of living issues.

If they were seen as economically beneficial, though, immigrants were more acceptable. This is consistent with research from the United States (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). An Arab Muslim Moroccan man (YOB 1986) would welcome immigrants conditional on their societal contribution: "A person, whatever his type, must be useful to society"[29] (E: −0.05, IP: 0.32). He scored very low on anti-immigrant sentiment, although he was less sanguine about religious diversity and minority rights. Taking it a step further, an Arab Muslim Moroccan woman (YOB 1999) stressed economic issues over racial or religious considerations: "Everyone should believe in peace. Despite the differences in religions, races, or social classes, the most important thing is that everyone must know his property and his obligations and respect others without violence, hatred, or ill will"[30] (E: −0.46, IP: 0.32). In her survey responses, she was willing to permit any government, even nondemocratic governments, that could solve the country's economic problems. In countries with substantial immigration *and* substantial economic problems, it is not surprising that these domains are linked for the public. Ethnodoxic respondents, though, are apparently more reactive to the threat to the social order, while their response to the economic question was not substantially different from the less-ethnodoxic respondents.

The cultural dimension, though, was not overlooked in the qualitative responses. Immigration was taken as a threat to the very social identity. An Arab Muslim Moroccan man (YOB 1967) stated, "The wave of African immigration to Morocco will create, with the passage of time, a big problem at the level of the country's Islamic identity."[31] Although he was high in ethnoreligious linkage, he saw benefits in religious diversity and expressed mixed attitudes toward migration (E: 0.82, IP: 0.32). The identity crisis may then not be imminent in his eyes, or it may be resolvable.

[26] في نظري انشغال الحكومة بسلامة المواطن واستقراره وامنه ومعيشته اهم من اي انشغال ديني او ايديولوجي او جيوسياسي (original Arabic)

[27] للاسف المغرب تواجه حاليا أزمات اقتصادية كثيرة و ذلك اعدم كفائة الحكومة لهذا تجد الشارع المغربي يعانني لتوفير (original Arabic)
قوته ويحاول بكل جد الحفاظ على عقيدته المسلمة

[28] أود فعلا التحدث عن الأوضاع الإقتصادية للدول العربية. في ضل تدهور المستوى المعيشي لغالبية المواطنين العرب خصوصا في (original Arabic)
دول شمال افريقيا

[29] الإنسان مهما كان نوعه يجب أن يكون موفيد للمجتمع (original Arabic)

[30] الجميع يجب ان يؤمن بالسلام" (original Arabic)
رغم اختلاف الديانات او الاعراق او الطبقة الاجتماعية الاهم هو ان كل شخص يجب
"ان يعرف ماله وماعليه وان يحترم الغير بدون عنف او كره او حقد

[31] موجة هجرة الأفارقة إلى المغرب ستخلق مع مرور الوقت مشكل كبير على مستوى الهوية الإسلامية للبلد (original Arabic)

An Arab Muslim Moroccan woman (YOB 1962) said, "Limit African migration because they pose a danger to society."[32] She was very high on ethnoreligious linkage and on anti-immigrant sentiment (E: 1.86, IP: 0.32). Notably, sub-Saharan African migrants are not necessarily non-Muslims. However, this assumption that they would challenge the Islamic identity and social fabric demonstrates the tacit linkage of the state's Arab character and its Islamic character.

As long as the immigrants were not a cultural threat, then, they could be welcomed. An Arab Muslim Moroccan man (YOB 1964) stated, "I hope that every Muslim is open to other cultures and accepting of other opinions, as long as it does not impinge on his traditions and religious beliefs. We are all equal. Thank you."[33] He expressed openness to religious diversity and great pro-immigrant sentiments although he also averred a strong ethnoreligious linkage (E: 0.82, IP: 0.32). Still, respect and toleration did not always extend beyond the border. An Arab Muslim Moroccan woman (YOB 1979) proposed, "There will be no problems in co-existence among people, no matter the religion or race, when there is mutual respect and good morals" (E: −0.46, IP: 0.32).[34] She approved of religious diversity but demonstrated strong anti-immigrant sentiments. Ethnodoxic respondents were more likely to assert a sociocultural threat.

Overall, while these respondents recognize that citizens of other Middle East or African countries feel called to immigrate, they fear the social and economic consequences that they anticipate for their countries. These forces create seeming ambiguities in public opinion. The results then demonstrate the great variety of public attitudes that exist toward immigration in these North African countries and the social forces undergirding that opinion. Ethnodoxy, though, is more associated with the symbolic threat than the economic concerns.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has focused on the linkage between ethnodoxy—the belief that ethnicity and religion are overlapping identities—and immigration attitudes, demonstrating that ethnodoxic Arab Muslims hold more conservative immigration attitudes. Drawing on surveys of Muslim populations in Egypt and Morocco conducted in February and May–June 2023, it finds that ethnodoxic respondents are more likely to believe immigrants cause crime and social disorder. The ethnodoxic respondents are more reactive to potential symbolic threats from immigration than less ethnodoxic respondents.

The effect of ethnodoxy is distinguished from the effect of their attitudes toward Islam and its place in society. Those who would promote Islam in Egypt and Morocco, instead, are more likely to say that immigrants serve a useful economic role and are less likely to say that they cause social harms. Overall, then, it seems that although ethnodoxy may align identities, encourage a sense of founders' privilege, and support nationalism, it is problematic in migration-salient environments.

In doing so, this study extends the literature on ethnodoxy and political preferences. Previous studies have emphasized identifying cases of ethnodoxy and demonstrating that ethnodoxy increases the power of religious groups or country-based nationalism. In this case, ethnodoxy is linked to another secular policy domain, immigration. Future research, though, could extend ethnodoxy research to less potentially-ethnicized policy arenas.

Similarly, this study extends the social identity complexity literature by examining ethnoreligious identities and by examining social identity complexity in the Middle East. By linking ethnicity and religion, these individuals create simpler social identities, which facilitates negative out-group attitude formation. Furthermore, it maximizes the apparent threat from an ethnic

[32] حد من هجرة أفارقة لانهم يشكلون خطر على المجتمع (original Arabic)

[33] ارجو ان يكون كل مسلم منفتح على ثقافة الاخر متقبلا للراي الاخر طالما لا يمس بتقاليده و معتقداته الدينية كلنا سواسية شكرا (original Arabic)

[34] لاتكون هناك مشاكل في التعايش بين الناس لادينية ولاعرقية عندما يكون الإحترام المتبادل والأخلاق الطيبة. (original Arabic)

or religious threat to a potential threat on both dimensions. Notably, this study has distinguished this belief in overlapping identities from attitudes toward diversity. Thus, it shows that the effect of social identity simplicity extends beyond a mere increase in tolerance, which was identified in previous research.

Furthermore, the relationships identified between ethnodoxy and immigration attitudes are distinct from citizens' preferences for social distance. Ethnodoxic respondents were not opposed to diverse neighborhoods, compared to the less ethnodoxic respondents, despite their skepticism toward immigrants. Thus, the focus seems to be on the *idea* of an outgroup or of societal change, rather than distaste for individual migrants. Thus, this study emphasizes the distinction between social behavior and political behavior.

Subsequent studies could explore heterogenous effects of ethnodoxy by demographics. The present sample is rather educated and urban, so it may be more pro-immigrant overall; hence not reporting the per-question response rates. These kinds of characteristic, though, invite further scrutiny. For instance, such that higher education is associated with lower ethnodoxy and more immigration tolerance (Hainmeuller and Hopkins, 2014, 2015; Ridge 2023c), education may moderate these effects. Similarly, future work could consider the impact of immigrant exposure or personal migration experience, be it from a rural area to the city, between countries, or by family members. Urban-dwellers may have more contact with migrants and more experience changing locations themselves. Thus, their immigration attitudes may be more stable and less ideologically inflected. Scholars might also consider whether the effect varies by migration experience, such as receiving remittances, which could moderate the relationship. Due to space and data constraints, such evaluations are left to future research.

Future research can also examine additional elements of outgroup toleration that could be impacted by ethnodoxy. For instance, it could specify the ethnic, racial, and religious demographics of potential migrants to examine heterogenous effects. It could also consider toleration toward domestic minorities, such as local Christian populations, the Amazigh, or black Arabs. By showing that belief in the fusion of religious and ethnic identity impacts Muslims' political attitudes in the MENA, this study contributes to the growing literature on comparative race and ethnic politics and religion's role in public opinion formation.

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