"A New and Unwholesome Principle": American and British Influence on the Turco-Greek Exchange Convention of January 30, 1923

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"A New and Unwholesome Principle": American and British Influence on the Turco-Greek Exchange Convention of January 30, 1923

By Matthew Hacholski

Traveling across Anatolia during the Greco-Turk War, Arnold Toynbee lamented the atrocities he saw committed by both sides. "Western civilization," he wrote, had brought about a "war of extermination between local nationalities let loose by its own diplomacy."[2] In the fall of 1922, Western diplomats would attempt to rectify their error at the 1st Lausanne Conference by seeking to bring peace between Turkey and Greece. Part of the solution would be the first internationally condoned compulsory population transfer, the Turco-Greek Exchange, whose formulation most historians have attributed to Turkey, Greece, and Great Britain alone. However at the Lausanne Peace Conference, the American delegation also actively contributed to the creation of this exchange convention, which served as a template for later forced population transfers.[3] In fact it was American pressure rather than the "diplomatic skills" of Venizelos, the Greek Representative at the conference, or the "steamroller tactics" of British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon which led to the exclusion of the Constantinople Greeks from the population exchange and to some degree, bears responsibility for its compulsory nature.[4]

The exchange convention has long been studied as part of diplomatic history.[5] Relying on diplomatic communiqués and other government documents, as well as private memoirs, early 20th century scholars treated the Lausanne Conference as the official end of the Ottoman age and part of the "maturation" process of the Middle East.[6] Turkey's adoption of the nation-state model and membership in the League of Nations further encouraged these old-style diplomatic historians to see the exchange as a historic, if regrettable, "great success," the first forced ethno-religious transfer sanctioned by an evolving international community.[7] Some even felt this new concept of compulsory exchange offered a viable solution to a Europe still-racked by ethnic strife.[8] Concurrently in Greece and Turkey, the exchange and the entire Lausanne Conference were integrated into nationalist narratives whose glorification of the nation and vilification "the other" often came at the expense of historical accuracy.[9] As E.J. Hobsawn wrote, "historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroin-addicts: we supply the essential raw material for the market," and the past profuse use of this intellectual narcotic on both sides of the Aegean makes the presentation of the exchange even by present Greek and Turkish historians at times suspect.[10] Yet for contemporary scholars outside of Greece and Turkey, the study of the exchange has shifted to the field of refugee studies. These researchers, such as Rene Hirschon, have examined exclusively the social and cultural ramifications of the Turco-Greek population transfer.[11] While now conceptualized as part of a larger phenomenon of population expulsions, the exchange is still seen as particularly important as it created "a new type of refugee, stemming from the organization of a largely involuntary unmixing of people under the aegis of international law."[12] While in the past diplomatic historians allowed the political dimensions of the transfer to dominate their analysis, this new method of scholarship as one authority has warned, "runs the risk of reducing in importance the role of the political and diplomatic process that led to [the exchange]."[13] Oddly, however, historians from both diplomatic history and refugee studies have failed to notice the key American contribution to what they have called "the most important" of all population transfers in modern history which this study examines through the former methodology.[14]

As self-appointed Chairman of the Lausanne Conference and representative of the leading European power, Lord Curzon had substantial influence on the drafting of the exchange convention and set the British position on the population exchange. Under his leadership, the concept of population exchange would be presented to the conference by a representative of the League of Nations, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, on December 1, 1922.[15] The British Foreign Secretary specially chose the timing and presenter of the exchange. As the conference dealt with several issues beyond the conflict between Greece and Turkey, Curzon first presented topics he believed the Allies and
other neutral parties, including America, could agree on. He hoped this strategy, which encompassed the exchange, would strengthen allied unity and isolate Turkey diplomatically. Also, by having a renowned philanthropist introduce the concept, it cast an aura of humanitarianism over the exchange while obscuring British influence. Because of international condemnation of the exchange's compulsory nature, not only the British, but the Turkish and Greek delegations as well, attempted on multiple occasions during the conference to disavow their role in fathering the concept while American diplomats made no attempt to draw attention to their role in the negotiations. This diplomatic "distancing" may in part explain why the American contribution to the exchange through Constantinople's exemption has been previously unexamined and why some have cited Dr. Nansen as the sole architect of the exchange.

After Nansen's introduction in which mention was made of a possible sub-commission to decide the matter, the leading Turkish delegate, İsmet İnn, announced Turkey's intent to include the Greeks of Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul) in the transfer. Having emerged victorious from the Greco-Turk War, Turkey expected to dictate many of the peace terms, including the exchange. In reply to İsmet's position on Constantinople, Curzon commented that he "hoped that the sub-commission, if set up, would consider the desirability of persuading the Turkish Government to keep the Greek population of Constantinople." Thus, while Curzon "hoped" the Constantinople Greeks would be exempt from the transfer, he expected the sub-commission to persuade the Turkish delegation, as he wanted to discuss issues that were more relevant to British interests in the conference's main commission. Curzon's only attempt to dissuade Turkish delegates that day from including Constantinople was to remind them that Constantinople's Greeks were "vital to the existence of Constantinople as a great city of commerce and industry."

After İsmet İnn declared Turkey's position, the head Greek delegate Venizelos did not obstinately oppose the inclusion of Constantinople within the exchange. This is as representing a defeated nation in political turmoil and flooded with refugees, Venizelos had little besides personal charisma with which to resist Turkish demands. He also faced a precedent of previous Greek passiveness in diplomacy set during Mudania, the armistice of the Greco-Turk War. Negotiated on a pier jutting into the Aegean Sea at Mudania, allied representatives from France, Italy, and Great Britain brokered an end to fighting between Greece and Turkey. The overall allied commander, General Tim Harington of Britain, took the lead in discussions with Turkish representatives as Curzon would later at Lausanne. Unfortunately for Greece, the only Greeks present at Mudania were those floating decreased underneath the pier, and thus the Greeks were compelled to accept an armistice that was literally dictated over their heads. In many ways, Lausanne was delegated in a similar manner with the Allies taking the lead in negotiations with the newly formed state of Turkey while Greece, overwhelmed by its defeat, could comment little on the proceedings including the exchange. However in this discussion Venizelos did note "A special question arose as regards Constantinople. [He] could not allow that the thousands of Greeks who lived there, with the addition of the numerous refugees from Thrace and Anatolia, should be obliged to leave that city. Such an expulsion would amount to an unprecedented political, economic, and social catastrophe. If Turkey actually insisted on such an exodus, the number of refugees in Greece would be so great that he would be obliged to ask America, the great democracy of the West, to increase, for the benefit of the refugees, the percentage of immigrants she was willing to receive".

American diplomats present at the diplomatic table no doubt noted this suggestion with special interest. Should the Constantinople Greeks be forced from their homes, the United States would probably be asked to take in tens of thousands of them, making a matter whose outcome at first seemed of little relevance to the United States possibly having quite palpable effects. The issue of Constantinople then had immediately risen as a point of contention during the first discussion on the population exchange at Lausanne, which would require later American intervention. Overall, there is no sign that Venizelos's or Curzon's statements on December 1st had any effect on the Turkish delegation as afterwards they continued to insist on Constantinople's inclusion. At the conclusion of this meeting, the commission "decided that the question of the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey shall be examined by a sub-commission" while the American delegation now had to weigh the seriousness of Venizelos's statement.
After this first discussion the next ten days of the conference, December 2 to December 12, were critical in the formulation of the precise policy and goals of the population exchange in the sub-committee including the fate of Constantinople. During those ten days, Curzon would not attend a single exchange meeting, giving him little opportunity to influence the outcome of the exchange and greater leverage to the American delegation.[28] Instead, Curzon, having chosen free transit of the Straits, the Dardanelles, and the Bosporus as the conference’s main topic of discussion, exercised all his diplomatic expertise in an ostentatious display of old-style diplomacy. Ensuring Britain’s merchant and naval fleets could travel unmolested from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea was for the British Empire, as Curzon had concisely argued to the British Cabinet a month earlier, an essential "Category A" concern.[29] The greater historical narrative of Great Britain sheds light on Curzon’s decision to ignore the question of exchange. During the three years before Lausanne, the British foreign secretary had found himself futilely attempting to prevent the deterioration of British interests globally. In the aftermath of World War I, diverse problems had manifested themselves across Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, to which Curzon, representing an empire exhausted of its resources, continuously failed to resolve in Britain’s favor. The British public viewed Curzon’s seemingly endless diplomatic debacles with such distain that many London newspapers demanded his resignation with one Times writer even resigning himself in protest.[30] In the fall of 1922, Curzon came personally to Lausanne determined to win a diplomatic victory, not only to protect the interests of his country, but also to save his floundering political career.[31] Yet he also knew that with Turkey’s military triumph over Greece and in an informal sense the Allies, Britain could only hope to achieve limited diplomatic objectives at the conference. British access through the Turkish Straits was among these select interests, if not the most important, while the maintenance of the Greek population of Constantinople ranked low. Furthermore, Curzon hoped to use the Straits issue as a diplomatic tactic to drive a wedge between Soviet and Turkish diplomats, another critical goal of the British at the conference.[32] With Communism on the rise and in an interesting foreshadowing of Cold War politics, Curzon sought to prevent Turkey and the Soviet Union from forming a close relationship while the Soviet delegation hoped to use the Lausanne negotiations to strengthen Turkey’s ties to Moscow.

On top of these pressing concerns, the British delegation, unlike the Americans had to entertain the possibility of renewed hostilities with Turkey, which tempered any enthusiasm Britain could spare to hound Turkey over minority rights in general; never mind preserving Constantinople’s Greek population.[33] Only months before, Great Britain and the Turkish Republic had come to the brink of war during the Chanak crisis and the Allies still occupied Constantinople while Turkish military forces amassed nearby threateningly.[34] At the same time the conference’s delegates were discussing the exchange, Curzon openly warned the British commander of the Constantinople garrison, General Harington, that at Lausanne, the "peace negotiations may break down," which could lead to war once more.[35] With peace still tenuous, Curzon made a pragmatic decision by leaving unattended the "Category B" issue of exchange as he devoted all his energies to dazzling his peers to achieve his higher diplomatic priorities.[36]

Venizelos during those ten critical days did not attend the exchange sub-committee meetings either but participated in the conference's main discussions on the Straits to uphold Greek prestige. Because of Greece's weak political position, Venizelos contributed little to the meetings themselves as his attendance rather served a vital symbolic purpose as it showed that Greece was still able to sit at the same table with Turkey and the Great Powers. Venizelos sought only to protect Greek honor, an objective that on one well-recorded occasion provoked a "dramatic incident" over a perceived slight to Greek dignity.[37] No mention of the exchange was made in the conference’s main commission until its meeting on minority issues held on December 12. In sum, the absence of both Curzon and Venizelos from the exchange sub-committee in order to pursue other political goals from December 2 to December 12 left a diplomatic void which allowed the American delegation to decisively contribute to the population transfer by persuading the Turkish delegation to agree to Constantinople’s exemption from the exchange.

Initially, it appeared the United States would have little influence over the formulation of population exchange policy. The Americans were officially only diplomatic observers at a conference where their attendance itself had
been in serious doubt. However, when coming to Lausanne they did also possess a diplomatic precedent of American intervention to protect the welfare of Greek populations under Turkish rule established during the Greco-Turk War. Yet, American Secretary of State Charles Hughes had left ambiguous the American position on the exchange. In a detailed aide-memoire before the conference to the then tentative American ambassadors, Hughes had noted that “the most feasible solution of the problem [minority protection] might possibly be an exchange of Christian and Moslem minorities in Asia Minor and Greece.” He left the initiative to the diplomatic triumvirate appointed by President Harding to the conference, Admiral Mark Bristol and Ambassadors Richard Child and Joseph Grew, to decide if a population exchange including Constantinople best served American interests.

In truth, despite their "observer" status, when the Americans entered into the Lausanne Conference in November, they actively participated, including on the issue of exchange. As a non-aligned power, American delegates served as trusted mediators when negotiations at times reached a standoff. Behind closed doors, Allied, Greek, and Turkish delegations jostled for American support and publicly encouraged American participation in discussions. As a seasoned member of the US Diplomatic Corps and the ambassador to Germany during WWI, Ambassador Joseph Grew candidly recorded how quickly these maneuvers began stating "old world diplomacy is by no means a thing of the past. We are running up against it every day." He noted that while the British "took tea" with the Americans and declared the two countries "ought to co-operate on every issue," simultaneously the Turkish delegation engaged in secret negotiations with the Americans that revealed "some interesting features of their [Turkey's] attitude." Grew noted in his diary one of the major points the Turkish representatives privately expressed to the American ambassadors was "in view of public opinion and sentiment of the [Turkish] National Assembly," Turkish guarantees for minority rights could only be assured provided a "reduction of minorities should be carried out [in Turkey]." At the same time, the Turkish delegation made clear that the Ankara government looked favorably to future American "participation" in the development of Turkish-claimed oil fields. Early on, the Americans came to realize Turkey's firm determination to rid itself of its minority populations, including the Greeks of Constantinople, while in the same breath alluding to a mutually beneficial business arrangement between Turkey and the United States. This would not be the only instance during the Conference that Turkish delegates would attempt to garner American favor with offers of economic privileges, yet this particular moment best embodies how economic interests and the American perspective on the minorities, including population exchange, were discussed in the same forum and influenced one another.

During the first discussion on the exchange on December 1, when the Conference had invited the American delegation to join the exchange sub-commission, they had declined, stating that "this question did not concern us [the United States] and that after the arrangement is concluded we can participate in question of protection of such minorities as may be left." Critically, the United States' delegates experienced a change of heart and decided that from December 4, an American representative should attend the meetings of the exchange sub-commission. They explained to Washington, rather cryptically, that this diplomatic about face was taken "on account of the tendency of these meetings to take unexpected turns." At the same time the Americans joined the sub-commission, the Greek delegation was on the verge of reluctantly agreeing to Constantinople's inclusion in the exchange. In a "hot discussion," Turkish delegates refused to release Greek civilian prisoners unless the Greek delegation agreed to a compulsory exchange that included not only all of Anatolia, but Constantinople as well. While the American representatives listened silently during this and the next exchange meeting as the Turkish delegates browbeat the Greeks over Constantinople even to point of alluding to renewed hostilities, they were not likely endeared to the Turkish delegation's attempts to impose this "exchange". For the American perspective, the continued expulsion of Greeks from Turkey would only exacerbate a humanitarian crisis and there remained the possibility the expulsions could lead to the emigration of a large number of Greeks to the United States. However, the Americans pursued both "idealistic and commercial" concerns at the conference and bore in mind the political reality of their position. Resisting the compulsory exchange as a whole would likely cause no change in policy, as Turkey was already forcibly expelling its Greek population from Anatolia as the Conference convened, yet would incense Turkish delegates and thereby jeopardize future American business interests in that country. Also having been untouched by the conflict and then under Allied occupation, the American delegation likely realized Constantinople provided perhaps the only area under nominal Turkish rule where Turkey...
could be persuaded to allow the Greeks to remain if the Americans chose to participate in the exchange's negotiations. Therefore, on December 7, the American delegation issued a statement arguing for the exemption of only the Constantinople Greeks from the exchange rather than the whole Greek population of Turkey. Prompted by a request from the Chairman of the sub-commission for the American perspective on the topic, Ambassador Joseph Grew replied that "the American delegation is not in accord with proposals for a new compulsory movement of populations unless it is clearly shown that good purpose will be served where the exchange is necessary to serve humanitarian ends. Without discrimination between the parties to the negotiation for exchange, the American delegation is unable to approve the movement from Constantinople."[52]

The British and other allied delegates quickly declared their support of this statement and the Americans reported home that the Turkish delegates, "apparently impressed," requested three days time to make their reply.[53]

This statement served as America's most direct and influential contribution to the population transfer discussion. The American delegation expressed opposition to Constantinople's inclusion, but a willingness to accept the greater compulsory exchange so long as a "good purpose will be served."[54] In Washington, Grew's statement delighted Secretary of State Hughes. He personally telegraphed the American delegation to inform them of his approval and quoted Grew's words verbatim, the same as are quoted above, in a memorandum to President Harding. At the end of his account to the president, Hughes wrote, "I feel that Mr. Grew has correctly interpreted American sentiment and American policy in this statement."[55] At the highest levels of American foreign policy making, there was strong support for the exclusion of Constantinople, but a tacit acceptance of the principle of forced population transfer in general.

Despite expressed British support in the exchange sub-commission, the American delegation remained the real author of Constantinople's exemption. Without the American initiative, it is unlikely that the British would have objected to the removal of Constantinople's Greeks. They had listened for days to the Turkish delegation pressuring the Greeks without objection.[56] Further, many in the Turkish delegation at Lausanne and the Turkish population at large like Secretary Hughes believed the British had used the Greeks as proxies during the recent Greco-Turk War and sought to expand British imperial influence in Asia Minor.[57] British delegates were disinclined to make any independent statement supporting Greeks then under Turkish rule as it would have been construed as another underhanded British attack on Turkish sovereignty, and this would have upset Curzon's greater efforts and interests in the main commission such as the Straits. Possibly to avoid such an occurrence, Curzon had informed American diplomats earlier during the conference that the British delegation would support any position the American delegates took on minority rights and had expressed his belief that population exchange was a minority's issue.[58]

While the Turkish delegates had requested three days to prepare a response, the sub-commission would have to wait until December 12, five days, for their reply. This was not unusual, as delaying or ignoring a matter were common tactics used by the Turkish delegation throughout the conference when discussions seemed to favor their opponents.[59] On the morning of December 12, Turkish representative Rizanour Bey stated in response to American and allied views, that the Turkish delegation had decided to adopt "a conciliatory spirit by allowing [the] Constantinople Greeks to remain."[60] The timing of this concession is critical for historians to note as Turkish delegates agreed to exclude Constantinople from the exchange only after Ambassador Grew's statement on December 7 and before Curzon and Venizelos would address the exchange in a later discussion on December 12. This combined with the fact the intermediary period of five days from December 7 to December 12 1922, possessed no formal discussions on the exchange at the Conference displays there is a direct causation between the American statement and Turkish consent to exempt Constantinople from the exchange.

A recent historian, Onur Yıldırım, argues in *Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek Exchange of Populations, 1922-1934* the critical "turning point in the [exchange's] negotiations, [was] the agreement on the exemption of the Greeks of Constantinople."[61] He also contends that during the Conference, Curzon and...
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Venizelos played lead roles in convincing the Turkish delegation to exempt Constantinople from the population exchange in contrast to this thesis. As the most direct support of his claim, he cites that an ultimatum from Curzon to the Turkish delegation, which Venizelos supported, forced Constantinople's exemption. The discussion in question took place in the afternoon December 12 meeting of the main commission as he writes

Curzon combined the two problems to propose that "the Greek government is prepared to leave alone [the Muslims of Western Thrace] if the population of Constantinople is also left undisturbed If no such arrangement can be arrived at, then they also will be turned out, and there will be no Turkish population in Western Thrace for whom provision will be required." Venizelos seconded Curzon's proposal without any hesitation. The Turkish delegation, which had vehemently argued for the complete uprooting of the Greeks from Constantinople, adopted henceforward a more reconciling attitude.

In fact, the Turkish delegation had already conceded to American-led diplomatic pressure earlier that morning on December 12 in the exchange sub-commission to exempt Constantinople. Curzon himself hints at this later in the speech Yıldırım cited and in his daily report back to London, however the scathing response Curzon's proposition received from İsmet İnn, head of the Turkish delegation, best suggests the Turkish delegates had previously agreed to Constantinople's exemption. When given an opportunity to reply, İnn stated that "as the Turkish delegation had [already] acquiesced in the demand for the maintenance of the Greek population of Constantinople," Curzon's implicit threat once more demonstrated how the Turkish people's magnanimity "always recoiled to their disadvantage." Curzon's statement and Venizelos's backing were not then, as Yıldırım claims, the cause of Turkish consent to the exemption of the Constantinople Greeks but rather American Ambassador Joseph Grew's earlier statement on December 7.

The communiqués of İsmet İnn back to the Turkish Assembly also suggested that American influence led to the exemption of the Constantinople Greeks. As head of the Turkish delegation, İnn early on in the conference reported to Ankara he felt that "with the participation of the Americans in the discussions on such issues as minorities and Christians, I guess, we will face great difficulties." İnn also hoped during the Conference to separate the exchange issue from other minority questions, especially the fate of the Armenians. In another telegram, he stated that "I think it is not possible to justify to the world the expulsion of the Armenians I have to conduct negotiations with the American representatives and the Armenian delegation on this ground, and [try] to isolate the Greeks [from the other minorities]." Concerned with only the American stance on the exchange rather than Greek or British perspectives, İnn and rest of the Turkish delegation worried American criticism of Constantinople's inclusion could have amalgamated with other American objections to Turkey's minority policy and led to a diplomatic rift. In order to prevent such an occurrence, the Turkish delegation calculated to pacify American sentiment by agreeing to exclude the Constantinople Greeks as Turkey needed American goodwill both to implement the larger exchange without great international embarrassment and to encourage future American investment, which they actively pursued during the Conference, in order to revitalize their devastated country.

In the exchange sub-commission on the same morning of December 12, emboldened by American support for Constantinople's exclusion, Greek delegates proposed that the whole concept of a compulsory exchange be abandoned. Yet later that afternoon, American delegate Richard Child reiterated American acceptance of the compulsory nature of the larger exchange. Child had gained notoriety during the Conference for his excessive idealism, which Curzon felt gave his diplomacy a "Childish" character. Yet, privately, Child felt that a population exchange would be of "greater value than all the treaty guarantees ever written" and expressed distaste when minority groups sought American support. He publicly declared on December 12 that a "wise exchange of nationals" could allow families to be reunited and "separation" as well could serve to protect the welfare of minorities. However, in the same speech he warned "that new precedents which tend to establish the right of nations to expel large bodies of their citizens must be considered before countenance is given to them lest a new and unwholesome principle find foothold to vex international law and justice." While Child subtly conceded to American acceptance of the compulsory population exchange, he also vocalized American discomfort with the concept's obligatory nature and fear of its misuse, which the Greeks the next day wrongly interpreted as a rejection of compulsory exchange altogether. The next morning, in the exchange sub-commission, Greek delegates
"referring to Child's statement of yesterday inquired whether the Turks were ready to renounce principle of obligation exchange."[73] It is a great irony then when the Greek delegation would implore the Turkish delegates to renounce the use of an obligatory exchange citing Child's statement, the American delegation remained silent and unwilling to support Greece's efforts which ultimately ended any real further discussion on the question on a voluntary exchange.[74] The American delegation in broad terms justified this course of action to Washington as implementing a half way policy where

"if we adopt as attitude of willingness to admit the changed situation of the Turkish nation, and by utilizing this friendly attitude (of the Turks towards the United States) and the fact that the leading classes in Turkey hope for very considerable investment of American capital into their country and would like to encourage such investment, we should be able to secure for our interests in Turkey more favorable conditions than if we opposed the Turkish aspirations during a long period and then in the end have to accept them. At the same time, besides gaining some positive advantages for our own interests, we should strengthen our position with the Turkish governing classes and thus be able to do more at this time for the minorities, by taking the lead in stating to the Turks that we are ready to meet them half way."[75]

The American delegation reasoned that by not resisting the compulsory nature of the exchange which eventually they would probably be forced to accept anyway due to facts on the ground, this would encourage future "favorable conditions" for American economic interests and ultimately place America in an advantageous diplomatic position to improve the lot of minorities in Turkey.

On January 31, 1923, during the presentation of the final draft treaty of the Exchange Convention, Ambassador Child reaffirmed the American position with respect to Constantinople and the compulsory nature of the population exchange. In his speech he credited the United States during the Conference with having "spoke[n] against the expulsion of populations when these appeared to menace human beings with suffering and with injustice," a subtle allusion to Ambassador Grew's statement against the proposed removal of the Constantinople Greeks. Further, he absolved the United States of responsibility for the population exchange, calling it a "joint action" and justified silent American consent to its compulsory nature stating "that unparalleled suffering should be prevented and relieved" thereby.[76]

Present during the Conference as a correspondent, Ernest Hemingway wrote the diplomats at Lausanne, "They All Made Peace-[but] What Is Peace?"[77] Peace, for many on both sides of the Aegean, meant an exchange convention now sanctioned the expulsion from their homes. Signed on January 30, 1923 by both Turkey and Greece, the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations formalized the transfer of 1.5 million Greeks and 400,000 Turks, which did in fact exempt Constantinople.[78] In contrast to the works of historian Onur Yıldırım, this thesis concludes neither British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon nor the leading Greek delegate Venizelos contributed greatly to persuading the Turkish delegation to consent to the exclusion of Constantinople from the population exchange. Curzon and the rest of British delegation had pre-planned and devoted their diplomatic efforts to ensuring the freedom of the Turkish Straits and other political goals which were discussed in conjunction with the exchange during the Conference from December 2 to December 12, 1922. Having to balance the threat of continued hostilities and managing the foreign affairs of an empire severely weakened by the Great War, Curzon pragmatically chose not use to Britain's finite diplomatic clout on an issue that paid no direct dividends to Great Britain. Instead, Curzon expended only rhetoric on the question of the exchange and Constantinople's fate and given that Curzon, as head of the Conference, determined that the Straits and exchange would be discussed simultaneously and directed the British delegates in the exchange sub-commission, British focus on the Straits issue and inaction in the exchange sub-commission surrounding Constantinople should be attributed ultimately to him. Simultaneously, Venizelos and the Greek delegation continuously and adamantly opposed the compulsory nature and inclusion of Constantinople throughout the conference, hoping to minimize the refugee crisis Greece was then experiencing. However, possessing little political strength, Venizelos and the rest of the Greek delegates could do little more than express Greek positions and then look to the Allies and America for support in actually persuading the Turkish delegation to compromise or
concede on a diplomatic point. This was particularly evident during discussions in the exchange sub-commission when Greece and Turkey engaged one on one negotiations and Turkey continuously refused to compromise its position until the United States intervened on the question of Constantinople. The exemption of Constantinople then, despite Greek resistance to its inclusion would not have occurred without America's diplomatic contribution since Greece, reeling from its defeat in the Greco-Turk War, could do little but eventually accept the dictations set by Turkey at Lausanne. For its part, the Turkish delegation headed by Ismet Inn concerned itself little with Greek and British objections to the exchange on December 1st and conceded to Constantinople's exemption out of political expediency for fear of losing American favor necessary for later economic development rather than a spirit of reconciliation.\[79\] Determined to ensure the welfare of the Turkish people, the Turkish delegation saw the removal of minorities, Greeks in particular, as a national necessity, making the Turkish delegation staunch supporters of the exchange's compulsory nature.

For the United States, the possibility of Greek refugees arriving on America's shores and perhaps the sincere humanitarian concerns motivated Admiral Mark Bristol and Ambassadors Richard Child and Joseph Grew to insist on Constantinople's exemption from the exchange, but economic concerns and a desire to acquire Turkish goodwill led America not to resist the greater exchange's compulsory nature. Having taken an interest in the welfare of the Greek population of Turkey in the past these delegates tempered their precedent of intervention and defending Greeks under Turkish rule by recognizing the intransigence of the Turkish delegation on the question of minorities. While at first unwilling to join the exchange sub-commission, the Americans, whose eventual change of heart would lead to a statement issued by Ambassador Grew on December 7, 1922, led Turkey to agree to Constantinople's exemption. Attempts during the conference by the Greek delegation to enact a voluntary population exchange rather than compulsory one would be met with silence by the Americans, implying a tacit acceptance for the principle of compulsion which the Americans described as their "half way" policy. While the 1st Lausanne Conference failed to produce a final peace treaty between Turkey, Greece, and the Allies, the American delegation congratulated itself for having "spoken against the expulsion of populations."\[80\] Unfortunately, the convention and American intervention granted the Greeks of Constantinople a temporary reprieve as state-sponsored pogroms in the 1950's would later remove the almost the entire Greek population from the city. Notably, the final draft also stipulated an exchange based on religion rather than ethnicity, showing that despite the rise of nationalism, a concept of identity defined by religious affiliation, that's roots lay in the former Ottoman millet system still lived on into the 20th century.\[81\] Yet for the international community, the Turco-Greek Exchange Convention served a legal veneer for later forced ethnic-based population movements in Europe implemented by totalitarian regimes, for which America must share some responsibility.

\[1\] On December 12, 1922, American ambassador Richard Child warned the compulsory nature of the Exchange Convention could set an easily abused precedent and create "a new and unwholesome principle". This statement foreshadowed how in the decades to follow totalitarian regimes used the Turco-Greek exchange to legitimize their own forced "population transfers".

\[2\] Arnold Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey; A Study in the Contact of Civilizations (New York: H Fertig, 1970), 375.


\[4\] Onur Yıldırım, Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek Exchange of Populations, 1922-1934 (New York: Routledge, 2006), 33, 82.

http://books.google.com/, 314-315. Matusumoto reports diplomatic history as a "trend most evident in the years following World War I."


[9] Yıldırım, *Diplomacy and Displacement*, 16-17. Yıldırım describes the historiographies produced by Greece and Turkey soon after the transfer as "written from the vantage point of the nationalistic ideological concerns of the ruling elite" which served as instruments "manipulating collective memory."


[20] Ibid., 118, 123.

[21] Ibid., 122.

[22] Ibid., 122.


[25] Ibid.
United States, National Archives, Greece, 767.68 (1961) Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations between Turkey and other States, 1910-29 (National Archives Microfilm Publication No. 363 Roll 25); National Archives at University of Florida, Telegram, (Index Bureau 767.68119 T+M-2/1). (From now on, NAMP).

HMSO, Lausanne Conference, 123.

HMSO, Lausanne Conference, 125-173; NAMP, Telegram, (Index Bureau 767.68119 T+M-2/1 to 2/5).


Gilmour, *Curzon; Imperial Statesman*, 528-548.


Ibid., 487-555.


Ibid., 492.

Ibid.

Ibid.

NAMP, Telegram 50, (Index Bureau 767.68119 T+M/10).

NAMP, Telegram, (Index Bureau 767.68119 T+M-2/1).

NAMP, Telegram, (Index Bureau 767.68119 T+M-2/3).

NAMP, Telegram, (Index Bureau 767.68119 T+M-2/3).

Ibid.


[60] NAMP, Telegram, (Index Bureau 767.68119 T+M-2/5).
[61] Yıldırım, Diplomacy and Displacement, 58.
[62] Ibid., 33, 35, 58, 82.
[64] NAMP, Telegram, (Index Bureau 767.68119 T+M-2/5).
[65] HMSO, Lausanne Conference, 188-189; FCO, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 386-387; HMSO, Lausanne Conference, 177.
[66] Yıldırım, Diplomacy and Displacement, 62. Yıldırım translates and quotes from the original text.
[67] Ibid., 64. Yıldırım again translates and quotes from the original text, the brackets are his.


[69] NAMP, Telegram, (Index Bureau 767.68119 T+M-2/5).
[70] Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 320.
[71] Child, A Diplomat's Looks at Europe, 107.
[73] NAMP, Telegram, (Index Bureau 767.68119 T+M-2/9).
[74] Ibid.
[77] Gerogiannis, ed., Complete Poems by Ernest Hemingway, 63-64. Titled "They All Made Peace- What Is Peace?", in this poem Hemingway scornfully records snippets of the diplomatic intrigue, false rumors, and sallow fraternizing which occurred amongst diplomats and journalists in the process of "making peace" at the Lausanne Conference.
[81] HMSO, Lausanne Conference, 817; Clark, Twice a Stranger, 14-15.