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Geometries and Words: Linguistics and Philosophy: A Model of the Composing Process

By now all of us are familiar with (if not conversant with) at least one of the symbolic maps or abstract grammars of modern linguistics or philosophy of language. Chomsky's tree diagram is best known perhaps, but other models, the case relations heuristic of Charles Fillmore, for example, are becoming less exotic as they compete successfully in discussions of the sentence encoding-decoding system. One important benefit in their use is that they do compete with each other. And in competing, they help, not hinder, the dialogue among factions within modern lan-

1Philosophy of language and linguistics are now nearly identical disciplines, given the mentalistic paradigm under which both operate. According to John R. Searle, "Until fairly recently it seemed possible to draw a boundary, however vague, between linguistics and the philosophy of language: linguistics dealt with the empirical facts of natural human languages; the philosophy of language dealt with the conceptual truths that underlie any possible language or system of communication. . . . Lately, however, all this has changed. In the current period of expansion, linguistics have simply moved into large territories where previously only philosophers worked, and the writing of such philosophers as Austin, Grice, and others have now been assimilated into the working tools of the contemporary linguist. The philosopher of language can only welcome this development, for the linguist brings to bear a knowledge of the facts of natural human languages, together with techniques of syntactical analysis which, at least in the past, have been absent from the purely philosophical writings on language" ("Speech Acts and Recent Linguistics," unpublished manuscript, Berkeley, 1975, p. 1). In the course of this essay, I will not make any distinction between the terms "philosophy of language" and "linguistics."

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guage study, for the schematizations make conveniently available the distinctive variations of theory which inform them. They serve as a conceptual shorthand. But like any “model,” they are not “real.” They do not even represent something which is claimed to be “real.” They act as categorical or hypothetical promises; they function as Pirandello-like representations of representations, images of constructs of propositions about reality. As George Lakoff and Henry Thompson admit, “abstract grammars do not have any separate reality; they are just convenient fictions for representing certain processing strategies.”

One could argue that they are necessary fictions as well. Without the illustrative property, without the all-at-onceness of the diagrams in early transformational-generative publications, the theory of deep structure might have exerted less revolutionary power during its relatively short period of influence on linguistic research. Following that early lead, post-Chomskian linguists have reinforced their verbal metaphors of “deep structure” by providing graphic schemes to accompany their discussions. The advantage of such models lies in their exploitation of human cognition and memory (paradoxically, the very thing the models, in part, describe). Try defining “deep structure”; now try illustrating the same concept. All things being equal, the second task will be the easier, or at least it will “give shape” to the verbal definition. The mental image of the “grammar” gives us a handle on the wider outlines of the linguistic philosophy.

Though literary scholars and rhetoricians take for granted the merits of imagistic thought, we generally mean by that verbal images—the metonymic wordplay in the literature which we study, the “examples” and “specificities” which we encourage in the writing of our students. By definition, disciplines within the humanities are oriented toward human language, and, generally speaking, the more abstract any form of communication becomes, the more it shifts into forms alien to us. Diagrams, schemata, formulas, charts, heuristics, computer programs, all representations of language (of our reality) tend to disarm us. We get defensive. We back off. My guess is that, aside from the obviously manifest inclination of humanists to deal with words rather than another symbolic system, many of us timidly back away from linguistic models because we see them as ugly and simplistic geometries of a fascinatingly beautiful and complex world, human speech-making. Many of us have, in effect, confused the map with the territory.

There is a lesson to be learned, if we grant the above, for those involved in language research outside the conventional disciplines of pure and applied linguistics. For those of us who teach traditional English department courses in literary criticism and composition (reading and writing), the lesson is crucial if we further grant that both are exercises in the processing of language. Except for a very few who have not been intimidated by the highly visible models of contemporary linguistic theory, we have not overcome or even acknowledged our reluctance to overcome the preliminary confusion entailed by what Thomas Kuhn calls the shift of paradigms. Those few in literary studies who have made reference to philosophy of language by examining the text-language-reader transaction are the exceptions which prove the rule. Stanley Fish, for example, or Richard Ohmann or Barbara Herrn-

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stein Smith are among the handful of critics exploring the correlations between a theory of language and a theory of reading. But most of us, in fact, have not accommodated the prevailing philosophy of language to our own endeavors in the comprehension and production of "texts." This despite the fact that most of us "grant" the validity of post-Chomskian theory.

As a result, much of our research in composition goes over the same ground year after year. Our new theories amount to an updating of the old with the result that new strategies based on the research in linguistics—sentence combining, perhaps, or tagmemic aids to invention—find no philosophical coherence with the traditional approaches to teaching rhetoric—the study of style and arrangement or practice in the topics and logic. In our role as pedagogues and practical researchers, we have taken on the vocabulary of post-Chomskian thought without taking on the thought. No wonder that the classical scholar stares in amazement at much of the "modern" theory in composition and dubs it "just Aristotle in new trappings." We have taken what seems to square with traditional concepts only to talk piecemeal, finally, about the broadest considerations, the whole of rhetoric and the whole in it. And our "research designs" prove it. By and large, we ignore the deductive paradigm of modern language inquiry; our inductive activity induces no principle to guide it. And this is all the more frustrating when we consider that most of us, as I posited above, do subscribe to the governing rule of modern linguistics, that any user of language—and that must include the writer as well as the speaker or the reader—operates in two dimensions simultaneously, the surface representation and the underlying form.

Rhetorical theory, simply put, desperately needs a model of the holistic activity which is its subject, a set of coherent assumptions about the process of composing which finds broad definition and easy reference in a symbolic map of the territory. Such a model should be tested, in whole or in part, amended, refined, adapted, modified, scrapped and substituted, or otherwise exploited, debated, deliberated, discussed, disputed. No one should consider it "finished," in other words. But without the imagistic stimulus such a model provides for a governing philosophical base, I submit that we will continue to make beginnings ad infinitum. Our premises about the composing process will remain fragmented, and practical strategies, productive though they may be in writing courses, will persist as unconnected pedagogical flashes of wisdom.

So I view the model which I have formulated and will introduce shortly as a deductive frame for investigation of the composing process. I hope it will function as a hypothetical promise. Others' intuitions may deny some of my theses; empirical data may contradict some of my conclusions. But we need to remind ourselves that productive research in any field proceeds exactly along those dialectical lines of inquiry. Perhaps our discipline is as ripe for recognizing that truth as linguistics was over twenty years ago.

We can advance toward the model by making two assertions. The subsequent discussions of each will clarify my major premises.

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1) Reading is not simply the inverse of writing; or, to put it another way, a language user does not simply reverse gears when he switches from comprehension to production of the written word. If that were the case, we could conveniently invert, say, Goodman’s model of the reading process in order to understand what it is that writers do. Yet obviously both reading and writing proceed from the same base of competence, and our understanding of one should help us to make insightful comments about the other. Fortunately, we have a rich but elegant body of research in reading from which an informed excursion into the composing process may be launched.

2) There is no model of language (or “what happens” when people communicate intentions and responses to one another) that satisfies everyone. But a number of formal accounts seem in accord with the intuitions of a majority of researchers who find such speculations “interesting” (to use the word as philosophers do), if we take reference to those accounts in subsequent research to mean just that. In applying two of the better known mechanisms to a theory of discourse or composition—the intention-response model of H. P. Grice and the speech act theory from the work of J. L. Austin—I will necessarily leave some large gaps in a short essay where complete discussions of philosophical arguments are impossible. At any rate, the primary sources are easily available, and the language becomes technical only where a philosopher-writer would want to prove a point (already discussed at length) to other philosophers. But if the model should align with the reader’s intuitions, so much the better.

We understand now that the reader’s job cannot be described in her identifying letter by letter or word by word the half-inches of text which appear at the end of her nose in a sequential scanning of a line of print. Decoding or comprehending the meaning of any text at the rate of even 100 words per minute would be impossible by such a procedure. The reader’s short-term memory could not store all the features of the graphic medium and, at the same time, allow interpretive room for the “sense” of what she is seeing. Rather, any competent reader “picks up graphic cues, guided by constraints set up through prior choices, his language knowledge, his cognitive styles, and strategies he has learned.”5 He then predicts what the text will say, tests the prediction by matching his choices with the graphic cues, and finally confirms his prediction by accepting the semantic match of his “choice” and the graphic and syntactic cues. Or if her projected meaning does not match the prior choices realized as context and syntax, she disconfirms and begins the cycle over again from the beginning. Reading, as Goodman puts it, is a psycholinguistic guessing game, and a good deal of the guessing involves the reader’s anticipating the writer’s intention or meaning. To illustrate: A reader can comprehend the entire message of a syntactic unit before she has read every word, as in the following sentences:

He winds his watch while the children read.

I read yesterday that the winds would be blowing.

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These sentences must be comprehended in their entirety before the reader has decoded every word in a left to right sequence. Otherwise, "winds" and "read" might have been mispronounced if the sentences were read aloud, given another semantic value if read silently, misunderstood in both cases. Reading, thus, is hardly a passive exercise, a ventriloquism for the literate. The reader must be credited with forming presuppositions which the process of reading both stimulates and satisfies. On a higher level, we can view the discrete parts of discourse, to paraphrase Kenneth Burke, as an arousing and fulfillment of desires, the interrelationships of which constitute the rhetorical act. The point is, the reader is a full-fledged partner in this activity. If the writing of the discourse and the reading of it are successful, both participants will meet not on the page, but in the deep structure of meaning, the underlying form of discourse. Such a notion makes sense insofar as a reader may paraphrase a text, summarize it, supply missing transitions, "correct" it, make any number of adjustments to the text while preserving the semantic intention of the writer. In some cases, the adjustments may even enhance or clarify the writer's representation of meaning, as in the criticism offered in a writing workshop or teacher-student conference.

Introducing a term like semantic intention fits reading theory into a larger philosophical context. The history of semantics, even its recent history, is so orchestrally rich that my caveat (and apology) above concerning the necessarily brief discussions of complex arguments bears repeating. I will be arbitrary, in order to be brief, in my choice of sources and how they ultimately connect with one another. 6

In 1958, H. P. Grice proposed a mechanism for describing language which works like this: A intends to bring about a response on the part of B by getting B to recognize A's intention; B does recognize A's intention to bring about that response and is thereby given some sort of reason to respond just as A intended. Now the key words of that description (intention, response, recognition, reason) satisfy so well the philosophical and rhetorical quarrels incited by such other words as “truth-value,” “meaning” (in the empiricist's sense), or “analyticity,” that Grice's mechanism has worn well in the two decades since he first offered it for inspection, the busiest, most revolutionary period in the history of our study of language.

Certainly, one of the most interesting lines of research extending from Grice began in 1962 with the publication of J. L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words. Austin proposed that intention may be realized in either "constative" or "performative" utterances. The first are statements; they denote a state of affairs, describe a process, or relate an event; they are subject to tests of empirical truth. The second, by contrast, have no truth values; they do something. Inasmuch as they are used as utterances, they have performative value. The difference between constative and performative utterances, as Austin illustrates, is shown in the distinction between saying something and doing something by means of language—"It is cold in here" vs. (I command . . . you) "Turn the heat on," or "We are naming our daughter 'Ann'" vs. "I

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6For an overview of the recent research in semantics, a convenient though sometimes technical source is available: John Lyons, Semantics, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). One obvious omission in the text of this essay is any mention of the work of John R. Searle. While there is no question about his contribution to speech act theory, his findings, I believe, are not central to an understanding of underlying form in discourse. I would, nevertheless, like to acknowledge his influence on my ideas and direction.
christen you Ann.” And yet that sharp distinction was short-lived in the research which followed How to Do Things with Words.

In 1968, John Robert Ross’ paper, “On Declarative Sentences,”7 called into question the proposition that performative values are distinguished in discourse by the “classical” performative verbs, command, pronounce, sentence, will, and the like. Relying, in effect, on the underlying form of intention and response, Ross postulated that performative verbs (and he expands the category to include all verbs of saying, e.g., asert, enquire, demand, “joke”, propose, reply, etc.) are intuitively understood by interlocutors to direct meaning even in such seemingly constative surface locutions as “Prices slumped” or “You should learn Greek.” To illustrate by means of the latter: Does the speaker mean, does he intend me to respond to a) I insist that “You should learn Greek” or b) I suggest that “You should learn Greek”? An audience will rarely misunderstand the intention and will not ordinarily require that the speaker make his rhetorical purpose clear by supplying the “missing” performative. Thus, Ross is prompted to examine and prove the thesis that “declarative sentences [constatives] . . . must also be analyzed as being implicit performatives, and must be derived from deep structures containing an explicitly represented performative main verb” (p. 224). Or, rendered graphically, we can demonstrate the “reality [that] every declarative sentence . . . will be derived from a deep structure containing as an embedded clause what ends up in the surface structure as an independent clause” (p. 261).

Thus, though performative values may not be explicit in the surface structures of discourse, they must be understood by interlocutors as a part of the underlying form. Any discussion of meaning, therefore, or of intention, or of purpose in the rhetorician’s terms, must take into account the deep structure of performative values.

Now how does this matter to the processes of literacy? The answer is tenuous,

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but, like the filament of the spider betrayed by the shift of a sunbeam, it is nevertheless there. If readers understand writers’ meanings, intentions, purposes because they are able to reckon intuitively with writers’ implicit underlying forms, then writers must intuitively rely on readers being able to do exactly that. Otherwise, as in the case for performative values sketched above, every declarative sentence that we read would be preceded by a performative clause explicitly announcing the intention to which we are to respond. Therefore, we can assume that the greater part of the rules of discourse are applied unconsciously, yet reader and writer “connect” in that expert, tacit knowledge of the rules of language.

Clearly the writer cannot be thought of as simply engaged in transposing some inviolable thought into words via the written medium. She must presuppose an addressee who will have a context ready for the subject matter, a “linguistic” context as well as a “conceptual” frame of knowledge. And given the discussion above, “presupposing an addressee” amounts to something quite distinct from classical claims for pathos. In encoding a message which the writer believes will eventually be reconstructed by a reader, she must make some hypotheses about the reader’s reconstruction of that message. In effect, the writer will engage in a variation of the intention-response exchange by “standing in” for the addressee, by completing proxy the intention-response mechanism.

By and large, we can see now how the methods and techniques for discovering “subject matter,” the whole art of rhetorical invention, act as a formalized recognition of “responses” in the variation of intention-response which we call rhetoric. If I, for instance, having heard Solzhenitsyn’s Harvard Commencement Address, feel the need to write a review of the speech, I have already formed an intention to evoke a particular response in my audience. Suppose that my “thesis” turns out to be “Solzhenitsyn’s speech was an emotionally effective but essentially illogical appeal to the need for certainty in human affairs.” Of course, I intend that my reader join me in criticizing the speaker’s presuppositions about the world. The underlying form of my intention might be realized abstractly as

I \[ \begin{cases} \text{advise} \\ \text{urge} \\ \text{warn} \end{cases} \text{you (that)} \quad \text{"You should be critical of Solzhenitsyn's speech."}^8 \]

But that intention must be framed with a view to the responses which I hypothesize in order for my communication to be rhetorically effective. In this light, Aristotle’s topics may be seen as a notational system for possible responses by probable audiences. A brief sketch of correlations may help us here.

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^8The performative value attached to such a thesis would be termed, in the classical tradition, an appeal to pathos, inasmuch as the audience’s state is directly or indirectly affected by its ultimate assent or dissent. Other performative verbs associated with the appeal to pathos are ask, beg, beseech, caution, dare, entreat, implore, propose, request. Not surprisingly, most of the remaining performatives line up under the rhetorical and semantic values we assign to classical notions of ethos (admit, appoint, authorize, beseech, command, condemn, confess, demand, deny, empower, excommunicate, grant, instruct, order, pledge, pronounce, require, sentence, vow) or logos (accede, assert, cede, challenge, claim, concede, declare, doubt, enquire, inform, offer, report). The correspondences may mark Aristotle’s division as intuitively valid or the current theory as conservatively framed; either way, rhetoric can be viewed as an inherent system which is “discoverable,” rather than as a set of rules imposed from without. See Dorothy Augustine and W. Ross Winterowd, “Speech Acts and the Sources of Composition,” forthcoming.
On a more particular level, every one of the twenty-eight topics listed in Book II of the Rhetoric may be considered abstractions, not of the way people "think" within a system of logic, but of how they "cooperate" in the hypothetical dialogue of rhetoric. Such conventional procedures as topics, then, are not so much an aid in discovering "subject matter" as it is conventionally understood, as they are a tool for expressing the beliefs and the attitudes of the participants in the hypothetical dialogue.

Like reading, then, writing is a psycholinguistic guessing game. Like the reader, one who is engaged in the composing process "concentrates his total prior experience and learning on the task, drawing on his experience and the concepts he has attained as well as the language competence he has achieved."9 As a user of language, he constructs a mechanism for communicating his intentions in the absence of immediate cues in the form of spoken responses which may help him to define the audience. The competent writer invents the reader. Or, to put it another way, she invents her subject matter—she analyzes what she knows and discovers what she needs to know—on the basis of what she is able to project about a probable, existential exchange of intention(s) and response(s) between herself and some other "self."

So the beginning of the rhetorical speech act is the intention to bring about a response from a probable audience, not the introduction of the first grapheme or word. In short, the writer's job is to compose the tacit presuppositions which he and the reader bring to their present and future understanding of each other and the subject matter which is being communicated.10 That the writer has generalized the rules of conversation so that the dynamics of intention-response obtain in written

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10Chaim Perelman's discussion of general and particular audiences adapts very well to the experience in language games I claim for the writer and reader of discourse. He says, "In no other period has there been such amazement at the fact that a person can communicate to another something which has, for the hearer, a foreseeable meaning" (The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969], p. 123).
discourse describes a genuinely new rhetoric. It is one in which invention not only takes precedence as a rhetorical art, but one with a view of composing which is, for all intents and purposes, synonymous with every aspect of invention. For indeed the writer must invent everything. He invents the reader, as I have already suggested, by projecting the performative values in the responses to his intention(s), values designated by verbs like deny or question, doubt or require. He invents himself, his ethos or "voice" or "presence," by implying through surface phenomena realized as style and form his choice of a performative stance,¹¹ which may be articulated in an express verb like assert or declare or suggest or warn. And he invents the subject matter (logos) as a product of the hypothetical exchange of intentions and responses.

Part of our failing as modern theorists is that we have delimited the scope and influence of invention to conventional or modified schemes of logic, classification, or audience-psychology, unaffected by the proposition of "ordinary language" philosophers that those schemes are themselves informed by our knowledge as users of language.¹² But that is matter for future essays. Suffice it to say right now that composing is inventing, that each is indistinguishable from the other so long as the writer is choosing, rejecting, comparing, matching, and adjusting the materials of discourse—presuppositions, intentions, responses, subject matter. A writer may know what she knows or wants to say, for example, but even that seemingly fixed element of the whole may change shape as her attention focuses on one bit or another of her materials, to say nothing of the change in perspective which takes place as one bit of material after another assumes prominence in the hierarchy of what is recalled at any one moment from both long- and short-term memory banks.¹³

At this point, narrative becomes more and more clumsy. We need a model of the composing process, a mechanism of "what happens" when someone addresses the materials of discourse. I offer this model bearing in mind that writing is one of the most complex games that human beings have devised, and that any attempt to reduce that complexity to a manageable abstraction must delete the most interesting parts, the intuitive leaps that happen in any creative act. Nevertheless, for the sake of tidiness and convenience, here are what I judge to be the principal sequences and strategies in the composing process which have some basis of validity in the research in linguistics and philosophy. I have given the model a "trial run" against my own

¹¹I am borrowing and adapting the useful term "rhetorical stance" from Wayne Booth: "a stance which depends on discovering and maintaining in any writing situation a proper balance among the three elements that are at work in any communicative effort: the available arguments about the subject itself, the interests and peculiarities of the audience, and the voice, the implied character, of the speaker" ("The Rhetorical Stance," in Contemporary Rhetoric: A Conceptual Background with Readings, ed. W. Ross Winterowd [New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975], p. 74).

¹²Lyons states, for example, that "the logical calculi constructed by mathematicians and logicians have been strongly influenced by the grammatical structure of particular languages and cannot therefore be regarded as independent ideal systems by reference to which language can be judged." (Semantics, 1, 139).

¹³The terms "long-term memory" and "short-term memory" are nearly self-explanatory. "Medium-term memory," to be used shortly in laying out the model, may be understood as the storing of information for longer than immediate but less than permanent use. A familiar example of the duration of medium-term memory would be our returning to a piece of writing after the elapse of some days or weeks, noticing a certain tone or attitude sustained throughout, and wondering about the particular ratio of choices leading to a style or form which is, on a second approach, rejected out of hand.
and others intuitions, the first hurdle that any linguistic model must pass, and have found it to be, in the linguists' terms "psychologically real."

1. The writer addresses a subject, X, to be composed.
2. He forms a tentative perspective toward X by recalling what he knows about X from his long-term memory and by judging his experience with X and with the task of writing in general.
3. He forms Presupposition 1: the meaning of X to the addressee.
4. He projects a tentative perspective toward X by the addressee by reconstructing images or notions of general and particular contexts (frames, or places, intellectual schemata, works of art, etc.) in which X or something associated with X was discussed.
5. He forms Presupposition 2: the meaning of X to the addressee.
6. He chooses a "performative stance," thereby choosing a general or particular mode or form for his discourse which he stores in his medium-term memory to be adjusted, adopted, or abandoned as he proceeds.
7. He adjusts the relationships of the two presuppositions and the performative stance. If there is little or no "match," he begins all over again. If there is a possible match of meanings and form, he will then adopt a style or code of presentation in order to effect and affect the combination of meanings and form.
8. Now he fixes his "intention." Out of all the possible performative verbs, he judges one to be the most appropriate to his composition of materials thus far ("I assert . . .," or "I advise . . .," etc.). He scans his long-term memory for information on X and his medium-term memory for his choice of form and style to qualify his intention.
9. He then fixes a frame for his intention about the meaning of X so that it may adjust to the addressee's "response," based on Presupposition 2. He compares intention, frame, and response for a match and proceeds if there is enough of a conceptual or contextual overlap. If not, he begins the process over again at the beginning or at some intermediate and appropriate step.
10. If the possible match between intention and frame seems workable, he scans his medium-term memory for his qualified choices of style and form and adjusts intention or frame or both for coherency.
11. He encodes, finally, not just data or subject matter, but the rhetorical materials of discourse: what is known and projected about the perspectives of addressee and addressee along with what is known about conversational rules in the absence of immediate responses.
12. He judges the appropriateness of the composition of materials: subject, meanings, intention(s), response(s), form, and style. If the potential discourse fails the test of appropriateness, he begins again at some sequence or strategy judged to be far back enough in the process to correct the problem. If there is a possible match of all choices in the process thus far, he proceeds to the task of writing.

14For talk, advice, criticism, and support, I would like to thank Stephen D. Krashen and especially W. Ross Winterowd, whose intuitions were invaluable in helping me to shape and articulate my own.
Of course, the addressee may begin to encode or to engage in the physical act of writing at any stage in the process which is described above. Nevertheless, until he arrives at the cognitive judgments in (12) which admit appropriateness, he is involved in invention of the first order.

I should point out two things which if I included in the model would have made it even more unwieldy. The first is that at any point in the composing process, the writer will be switching back and forth from long- to medium- to short-term memory, making ad hoc decisions about her progress through the whole of the process as well as where she might be at any step. The recursivity of the model attempts to account for the mental looping which may occur as a result of such ad hoc decisions. But the complexity of the recursive patterns in composing can hardly be done justice in a “tidy and convenient” abstraction. Second, and related to the first point, the writer will almost always make cognitive adjustments in the “writing” or “rewriting” levels of composing that will put her back in some step of adjusting and choosing her materials. Invention is an ongoing exercise until the composition passes from the hands of the writer.

Here, finally, is a schematization of the model.