

Chapman University

## Chapman University Digital Commons

---

Business Faculty Articles and Research

Business

---

5-7-2018

### Models of Intragroup Conflict in Management: A Literature Review

Matthew W. McCarter

*University of Texas at San Antonio*

Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni

*Duke University*

Darcy Fudge Kamal

*Chapman University, kamal@chapman.edu*

H. Min Bang

*Duke University*

Steven J. Hyde

*University of Texas at San Antonio*

*See next page for additional authors*

Follow this and additional works at: [https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/business\\_articles](https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/business_articles)



Part of the [Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons](#), [Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons](#), [Organizational Communication Commons](#), [Other Business Commons](#), and the [Other Communication Commons](#)

---

#### Recommended Citation

McCarter, M. W., Wade-Benzoni, K., Kamal, D. K. F., Bang, H. M., Hyde, S. J., & Maredia, R. (2018). Models of intragroup conflict in management: A literature review. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.017

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Business at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Business Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [laughtin@chapman.edu](mailto:laughtin@chapman.edu).

---

## Models of Intragroup Conflict in Management: A Literature Review

### Comments

NOTICE: this is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* in 2018.

[DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.017](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.017)

The Creative Commons license below applies only to this version of the article.

### Creative Commons License



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

### Copyright

Elsevier

### Authors

Matthew W. McCarter, Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni, Darcy Fudge Kamal, H. Min Bang, Steven J. Hyde, and Reshma Maredia

# Models of Intragroup Conflict in Management: A Literature Review

Matthew W. McCarter<sup>\*‡</sup>  
H. Min Bang<sup>§</sup>

Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni<sup>§</sup>  
Steven J. Hyde<sup>\*</sup>

Darcy K. Fudge Kamal<sup>\*\*†</sup>  
Reshma Maredia<sup>\*</sup>

## Abstract

The study of intragroup dynamics in management studies views conflict as a contingency process that can benefit or harm a group based on characteristics of the group and context. We review five models of intragroup conflict in management studies. These models include diversity-conflict and behavioral negotiation models that focus primarily on conflict within a group of people; social exchange and transaction cost economics models that focus primarily on conflict within a group of firms; and social dilemma models that focus on conflict in collectives of people, organizations, communities, and generations. The review is constituted by summarizing the insights of each model, foundational papers to each model; the most recent uses and developments of the models in the last decade; the complementarity of these models; and the future research directions.

**Keywords:** behavioral negotiation, conflict, diversity, intragroup conflict, intra-organizational relationships, social exchange, social dilemmas, and transaction costs economics.

Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Special Issue on Conflict and War

---

\* College of Business, University of Texas, One UTSA Circle, San Antonio TX 78249, USA

† Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA

‡ Corresponding author: [matthew.mccarter@utsa.edu](mailto:matthew.mccarter@utsa.edu)

§ Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, 100 Fuqua Drive, Durham, NC 27708, USA

\*\* Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA

## 24 1. Introduction

25 The study of conflict in management began at the field's inception with Dubin (1957) observing power conflicts  
26 between labor unions and managers within organizations. Thompson (1960) brought the study of conflict to the  
27 forefront when he observed that conflict is something ever-present in organizations and is to be avoided and controlled.  
28 Cyert and March's (1963) seminal book, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm*, built on Thompson's ideas, observing that conflict  
29 stems from incompatible goals and information among people who constitute an organization. Litterer (1966) agreed  
30 with Thompson, Cyert, and March on the ubiquity and often burdensomeness of conflict in organizational life, but also  
31 noted that, because it "energizes people to activity" (p. 180), conflict can be a positive thing for organizations – especially  
32 when innovation and change are wanted. Consequently, Litterer urged organizations, and those who study them, to find  
33 ways to harness the good and avoid the bad of conflict. Pondy (1967) complemented Litterer's work by observing that  
34 conflict may be studied between or within organizations, suggesting that models of conflict may have different  
35 assumptions and uses depending on the level of analysis. Since these early works, many fruitful research areas on conflict  
36 arose; focusing on the positives and negatives conflict brings to organizations. Figure 1 provides an estimate of the rise  
37 and steady state of conflict research in top-tier management journals.<sup>1</sup>

38 The management field studies conflict at different levels of analysis. Conflict can be studied within a person such  
39 as when modeling role conflict (e.g. Rizzo et al., 1970) and cognitive dissonance (e.g. Festinger, 1962). Conflict can also  
40 be studied among groups such as in the modeling of team competition (e.g. Johnson et al., 2006), network competition  
41 (e.g. Das & Teng, 2002), and firm sustainability in resource-constrained environments (e.g. Hart & Ahuja, 1996). Lastly,  
42 conflict can be studied within a group or a collective of agents who are interdependently connected (Sullivan, 2002)  
43 such as in modeling team diversity and alliance cooperation (e.g. Jehn, 1995; Zeng & Chen, 2003).

44 The current review focuses on five models about conflict within a group or intragroup conflict. The models are  
45 diversity-conflict, behavioral negotiation, social dilemma, social exchange, and transaction cost economics models.  
46 There are several reasons for focusing on intragroup conflict models.<sup>2</sup> First, while previous reviews focus primarily on  
47 the negatives (e.g. Rubin et al., 1994) or positives of conflict (e.g. De Dreu & Van De Vliert, 1997), there is has been  
48 little attempt to discuss complementarity among intragroup conflict models. The absence of such integration may be  
49 because the models are used in distinct areas of management with little crosstalk. Second, the research that reviews

50 specific models of intragroup conflict is primarily descriptive in findings and not theoretical insights.<sup>3</sup> It is therefore our  
51 intention to highlight the foundational papers of the models reviewed and explain why the papers are critical and go  
52 one step further by reviewing some of the most recent contributions to these models.

53 Taken together, the intragroup conflict models reviewed herein present several insights. The first is how conflict is  
54 conceptualized. Conflict is a “dynamic process” whereby at least one agent feels, perceives, or behaves in opposition  
55 toward another agent (Pondy, 1967). The ideas of conflict being a perception or feeling – coupled with the possibility  
56 of it producing positive outcomes for organizations – distinguish management’s study of the topic from other fields’.  
57 Whereas other fields – e.g. economics – consider an agent expending resources to harm another as a necessary condition  
58 of conflict (Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2007), conflict as studied in management may be entirely a perception made by the  
59 individual agent in addition to it “manifesting” through behavior (Pondy, 1967).

60 The second insight is that intragroup conflict does not always result in a negative outcome, providing some  
61 additional parsimony between management’s study of the topic and other’s in the social sciences. Some disciplines –  
62 e.g. international relations in political science – primarily view conflict as leading to negative outcomes (e.g. Levy &  
63 Thompson, 2011). Indeed, intragroup conflict does have its negative effects between individuals – be they people or  
64 organizations. As we shall discuss here, intragroup conflict is viewed primarily by social dilemma and transaction cost  
65 economics models as resulting in negative outcomes. However, the field of management approaches conflict as a  
66 contingency process that can benefit or harm an organization based on characteristics of that organization and its  
67 members (Litterer, 1966).<sup>4</sup> The contingency of conflict is in the type of conflict occurring among the parties and the  
68 outcomes of these types of conflict can be positive, negative, or both. As shall be detailed in our discussion about  
69 diversity-conflict, negotiation, and social exchange models, intragroup conflict can lead to positive or negative outcomes  
70 for organizations.

71 Before we begin, however, we observe that conflict research in management is vast – with enough research to fill  
72 multiple review volumes. The voluminous body of management scholarship on conflict developed from a field that is  
73 a melting pot of scholars who develop and borrow theory from many disciplines in the social and natural sciences  
74 (Ferraro et al., 2005); e.g. organizational theory, organizational behavior, strategy, sociology, psychology, economics,

75 social psychology, industrial psychology, history, industrial relations, political science, anthropology, and evolutionary  
76 biology. In management, any attempt to review every model of conflict in a single article would be futile.

77 To give the curious student a survey of the forest and not the trees, we review the five intragroup conflict models  
78 most commonly studied in management. These five intragroup models were selected because they either “shifted” or  
79 “created consensus” about findings in conflict research (Hollenbeck, 2008). Section 2 reviews the models, and Section  
80 3 reviews the recent literature using those models. Section 4 provides future research directions, and Section 5 concludes  
81 the review. Table 1 summarizes the main models of intragroup conflict and foundational papers.

## 82 **2. Models of Intragroup Conflict**

83 In the current section, we summarize the foundational papers for each model. The first two models reviewed are  
84 often used to understand conflict within a group composed of people: diversity-conflict and behavioral-negotiation  
85 models. The third is the social dilemma model and is used to study conflict either within a group of people or  
86 organizations. The last two models – social exchange and transaction cost models – are often used to understand conflict  
87 within a group of organizations.

### 88 **2.1. Diversity-conflict Model**

89 Diversity is defined as differences people perceive that separate themselves from others (Perry-Smith & Shalley,  
90 2003). Such differences can be visible or invisible; e.g. race, gender, values, and work experience. Following Litterer  
91 (1966), the diversity-conflict model assumes that conflict can be positive or negative for an organization contingent on  
92 the characteristics of the task and individual members involved. Further, the diversity-conflict model assumes conflict  
93 has several dimensions, and each dimension is a mechanism explaining the impact of work-team diversity on team  
94 performance. The model created consensus from a mass of publications showing inconsistent relationships between  
95 conflict and work-team performance, and it is based on three papers led by Karen Jehn. The Jehn papers show nuances  
96 about the nature of conflict and its role in understanding diversity and team performance.

97 **Jehn (1995).** The first paper is Jehn’s (1995) field survey of workers in the logistics industry and examines two  
98 dimensions of conflict in work teams: relational conflict and task conflict. Relational conflict is about interpersonal  
99 incompatibility and includes annoyance, agitation, and hostility among teammates. Task conflict is about team member  
100 incompatibility over ideas, the interpreting of information, and approaches to an organizational problem that the team

101 is facing (Jehn, 1995). Jehn (1995) found that team performance has an inverted-U relationship with task conflict: at low  
102 and high levels of task conflict, team performance is low, while a moderate level of task conflict improves team  
103 performance. Relationship conflict is robustly detrimental to team performance. Further, the nature of the task  
104 moderated the intensity of the effects between the two conflict dimensions and team performance. In routine tasks,  
105 teams that experienced either form of conflict did not perform well, but in non-routine tasks, moderated levels of task  
106 conflict were a blessing, not a curse.

107 **Jehn (1997).** The second paper is Jehn's (1997) case study of teams in a household-goods-moving organization.  
108 Jehn (1997) examined the relationship between relationship and task conflict dimensions with team performance and,  
109 more importantly, introduced the idea of process conflict. Process conflict is about incompatible preferences over how  
110 a task should be performed; e.g. how resources are allocated, who does what, and when (Jehn, 1997). Jehn (1997)  
111 introduced a new model of conflict with the different dimensions of conflict as antecedents, team performance as the  
112 outcome, and a host of team characteristics as moderators. Like relational conflict, process conflict had strong negative  
113 impact on team performance and teammate satisfaction. Process conflict ate up time the team could have used for the  
114 task and created uncertainty among teammates, motivating them to leave the team. Process conflict's effect on team  
115 performance followed an inverted-J shape: low levels of process conflict provided direction and solidarity to the team  
116 and consequently improved their performance, while medium and high levels of process conflict increasingly decreased  
117 team performance and teammate satisfaction.

118 **Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale (1999).** The final foundational paper of the diversity-conflict model is Jehn et al.'s  
119 (1999) field study of work teams in the household-goods-moving industry. Jehn et al. (1999) linked team diversity  
120 characteristics with team performance, using conflict dimensions as mediators. Team diversity characteristics included  
121 social category characteristics (e.g. gender and race), informational characteristics (e.g. education and background), and  
122 value characteristics; e.g. quantity versus quality and ends versus means. Jehn et al. (1999) found that information  
123 diversity increased task conflict among teammates that positively affected team performance. Second, value diversity  
124 increased relational conflict within the team that negatively affected team performance. Lastly, value diversity increased  
125 process conflict among teammates that negatively affected teammate sentiments of team morale, intent to remain, and

126 commitment. One process strategy that can be employed to resolve conflict among organizational members is  
127 negotiation; however, as we shall see, what people should do in a negotiation is not the same as what they actually do.

## 128 **2.2. Behavioral Negotiation Model**

129 Negotiation is a strategic process for navigating conflict and is broadly defined as the process whereby two or more  
130 parties decide what each will give and take in a relationship (Thompson, 2015). Within management, the dominant  
131 model used to study negotiation is the behavioral negotiation model. An interpersonal model, the behavioral negotiation  
132 model assumes the group of negotiators are bounded rationally in their cognitive abilities (Simon, 1982), leaving the  
133 negotiators susceptible to cognitive biases triggered by their interaction with the opponents and the deal's context. The  
134 cognitive biases undermine the information sharing process between the parties, thereby impacting the value created  
135 and claimed from the negotiation (Thompson, 1991). Like the diversity-conflict model, conflict is not seen as always  
136 being a burden, but rather than opportunity for parties to create value that could not be achieved acting alone. The  
137 pivotal works either introduced or integrated key ideas in negotiation from across several disciplines.

138 ***Walton and McKersie (1965)***. Until Walton and McKersie's (1965) book, negotiation scholarship was primarily  
139 descriptive and studied disparately in economics, political science, and labor relations. Little theory explained the various  
140 findings in labor disputes, arbitration, contract law, and traditional buyer-seller bargaining. Walton and McKersie (1965)  
141 introduced a central framework for thinking about negotiation by describing two different strategic approaches:  
142 distributive versus integrative negotiation. Distributive approaches focus on claiming as much value as possible for  
143 oneself and consist primarily of the use of threats and emotional appeals to influence counterparties to make  
144 concessions. Integrative approaches focus on creating and claiming value and consist of sharing information about  
145 interests and priorities and then finding tradeoffs to generate joint gains (Pruitt, 1981). Walton and McKersie's (1965)  
146 were consensus shifter, providing conflict scholars a package of context-specific models about how negotiators discover  
147 and divide resources.

148 ***Pruitt and Rubin (1986)***. The second work is Pruitt and Rubin's (1986) book *Social conflict*. Therein, Pruitt and  
149 Rubin (1986) introduced the dual-concerns model. The dual-concern model maintains that a negotiator has concerns  
150 for their own outcome and the other party's. Contingent on the weight the negotiator places on each of these concerns  
151 constitutes the strategy she will use during the negotiation process. Negotiators with a high concern for the other's

152 outcome and a low concern for themselves yield to requests from the opponent; when concern for the other and oneself  
153 is high then a problem-solving approach is taken to reach a deal; should concern for the other and oneself be low then  
154 it is predicted the negotiator will be disengaged from the negotiation; and lastly, when the concern for other is low and  
155 high for the self then the negotiator will contend aggressively to further her interests. The power of the dual-concerns  
156 model is not found in predicting negotiation outcomes, but rather in predicting the strategies negotiators use to achieve  
157 those outcomes. Further, the value of dual-concerns model was the idea of perceptions other than the focal negotiator  
158 when developing the now-popular behavioral negotiation model.

159 *Neale and Northcraft (1991)*. The last contribution is Neale and Northcraft's (1991) dual-party behavioral  
160 negotiation model. In presenting the model, Neale and Northcraft (1991) synthesize a sizable body of disparate empirical  
161 research into a model that predicts negotiation outcomes as a function of contextual and negotiator characteristics.  
162 Their main proposition is that any negotiation outcome is a function of the context the negotiators find themselves in  
163 and the characteristics of the negotiators themselves. Contextual characteristics are fixed elements of the negotiation  
164 environment; e.g. payoff functions between the parties, time pressure, whether negotiation occurs through a third party,  
165 or whether it occurs through a rich, compared to lean, media such as face-to-face versus text messaging. Negotiator  
166 characteristics are visible behaviors such as mood and emotions, personality and physical appearance, communication  
167 methods, and non-visible cognitions such as information processing and biases. Further, compared to contextual  
168 characteristics, negotiator characteristics can be dynamic - as emotions, ways of communication, and information  
169 processing can change over time. The elegance of Neale and Northcraft's (1991) model is that research can be  
170 categorized into one of these bins of characteristics.

### 171 **2.3. Social Dilemma Models**

172 Individual members of a group are often tempted to act in their own self-interest and profit from selfish choices,  
173 even though the whole group is better off cooperating. Such situations, in which individual benefits conflict with  
174 collective benefits, are called social dilemmas. The conflict between individual and collective rationality represents a  
175 fundamental challenge that organizations continually face, involving multiple levels of social interaction. The key issue  
176 surrounding social dilemmas is whether individuals can cooperate and prioritize the interest of the collective over the  
177 personal benefit, and if so, how such cooperation and coordination can be achieved (e.g. Sally, 1995). Cooperation in

178 social dilemmas is inherently difficult and risky. A traditional economic framework predicts that because rational  
179 individuals always attempt to maximize one's utility and make decisions that provide the greatest benefit in their highest  
180 self-interest, cooperative solutions are unlikely or unstable (Luce & Raiffa, 2012). Like the models previously reviewed,  
181 social dilemma models view conflict as being either a negative or positive thing. Each article below was instrumental in  
182 developing the models of social dilemmas because they either were the first to introduce the model, create consensus  
183 out of disparate findings about how social dilemmas are solved, or shift consensus about how we think about conflict  
184 in social dilemmas.

185 **Dawes (1980).** Dawes (1980) introduced the idea of social dilemmas and identified two outcome-relevant  
186 properties of them: (a) everyone receives the highest payoff for a selfish choice regardless of others' choices, and (b)  
187 everyone ends up receiving a lower payoff if all choose to defect rather than to cooperate. Therefore, a social dilemma  
188 is marked by a deficient equilibrium in which everyone has dominating strategies. Dawes coined the concept of the n-  
189 person prisoner's dilemma by introducing "give some" and "take some" games.<sup>5</sup> To the extent that social dilemmas  
190 involve interpersonal comparisons of payoffs, one way of eliciting cooperation is changing payoffs by introducing  
191 rewards and punishments. Dawes (1980) argues that this simple approach however raises an important question of who  
192 changes it and how to change it. The extent to which individuals value mutual benefits may be determined by other  
193 influences, such as altruism, norms and conscience that are beyond a payoff structure and material outcomes.

194 **Messick and Brewer (1983).** In addition to n-person dilemmas, Messick and Brewer (1983) further discussed  
195 interdependent interactions in a broader context in which self-interested behavior damages collective well-being. Social  
196 traps indicate situations in which individuals pursue immediate gains that are seemingly beneficial, which in the long run  
197 lead to a larger loss for the whole group. For example, if all members continue to exploit a common resource for their  
198 individual benefit, the resources will eventually be depleted. On the other hand, social fences refer to situations in which  
199 members of a group are tempted to avoid an immediate cost for collective benefits such that individuals' inaction and  
200 under-contribution hurt the group. They also discussed the temporal dimension of social dilemmas in which the  
201 outcome of the action is delayed. In this review, two types of solutions to social dilemmas were suggested. The first  
202 approach aims at influencing psychological and behavioral variables associated with actors' cooperative behavior. For  
203 example, communication is one of the prominent solutions under this category. Encouraging communication among

204 actors in social dilemmas allows them to exchange information about choices of others and creates a sense of group  
205 identity and feelings of identification. The second type of the solutions focuses on interventions that change the  
206 structural features of social dilemmas, such as the payoff structure and the group's decision structure.

207 **Kollock (1998).** Kollock (1998) further divided solutions to social dilemmas into three broad types depending on  
208 whether the solution assumes self-interested actors - motivational, strategic, and structural solutions. Motivational  
209 solutions assume that individuals can take their partners' outcomes into account. Strategic solutions assume egoistic  
210 decision-makers and do not involve structural changes in social dilemmas. Because strategic solutions are contingent  
211 upon the decision of actors that influence the outcome and behavior of their partners, such a solution is restricted to  
212 repeated two-person dilemmas. For example, reciprocal or tit-for-tat strategies have been shown to maintain  
213 cooperation in a two-person social dilemma. Finally, structural solutions involve changes in the rules of social dilemmas.  
214 Specifically, Kollock (1998) highlighted the importance of creating or reinforcing structural features that can facilitate  
215 strategic solutions. The use of monitoring and sanctioning systems can be implemented by using selective incentives  
216 and punishments.

217 **Weber, Kopelman, and Messick (2004).** The last paper challenged how we think about conflict in social  
218 dilemmas. The Weber et al. (2004) paper draws from James March's (1994) idea of the logic of appropriateness to  
219 provide alternative explanations for why people cooperate in social dilemmas. The appropriateness framework is more  
220 about perceptions than calculations. The framework maintains that – in addition to weighing the costs and benefits of  
221 a decision – individuals make decisions based on normative rules. Normative rules – e.g. “women and children first!” –  
222 are followed as a function of a person's perception of what the decision's context is and what their role in that situation  
223 is. In short, Weber et al. (2004) introduce the idea that individuals may not just ask “What are the positives and negatives  
224 of me cooperating in this social decision problem?” but also ask “What does a person like me (role) do (rules) in a  
225 situation like this (context)?” A core insight of the Weber et al. (2004) paper is that it suggests that the conflict between  
226 individual and collective preferences in social dilemmas does not always lead to a negative outcome that needs structural  
227 and psychological solutions (as maintained in the previous three reviewed papers); but rather can encourage people to  
228 cooperate and achieve collective action as a function of how the social dilemma is framed.

## 229 2.4. Social Exchange Model

230 The social exchange model approaches conflict among organizational groups out of effectiveness rather than  
231 efficiency considerations. Specifically, the model crosses levels of analysis from between individuals and organizational  
232 groups by assuming institutions and structures are negotiated through social interaction (Blau, 1964). Boundary spanning  
233 role representatives behave and act, on behalf of their organizations, as decision makers based upon the norms, values  
234 and constraints of their organization. In turn, the boundary spanners' actions subsequently influence the collective  
235 beliefs their organization holds towards the exchange partner (e.g. Zaheer et al., 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Due  
236 to its broad perspective on effectiveness, which may be gained by power, to enhancing conflict outcomes, social  
237 exchange theory has become one the most prevalent paradigms in explaining conflict.

238 Through the lens of social exchange theory, conflict involves the friction between the interests of the powerful  
239 maintaining their power over the interests of the less powerful seeking independence (Blau, 1964). As such, each person  
240 has an expected cost-benefit ratio of each relationship, based on prior experiences (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). If an  
241 individual receives fewer benefits from a given relationship than expected or less than what they could obtain from  
242 another, they will most likely terminate the relationship. A central tenet of this theory is the concept of reciprocity norm  
243 (Gouldner, 1960), which is the expectation that individuals will treat others as they are treated. As such individuals  
244 expect the benefits they have given to others will be paid back. There are caveats in which one party has more power  
245 than the other and may force the opposing party to provide benefits with little reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). The weaker  
246 party may be so dependent on scant benefits received from the more powerful party they must tolerate significant  
247 inequity in benefits. Such imbalances in reciprocity identified by Blau (1964) have become known as power asymmetry.  
248 The breadth of benefits from relationship exchanges may yield effective organizational arrangements through enhancing  
249 outcomes such as power which yield control of other actors or resources, as well as reducing constraints in the external  
250 environment (Grandori, 1991; Scott & Davis, 2003).

251 Unlike the models mentioned above, conflict from the social exchange perspective is viewed negatively for the  
252 relationship as a whole, as well as the more dependent party. In contrast, conflict is largely viewed positively when the  
253 result of the conflict yields increased power, whilst negatively for the party that becomes more dependent. Instabilities  
254 in power are typically viewed as motives for terminating relationships, which might be viewed negatively if there is an

255 expectation of continuity (e.g. Polidoro et al., 2011). Broadly, this raises issues over sources of power which involve  
256 access to resources, availability of alternatives, political coercion or legitimacy, and conflicting ideologies over resources  
257 controlled by the powerful (Blau, 1964).

258 **Emerson (1962).** Emerson's (1962) classic conceptualization of power defines it in relational terms, as a function  
259 of an actor's dependence on the other. The power of actor, Party A, over the other actor, Party B, formally, is defined  
260 as the inverse of Party B's dependence on Party A. Dependence may arise from the need for resources, organizational  
261 size, and bargaining alternatives. Emerson (1962) clarified that power is not isolated to an individual or group but as a  
262 relationship of one actor over another. Given the relative nature of power, it is important to consider who controls the  
263 resource in question over those who are dependent on the resource (Gomes-Casseres, 1994). Further, Cook and  
264 Emerson (1978) clarify that power may not only occur in a dyadic relation but also can occur amongst multiple actors  
265 in a network.

266 **Blau (1964).** Social exchange theory was initially conceptualized through the lens of behaviorism (Homans, 1958).  
267 However, it was Blau (1964) who took - what is now the most utilized approach - an economic and utilitarian perspective  
268 to explain social exchange. Although, he conceived of behavior in terms of costs and rewards, Blau maintained that  
269 behavior was determined by the rewards or costs the individual anticipates they will receive in the future rather than the  
270 rewards they received in the past, which is the opposite of behaviorism. Blau (1964) also contributed to the theory by  
271 establishing a link between micro-level behaviors and macro-level phenomena.<sup>6</sup> Blau and Scott (1962) saw the firm  
272 interacting in a context of an external environment consisting of an "organizational set". Lastly, Blau (1964) defined  
273 power as "the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence" (p. 117).  
274 Blau (1964) also notes that relationships may exhibit equilibrium in one instance and yet face disequilibrium in others.  
275 For example, a supplier firm might control access to a key input needed to the buying firm, exerting power over the  
276 buying firm. However, the buying firm might be able to anticipate changes in the downstream market more quickly than  
277 the supplier firm, negating the supplier firm's influence and control in the long-term. Thus, both the stability and  
278 instability of power become key areas of interest to social exchange theories.

279 **Pfeffer and Salancik (1978).** Social exchange theory evolved the study organizational conflict through resource  
280 dependency theory developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Drawing on social exchange theory assumptions, resource

281 dependence seeks to understand why a firm may act beyond economic efficiency considerations. Firms manage the  
282 costs and benefits of their relationships in a give-and-take (Scott & Davis, 2003). Resource dependence identifies three  
283 important considerations. First, building on Blau and Scott's (1962) idea of the "organizational set," Pfeffer and Salancik  
284 (1978) observe there is a social context in which organizations are responding to actions taken by other organizations.  
285 Organizations are not independently making decisions in isolation from each other. Second, organizations may draw on  
286 a much wider set of strategies to alleviate constraints in their environment beyond a binary market versus acquisition  
287 governance choices. Firms invoke several social strategies such as using their board of directors, industry associations  
288 and strategic alliances to manage their need for autonomy. Third, drawing on Emerson (1962) an organization becomes  
289 effective and unconstrained by seeking power, rather than efficiency, to manage their external relationships. Scott and  
290 Davis (2003, p. 234) summarize the goal of the resource dependency approach as "organizations should choose the  
291 least constraining approach to coordinate relations with other organizations and to reduce the dependence that their  
292 exchanges create."

### 293 **2.5. Transaction Cost Economics**

294 Transaction cost economics has been broadly applied to study alliance relationships. Lumineau and colleagues  
295 (2015) noted that the central concept of opportunism in transaction cost theory comports well as a model understanding  
296 conflict among organizational groups due to its "emphasis on self-interest seeking with guile" (Williamson, 1985, p. 6,  
297 47). Specifically, without such noisy bargaining tactics, parties would coordinate on the open market efficiently, leaving  
298 costlier forms of governance such as joint ventures and acquisitions as less desirable forms of organizing. Early  
299 theorizing by Commons (1932, p. 4) also raised the link between conflict and transactions by suggesting that the unit of  
300 analysis, the transaction, exhibits three conditions 'mutuality, conflict and order'. Williamson (2000, p. 599) notes the  
301 role of designing efficient forms of governance mechanisms are to "craft order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize  
302 mutual gains." Conflict would be largely viewed negatively in transaction cost economics due to the increased costs of  
303 governance required to mitigate risks of opportunism. However, management scholars integrate transaction cost  
304 approaches with other theories which might yield positive outcomes for firms through contracting capabilities (Argyres,  
305 1996) as well as integrating trust into governance decisions (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).

306 **Coase (1937).** Coase's (1937) theorizing sought to answer the question of the nature of the firm. In a comparative  
307 assessment between the firm and the market he asked, 'why would firms exist?' He defined a firm as "the system of  
308 specialized relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur"  
309 (p. 393). Such a definition brought forth a relative comparison between the actions of the entrepreneur organizing within  
310 the boundaries of the firm versus the price available in the market. Specifically, Coase highlighted that under certain  
311 conditions transactions may be more efficiently carried out by the firm than the market. He identified that bargaining  
312 in the market might be costly due to uncertainty with writing contracts which may involve third-parties such as lawyers  
313 as well as time taken to negotiate (Scott & Davis, 2003).

314 **Williamson (1975).** Williamson's (1975) work on transaction cost economics is widely credited with giving the  
315 theory empirical traction. Building on Coase's (1937) comparison between market and hierarchy efficiencies, Williamson  
316 (1981, p. 552) defines a transaction as an instance "when a good or service is transferred across a technologically  
317 separable interface." This allowed for a study of contracts, or verbal agreements, between actors, such as two  
318 organizations' respective boundary spanners, for the exchange of goods or services (Scott & Davis, 2003). The costs of  
319 arranging contracts, such as planning and revising the agreement as well as overseeing the task through completion are  
320 known as transaction costs. Williamson (1975) further identified three conditions under which small numbers bargaining  
321 might arise increasing the costs for a transaction to take place in the market. First, Williamson, building on Coase's  
322 notion of uncertainty as well as incorporating ideas of bounded rationality (Simon, 1982), identified opportunism as a  
323 source of conflict in exchange (Williamson, 1975, 1985). This concern over behavioral uncertainty limits the extent to  
324 which exchange partners can identify all possible contingencies from the exchange. Second, Williamson identified the  
325 frequency of exchange, as the more often a transaction occurs with a partner the greater complexity and fewer  
326 alternatives might be available (Williamson, 1979). Third, is the role of asset specificity, which limits the ability of the  
327 partners to redeploy investments for alternate uses, thereby decreasing available bargaining partners. Because of the  
328 inherent risks of vulnerability towards their exchange partner, the focal party making asset specific investments, will  
329 seek safeguards to protect their self-interest in the exchange. These safeguards lead to costlier forms of governance such  
330 as the use of hierarchies.

331

### 332 **3. Recent Trends about Conflict in Management**

333 Here we examine the contributions to the conflict literature published in the last decade, drawing on the five conflict  
334 models reviewed above. Because some topics straddle multiple domains in addition to management, several of our sub-  
335 sections focus on specific papers while others use a host of papers that examine a specific trend.

#### 336 **3.1. Trends using the diversity-conflict model**

337 Since Jehn's seminal papers on conflict, management scholars have examined how the negative conflict dimensions  
338 - relational and process conflict - can be mitigated to improve team performance. The trend begins with Greer et al.'s  
339 (2011) field study of sales teams in the Dutch telecommunications industry. Greer et al. (2011) maintain that teams with  
340 high power or influence in an organization will encourage its teammates to seek more power and to maintain the power  
341 they have, competing with other power-hungry teammates. Consequently, teams in high power will experience more  
342 inter-personal conflict and sub-par performance compared to those teams in low power. They found evidence for  
343 relational and process conflict mediating the relationship between team power and performance. Further, the study  
344 went on to find that power congruence, teammate perceptions of each other's power within the team, dampens the  
345 impact team power has on team conflict. They found that process conflict was present in high power teams only when  
346 power congruence was low. In other words, managers can capitalize on powerful individuals working together in  
347 organizations if they align perceptions of the pecking order among powerful teammates.

348 A second contribution is Nishii's (2013) field study of workers in a biomedical firm. Nishii (2013) examines ways  
349 to reduce relational and task conflict in gender diverse teams through a climate of inclusion. Climate of inclusion is an  
350 individual's perception that the team possesses fair procedures and distribution rules for rewards; an environment that  
351 embraces differences and ways to resolve them; and a system that involves teammates in the team decision-making  
352 process. Nishii (2013) found that the negative effect of social categorical diversity on relational diversity and subsequent  
353 team performance was dampened when climate of inclusion was high compared to when it was low. A key insight here  
354 is that managers can reduce the devastating effects of relational conflict on teams - not by encouraging homophily at  
355 the team's design - but by changing how current teammates perceive each other.

356 Another avenue of interest is how the leader perceives the team and their diversity. Tepper et al.'s (2011) field study  
357 of supervisor-subordinate relations in hospitals examined the roles of perceived deep-level diversity in values and ways

358 of approaching problems between the supervisor and subordinate, relational conflict, and work performance on  
359 perceived abusive behavior from supervisors. They found that relational conflict mediated the positive relationship  
360 between the supervisor's perceived deep-level diversity and the subordinate's perception of being abused by the  
361 supervisor; however, this was only the case when the subordinate's performance was low. In other words, the Tepper  
362 et al. (2011) paper suggests that supervisors justify their ill treatment of subordinates who are different from them  
363 primarily when they perceive the subordinates as poor performers.

364 Further, Klein and colleagues' (2011) field study of volunteer humanitarian service teams in the USA investigated  
365 how leader behaviors impacted the relationship between team value diversity and team effectiveness - with team conflict  
366 as the mechanism. The authors examined whether different leadership types - i.e. task-oriented and person-oriented  
367 leadership - would moderate the impact of diversity in work ethic and morals among teammates on team conflict, and  
368 subsequent team performance. Leadership moderates the relationship between team diversity and performance through  
369 team conflict, but it depends on the type of diversity and leadership approach. Leaders whose behaviors are heavily  
370 task-oriented could reduce team conflict where there was high work-ethic diversity. Further, leaders whose behaviors  
371 are heavily person-oriented could reduce team conflict in morally diverse teams. In either case, the leadership style's  
372 reduction of team conflict enabled diverse teams to perform better compared to when leaders exhibit little attention to  
373 the task or the workers.

374 Lount et al. (2015) investigated whether a leader's perceptions of categorical diversity in teams impacts their  
375 willingness to provide requested resources to assist them in their tasks. The experiments report that leaders perceive  
376 more relationship conflict in a racially diverse team compared to a homogeneous one, and the increased perception of  
377 relationship conflict affects the leaders' generosity in supplying resources. Lount et al. (2015) complements the other  
378 papers by shifting the focus of inter-personal prejudice from the team to those looking from outside.

379 A new source of conflict in teams has generated a new conversation among management scholars: status conflict.  
380 Bendersky and Hays' (2012) study of MBA students introduce status conflict and examine its effect on team  
381 performance. *Status conflict* occurs there are disagreements among teammates over their relative amount of respect  
382 received in the team's social hierarchy. Bendersky and Hays (2012) provide several insights to the conversation about  
383 the diversity-conflict model. First, status conflict negatively affects team performance by discouraging information

384 sharing among teammates. Also, team cooperativeness or the norm among teammates to communicate and work  
385 together, attenuated the effect of status conflict on performance.

386 Building on Bendersky and Hays (2012), Anicich et al. (2015) examined the interaction between status and power  
387 on interpersonal conflict in teams. They observe that the interpersonal conflict teams experience stems from the  
388 interaction of perceptions teammates have about each other. Through a series of laboratory experiments and a field  
389 survey of government workers, Anicich et al. finds that those with high power and low status in teams use their power  
390 to abuse their low-power teammates compared to those teams with high status.

### 391 **3.2. Trends using the behavioral negotiation model**

392 The behavioral negotiation model separates negotiation influences into negotiator characteristics and contextual  
393 characteristics. The three negotiator characteristics that receive the most attention are biases, emotions, and gender.  
394 Three contextual characteristics that receive considerable attention are power, number of negotiating parties, and time.

#### 395 **3.2.1. Negotiator characteristics**

396 **Biases.** A substantial body of work in negotiations has looked at the role of cognition and biases in the negotiation  
397 process. Such biases included anchoring (Northcraft & Neale, 1987) and over-confidence (Neale & Bazerman, 1983).  
398 While early research was focused on cognition (e.g. Bazerman & Neale, 1992), later research focused on motivational  
399 biases. Egocentrism is a particularly pervasive bias in negotiation that leads negotiators to view themselves as entitled  
400 to more resources than their counterpart (Loewenstein et al., 1989). Egocentrism is especially pronounced when power  
401 is asymmetric (Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996) and this effect generalizes across cultures (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002a) and  
402 generations (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2008). Further, egocentrism can skew people's expectations of others' behaviors in  
403 negotiations (Tenbrunsel, 1998). Consistent with this finding, in a recent series of experiments, Chambers and De Dreu  
404 (2014) showed strong evidence for the occurrence of egocentric misperception of the other side's priorities and interests.  
405 The studies showed that participants judged their own interests to be more important than their opponent's, regardless  
406 of the opponent's interest. They found that perceptions of the opponent's interests were often more closely related to  
407 one's own interests than to the opponent's actual interests.

408 **Emotions.** Seminal research by Carnevale and Isen (1986) introduced emotion into negotiation research by  
409 showing that negotiators experiencing positive affect were more cooperative and reached higher joint gains as opposed

410 to a control group. More recent scholarship has turned their attention to studying the benefits and burdens of negative  
411 emotions. The expression of negative emotions - e.g. anger - in negotiations is found to produce lower joint gains (Antos  
412 et al., 2011), covert retaliation (Wang et al., 2012), and reduced trust (Côté et al., 2013). Van Kleef et al. (2010) introduced  
413 a model called Emotion as Social Information that predicts when anger and other negative emotions will lead to  
414 concessions and when they will not. Specifically, when anger provides information about a negotiator's own higher  
415 limits, anger motivates the counterparty to make concessions (Van Kleef, et al., 2010; Sinaceur et al., 2011). Subsequent  
416 research has shown how the model is contingent on other characteristics of the situation such as culture (Adam &  
417 Shirako, 2013; Adam et al., 2010), whether the anger is viewed as authentic (Tng & Au, 2014), and the competitiveness  
418 of the negotiation (Adam & Brett, 2015).

419 Scholars have also investigated more nuanced and contingent effects of emotion on negotiations. Sinaceur et al.  
420 (2013) showed that when the negotiator expressed emotional inconsistency, the recipient made greater concessions than  
421 when the negotiator expressed a consistent emotion. This was mediated by the recipient feeling less in control. Zhang  
422 et al. (2014) found that certain emotions are seen more positively in conflict-resolution depending on cultural values.  
423 Netzer et al. (2015) showed that negotiators try to increase an emotion in others when they believe it will lead to desirable  
424 outcomes and try to decrease an emotion in others when they believe it will lead to undesirable outcomes. This occurred  
425 even when the emotion made the other person feel worse, indicating that although inducing emotions in others can lead  
426 to personal gain, it can also cause harm to others.

427 **Gender.** Gender affects interpretations of the negotiation, negotiation style, negotiation performance, self-  
428 evaluation and self-worth, and the propensity to initiate negotiation. Women tend to interpret conflict situations in  
429 relationship terms and men are more concerned with the exchange of resources (Pinkley, 1990). Men are more likely to  
430 adopt a confrontational style and women are more likely to display communal focus and approaches (Tannen, 1990;  
431 King & Hinson, 1994). Men are more likely to achieve higher gains on the distributive dimensions of negotiation  
432 outcomes (Stuhlmacher & Walter, 1999), but women are better able to increase joint gain (Kray & Thompson, 2005).  
433 Women tend to engage in self-derogation during negotiation (Kimmel et al., 1980), expect to be paid less than men  
434 (Major & Konar, 1984), and are less assertive than men for fear of backlash (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013). Finally,  
435 women are less likely to engage in negotiation to begin with (Babcock et al., 2006).

436 Recent research has sought to create consensus among inconsistencies regarding the role of gender differences in  
437 negotiation styles. Faramand and Tu (2013) found that gender does not significantly affect business negotiation styles,  
438 while social culture does. Bowles & Flynn (2010) found that women negotiators were more persistent with male  
439 naysayers than female naysayers, but they persisted in a more indirect than direct manner. Leibbrandt and List (2015)  
440 found that in the workplace, men will negotiate for a higher wage more often than women if there is no explicit statement  
441 that wages are negotiable. If it is explicitly stated that wages are negotiable, then the gender difference disappears. This  
442 gives some insight into how negotiation relates to the gender wage gap in businesses.

443 In a provocative set of studies, Lee and colleagues (2016) sought to better understand the underlying reasons for  
444 some of the gender differences in negotiation. Using an evolutionary psychology approach, the authors predicted that  
445 because of greater male intra-sexual competition for mates, unethical behavior would be greater in negotiations between  
446 men than between women. A positive relationship between unethical behavior and mating motivation was found for  
447 men, but not women. Gender differences in unethical behavior, were greater with males and showed more unethical  
448 behavior when negotiating between same-sex, attractive opponents.

### 449 **3.2.2. Contextual characteristics**

450 **Power.** In negotiation, power is primarily determined by one's ability to induce the other party to settle for an  
451 outcome less than her maximum utility (Greenhalgh et al., 1985) and the strength of one's best alternative to a negotiated  
452 agreement relative to one's opponent (Pinkley et al., 1994). Best alternatives have been found to have several effects on  
453 negotiators. For example, negotiators with better alternatives set higher goals (Pinkley, 1995), behave more agentically  
454 (Galinsky et al., 2003), and are more likely to use threats (Lawler, 1992).

455 Power associated with social status, the esteem and respect conferred by others, has its own set of effects on  
456 negotiation. For example, high status parties may treat others in more procedurally just ways, such as listening to their  
457 counterparts' concerns and opinions, but only when the high-status parties also have a weaker alternative (Blader &  
458 Chen, 2012). Wolfe and McGinn (2005) demonstrated that objective power and perceived relative power have different  
459 effects on negotiation outcomes. They found that objective power drives individual payoffs, while perceived relative  
460 power exerts a strong effect on joint outcomes. Specifically, as perceived equality increases the potential for integration  
461 in the negotiation increases.

462 Insights into negotiation strategies are offered by Schweinsberg and colleagues (2012). Their research showed that  
463 extreme first offers may offend recipients and lead to an impasse but if the impasse is avoided it can bring benefits.  
464 Therefore, extreme offers can be risky. Furthermore, it was found that although both low- and high-power negotiators  
465 are offended by extreme offers, it is the low power negotiators who walk away.

466 ***Teams and multi-party negotiations.*** Multi-party negotiation is characterized by a higher level of complexity and  
467 longer time to settle as compared to dyadic negotiations. Research has found that teams achieved higher outcomes and  
468 perceived themselves to be more powerful as compared to individual opponents (Polzer, 1996). Teams exchange more  
469 information and generate higher-quality ideas for solutions as compared to individual negotiators. Hinds and Mortensen  
470 (2005) examined conflict and its effects on distributed teams to determine how existing models of conflict for co-located  
471 teams apply to distributed teams. They found that distributed teams experienced more task conflict and interpersonal  
472 conflict than collocated teams. Also, spontaneous communication had a direct effect on mitigating the effect of  
473 distribution in conflict. This shows that spontaneous communication is a useful tool in handling conflict for distributed  
474 teams. Swaab et al. (2012) proposed that the impact of communication channels depends on whether the communicator  
475 is cooperative or not. A meta-analysis supported the validity of this model for understanding the effect of  
476 communication channels on negotiation and group decision-making. Communication channels (i.e. visual channels,  
477 vocal channels, synchronicity) increased high-quality negotiation only when the communicator orientation was neutral.  
478 When cooperation was dominant, communication channels neither hurt nor hindered negotiation quality. When  
479 noncooperation was dominant, communication channels hindered outcome quality.

480 ***Time.*** Time plays a role in negotiation processes and outcomes in several ways. First, outcome delays – occurring  
481 when parties negotiate about future outcomes – moderate preferences and expectations. Research shows that outcome  
482 delays increase the efficiency reaching agreements due to perceptions of less contentious and aggressive opponents  
483 (Okhuysen et al., 2003). Time pressures have also been found to affect negotiators' perceptions and abilities to reach  
484 efficient outcomes. Agreements tend to favor the negotiator with less time pressure (Moore, 2004a) but informing the  
485 other party about a deadline can lead them to make concessions faster (Moore, 2004b). In addition, De Dreu (2003)  
486 found that time pressure reduces negotiators' motivation to process information systematically, produces a greater  
487 reliance on cognitive heuristics, and leads to less integrative agreements.

488 **3.3. Trends using social dilemma models**

489 In the most recent review and analysis of social dilemmas in the organizational literature, Van Lange et al. (2013)  
490 conclude that the study of social dilemmas is “alive and kicking.” The review looks at different types of social dilemmas,  
491 recent developments in the field, and makes suggestions for future studies. Topics include theoretical frameworks  
492 (interdependence, appropriateness, evolutionary), developments in structural, psychological and dynamic influences,  
493 and prospects for future social dilemmas. They suggest that moving forward scholars could explore further the role of  
494 emotions, construal processes, facial information, intergroup issues, reputation, and gossip.

495 ***Structural influences.*** De Cremer et al. (2012) discuss the integration between procedural justice, sanctioning  
496 systems, and public good dilemmas. Because there is little or no incentive for voluntary provisions in public goods  
497 dilemmas, it is in everyone’s benefit to take advantage of them without contributing to their production. They found  
498 that the procedural justice of the sanction had greater influence when the group failed early in the game and the group  
499 members exhibited high group identification. If the group members did not identify with the group, the procedural  
500 justice of the sanction only influenced contributions if the group had succeeded earlier in the game. Therefore,  
501 procedural justice matters in the sanctioning system’s effectiveness.

502 Kugler and Bornstein (2013) investigate the role of conflict structure in social dilemmas. Bilateral conflicts between  
503 groups and an individual, such as a confrontation between an employer and group of workers, involve asymmetric and  
504 complex interactions. In computer-controlled experiments, individuals and non-cooperative groups interacted in social  
505 dilemmas games. This asymmetric competition was compared to symmetric control conditions in which both  
506 competitors were either individuals or groups. Results showed that individuals generally did better than non-cooperative  
507 groups, regardless of conflict type. In symmetric conditions, individuals showed more cooperation with other individuals  
508 as compared to cooperation between groups. In asymmetric conditions, individuals took advantage of the group’s  
509 difficulties and dominated.

510 ***Psychological influences.*** Balliet and Ferris (2013) conducted research to better understand the relationship  
511 between ostracism and prosocial behavior. They hypothesized that whether individuals reduce prosocial behavior  
512 following ostracism depends on how they managed the temptation to treat others poorly in the short-term versus the  
513 long-term benefits of not treating others poorly. The studies showed that individuals who are less future-oriented

514 engaged in less prosocial behavior with others who have ostracized them than those who are more future-oriented.  
515 Yamagishi et al. (2013) also investigated pro-social behavior in a study in which participants completed five games (two  
516 prisoner's dilemmas, a trust game, a dictator game, and a faith game) with several month intervals in between games.  
517 The first major finding of this study was that participants showed across-game behavioral consistency. There was a  
518 strong correlation between the trusting choice in the faith games and acting in a pro-social manner in the other games.  
519 It was also found that there were significant cross-game correlations between expectations of the partner's behavior and  
520 a player's own behavior. This showed that a player's generalized expectations of human pro-sociality affected their own  
521 pro-social behavior.

522 Social value orientation has also been found to be related to cooperative behaviors in social dilemmas. Fiedler et al.  
523 (2013) considered the underlying processes of this relationship. Decision time, number of fixations, the proportion of  
524 inspected information, the degree of attention toward the others' payoffs and the number of transitions from and toward  
525 others' payoffs increased with social value orientation deviation from a pure selfish orientation. Information search  
526 seems to underlie the relationship between social value orientation and cooperation.

527 ***Intergenerational dilemmas.*** Some of the most important issues in organizations and society today have long  
528 time horizons and thus conflict can involve more than one generation of people. Intergenerational decisions regarding  
529 the allocation and consumption of resources may create a conflict of interest between the present and future generations  
530 as the present generation may be required to forego the consumption of desirable resources to maintain sustainable  
531 levels for the future. Economists have examined how to balance the interests of present and future generations such  
532 that efficiency is optimized (e.g., Kotlikoff, 1995; Portney & Weyant, 1999). In contrast to this normative approach, a  
533 burgeoning body of scholarship in teams of management scholars and social psychologists focus on identifying the  
534 psychological factors that affect intergenerational decisions (see Wade-Benzoni & Tost, 2009, for a review). Most of  
535 this work centers on "intergenerational dilemmas," defined as decisions in which the interests of present decision makers  
536 conflict with the interests of future others.

537 An imperative in the study of intergenerational dilemmas has been to identify factors that influence the extent to  
538 which members of the present generation (void of economic or material incentive) are willing to sacrifice their own self-  
539 interest for the benefit of future others. Central variables that affect decisions about intergenerational conflict include

540 temporal and interpersonal distance between decisions and outcomes (Wade-Benzoni, 2003; 2008), uncertainty about  
541 the future (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2008; see also McCarter et al., 2010), lack of direct reciprocity between generations  
542 (Bang et al., 2017; Wade-Benzoni, 2002), egocentrism (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2008), asymmetric power (Tost et al., 2015),  
543 resource valence (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2010), and legacy motivations (Fox et al., 2010; Wade-Benzoni, 2006; Wade-  
544 Benzoni et al., 2012).

### 545 **3.4. Trends using the social exchange model**

546 Subsequent empirical work on resource dependence models, building on social exchange theory, sought to  
547 understand bridging mechanisms (Thompson, 1967) which allow organizations to manage their constraints with other  
548 organizations. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 114) maintain that organizations use bridging mechanisms to “accomplish  
549 a restructuring of the organization’s interdependencies, rather than for reasons of profitability or efficiency.” The  
550 earliest empirical work citing resource dependency identifying bridging mechanisms was carried out by Pfeffer and his  
551 colleagues (Pfeffer, 1972a, 1972b, 1973; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980).

552 Principle interest centered on actions firms take to minimize dependencies which lessen external constraints namely:  
553 mergers and acquisitions (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005), joint venture/alliances (e.g. Mitchell & Singh, 1992), alliance  
554 portfolios (Gomes-Casseres, 1994), political action (Mullery et al., 1995), executive succession (Dalton & Kesner, 1983),  
555 trade associations (Granovetter, 1994) and boards of directors (Davis & Mizruchi, 1999). Specifically, Scott and Davis  
556 (2003) noted that much empirical research surrounding resource dependence theory investigates the relationship  
557 between the firm and its board of directors. Firms may appoint board members to help facilitate access to resources  
558 (e.g. Davis & Mizruchi, 1999). For example, in countries where nationalization of firms is a risk, many companies tend  
559 to seek board representatives from government to increase their likelihood of favorable policies towards the firm (e.g.  
560 Liang et al., 2015). Three recent themes we note emerging over the past five years address the relationship between  
561 power and dependence, relational outcomes given power imbalances, and learning from terminating bridging  
562 mechanisms such as alliances. We review each of these recent themes below.

563 ***Power versus dependence.*** A firm seeking to use size as leverage may wish to pursue mergers and acquisitions to  
564 gain power. Empire building, through increased of merger and acquisition activity, may exist because a firm wants to  
565 increase its size as leverage over key stakeholders, such as suppliers or politicians (Darnall et al., 2010; Hope & Thomas,

566 2008). Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) found that acquisition activity followed a pattern of power and dependence. Rather  
567 than theorizing dependence as solely the inverse of power, Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) posited that industries are  
568 both composed of power relations as well as conditions of mutual dependence. Mutual dependence reflects the shared  
569 level of constraints between two parties. Their study considered both types of relational constraints finding separate  
570 effects of power and mutual dependence in merger and acquisition activity. This conceptualization that power and  
571 dependence as distinct constructs led to understanding a variety of organizational outcomes including alliances (Lee et  
572 al., 2015) and divestitures (Xia & Li, 2013).

573 ***Trust development under power asymmetry.*** Conflict may exacerbate from failed expectations from previous  
574 trust violations (Lumineau et al., 2015). Trust exists between firms as a positive expectation that the counterpart will act  
575 in good faith (Rousseau et al., 1998; Zaheer et al., 1998). As firms continue to work through their conflict, they are likely  
576 to establish a reputation of trustworthiness within their industry (Park & Ungson, 2001). Consequently, a firm's  
577 enhanced reputation may make it easier for the firm to form new alliances. However, trust development and beliefs are  
578 not always symmetric across both parties in power imbalanced relationships where firms make asymmetric investments.  
579 One partner may believe they are in a trusting relationship while the other may not, particularly in single shot games  
580 (e.g. Graebner, 2009). Firms may also compensate for asymmetries between organizational groups by using structural  
581 mechanisms such as contracts. Lumineau and Malhotra (2011) found that contracts influence the type of conflict  
582 resolution approaches adopted by disputing firms particularly where power is asymmetric. Further, McEvily et al. (2017)  
583 found that power imbalances impact the antecedents to trust for each party in different ways, so that less powerful  
584 parties would look towards the more powerful party to determine their own perceptions about the more powerful party  
585 in relationship, largely ignoring their own circumstance.

586 ***Alliance termination.*** Firms may seek alternate forms of relationships among organizational groups such as  
587 strategic alliances that can more fluidly adapt to the external environment than acquisitions. The pattern of failures for  
588 acquisitions is well-understood by the market, as purchasing firm's stock prices tend to lower on acquisition  
589 announcements (Morck et al., 1990). However, alliance termination rates also remain similarly high at 50-70%, with  
590 these estimates potentially under-reporting terminations as firms are not required to disclose non-equity alliance  
591 activities. Pfeffer and Nowak (1976) found a relationship between changes in the external environment and alliance

592 termination. Given the preponderance of alliance termination rates, Faems et al. (2008) extended prior work on alliance  
593 terminations to consider how alliance partners may use a failing relationship to successfully execute another alliance in  
594 tandem. Their case study of subsequent ink-jet printer R&D alliances between the same partners suggests that  
595 restructuring a prior alliance may be an alternate recourse for a firms' adjusting to their external environment. Moreover,  
596 Mellewigt et al., (2017) reveal that – after an alliance has been terminated – the recurrence of the same partnership as  
597 another alliance or acquisition is impacted by the characteristics of the prior alliance. The characteristics which influence  
598 the likelihood of a subsequent alliance are partner-specific: trust, routines, and the focal firm's understanding of the  
599 target firm's assets. Thus, knowledge gained about a former partner in a prior transaction may be beneficial in  
600 subsequent relationships with the same partner.

### 601 **3.5. Trends using the transaction cost economics model**

602 Streams of work in the management literature have largely focused on make-buy decisions, but also the role of  
603 hierarchy such as M-form and U-form organizations, employment relationships assessing short-term temporary work  
604 versus long-term full-time employment as well as complex contracts where relational and formal contracts play  
605 complementary governance support (Scott & Davis, 2003; see Macher & Richman, 2008 for a review of empirical work).  
606 Organizational scholars were particularly interested in hybrid forms of governance (Williamson 1983, 1991) such that  
607 an entire continuum of governance choices between make versus buy ranging from licensing to equity arrangements  
608 such as joint ventures (Oxley, 1999; Park & Russo, 1996) could be approached as outcomes of transaction cost  
609 considerations. Within the management literature the empirical work investigating transaction cost economics has  
610 mainly focused on comparing and integrating other organizational theories by relaxing initial assumptions and  
611 integrating relationship, firm, and transaction level considerations (Hoetker, 2005; Ghosh & John, 1999, 2005; Argyres,  
612 1996). Building on the resource based view of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991), prior work suggests that a  
613 firm's distinctive competencies increases the efficiency of the governance choice (Silverman, 1999), thus implying similar  
614 transactions for different firms may employ alternate governance structures (Nickerson et al., 2001). More broadly,  
615 organizational scholars have also drawn from organizational theories invoking the external environment (Osborn &  
616 Baughn, 1990) and institutional theory (Hughes et al., 1997, Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Zhao et al., 2004).

617        ***Opportunism and trust.*** The role of opportunism played a role in transaction cost economics since its  
618 conceptualization. Many transaction hazards are exacerbated by an absence of trust due to the threat of opportunism.  
619 Specifically, Williamson (1993) argues in favor of calculative trust where actors are better served by guarding themselves  
620 against opportunism. This contrasts with other scholars' view of trust as a willingness to be vulnerable to the other party  
621 (Zaheer et al., 1998), by entering an exchange with positive expectations (McCarter & Northcraft, 2007). Contracts  
622 moderate the trust-conflict relationship (e.g. Poppo & Zenger, 2002) by clarifying partners' expectations and detail  
623 conflict resolution mechanisms. Where trust may be relatively weak initially, contracts may facilitate partners' beliefs  
624 about trust in the other by enhancing transparency. Likewise, stronger forms of trust may lessen the need for costlier  
625 forms of alliance relationships such as equity based arrangements that create mutual hostages which safeguard against  
626 conflict (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). Recently, Lumineau and colleagues (Guo et al., 2017; Lumineau, 2017) argue that  
627 trust and distrust can co-exist simultaneously.

628        ***Unpacking uncertainty.*** The recent work of Weber and her co-authors develop transaction cost theorizing by  
629 focusing on the psychological elements of the exchange relationship surrounding uncertainty. Weber and Mayer (2014)  
630 introduced cognitive frames by theorizing about conflict due to uncertainty. They define uncertainty as any  
631 "unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange" (Noordewier et al., 1990, p. 82). Traditionally,  
632 scholars have focused on how uncertainty in the external environment increases transaction costs due to opportunism  
633 (Williamson, 1975) and information overload (Simon, 1957). Weber and Mayer (2014) expanded the theory that  
634 transaction costs and conflict arise from differing interpretations of the environment due to each party's unique  
635 cognitive frames. In other words, they posit that if the parties involved have conflicting cognitive frames their  
636 interpretation of the unanticipated event will differ leading to divergent opinions of how to respond to the event leading  
637 to conflict. Moreover, they argue that efficient governing mechanisms are those that facilitate congruent cognitive  
638 frames. Foss and Weber (2016) draw from the bounded rationality literature addressed a common critique of transaction  
639 cost economics: it fails to explain when hierarchies collapse or differ in efficiency.

640        ***Negotiation roles.*** The role of each party in a relationship may also influence the bargaining process as well as the  
641 design of efficient governance structures. As mentioned above, as firms continue to work with each other their  
642 subsequent boundary spanning representatives will establish familiar routines, trust each other and consequently

643 decrease transaction costs (e.g. Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). However, recently scholars indicate that the parties involved  
644 in the contracting relationship may influence the efficiency of the outcome (e.g. Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Bercovitz &  
645 Tyler, 2014). For example, Bercovitz and Tyler (2014) examined the contracting relationship between scientists and for-  
646 profit institutions and found that firm representatives were more likely to increase the specificity of the contract over  
647 time, whereas the scientists were more likely to decrease it. Others have looked at the influence of power gained by  
648 buyer versus supplier firm roles (e.g. McEvily et al., 2017; Nyaga et al., 2013) suggesting there may also be differences  
649 in sources of governance derived from the positions the parties occupy across the value chain.

#### 650 **4. Future Directions for Conflict Research in Management**

651 Harnessing conflict's advantages and navigating its burdens continues to be the focal interest of management  
652 scholars. In the current section, we summarize what we believe to be the important future research directions for each  
653 area of management research utilizing the six reviewed models of conflict.

##### 654 **4.1. The future of diversity-conflict models**

655 There is no dearth of research on diversity-conflict models reporting the statistical significance of the relationships  
656 among diversity, conflict types, and team performance (see De Dreu & Weingart, 2003, for a meta-analysis). However,  
657 one avenue with little traffic is to determine the model's practical significance. Most scholars on the diversity-conflict  
658 model ask *Is there an effect between a diversity and team performance as mediated by conflict?* The next question is to ask *How much*  
659 *of an effect is there?* In knowing the size of the science behind the diversity-conflict model will give us the model's  
660 "organizational significance" (Shaver, 2008). Surprisingly, our review of the diversity-conflict finds little examination of  
661 magnitude - at least when it comes to quantifiable outcomes. The neglect of putting size to the science is a lack of  
662 confidence in the model's practical power (McCloskey & Ziliak, 1996). It is one thing for the diversity-conflict theorist  
663 to say to an executive "you can capitalize on the differences in teams through behavioral leadership training that reduces  
664 team conflict," and it is another more meaningful thing to say, "Typically managers who are trained in how to be  
665 consistent in how they respectfully instruct and encourage their teams will see 20% fewer sick days and an 15% increase  
666 in sales from employees." While there are multiple ways to assess a theory's practical size, McCloskey and Ziliak's  
667 (1996) assessment approach may be a good starting point.

668 Another field ripe for picking involves finding strategies that encourage wanted conflict while not simultaneously  
669 encouraging unwanted conflict. For instance, encouraging a devil's advocacy strategy in a team increases task conflict  
670 but it can also simultaneously increase relational conflict (Cosier & Rose, 1977). Carton and Tewfik's (2016) recent  
671 review of conflict strategies proposes that strategies used in isolation may do more harm than good. Rather,  
672 combinations of strategies are submitted by Carton and Tewfik (2016) to be more effective in successfully navigating  
673 diversity-stemmed conflict. Future scholarship may produce findings of high theoretical and practical significance by  
674 testing the arguments made in the Carton and Tewfik (2016) paper. A second layer of the conflict-strategy puzzle  
675 germane to the Carton and Tewfik (2016) taxonomy and theory is knowing *who* is best to implement the solutions. A  
676 promising theory to help solve this puzzle is decision process theory. Decision process theory would maintain that who  
677 implements a solution is just as important as which solutions are employed (e.g. Vroom & Yetton, 1973). For instance,  
678 teams high in status conflict may not react well to a fellow teammate using intervention and prefer an outsider to institute  
679 chance solutions.

#### 680 **4.2. The future of behavioral negotiation model**

681 Two areas have seen increasing development pertaining to the behavioral negotiation model. The first is sacred  
682 issues or ideologically or value-based issues play out differently than negotiations dealing with more traditional material  
683 interests (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Tenbrunsel et al., 2009; Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002b). When an issue involves a  
684 closely held value, people are less likely to be willing to make tradeoffs on that issue in exchange for something else.  
685 Naturally, this can interfere with the essential "logrolling" aspect of integrative negotiations. Research has revealed that  
686 opposing sides in ideological conflicts tend to exaggerate their opponents' extremism (Keltner & Robinson, 1993;  
687 Robinson et al., 1995; Robinson & Kray, 2001). Sacred issues in negotiations tend to increase the likelihood of impasse,  
688 reduce the profitability of outcomes, and produce more negative perceptions of opponents - particularly when  
689 negotiators have a strong best alternative to a negotiated agreement (Tenbrunsel et al., 2009). More recently, Bendersky  
690 (2014) proposed a way to solve ideological conflict: affirming an opponent's status may help reduce defensiveness and  
691 resistance to compromising in ideological conflicts. In a study by Tuller et al. (2015), participants were asked to write  
692 about a controversial issue from the perspective of a partner with an opposing view. The approach was effective at  
693 changing views but only when participants met with the opponent in person and observed the perspective-taking effort.

694 The study of individual differences and personality initially fell out of favor among negotiation scholars due to early  
695 research by Rubin and Brown (1975) concluding that it had little impact on negotiation behavior and outcomes. For  
696 many years, negotiation scholars have been enamored with studying the power of the situation to influence negotiations  
697 (Brett & Thompson, 2016). However, a relatively recent meta-analysis concluded that a variety of individual differences  
698 affect the strategies negotiators use, individual and joint gains, and psychological outcomes (Sharma et al., 2013). The  
699 effect of personality was further investigated by Dimotakis et al. (2012) who found that negotiators high in agreeableness  
700 were best suited for integrative negotiations while negotiators low in agreeableness were best suited for distributive  
701 negotiations. Negotiators whose dispositions were a good fit for their context had higher levels of cardiac arousal than  
702 those who were not a good fit, which related to positive affect, persistence, and increased economic outcomes.

### 703 **4.3. The future of social dilemma models**

704 A significant body of research on cooperation has opened questions of how such knowledge can be applied to  
705 social dilemmas in real-world conflicts. An important challenge regarding practical implications is that much of the  
706 current debate on the problem of cooperation in social dilemmas assumes a static, one-time relationship. Unlike  
707 experimental settings, social interactions in real life involve repeated interactions in which decision makers actively  
708 respond to changes in its dynamic and adopt different strategies (Van Lange et al., 2013). For example, business ventures  
709 often involve repeated partnership and dealings. Sometimes the end of the business relationship is expected, such as  
710 when contract duration is specified, but can be ambiguous in other relationships. An awareness of possible future  
711 encounters and long-term relationships can have significant impact on individual choices in social dilemmas. If repeated  
712 encounters are expected, acting selfishly and pushing the other too hard can invite retaliation in the future (Axelrod,  
713 1984). Conversely, if the interaction is likely to end soon, individuals may discount the future payoffs and the interest  
714 of others and decide not to cooperate in the present.

715 The prospective of future interactions also involves possible encounters with others in the same network.  
716 Reputation matters in the interconnected society and discourages individuals from engaging in socially undesirable  
717 behavior. Knowing that today's selfish or cooperative action may trigger a negative or positive feedback loop in future  
718 conflicts can encourage individuals to contemplate their long-term reputations (McCarter et al., 2011b). A non-  
719 cooperative reputation can eventually lead to ostracism (Kerr et al., 2009). On a more psychological level, people are in

720 fact aware of this effect of transparency and more likely to cooperate with subtle signals of being watched by others  
721 (Bateson et al., 2006). Understanding such a reputational mechanism will also be informative in social dilemmas in larger  
722 settings, in which uncertainty and anonymity are the major obstacles to cooperation. For example, Weber and  
723 Murnighan (2008) find that a consistent contributor in social dilemmas creates cooperative perceptions of social norms,  
724 which facilitates fellow members' cooperation. In this case, while the emergence of contributors may underlie the role  
725 of individual difference factors, efforts to increase structural transparency and reputational effects are crucial to support  
726 and facilitate their positive influences on other members. Therefore, the lessons derived from understanding one's  
727 perspective on relationships through time or across partners will be worthy of future investigation, providing  
728 prescriptive advice regarding paths to cooperation.

#### 729 **4.4. The future of social exchange models**

730 Scholars may focus on how the consequences of conflict may be impacted by power asymmetry. Conflict itself is  
731 not necessarily positive or negative for any organizational relationship, despite its pervasiveness. Prior emphasis on  
732 symmetry in mutual understanding across partners (e.g. Lewis & Wiegert, 1985) for mitigating conflict may not account  
733 for the diverse perceptions each party brings to their relationship (e.g. Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998). As Pondy (1967)  
734 explained, that the function of conflict can be either beneficial or detrimental for the relationship and parties involved.  
735 We note that the firm level potential benefits gained through conflict are likely similar in imbalanced and balanced power  
736 relationships (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Park & Ungson, 2001). The difference lies in the likelihood for resolution  
737 between the two parties, affecting outcomes at the level of the dyad. Power advantaged firms might be privileged in  
738 guiding conflict resolution and, propose for future research, that firms in asymmetric relationships may be more likely  
739 to find a resolution than those in symmetric power relationships. Power asymmetry may play more of a positive role in  
740 mitigating conflict than prior work has assumed.

#### 741 **4.5. The future of transaction cost economics models**

742 As management scholars look to the future there is a trend towards taking a micro-foundational approach to the  
743 transaction cost literature. Such recent theorizing may lend well to empirical testing in laboratory environments. Future  
744 conflict researchers might heed Lumineau et al.'s (2015) recommendation that transaction cost perspectives can explore  
745 different types of conflict among organizational groups, such as integrity-based and competence-based failures.

746 However, with many of these conflict types, the offending firm may have a divergent perception of what validates their  
747 past behavior, misinterpreting the potential of an integrity-violation as an act of strategic necessity (e.g. Sutcliffe &  
748 Zaheer, 1998). For example, in pursuit of greater efficiency, the offending firm may utilize more resources than the  
749 other party perceives as appropriate and unintentionally cause conflict within the relationship. To that end, we add that  
750 the long-term impact on value creation versus the share of value captured by the partners (e.g. Elfenbein & Zenger,  
751 2017), may be a promising avenue to pursue to understand each party's costs and motivations in maintaining governance  
752 structures despite the presence of conflict.

## 753 **5. An Integration of Intragroup Conflict Models**

754 There are patterns and differences across the five models reviewed. Indeed, each model complements the others in  
755 a host of ways, and this complementarity is summarized in Table 2.

### 756 **5.1. Insights about intragroup conflict**

757 A common thread across the five models is that conflict within a group can create considerable barriers to  
758 organizational effectiveness. Diversity-conflict models predict that teams with high relational, process, and status  
759 conflict will not perform well. Social dilemma models predict that – without restructuring the payoffs, instigating  
760 cooperative contextual cues, and removing competitive individuals – costly conflict will increase. Behavioral negotiation  
761 models maintain that when negotiators take primarily a distributive approach to dividing resources that conflict will be  
762 high and the likelihood of achieving an agreement is low. When it comes to conflict among alliances networks (Gomes-  
763 Casseres, 1994), social exchange models suggest that control over resources motivates organizations to reduce  
764 dependence on each other. Intragroup conflict might arise out of this struggle for control. The transaction cost  
765 economics model proposes that conflict will increase the use of safeguards, thereby increasing use of costlier forms of  
766 organizing in alliance relations.

767 A key difference rests in what these models say about positive outcomes from conflict. Diversity-conflict and  
768 behavioral negotiation models both predict that the work team or negotiating parties will be better off when conflict  
769 exists under certain conditions; e.g. moderate levels of task conflict and competing preferences where there are different  
770 values. Social dilemma and transaction cost models see intragroup conflict as primarily a negative event that can only

771 be mitigated through structural or motivation solutions.<sup>7</sup> Social exchange models suggest that firms can establish more  
772 independence by using conflict to lessen their dependence on resources from other firms.

773 Overall, three models (i.e. diversity-conflict, behavioral negotiation, and social exchange models) view intragroup  
774 conflict as a contingency process where two of the models (i.e. social dilemma and transaction cost models) view  
775 intragroup conflict as resulting in a negative outcome. Of the five models, only the diversity-conflict model parses  
776 conflict into a multidimensional construct (i.e. task conflict, relational conflict, process conflict, and status conflict)  
777 where the remaining models see conflict as one-dimensional – leading to either a positive or negative outcome.<sup>8</sup>

## 778 **5.2. How conflict is conceptualized**

779 The volume of conflict research in management studies brings with it different views about intragroup conflict.  
780 Consequently, the models reviewed here define intragroup conflict differently. Transaction cost economics define  
781 intragroup conflict as “a destructive process, creating negative reactions” (White et al., 2007). Social dilemma models  
782 view conflict as a tension between individual and group interests, where an individual cannot do something to benefit  
783 themselves without harming the group (Kollock, 1998). Taken together, transaction cost economics and social dilemma  
784 models view intragroup conflict as always resulting in a negative outcome that should be either navigated or discouraged.

785 On the other hand, diversity-conflict, behavioral negotiation, and social exchange models view intragroup conflict  
786 as something that can be leveraged. The diversity-conflict model sees conflict as a multi-dimensional construct, with  
787 such dimensions as task conflict being something to encourage and relational conflict being something to avoid (Jehn  
788 et al., 1999). Behavioral negotiation models also view conflict as being a good thing or a bad thing depending on what  
789 issues the negotiators value, how much those issues are valued, and what information is shared among negotiating  
790 parties. The information exchange process helps both sides better understand each other’s interests and thus make  
791 possible tradeoffs among integrative issues, thereby meeting all parties’ interests (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2010).  
792 Social exchange models suggest that, as firms continue to work together and resolve conflicts, they will begin to establish  
793 strong relational norms, trust, and commitment (Lumineau et al., 2015; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). Consequently,  
794 they will rely less on formal and costly governance mechanisms (e.g. contracts) to settle conflict as time passes (Gulati  
795 & Nickerson, 2008). The differences in the models’ definitions of conflict leave us with our broad definition of  
796 intragroup conflict that we began with in the current review.

797 **5.3. Analytical unit of analysis and methodology**

798 There are differences among the five models when it comes to the unit of analysis and methodology. Diversity-  
799 conflict and behavioral negotiation models are studied primarily at the individual, human subject level as part of a work  
800 team or community. Transaction cost economics and social exchange models examine intragroup conflict primarily at  
801 the interorganizational level as part of an alliance venture (portfolio, consortia, or network or partners) with the caveat  
802 that transaction cost examines transactions and firms may be involved in multiple transactions simultaneously. Social  
803 dilemma models – while originally used at the individual human-subject level – are now regularly used to understand  
804 intragroup conflict among organizations.

805 Behavioral negotiation and social dilemma models are almost exclusively studied in the behavioral laboratory, where  
806 there is tight control over testing the model relationships. It is only recently that management scholars have used field  
807 studies (i.e. natural experiments) to examine the general application of social dilemma models (e.g. Van den Assem et  
808 al., 2012). Diversity-conflict models have been tested in the behavioral laboratory as well, but have also examined the  
809 direct application of the models through longitudinal field studies where team structure, conflict types, and performance  
810 are measured at different points in time (e.g. Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Jehn et al., 1997; Jehn et al., 1999).

811 Social exchange and transaction cost models both have been approached using mixed-methods. More recently  
812 scholars have turned their attention towards testing social exchange theory in the behavioral laboratory (e.g. Galinsky,  
813 Rucker & Magee, 2015) but less so at an interorganizational level as much interorganizational research has been tested  
814 through survey and archival data. Thus, scholars have examined the direct application of social exchange models while  
815 also recently wanting higher control when testing the models' relationships. In contrast, more recent laboratory-based  
816 studies of transaction cost economics complement years of field studies that examine the applicability of the models  
817 (e.g. Harmon, Kim & Mayer, 2015; for reviews see McDowell & Voelker, 2008; Macher & Richmann, 2008).

818 **6. Concluding Remark**

819 The study of intragroup conflict in management is old, at least old in relation to the tenure of the management field.  
820 The fact that management lies at the confluence of multiple fields in the social sciences, has resulted in a voluminous  
821 body of conflict research, making it difficult for a single article to present the curious student a comprehensive review.  
822 The current research summarizes five models used to study intragroup conflict in management. Each model has been

823 the muse for scholars to understand how existing conflict can be leveraged (even increased) to an individual's advantage;  
824 how conflict can be reduced to an individual's advantage; and the contingencies of when conflict is a blessing and a  
825 curse for a person or organization. Figure 2 is a Venn diagram conceptualizing the conflict research domain in  
826 management and provides a sample of empirical and theory papers across the five models.

827 While each model has been well-used and improved upon, many unanswered, important questions about conflict  
828 in and among organizations remains. Management scholars who want to make a significant impact in the study of  
829 conflict may consider problematizing the models or challenging core assumptions of a model while bringing alternative  
830 logics and models from the literature's periphery into consideration (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011). In doing so,  
831 management will increase its collective wisdom about conflict. In other words, in knowing what it does not know or  
832 what it assumes it knows about conflict, management scholars will be better equipped to make order out of the chaos  
833 of conflict.

834 **References**

835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

843

844

845

846

847

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

859

860

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

- Adam, H., & Brett, J. M. (2015). Context matters: The social effects of anger in cooperative, balanced, and competitive negotiation situations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 61, 44-58.
- Adam, H., & Shirako, A. (2013). Not all anger is created equal: The impact of the expresser's culture on the social effects of anger in negotiations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 98, 785-798.
- Adam, H., Shirako, A., & Maddux, W. W. (2010). Cultural variance in the interpersonal effects of anger in negotiations. *Psychological Science*, 21, 882-889.
- Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. (2011). Generating research questions through problematization. *Academy of Management Review*, 36, 247-271.
- Amanatullah, E. T., & Tinsley, C. H. (2013). Punishing female negotiators for asserting too much or not enough: Exploring why advocacy moderates backlash against assertive female negotiators. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 120, 110-122.
- Anicich, E., Fast, N., Halevy, N., & Galinsky, A. (2015). When the bases of social hierarchy collide: Power without status drives interpersonal conflict. *Organization Science*, 27, 123-140.
- Antos, D., De Melo, C., Gratch, J., & Grosz, B. (2011). The influence of emotion expression on perceptions of trustworthiness in negotiation. In *Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Conference on Artificial Intelligence* (pp. 772-778).
- Argyres, N. (1996). Evidence on the role of firm capabilities in vertical integration decisions. *Strategic Management Journal*, 17, 129-150.
- Argyres, N., & Mayer, K. (2007). Contract design as a firm capability. *Academy of Management Review*, 32, 1060-1077.
- Axelrod, R. M. (1984). *The evolution of cooperation*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Babcock, L., Gelfand, M., Small, D., & Stayhn, H. (2006). Gender differences in the propensity to initiate negotiations. In *Social psychology and economics*, (Ed.) De Cremer, D., Zeelenberg, M., & Murnighan, J. (pp. 239-262). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Balliet, D., & Ferris, D. L. (2013). Ostracism and prosocial behavior: A social dilemma perspective. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 120, 298-308.
- Bang, H. M., Zhou-Koval, C., & Wade-Benzoni, K. A. (2017). It's the thought that counts over time: The interplay of intent, outcome, stewardship, and legacy motivations in intergenerational reciprocity. Working paper. Duke University.
- Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. *Journal of Management*, 17, 99-120.
- Bateson, M., Nettle, D., & Roberts, G. (2006). Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting. *Biology Letters*, 2, 412-414.
- Bazerman, M. H., & Neale, M. A. (1992). *Negotiating rationally*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Bendersky, C. (2014). Resolving ideological conflicts by affirming opponents' status: The Tea Party, Obamacare and the 2013 government shutdown. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 53, 163-168.
- Bendersky, C., & Hays, N. A. (2012). Status conflict in groups. *Organization Science*, 23, 323-340.
- Bercovitz, J.E., Tyler, B.B., 2014. Who I am and how I contract: The effect of contractors' roles on the evolution of contract structure in university-industry research agreements. *Organization Science*, 25, 1840-1859
- Bowles, H. R., & Flynn, F. (2010). Gender and persistence in negotiation: A dyadic perspective. *Academy of Management Journal*, 53, 769-787.
- Blader, S., & Chen, Y. (2012). Differentiating the effects of status and power: A justice perspective. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 102, 994-1014.
- Blau, P., (1964). *Exchange and power in social life*. London, UK: Transaction Publishers.
- Blau, P., & Scott, W. (1962). *Formal organizations: A comparative approach*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bornstein, G., & Ben-Yossef, M. (1994). Cooperation in intergroup and single-group social dilemmas. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 30, 52-67.
- Bornstein, G., Erev, I., & Rosen, O. (1990). Intergroup competition as a structural solution for social dilemmas. *Social Behavior*, 5, 247-260.
- Brett, J., & Thompson, L. (2016). Negotiation. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 136, 68-79.
- Brouthers, K. D., & Brouthers, L. E. (2000). Acquisition or greenfield start-up? Institutional, cultural and transaction cost influences. *Strategic Management Journal*, 21, 89-97.

886 Brown, G., Lawrence, T. B., & Robinson, S. L. (2005). Territoriality in organizations. *Academy of Management Review*,  
887 30, 577-594.

888 Budescu, D. V., & McCarter, M. W. (2012). It's a game of give and take: Modeling behavior in a give-or-take-some  
889 social dilemma. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 15, 649-667.

890 Carnevale, P. J. D., & Isen, A. M. (1986). The influence of positive affect and visual access on the discovery of integrative  
891 solutions in bilateral negotiation. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 37, 1-13.

892 Carton, A., & Tewfik, B. (2016). A new look at conflict management in work groups. *Organization Science*, 27, 1125-1141

893 Casciaro, T., & Piskorski, M. (2005). Power imbalance, mutual dependence, and constraint absorption: A closer look at  
894 resource dependence theory. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 50, 167-199.

895 Chambers, J. R., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2014). Egocentrism drives misunderstanding in conflict and negotiation. *Journal*  
896 *of Experimental Social Psychology*, 51, 15-26.

897 Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. *Economica*, 4, 386-405.

898 Commons, J. R. (1932). The problem of correlating law economics and ethics. *Wisconsin Law Review*, 8, 3-26.

899 Cook, K., & Emerson, R., (1978). Power, equity and commitment in exchange networks. *American Sociological Review*,  
900 43, 721-739.

901 Cool, K. O., & Schendel, D. (1987). Strategic group formation and performance: The case of the US pharmaceutical  
902 industry, 1963–1982. *Management Science*, 33, 1102-1124.

903 Cosier R. A., & Rose, G. L. (1977). Cognitive conflict and goal conflict effects on task performance. *Organizational*  
904 *Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 19, 378-391.

905 Côté, S., Hideg, I., van Kleed, G. A. (2013). The consequences of faking anger in negotiations. *Journal of Experimental*  
906 *Social Psychology*, 49, 453-463.

907 Cropanzano, R., & Mitchell, M. (2005). Social exchange theory. *Journal of Management*, 31, 874-900.

908 Cyert, R., & March, J. (1963). *A behavioral theory of the firm*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

909 D'aveni, R. A., & Gunther, R. (2010). *Hypercompetition*. New York, NY: Free Press.

910 Dalton, D., & Kesner, I. (1983). Inside/outside succession and organizational size: The pragmatics of executive  
911 replacement. *Academy of Management Journal*, 26, 736-742.

912 Darnall, N., Henriques, I., & Sadorsky, P. (2010). Adopting proactive environmental strategy: The influence of  
913 stakeholders and firm size. *Journal of Management*, 47, 1072-1094.

914 Das, T. K., & Teng, B. S. (2002). Alliance constellations: A social exchange perspective. *Academy of Management*  
915 *Review*, 27, 445-456.

916 Davis, G., & Mizruchi, M. (1999). The money center cannot hold: Commercial banks in the US system of corporate  
917 governance. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 44, 215-239.

918 Dawes, R. (1980). Social dilemmas. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 31, 169-193.

919 De Cremer, D., Hoogervorst, N., & Desmet, P. (2012). Procedural justice and sanctions in social dilemmas: The  
920 moderating effects of group feedback and identification. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 42, 1675-1693.

921 De Dreu, C. K. (2003). Time pressure and closing of the mind in negotiation. *Organizational Behavior & Human*  
922 *Decision Processes*, 91, 280-295.

923 De Dreu, C. K. & Van De Vliert, E. (1997). *Using conflict in organizations*. London, UK, Sage.

924 De Dreu, C. K., & Weingart, L. R. (2003). Task versus relationship conflict, team performance, and team member  
925 satisfaction: a meta-analysis. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 88, 741-749.

926 Dimotakis, N., Conlon, D., & Ilies, R. (2012). The mind and heart (literally) of the negotiator. *Journal of Applied*  
927 *Psychology*, 97, 183-193.

928 Dubin, R. (1957). Power and union-management relations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 2, 60-81.

929 Ebenbach, D. H., & Keltner, D. (1998). Power, emotion, and judgmental accuracy in social conflict: Motivating the  
930 cognitive miser. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 20, 7-21.

931 Elfenbein, D. W., & Zenger, T. (2017). Creating and capturing value in repeated exchange relationships: The second  
932 paradox of embeddedness. *Organization Science*, 28, 894-914.

933 Emerson, R. (1962). Power-dependence relations. *American Sociological Review* 27, 31-41.

934 Faems, D., Janssens, M., Madhok, A., & Van Looy, B. (2008). Toward an integrative perspective on alliance governance.  
935 *Academy of Management Journal*, 51, 1053-1078.

936 Faramand, F. A., & Tu, Y.-T. (2013). The role of gender in business negotiations. *International Journal of Management*  
937 *and Human Resources*, 1, 29-43.

- 938 Ferraro, F., Pfeffer, J., & Sutton, R. (2005). Economics language and assumptions: How theories can become self-  
 939 fulfilling. *Academy of Management Review*, 30, 8-24.
- 940 Festinger, L. (1962). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- 941 Fiedler, S., Glöckner, A., Nicklisch, A., & Dickert, S. (2013). Social value orientation and information search in social  
 942 dilemmas: An eye-tracking analysis. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 120, 272-284.
- 943 Foss, N.J., & Weber, L., 2016. Moving opportunism to the back seat: Bounded rationality, costly conflict, and  
 944 hierarchical forms. *Academy of Management Review*, 41, 61-79.
- 945 Fox, M., Tost, L. P., & Wade-Benzoni, K. A. (2010). The legacy motive: A catalyst for sustainable decision making in  
 946 organizations. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 20, 153-185.
- 947 Galinsky, A. D., Rucker, D. D., & Magee, J. C. (2015). Power: Past findings, present considerations, and future  
 948 directions. In Mikulincer, M., Shaver, P. R., Simpson, J. A. & Dovidio, J. F. (Ed.), *APA Handbook of personality  
 949 and social psychology* (Vol. 3, pp. 421-460). Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association.
- 950 Galinsky, A. D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Magee, J. C. (2003). From power to action. *Journal of Personality and Social  
 951 Psychology*, 85, 453-466.
- 952 Garfinkel, M. R., & Skaperdas, S. (2007). Economics of conflict: An overview. In Sandler, T., & Hartley K. (eds.)  
 953 *Handbook of defense economics*, (Vol. 2, pp. 649-709). Oxford, UK: Elsevier.
- 954 Ghosh, M., & John, G. (1999). Governance value analysis and marketing strategy. *Journal of Marketing*, 63, 131-145.
- 955 Ghosh, M., & John, G. (2005). Strategic fit in industrial alliances: An empirical test of governance value analysis. *Journal  
 956 of Marketing Research*, 42, 346-357.
- 957 Gouldner, A. (1960). The norm of reciprocity. *American Sociological Review*, 25, 161-178.
- 958 Gomes-Casseres, B. (1994, July 1). Group versus group: How alliance networks compete. *Harvard Business Review*.  
 959 <https://hbr.org/1994/07/group-versus-group-how-alliance-networks-compete>.
- 960 Graebner, M. (2009). Caveat venditor: Trust asymmetries in acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms. *Academy of  
 961 Management Journal*, 52, 435-472.
- 962 Grandori, A. (1991). Negotiating efficient organization forms. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 16, 319-340.
- 963 Granovetter, M. (1994). Review of alliance capitalism. *Contemporary Sociology*, 23, 3-5.
- 964 Greenhalgh, L., Neslin, S. A., & Gilkey, R. W. (1985). The effects of negotiator preferences, situational power, and  
 965 negotiator personality on outcomes of business negotiations. *Academy of Management Journal*, 28, 9-33.
- 966 Greer, L. L., Caruso, H. M., & Jehn, K. A. (2011). The bigger they are, the harder they fall: Linking team power, team  
 967 conflict, and performance. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 116, 116-128.
- 968 Gulati, R., & Nickerson, J. A. (2008). Inter-organizational trust, governance choice, and exchange performance.  
 969 *Organization Science*, 19, 688-708.
- 970 Guo, S. L., Lumineau, F., & Lewicki, R. J. (2017). Revisiting the foundations of organizational distrust. *Foundations  
 971 and Trends® in Management*, 1, 1-88.
- 972 Harinck, F., & De Dreu, C. K. (2004). Negotiating interests or values and reaching integrative agreements: The  
 973 importance of time pressure and temporary impasses. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 34, 595-611.
- 974 Harmon, D., Kim, P. H. & Mayer, K. J. (2015). Breaking the letter vs. spirit of the law: How the interpretation of  
 975 contract violations affects trust and the management of relationships. *Strategic Management Journal*, 36, 497-517.
- 976 Hart, S. L., & Ahuja, G. (1996). Does it pay to be green? An empirical examination of the relationship between emission  
 977 reduction and firm performance. *Business Strategy and the Environment*, 5, 30-37.
- 978 Hinds, P. J., & Mortensen, M. (2005). Understanding conflict in geographically distributed teams: The moderating  
 979 effects of shared identity, shared context, and spontaneous communication. *Organization Science*, 16, 290-307.
- 980 Hoetker, G. (2005). How much you know versus how well I know you: selecting a supplier for a technically innovative  
 981 component. *Strategic Management Journal*, 26, 75-96.
- 982 Hollenbeck, J. (2008). The role of editing in knowledge development: Consensus shifting and consensus creation. In  
 983 Baruch, Y., Konrad, A., Aguinis, H. & Starbuck, W. (Eds.), *Journal editing: Opening the black box* (pp. 16-26). San  
 984 Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- 985 Homans, G. (1958). Social behavior as exchange. *American Journal of Sociology*, 63, 597-606.
- 986 Hope, O., & Thomas, W. (2008). Managerial empire building and firm disclosure. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 46,  
 987 591-626.
- 988 Hughes, D., Griffiths, L., & McHale, J. V. (1997). Do quasi-markets evolve? Institutional analysis and the NHS.  
 989 *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 21, 259-276.

- 990 Jehn, K. (1995). A multimethod examination of the benefits and detriments of intragroup conflict. *Administrative*  
991 *Science Quarterly*, 40, 256-283.
- 992 Jehn, K. (1997). A qualitative analysis of conflict types and dimensions in organizational groups. *Administrative Science*  
993 *Quarterly*, 42, 530-557.
- 994 Jehn, K. A., Chadwick, C., & Thatcher, S. (1997). To agree or not to agree: The effects of value congruence, individual  
995 demographic dissimilarity, and conflict on workgroup outcomes. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 8,  
996 287-305.
- 997 Jehn, K. A., & Mannix, E. A. (2001). The dynamic nature of conflict: A longitudinal study of intragroup conflict and  
998 group performance. *Academy of Management Journal*, 44, 238-251.
- 999 Jehn, K. A., Northcraft, G. B., & Neale, M. A. (1999). Why differences make a difference: A field study of diversity,  
1000 conflict, and performance in workgroups. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 44, 741-763.
- 1001 Johnson, M., Hollenbeck, J., Humphrey, S., Ilgen, D., Jundt, D., & Meyer, C. (2006). Cutthroat cooperation:  
1002 Asymmetrical adaptation to changes in team reward structures. *Academy of Management Journal*, 49, 103-119.
- 1003 Keltner, D., & Robinson, R. J. (1993). Imagined ideological differences in conflict escalation and resolution.  
1004 *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 4, 249-262.
- 1005 Kerr, N. L., Rumble, A. C., Park, E. S., Ouwkerk, J. W., Parks, C. D., Gallucci, M., & van Lange, P. A. (2009). How  
1006 many bad apples does it take to spoil the whole barrel? Social exclusion and toleration for bad apples. *Journal of*  
1007 *Experimental Social Psychology*, 45, 603-613.
- 1008 Kimmel, M. J., Pruitt, D. G., Magenau, J. M., Konar-Goldband, E., & Carnevale, P. J. D. (1980). Effects of trust,  
1009 aspiration, and gender on negotiation tactics. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 38, 9-22.
- 1010 King, W. C., & Hinson, T. D. (1994). The influence of sex and equity sensitivity on relationship preferences, assessment  
1011 of opponent, and outcomes in a negotiation experiment. *Journal of Management*, 20, 605-624.
- 1012 Klein, K. J., Knight, A. P., Ziegert, J. C., Lim, B. C., & Saltz, J. L. (2011). When team members' values differ: The  
1013 moderating role of team leadership. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 114, 25-36.
- 1014 Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24, 183-214.
- 1015 Kotlikoff, L. J. (1995). *Generational accounting*. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- 1016 Kray, L.J., & Thompson, L. L. (2005). Gender stereotypes and negotiation performance: An examination of theory and  
1017 research. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 26, 103-182.
- 1018 Kugler, T., & Bornstein, G. (2013). Social dilemmas between individuals and groups. *Organizational Behavior & Human*  
1019 *Decision Processes*, 120, 191-205.
- 1020 Lawler, E. (1992). *The ultimate advantage*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- 1021 Lee, S., Mun, H., & Park, K. (2015). When is dependence on other organizations burdensome? The effect of asymmetric  
1022 dependence on internet firm failure. *Strategic Management Journal* 36, 2058-2074.
- 1023 Lee, M., Pitesa, M., Pillutla, M. M., & Thau, S. (2016). Male immortality: An evolutionary account of sex differences in  
1024 unethical negotiation behavior. *Academy of Management Journal* 60, 2014-2044.
- 1025 Leibbrandt, A., & List, J. A. (2015). Do women avoid salary negotiation? Evidence from a large-scale natural field  
1026 experiment. *Management Science*, 61, 2016-2024.
- 1027 Levy, J., & Thompson, W. (2011). *Causes of war*. New York, NY: Wiley.
- 1028 Lewicki, R.J., Barry, B., & Saunders, D.M. (2010). *Negotiation*, Chapter 3. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.
- 1029 Lewis, J. D., & Weigert, A. (1985). Trust as a social reality. *Social Forces*, 63, 967-985.
- 1030 Liang, H., Ren, B., & Sun, S. L. (2015). An anatomy of state control in the globalization of state-owned enterprises.  
1031 *Journal of International Business Studies*, 46, 223-240.
- 1032 Litterer, J. A. (1966). Conflict in organization: A re-examination. *Academy of Management Journal*, 9, 178-186.
- 1033 Loewenstein, G. F., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, M. H. (1989). Social utility and decision making in interpersonal  
1034 contexts. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 57, 426-441.
- 1035 Lount, R., Sheldon, O., Rink, F., & Phillips, K. (2015). Biased perceptions of racially diverse teams and their  
1036 consequences for resource support. *Organization Science*, 26, 1351-1364.
- 1037 Luce, R., & Raiffa, H. (2012). *Games and decisions: Introduction and critical survey*. New York, NY: Dover.
- 1038 Lumineau, F. (2017). How contracts influence trust and distrust. *Journal of Management* 43, 1553-1577.
- 1039 Lumineau, F., Eckerd, S., & Handley, S. (2015). Inter-organizational conflicts: Research overview, challenges, and  
1040 opportunities. *Journal of Strategic Contracting & Negotiation*, 1, 42-64.

1041 Lumineau, F., & Malhotra, D. (2011). Shadow of the contract: How contract structure shapes interfirm dispute  
1042 resolution. *Strategic Management Journal*, 32, 532-555.

1043 Macher, J. T., & Richman, B. D. (2008). Transaction cost economics: An assessment of empirical research in the social  
1044 sciences. *Business & Politics*, 10, 1-63.

1045 McDowell, W., & Voelker, T. (2008). Information, resources and transaction cost economics: the effects of informal  
1046 network centrality on teams and team performance. *Journal of Behavioral & Applied Management*, 9, 134-147.

1047 Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of power and status. *Academy of  
1048 Management Annals*, 2, 351-398.

1049 Major, B., & Konar, E. (1984) An investigation of sex differences in pay expectations and their possible causes. *Academy  
1050 of Management Journal*, 27, 777-793.

1051 Malhotra, D., & Lumineau, F. (2011). Trust and collaboration in the aftermath of conflict: The effects of contract  
1052 structure. *Academy of Management Journal*, 54, 981-998.

1053 Mannix, E. A., & Neale, M. A. (2005). What differences make a difference? The promise and reality of diverse teams in  
1054 organizations. *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, 6, 31-55.

1055 March, J. G. (1994). *A primer of decision making: How decisions happen*. New York, NY: Free Press.

1056 McCarter, M. W., & Northcraft, G. B. (2007). Happy together? Insights and implications of viewing managed supply  
1057 chains as a social dilemma. *Journal of Operations Management*, 25, 498-511.

1058 McCarter, M. W., Rockmann, K., & Northcraft, G. B. (2010). Is it even worth it? The effect of loss prospects in the  
1059 outcome distribution of a public goods dilemma. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 111, 1-11.

1060 McCarter, M. W., Budescu, D. V., & Scheffran, J. (2011a). The give-or-take-some dilemma: An empirical investigation  
1061 of a hybrid social dilemma. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 116, 83-95.

1062 McCarter, M. W., Mahoney, J. T., & Northcraft, G. B. (2011b). Testing the waters: Using collective real options to  
1063 manage the social dilemma of strategic alliances. *Academy of Management Review*, 36, 621-640.

1064 McCloskey, D. N., & Ziliak, S. (1996). The standard error of regressions. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 34, 97-114.

1065 McEvily, B., Zaheer, A., & Kamal, D. (2017). Mutual and exclusive: Dyadic sources of trust in inter-organizational  
1066 exchange. *Organization Science*, 28, 74-92.

1067 Mellewigt, T., Thomas, A., Weller, I., & Zajac, E. J. (2017). Alliance or acquisition? A mechanisms-based, policy-  
1068 capturing analysis. *Strategic Management Journal*, 38, 2353-2369.

1069 Messick, D., & Brewer, M. (1983). Solving social dilemmas. In Wheeler, L. & Shaver, P. (Eds.), *Review of personality  
1070 and social psychology* (Vol. 4, pp. 11-44). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

1071 Mitchell, W., & Singh, K. (1992). Incumbents' use of pre-entry alliances before expansion into new technical subfields  
1072 of an industry. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 18, 347-372.

1073 Moore, D. A. (2004a). Myopic prediction, self-destructive secrecy, and the unexpected benefits of revealing final  
1074 deadlines in negotiation. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 94, 125-139.

1075 Moore, D. A. (2004b). The unexpected benefits of final deadlines in negotiation. *Journal of Experimental Social  
1076 Psychology*, 40, 121-127.

1077 Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1990). Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions? *Journal of Finance*, 45, 31-48.

1078 Mullery, C., Brenner, S., & Perrin, N. (1995). A structural analysis of corporate political activity: An application of MDS  
1079 to the study of inter-corporate relations. *Business & Society* 34, 147-170.

1080 Neale, M. A. & Bazerman, M. H. (1983). The role of perspective-taking ability in negotiations under different forms of  
1081 arbitration. *Industrial & Labor Relations Review*, 36, 378-388.

1082 Neale, M., & Northcraft, G. (1991). Behavioral negotiation theory. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 13, 147-190.

1083 Netzer, L., Van Kleef, G. A., & Tamir, M. (2015). Interpersonal instrumental emotion regulation. *Journal of  
1084 Experimental Social Psychology*, 58, 124-135.

1085 Nickerson, J.A., Hamilton, B., & Wada, T. (2001). Market position, resource profile, and governance. *Strategic  
1086 Management Journal*, 22, 251-273.

1087 Nishii, L. H. (2013). The benefits of climate for inclusion for gender-diverse groups. *Academy of Management Journal*,  
1088 56, 1754-1774.

1089 Noordewier, T., John, G., & Nevin, J. (1990). Performance outcomes of purchasing arrangements in industrial buyer-  
1090 vendor relationships. *Journal of Marketing*, 54, 80-93.

1091 Northcraft, G. B., & Neale, M. A. (1987). Experts, amateurs, and real estate: An anchoring-and-adjustment perspective  
1092 on property pricing decisions. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 39, 84-97.

- 1093 Nyaga, G., Lynch, D., Marshall, D., & Ambrose, E. (2013). Power asymmetry, adaptation and collaboration in dyadic  
1094 relationships involving a powerful partner. *Journal of Supply Chain Management*, 49, 42-65.
- 1095 Okhuysen, G., Galinsky, A., & Uptigrove, T. (2003). Saving the worst for last: The effect of time horizon on the  
1096 efficiency of negotiating benefits and burdens. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 91, 269-279.
- 1097 Osborn, R., & Baughn, C. (1990). Forms of inter-organizational governance for multinational alliances. *Academy of  
1098 Management Journal* 33, 503-519.
- 1099 Oxley, J. E. (1999). Institutional environment and the mechanisms of governance: the impact of intellectual property  
1100 protection on the structure of inter-firm alliances. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 38, 283-309.
- 1101 Park, S. H., & Russo, M. V. (1996). When competition eclipses cooperation: An event history analysis of joint venture  
1102 failure. *Management Science* 42, 875-890.
- 1103 Park, S., & Ungson, G. (2001). Interfirm rivalry and managerial complexity. *Organization Science*, 12, 37-53.
- 1104 Perry-Smith, J., & Shalley, C. (2003). The social side of creativity: A static and dynamic social network perspective.  
1105 *Academy of Management Review*, 28, 89-106.
- 1106 Pfeffer, J. (1973). Size, composition, and function of hospital boards of directors: A study of organization-environment  
1107 linkage. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 18, 349-364.
- 1108 Pfeffer, J. (1972a). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 17, 218-  
1109 228.
- 1110 Pfeffer, J., (1972b). Merger as a response to organizational interdependence. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 17, 382-394.
- 1111 Pfeffer, J., & Nowak, P. (1976). Joint ventures and inter-organizational interdependence. *Administrative Science  
1112 Quarterly*, 20, 398-418.
- 1113 Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (1978). *The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective*. Stanford,  
1114 CA: Stanford University Press.
- 1115 Pinkley, R. L. (1990). Dimensions of conflict frame: disputant interpretations of conflict. *Journal of Applied Psychology*,  
1116 75, 117-126
- 1117 Pinkley, R. L. (1995). The impact of knowledge regarding alternatives to settlement in a dyadic negotiation: Whose  
1118 knowledge counts? *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 80, 403-417.
- 1119 Pinkley, R. L., Neale, M. A., & Bennett, R. J. (1994). The impact of alternatives to settlement in dyadic negotiation.  
1120 *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 57, 97-116.
- 1121 Polidoro, F., Ahuja, G., & Mitchell, W. (2011). When the social structure overshadows competitive incentives: The  
1122 effects of network embeddedness on joint venture dissolution. *Academy of Management Journal*, 54, 203-223.
- 1123 Polzer, J. (1996). Intergroup negotiations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40, 678-698.
- 1124 Pondy, L. (1967). Organizational conflict: Concepts and models. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 12, 296-320.
- 1125 Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. (2002). Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?  
1126 *Strategic Management Journal*, 23, 707-725.
- 1127 Portney, P., & Weyant, J. (1999). *Discounting and intergenerational equity*. Washington DC: Resources for the Future.
- 1128 Pratt, M. G. (2008). Fitting oval pegs into round holes: Tensions in evaluating and publishing qualitative research in  
1129 top-tier North American journals. *Organizational Research Methods*, 11, 481-509.
- 1130 Pruitt, D. G. (1981). *Negotiation behavior*. New York, NY: Academic Press.
- 1131 Pruitt, D. & Rubin, J. (1986). *Social conflict: Escalation, impasse, and resolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- 1132 Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1994). Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships.  
1133 *Academy of Management Review*, 19, 90-118.
- 1134 Rizzo, J. R., House, R. J., & Lirtzman, S. I. (1970). Role conflict and ambiguity in complex organizations. *Administrative  
1135 Science Quarterly*, 15, 150-163.
- 1136 Robinson, R. J., & Kray, L. J. (2001). Status versus quo: Naïve realism and the search for social change and perceive  
1137 legitimacy. In Jost, J. T., & Major, B. (Eds.), *The psychology of legitimacy: Emerging perspectives on ideology,  
1138 justice, and intergroup relations* (pp. 135-154). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 1139 Robinson, R. J., Keltner, D., Ward, A., & Ross, L. (1995). Actual versus assumed differences in construal: 'Naïve realism'  
1140 in intergroup perception and conflict. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 68, 404-417.
- 1141 Rockmann, K. W., & Northcraft, G. B. (2008). To be or not to be trusted: The influence of media richness on defection  
1142 and deception. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 107, 106-122.
- 1143 Rousseau, D., Sitkin, S., Burt, R., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust.  
1144 *Academy of Management Review*, 23, 393-404.

1145 Rubin, K. H., & Brown, I. D. (1975). A life-span look at person perception and its relationship to communicative  
1146 interaction. *Journal of Gerontology*, 30, 461-468.

1147 Rubin, J. Z., Pruitt, D. G., & Kim, S. H. (1994). *Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement*. New York, NY:  
1148 McGraw-Hill.

1149 Sally, D. (1995). Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas. *Rationality & Society*, 7, 58-92.

1150 Salancik, G., & Pfeffer, J. (1980). Effects of ownership and performance on executive tenure in US corporations.  
1151 *Academy of Management Journal*, 23, 653-664.

1152 Schweinsberg, M., Ku, G., Wang, C. S., & Pillutla, M. M. (2012). Starting high and ending with nothing: The role of  
1153 anchors and power in negotiations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 48, 226-231.

1154 Scott, W., & Davis, G. (2003). *Organizations and organizing*. Newark, NJ: Pearson.

1155 Sharma, S., Bottom, W. P., & Elfenbein, H. A. (2013). On the role of personality, cognitive ability, and emotional  
1156 intelligence in predicting negotiation outcomes: A meta-analysis. *Organizational Psychology Review*, 3, 293-336.

1157 Shaver, J. M. (2008). Organizational significance. *Strategic Organization*, 6, 185-193.

1158 Silverman, B. (1999). Technological resources and the direction of corporate diversification: Toward an integration of  
1159 the resource-based view and transaction cost economics. *Management Science*, 45, 1109-1124.

1160 Silverman, B. (2002). Organizational economics. In Baum, J.A.C. (ed.), *Blackwell companion to organizations*, (pp. 233-  
1161 256). Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.

1162 Simon, H. A. (1957). *Models of man*. Oxford, UK: Wiley.

1163 Simon, H. A. (1982). *Models of bounded rationality*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

1164 Sinaceur, M., Adam, H., Van Kleef, G. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2013). The advantages of being unpredictable: How  
1165 emotional inconsistency extracts concessions in negotiation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 49, 498-508.

1166 Sinaceur, M., Van Kleef, G. A., Neale, M. A., Adam, H., & Haag, C. (2011). Hot or cold: Is communicating anger or  
1167 threats more effective in negotiation? *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 96, 1018-1032.

1168 Smith, K. G., Carroll, S. J., & Ashford, S. J. (1995). Intra-and interorganizational cooperation: Toward a research agenda.  
1169 *Academy of Management Journal*, 38, 7-23.

1170 Staw, B. M. (1991). Dressing up like an organization: When psychological theories can explain organizational action.  
1171 *Journal of Management*, 17, 805-819.

1172 Stuhlmacher, A., & Walters, A. (1999). Gender differences in negotiation outcome. *Personnel Psychology*, 52, 653-677.

1173 Sullivan, C. C. (2002). Finding the thou in the I: Countertransference and parallel process analysis in organizational  
1174 research and consultation. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 38, 375-392.

1175 Sutcliffe, K., & Zaheer, A. (1998). Uncertainty in the transaction environment. *Strategic Management Journal*, 19, 1-23.

1176 Swaab, R. I., Galinsky, A. D., Medvec, V., & Diermeier, D. A. (2012). The communication orientation model: Explaining  
1177 the diverse effects of sight, sound, and synchronicity on negotiation and group decision-making outcomes.  
1178 *Personality & Social Psychology Review*, 16, 25-53.

1179 Tannen D. (1990). *You just don't understand: Men and women in conversation*. New York, NY: Ballantine Books.

1180 Tepper, B. J., Moss, S. E., & Duffy, M. K. (2011). Predictors of abusive supervision: Supervisor perceptions of deep-  
1181 level dissimilarity, relationship conflict, and subordinate performance. *Academy of Management Journal*, 54, 279-294.

1182 Tenbrunsel, A. (1998). Misrepresentation and expectations of misrepresentation in an ethical dilemma: The role of  
1183 incentives and temptation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 41, 330-339.

1184 Tenbrunsel, A., Wade-Benzoni, K. A., Tost, L., Medvec, V., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, M. (2009). The reality and  
1185 myth of sacred issues in negotiations. *Negotiation & Conflict Management Research*, 2, 263-284.

1186 Thibaut, N., & Kelley, H. (1959). *The social psychology of groups*. New York, NY: Transaction Publishers

1187 Thompson, J. D. (1960). Organizational management of conflict. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 4, 389-409.

1188 Thompson, J. D. (1967). *Organizations in action*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

1189 Thompson, L. (2015). *The mind and heart of the negotiator*. London, UK: Pearson.

1190 Thompson, L. (1991). Information exchange in negotiation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 27, 161-179.

1191 Thompson, L., Jiunwen, W., & Gunia, B. (2010). Negotiation. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 61, 491-515.

1192 Thompson, V. (1961). Hierarchy, specialization, and organizational conflict. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 5, 485-521

1193 Tng, H.-Y., & Au, A. K. C. (2014). Strategic display of anger and happiness in negotiation: The moderating role of  
1194 perceived authenticity. *Negotiation Journal*, 30, 301-327.

1195 Tost, L. P., Wade-Benzoni, K. A., & Johnson, H. H. (2015). Noblesse oblige emerges (with time): Power enhances  
1196 intergenerational beneficence. *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 128, 61-73.

1197 Tuller, H. M., Bryan, C. J., Heyman, G. D., & Christenfeld, N. J. S. (2015). Seeing the other side: Perspective taking and  
1198 the moderation of extremity. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 59, 18-23.

1199 Van de Ven, A., & Delbecq, A. L. (1971). Nominal versus interacting group processes for committee decision-making  
1200 effectiveness. *Academy of Management Journal*, 14, 203-212.

1201 Van den Assem, M. J., Van Dolder, D., & Thaler, R. H. (2012). Split or steal? Cooperative behavior when the stakes are  
1202 large. *Management Science*, 58, 2-20.

1203 Van Kleef, G. A., Anastasopoulou, C., & Nijstad, B. A. (2010). Can expressions of anger enhance creativity? A test of  
1204 the emotions as social information (EASI) model. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 46, 1042-1048.

1205 Van Lange, P. A., Joireman, J., Parks, C. D., & Van Dijk, E. (2013). The psychology of social dilemmas: A review.  
1206 *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 120, 125-141.

1207 Vroom, V. H., & Yetton, P. W. (1973). *Leadership and decision-making*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburg Press.

1208 Wade-Benzoni, K. A. (2002). A golden rule over time. *Academy of Management Journal*, 45, 1011-1028.

1209 Wade-Benzoni, K. A. (2003). Intergenerational identification and cooperation in organizations and society. In M. Neale,  
1210 E. Mannix & A. Tenbrunsel (Ed.), *Research on managing groups and teams* (Vol. 5, pp. 257-277). Greenwich, CT:  
1211 JAI Press.

1212 Wade-Benzoni, K. A. (2006). Legacies, immortality, and the future: The psychology of intergenerational altruism. In A.  
1213 E. Tenbrunsel (Ed.), *Research on managing groups and teams* (Vol. 8, pp. 247-270). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

1214 Wade-Benzoni, K. A. (2008). Maple trees and weeping willows: The role of time, uncertainty, and affinity in  
1215 intergenerational decisions. *Negotiation & Conflict Management Research*, 1, 220-245.

1216 Wade-Benzoni, K. A., Hernandez, M., Medvec, V., & Messick, D. M. (2008). In fairness to future generations: The role  
1217 of egocentrism, uncertainty, power, and stewardship in judgments of intergenerational allocations. *Journal of*  
1218 *Experimental Social Psychology*, 44, 233-245.

1219 Wade-Benzoni, K. A., Okumura, T., Brett, J., Moore, D., Tenbrunsel, A., & Bazerman, M. (2002). Cognitions and  
1220 behavior in asymmetric social dilemmas: A comparison of two cultures. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87, 87-95.

1221 Wade-Benzoni, K. A., Sondak, H., & Galinsky, A. D. (2010). Leaving a legacy: Intergenerational allocations of benefits  
1222 and burdens. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 20, 7-34.

1223 Wade-Benzoni, K. A., Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Bazerman, M. H. (1996). Egocentric interpretations of fairness in  
1224 asymmetric, environmental social dilemmas: Explaining harvesting behavior and the role of communication.  
1225 *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 67, 111-126.

1226 Wade-Benzoni, K. A., & Tost, L. P. (2009). The egoism and altruism of intergenerational behavior. *Personality & Social*  
1227 *Psychology Review*, 13, 165-193.

1228 Wade-Benzoni, K. A., Tost, L. P., Hernandez, M., & Larrick, R. P. (2012). It's only a matter of time: Death, legacies,  
1229 and intergenerational decisions. *Psychological Science*, 23, 704-709.

1230 Walton, R., & McKersie, R. (1965). *A behavioral theory of labor negotiations: An analysis of a social interaction system*.  
1231 Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

1232 Wang, L., Northcraft, G. B., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2012). Beyond negotiated outcomes: The hidden costs of anger  
1233 expression in dyadic negotiation. *Organizational Behavior & Decision Processes*, 119, 54-63.

1234 Weber, L., & Mayer, K. (2014). Transaction cost economics and the cognitive perspective: Investigating the sources and  
1235 governance of interpretive uncertainty. *Academy of Management Review*, 39, 344-363.

1236 Weber, J. M., & Murnighan, J. K. (2008). Suckers or saviors? Consistent contributors in social dilemmas. *Journal of*  
1237 *Personality & Social Psychology*, 95, 1340-1353.

1238 Weber, J. M., Kopelman, S., & Messick, D. M. (2004). A conceptual review of decision making in social dilemmas:  
1239 Applying a logic of appropriateness. *Personality & Social Psychology Review*, 8, 281-307.

1240 Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm. *Strategic Management Journal*, 5, 171-180.

1241 White, G. O., Joplin, J. R., & Feras Salama, M. (2007). Contracts and conflict resolution strategies in foreign ventures:  
1242 A transaction cost perspective. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 18, 376-390.

1243 Williamson, O. (2000). The new institutional economics. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 38, 595-613.

1244 Williamson, O. (1993). Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization. *Journal of Law & Economics*, 36, 453-486.

1245 Williamson, O. (1991). Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives.  
1246 *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36, 269-296.

1247 Williamson, O. (1985). *The economic institutions of capitalism*. New York, NY: Free Press.

1248 Williamson, O. (1983). Credible commitments. *American Economic Review*, 73, 519-540.

- 1249 Williamson, O. (1981). The economics of organization. *American Journal of Sociology*, 87, 548-577.
- 1250 Williamson, O. (1979). Transaction cost economics. *Journal of Law & Economics*, 22, 223-261.
- 1251 Williamson, O. (1975). *Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- 1252 Wolfe, R., & McGinn, K. (2005). Perceived relative power and its influence on negotiations. *Group Decision &*  
1253 *Negotiation*, 14, 3-20.
- 1254 Xia, J., & Li, S. (2013). The divestiture of acquired subunits. *Strategic Management Journal*, 34, 131-148.
- 1255 Yamagishi, T., Mifune, N., Li, Y., Shinada, M., Hashimoto, H., Horita, Y., Miura, A., & Simunovic, D. (2013). Is  
1256 behavioral pro-sociality game-specific? Pro-social preference and expectations of prosociality. *Organizational*  
1257 *Behavior & Human Decision Processes*, 120, 260-271.
- 1258 Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., & Perrone, V. (1998). Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of inter-organizational and  
1259 interpersonal trust on performance. *Organization Science*, 9, 141-159.
- 1260 Zellars, K. L., Tepper, B. J., & Duffy, M. K. (2002). Abusive supervision and subordinates' organizational citizenship  
1261 behavior. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87, 1068-1076.
- 1262 Zeng, M., & Chen, X. P. (2003). Achieving cooperation in multiparty alliances: A social dilemma approach to partnership  
1263 management. *Academy of Management Review*, 28, 587-605.
- 1264 Zhao, H., Luo, Y., & Suh, T. (2004). Transaction cost determinants and ownership-based entry mode choice: A meta-  
1265 analytical review. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 35, 524-544.
- 1266 Zhang, Q., Ting-Toomey, S., & Oetzel, J. G. (2014). Linking emotion to the conflict face-negotiation theory. *Human*  
1267 *Communication Research*, 40, 373-395.

<sup>1</sup> While the management field has many top-tier scholarly outlets for research, our review primarily covers articles published in top-tier North American management journals. Our reasoning patterns after Pratt's (2008) in his review of best practices in qualitative management research: publishing in the *Academy of Management Journal*, *Academy of Management Review*, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *Organization Science*, and *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes* would advance an academic toward tenure and promotion in any business school in the world. Journals like *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, *Management Science*, *Journal of Operations Management*, and *Strategic Management Journal*, while also prestigious in management, are kept to a minimum in the review because they also represent flagship journals in fields of psychology, social psychology, management science, operations research, and strategy.

<sup>2</sup> Occasionally, some scholars draw a line between intergroup and intragroup conflict, with intragroup conflict only occurring *within* organizations and intergroup conflict only occurring *among* organizations (e.g. Smith et al., 1995). Indeed, across the expanse of management studies, some literatures conceptualize a group in this way, focusing on a collective of people within an organization; e.g. the group process (e.g. Van de Ven & Delbecq, 1971) and strategic group decision making literatures (e.g. Cool & Schendel, 1987). However, the current paper follows the broader conceptualization of groups suggested by the writings of Sullivan (2002) and Staw (1991): a group is any collective of agents – be they humans, departments, firms, communities, or generations – who are interdependently connected.

<sup>3</sup> Indeed, each of the models we review have their own reviews. The curious student may consider the following sample reviews that primarily describe each literatures' findings: the diversity-conflict model (e.g. Mannix & Neale, 2005), social dilemma models (e.g. Van Lange et al., 2013), the behavioral-negotiation model (e.g. Thompson et al., 2010), the social exchange model (e.g. Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), and the transaction cost economics model (e.g. Silverman, 2002).

<sup>4</sup> Early management papers researching conflict likened conflict to war through various terms and descriptors; e.g. battles, attack, hurt, and harm (e.g. Thompson, 1961). These terms, for the most part, declined in use during the 1970s, were near extinct by the 1990s, and now appear but occasionally in management research in such developing areas as territoriality in organizations (e.g. Brown et al., 2005) and hypercompetition (e.g. D'aveni & Gunther, 2010). Therefore, we do not address war research in the current review of the management literature.

<sup>5</sup> Recent scholarship merged the ideas of give-some and take-some dilemmas into a hybrid social dilemma termed the give-or-take-some dilemma (McCarter et al., 2011a; Budescu & McCarter, 2012). Its considerable newness and dearth of research, while providing much room for exploration, makes the give-or-take-some dilemma not a focus of the current review. For further discussion about the give-or-take-some dilemma, the reader may benefit from Van Lange et al.'s (2013) review of the psychology of social dilemmas.

<sup>6</sup> The reader may find of interest work utilizing the social exchange model to understand intragroup in the context of organizational justice, workplace politics, incivility, and abusive supervision (e.g. Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Zellars, Tepper, & Duffy, 2002).

<sup>7</sup> The reader may find of interest Gary Bornstein's work on increasing cooperation within groups by increasing conflict between them (e.g. Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994; Bornstein et al., 1990). These experiments are not reviewed in the current paper because they examine conflict between groups and not within them.

<sup>8</sup> Social dilemma models distinguish between opportunistic and defensive conflict or defection (e.g. McCarter et al., 2010; McCarter et al., 2011b; Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008). However, the multidimensionality of conflict here is between why a person chooses a course of action that harms the collective and not a course that can benefit the collective through conflict.


**Table 1: Research on Intragroup Conflict in Management**

<i>Topic</i>	<i>Description</i>
1) <i>The definition of conflict is ...</i>	a dynamic process whereby at least one agent feels, perceives, or behaves in opposition toward another agent.
2) <i>Main models of intragroup conflict include ...</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• diversity-conflict model</li> <li>• behavioral negotiation model</li> <li>• social dilemma models</li> <li>• social exchange model, and</li> <li>• transaction cost model</li> </ul>
3) <i>Foundational publications for each model include ...</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• general conflict research: Thompson (1960); Cyert &amp; March (1963); Litterer (1966); and Pondy (1967)</li> <li>• diversity-conflict model: Jehn (1995, 1997); and Jehn, Northcraft, &amp; Neale (1999)</li> <li>• behavioral negotiation model: Walton &amp; McKersie (1965); Pruitt &amp; Rubin (1986); and Neale &amp; Northcraft (1991)</li> <li>• social dilemma model: Dawes (1980); Messick &amp; Brewer (1983); Kollock (1998); and Weber, Kopelman, &amp; Messick (2004)</li> <li>• social exchange model: Emerson (1962); Blau (1964); and Pfeffer &amp; Salancik (1978)</li> <li>• transaction cost economics model: Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975)</li> </ul>

**Table 2: A Comparison among Five Models of Intragroup Conflict in Management Studies**


<i>Comparison Categories</i>	Diversity-Conflict Models	Social Dilemma Models	Behavioral Negotiation Models	Social Exchange Models	Transaction Cost Models
<i>Key ideas include ...</i>	Promote certain kinds of conflict (e.g. task conflict) while discouraging others; e.g. relational and status conflict through group characteristics.	Decrease conflict through structural and motivational solutions that encourage strategies that benefit the collective as well as the individual.	Leverage conflict through integrative negotiation where the parties value the issues differently, creating more value to divide through distributive negotiation.	Desire for independence motivates conflict where parties are interdependent for their access to shared resources.	Efficient contract design mitigates conflict and facilitates order. Risk of opportunism, motivates actors to seek appropriate safeguards against conflict.
<i>Conflict primarily viewed as resulting in a ...</i>	Mix of positive and negative outcomes	Negative outcome	Mix of positive and negative outcomes	Mix of positive and negative outcomes	Negative outcome
<i>Analytic units are ...</i>	Individual and group level	Individual and group level	Individual and dyad	Dyad and Network	Transaction
<i>Methodologies include ...</i>	Individual and team-level field surveys, and laboratory experiments	Individual and team-level laboratory experiments	Individual and dyad-level laboratory experiments	Case studies and large sample field studies	Large sample field studies and laboratory experiments
<i>Disciplinary foundation based in ...</i>	Organizational behavior	Social psychology	Organizational behavior / Social psychology	Social psychology / Sociology / Organizational theory	Economics

Figure 1: Conflict-Related Papers in Top North-American Management Journals, 1990-2015



Note: The figure was generated based on five journals *Academy of Management Journal*, *Academy of Management Review*, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *Organizational Science*, and *Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes*. The search terms – e.g. conflict, cooperation, social dilemma, negotiation, and alliance – commonly associated with models of conflict in management. Web of Science searches for articles within the given journals with these terms in the title were performed on 29 September 2016.

1 **Figure 2: A Venn diagram of intragroup conflict research in management with a focus on five models and a**  
 2 **sample of prior research.**  
 3



4  
 5  
 6 Note: BN, DC, SD, SE, and TCE are acronyms for the Behavioral Negotiation model, the Diversity Conflict model,  
 7 the Social Dilemma models, the Social Exchange model, and the Transaction Cost Economics model.