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Inkatha, Propaganda, and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1980s and 90s

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Inkatha, Propaganda, and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1980s and 90s

A Thesis by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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
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Inkatha, Propaganda, and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1980s and 90s

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ABSTRACT

Inkatha, Propaganda, and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1980s and 90s

by Michael MacInnes

The 1980s and 1990s marked the beginning of the end of Apartheid in South Africa but before the first fully democratic election in 1994, the KwaZulu-Natal region was being torn apart by a low level civil war. This conflict was not the black majority fighting against white minority, but part of so-called black on black violence. One side was the African National Congress (ANC) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) and on the other was Inkatha, secretly backed by the Apartheid state. Originally a Zulu nationalist liberation movement aligned with the ANC, Inkatha separated with the ANC over issues of ideology and politics. Instead, Inkatha secretly began working with the Apartheid government and engaging in violence against the ANC and their successor the UDF.

This thesis seeks to understand Inkatha's role in the violence in KwaZulu-Natal by looking at what motivated Inkatha's supporters to engage in violence. The main motivators examined in this thesis can be understood in the three categories of propaganda, coercion, and opportunistic and survival based violence. By utilizing interviews, newspapers, testimony, and more this thesis seeks to explore the experience of both those who were affected and perpetrated the violence to answer this question.

Finally, this thesis will follow the story of the Caprivi operatives, a group of Inkatha supporters trained by the Apartheid state to engage in violence and murder against the ANC and their allies during the transition period. By following the stories of these men and particularly

their leader, Daluxolo Luthuli, this thesis will illustrate how the same motives explored above affect their decisions to engage in violence.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANC- African National Congress

COSATU- Congress of South African Trade Unions

IFP- Inkatha Freedom Party

KZN- KwaZulu-Natal

MI- Military Intelligence

MK- uMkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation)

RENAMO- Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)

SADF- South African Defense Force

SAP- South African Police

TEC- Transitional Executive Council

TRC- Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UDF- United Democratic Front

UNITA- União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola)

UWUSA- United Workers Union of South Africa

MAPS

Political map of South Africa



Modern map of KwaZulu-Natal



Introduction

On March 25, 1990, in the twilight years of South African Apartheid, the low-intensity civil war that had been raging in the eastern region of KwaZulu-Natal between the African National Congress/United Democratic Front (ANC/UDF) and their political rival Inkatha entered a new, bloody phase. After an Inkatha rally, hundreds of armed men, aided by white and black police, engaged in organized raids on regional villages and townships viewed as supporting the UDF. For example, in the township of Kwamnyandu that afternoon, three Inkatha members armed with pistols shot twelve unarmed men in a store. A few hours later, several others had their homes burned and belongings taken.¹

By March 28, the violence had only escalated. Somewhere between 800 and 1000 Inkatha members entered Gezubuso both by truck and on foot. They targeted specific houses for arson and moved through the township to find more UDF homes. In response, nearly 150 comrades (term for UDF fighters) moved to a nearby hill and prepared for a fight. However, when they confronted the Inkatha men they found themselves out-flanked and out-gunned by the superior Inkatha force and retreated. Fighting resumed later that day, creating an untold number killed and wounded.² Across KwaZulu-Natal, the fighting lasted seven days and took the lives of approximately 100 people, with tens of thousands more left homeless, robbed, or both.

Soberingly, this was only one of many bloody episodes of the extreme political violence that characterized KwaZulu-Natal in the early 1990s, which itself was constituted only a limited chapter in an almost two-decade long violent struggle between Inkatha and the ANC/UDF. The Inkatha leadership obviously organized the raids and attacks seeking to eliminate, or at the very

¹ John Aitchison, *The Seven Days War: 25-31 March 1990 The victim's narrative*, Centre for Adult Education, May 9, 1991, KZN Political Violence, Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archive, PC126/8/5, 3-5.

² Aitchison, *The Seven Days War*, 10-14.

least intimidate, the opposition. A question remains, however; of why did the men actually doing the fighting—the Inkatha supporters— get involved? What drove these men to engage in such extreme violence within their own communities?

Today many mythologically remember the first free and democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, which ended Apartheid, to be a miracle of non-violence. This popular mythology also places a united black African majority against the white minority. However, these parts of the common narrative are partially true at best. While South Africa managed to avoid a feared race war, political violence still factored into everyday life. The style of political violence in Kwamnyandu and Gezubuso appeared during the 1980s and early 1990s in what is today, KwaZulu-Natal. There, a virtual state of civil war once existed, not between the government and democratic opposition, but between black African movements. The movement that was centered in much of this violence was the self-styled cultural liberation movement and Zulu nationalist organization called Inkatha. This thesis will examine this phenomenon of violence and this movement, and how it relates to a new understanding of the violence of the transition period.

Historical Background

The political violence in the 1980s and 90s in KwaZulu-Natal existed within the wider history of the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa. In 1948, South Africa entered a new phase of white minority rule with the ascension of the National Party and their implementation of Apartheid that only ended with the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994. Apartheid enforced segregation on the basis of race and constituted a brutal economic domination of black Africans and forced removal from their homes.³ Under Apartheid, Africans could only legally own land in

³ For the remainder of this thesis, whenever the term “African” is used it should be read as black or black African.

designated zones called homelands or Bantustans, each designed to house a separate native ethnic group.⁴

Additionally, homelands included only around 11% of all land in South Africa and usually were the worst lands which could not sustain the large populations that were forced to live on them.⁵ This was intentional and also gave South Africa's white-owned businesses (primarily mining and agriculture) access to large amounts of cheap, migrant labor. Traditional leaders, such as chiefs, usually ruled these lands causing some to support Apartheid, while others were bitterly opposed it.⁶

This thesis focuses on the predominantly Zulu homeland of KwaZulu, as well as Natal, the white owned area that surrounded KwaZulu. Today these are joined together as KwaZulu-Natal and the region will be referred to as such throughout this thesis. In understanding the political situation in KwaZulu-Natal, people must comprehend the deep history of the people that lived there- the Zulu. The Zulu are the largest ethnic group in South Africa and dominated the region before and during the arrival of the first Europeans. Zulus continued to draw on this history as did Inkatha, who used Zulu culture, imagery, and history heavily in its politics. The powerful kingdom formed under the famous King Shaka in the early 1800s, for example, had a central role. Inkatha's leadership utilized its ties to the Zulu Royal Family (which continues to exist) to garner support and legitimacy for the movement.

⁴ Note that the Apartheid government's ideas of ethnic groups were complex and often incorrect and did not include all ethnic groups, gave land to some ethnic groups while others had none, etc.

⁵ Nancy L. Clark and William H. Worger, *South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2011), 22-23.

⁶ Indirect rule through chiefs is in fact a system that predates Apartheid with its own complex history. For more information and theory on indirect rule, Mahmood Mamdani is an excellent starting point. Mahmood Mamdani, "Indirect Rule, Civil Society, and Ethnicity: The African Dilemma," *Social Justice* 23, no. 1/2 (63-64) (1996), 145-150.

Inkatha has a complex history of simultaneously being a Zulu cultural movement, a self-identified black liberation movement, and eventually a political party.⁷ Formed in the 1975 by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Inkatha was intended to organize the Zulu people and create a platform for liberation. The banning and forced exile of several liberation movements in the 1960s by the Apartheid regime made Inkatha a crucial movement in the 1970s and early 80s as it attempted to fill this void. In South Africa, Inkatha is referred to today as the Inkatha Freedom Party after Africans were legally allowed to form political parties starting in 1990. For the sake of simplicity, the organization and party will be referred solely as Inkatha. Inkatha's founder, Chief Buthelezi is often described by various titles: Gatsha, Doctor, or Chief Minister. He will be referred to here as Chief Buthelezi. It is important to note that Chief Buthelezi also led the KwaZulu homeland government (often referred to by its legislative body, the KwaZulu Assembly) which was predominantly made up of Inkatha members.

Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi started with strong links to the ANC, as shown by Chief Buthelezi's participation in the ANC youth league before he founded Inkatha. The organization adopted ANC slogans, symbols, and tactics. The group initially held fast to its nonviolent ideals and worked in with the ANC after its exile in 1960 in opposition to the Apartheid state.

The African National Congress or ANC is one of the oldest African liberation movements and can trace its history all the way back to the 1910s when it was originally known as the South African Native National Congress. The ANC has throughout its history supported the extension of rights and liberties to black Africans in South Africa and early on opposed the 1913 Native's Land Act and homeland system.⁸ The ANC transitioned to a more mass

⁷ Despite Inkatha's description of itself as a liberation movement, most of its opposition did not share that view. Instead, the ANC would often call Inkatha reactionary and counter-revolutionary.

⁸ The 1913 Native's Land Act is legislation that set the stage for Apartheid. This legislation demarcated limited areas where the African population could legally own land and helped to cement white ownership of much of South

movement and began to work more co-operatively with the South African Communist Party in the 1940s.⁹ In response to Apartheid the ANC began to engage more regularly in civil disobedience tactics and strikes throughout the 1950s but remained committed to non-violence. After party leaders were jailed or forced into exile and the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, several ANC members (particularly the younger and/or communist aligned members) decided that only through violence would the ANC prevail and began to engage in a guerilla war against the Apartheid state. Those involved in the violent struggle organized themselves as uMkhonto we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation) or MK. The violent struggle became the official policy of the ANC and MK became the military wing of the ANC. The violent struggle was only ended with the settlement with the government and resulting free election in 1994.¹⁰

Animosity arose between Inkatha and the ANC due to a falling out at a London conference in 1979-1980. After the fact, Inkatha argued the ANC tried to force Inkatha to compromise on its adherence to non-violence.¹¹ Some historians have argued that Inkatha sought to expand its influence in the vacuum the ANC left and opposed being controlled by the ANC in exile.¹² Regardless, this animosity grew into a state of violent conflict with assassinations and violent attacks being carried out on both sides, although the violence subsided when ANC activity inside South Africa decreased in the early 1980s.

The primary opponent of Inkatha became the United Democratic Front (UDF), a broad coalition of liberation movements, labor movements, and everyday people formed in 1983. The

Africa. It also further segregated Indians and Coloureds legally from the white population. Clark and Worger, *South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid*, 22-23.

⁹ Clark and Worger, *South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid*, 26-28.

¹⁰ Clark and Worger, *South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid*, 60-63.

¹¹ KwaZulu Ministry of Communications, "Pietermaritzburg Peace Plan And now will the agony end?", *Clarion Call*, Special Edition, 1988, Killie Campbell Africana Library, KCJ2937, 3.

¹² Laurence Piper, "Nationalism without a Nation: The rise and fall of Zulu nationalism in South Africa's transition to democracy, 1975-1999," *Nations and Nationalism*, January 2002, Vol.8.

UDF's composition meant that its political platform primarily revolved around ending Apartheid and implementing a truly non-racial democracy. Since the UDF continued operating in South Africa during the ANC's exile, many South Africans viewed it as the successor to, or at least tied to, the ANC.

This climate changed over time, however. In 1990, the government lifted the ban on political organizations and the ANC resumed its operations in South Africa and supported the UDF more directly. This placed the ANC back into more direct conflict with Inkatha. The ANC/UDF clashed with Inkatha often caused by the younger, more radical nature of their members as compared to the more conservative, traditionalist focus of Inkatha. ANC/UDF members frequently accused Inkatha of collaborating with the Apartheid state and instigating violence. Inkatha responded by accusing comrades (the name for the ANC's and UDF's members) of being little more than criminals and instigating the violence.

Despite Inkatha's claim to be a nonviolent liberation movement, it often perpetrated violence in KwaZulu-Natal during these decades of late Apartheid, more than any other organization.¹³ The growing influence and differing agenda of the UDF from Inkatha in the mid-1980s created a low-intensity civil war in KwaZulu-Natal. Simultaneously, Inkatha cultivated a close relationship with its professed enemy, the Apartheid State and by the late 1980s, Inkatha acted as a surrogate for Apartheid state violence.¹⁴

Why Inkatha worked with the Apartheid regime has stirred considerable scholarly debate, but many generally agree that Inkatha felt it needed the government's support to survive and

¹³ Archbishop Desmond Tutu, et al, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, Vol. 3, Chapter 1, 8-10, October 29, 1998, <https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume%203.pdf>.

¹⁴ Because of this whenever Inkatha is referred to as a liberation movement this will be put in quotes or have a moniker in front of it such as "self-styled."

continue its war against the UDF and ANC.¹⁵ A symbiotic relationship thus evolved between Inkatha and the Apartheid government created by Inkatha's desire for political control over KwaZulu and the government's desire to weaken black opposition (UDF and ANC) in the region. The Apartheid government granted Inkatha greater control over the KwaZulu homeland in exchange for Inkatha continuing to fight the UDF and ANC. By creating the model "loyal" homeland, with leaders who were traditional, ethno-nationalist, and deferential to the white-minority regime, the government achieved its goals including making Inkatha an acceptable alternative to the ANC for global conservatives.

In exchange for loyalty, South African security forces secretly but directly backed Inkatha with equipment and training. Inkatha's decision to collaborate revolved around its perception that the ANC/UDF constituted the bigger threat, with the underlying logic of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." After the fall of Apartheid, Inkatha discontinued its program of political violence, and continues to operate as a legitimate political party, though with considerably less widespread support than it once enjoyed in South Africa or even the KwaZulu-Natal region.¹⁶

It is finally worth noting the backdrop of much of this violence in South Africa was during a period of economic decline, largely due to the international disinvestment from South Africa campaign. Disinvestment was a global protest against Apartheid which started with the boycott of South African products and grew into calls for large international businesses to pull out from South Africa. The idea for disinvestment began from ANC protests inside South Africa in the 1950s but was only largely supported by other African countries whose economies were

¹⁵ Stephen Ellis, "The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24, no. 2 (1998), 261-299.

¹⁶ "Election for South African National Assembly," South Africa, ElectionGuide: Democracy Assistance and Election News, accessed September 13, 2021, <https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2721/>.

too small to have a real impact on South Africa. In the mid-1980s the United States and several other western nations signed disinvestment into law which greatly impacted the South African economy.¹⁷ Many regard the international disinvestment campaign as a success which forced the South African government to negotiate on crucial issues with some even advocating it as the real reason for the end of Apartheid.

Inkatha was very much opposed to disinvestment due to their ties with the Apartheid government and belief in free markets and providing jobs to Africans. Inkatha's outward declaration was that disinvestment would hinder African growth in South Africa's economy and the ANC's calls for disinvestment were misguided. Inkatha was able to position itself as pro-jobs while receiving support from big businesses and the Apartheid government.¹⁸ Inkatha's position on disinvestment will be mentioned as is required throughout this thesis.

Thesis Focus

Inkatha's direct violence toward other liberation movements despite its professed non-violent platform reflects an obvious contradiction, that continues to engage scholars. One question not receiving as much attention is why the *supporters* of Inkatha engaged in this violence, particularly when superficially they appear to have had little to gain directly. This thesis explores how and why Inkatha supporters engaged in violence in KwaZulu-Natal from the 1980s to the 1990s by analyzing the individual factors that motivated them.

These motivating factors exist within three categories: political propaganda, coercion, and opportunism. Inkatha utilized propaganda highlighting ANC/UDF violence thus providing a rationale for making them an enemy and supporting Inkatha's "defensive" violent acts. Inkatha

¹⁷ Richard Knight, "Sanctions, Disinvestment, and U.S. Corporations in South Africa," in *Sanctioning Apartheid*, edited by Robert E. Edgar, (African World Press, 1990).

¹⁸ Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa* (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1988).

also used propaganda and indoctrination to create loyal cadres of youth and students who were prepared for violence and act as a counter to growing ANC/UDF influence in the younger generation. Coercion was also used as a tactic to compel the hesitant into engaging in political violence. Particularly at the local leader level the use or threat of force installed fear in the local populace to create support for Inkatha. The stories of those coerced into violence will also be explored and how their experience questions the monolithic support Inkatha claimed to have. Finally, opportunism pushed some Inkatha supporters toward violence when it had the potential to benefit them directly, usually financially, given the dire economic situation in South Africa in the 1980s and 90s. The desire for personal wealth and status pushed both Inkatha supporters and leaders towards raiding politically opposed townships and settlements where looting was common. The economic situation in South Africa at this time also meant that in some cases violence was necessary to survive as the struggle for resources meant individual Inkatha supporters committed violence for necessities like groceries. Each of these motivators will be discussed in turn and explain how individuals reacted to them in the, at times confusing, political and violent landscape of KwaZulu-Natal.

Finally, the experience of an individual, Daluxolo Luthuli, in Inkatha and the men under him is used to examine how they reacted to these motivations how it influenced their participation in intense violence as professional hitmen for Inkatha. Daluxolo and around 200 other men were trained by the Apartheid government to act as a private force for Inkatha and were known as the Caprivi Operatives or Caprivians. These men's activities will be explored in relation to how they operated in both public and memorable conflicts and little known covert operations. Through the experiences of these men, particularly Daluxolo, their justification of

their involvement will be analyzed as well as how the previously described motives effect this group's decisions.

The same motivators of propaganda, coercion, and opportunism will be seen in this highly trained and involved group of men whose profession became one of violence. Their stories and involvement, particularly in the transition period will also be examined in relation to their importance both to the troubles and successes of the democratic transition and looming election in 1994.

Chapter 1: Historical Literature on Inkatha and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal

Previous scholarship on Inkatha has often focused on three main factors: Inkatha as a “Third Force,” the ethno-nationalism utilized by Inkatha, and Inkatha’s political motivations. The “Third Force” generally refers to an outside organization- or “force” which manipulates a violent situation to their advantage. Here, the Third Force concept argues that a clandestine force caused the surge in violence in KwaZulu-Natal. Research supports this argument, particularly as Inkatha’s secret relationship with the Apartheid State was uncovered. Most scholars agree that the Apartheid state and Inkatha as its surrogate fit the role of the Third Force. To many historians, Inkatha’s relationship with the Apartheid state has explained the violence perpetrated by Inkatha and in the KwaZulu-Natal region.

This relationship has been well documented by historians, such as Stephen Ellis, Peter Stiff, and Daniel Douek, and confirmed by multiple sources.¹⁹ Ellis and Stiff led the discussion on Third Force activities with Ellis highlighting the relationship between certain organizations like Inkatha and the Apartheid state.²⁰ Before these authors, the idea of a Third Force was popularized and discussed in Nelson Mandela’s speeches relating to the rise in conflict after 1990. Mandela and others in the ANC suggested that it was a subset of the security forces, not the Apartheid government as a whole.²¹ Ellis in his work “The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force” argues that Third Force activities were not separate from the government or even a subsection of the government but rather the active policy of the National Party and the

¹⁹ Stephen Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24, no. 2 (1998), 261-299; Peter Stiff, *Warfare by Other Means: South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s*, (Alberton: Galago Publishing, 2001); Daniel L. Douek, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa*, (London: Hurst and Company, 2020).

²⁰ Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” 262.

²¹ Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” 262. Likely Mandela and other leaders in the ANC did not push to call Third Force activities express policy of the government because they wanted to maintain good relations with de Klerk and his peace faction in the government during crucial negotiations.

Apartheid government. Ellis heavily utilized documents and testimony from the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa* which held many of the crucial “Third Force” hearings and released its final report in 1998, the same year Ellis published his work.

Ellis even contends that the term Third Force is a “misnomer” as it is simply the government operating in a covert manner.²² Ellis notes that military members making the necessary actions to aid the Third Force were in constant contact with higher officials in both military and civilian agencies. Because of this, it would be impossible for the highest echelons of the government to not know about these activities. Ellis relies on the government’s own Goldstone Commission into the violence in 1991 as evidence.²³ Ellis’ discussion of Inkatha is comparatively small, but he argues that the government used Inkatha as pawn to help combat the rising threat to the government posed by the UDF in the late 1980s and through the 1990s.²⁴

Stiff makes a similar argument to Ellis in his work, *Warfare by Other Means: South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s*, published in 2001. Stiff emphasizes that the Apartheid government undeniably knew about the Third Force activities being organized by their security forces. Stiff goes further, however, by providing more information such as government documents released during Mandela’s presidency and interviews with former security personnel that Ellis did not utilize or have access to. This allows Stiff to describe specific events as well as overall trends and what middle level to high ranking officials hoped to achieve. This analysis of the bureaucracy and goals of the Apartheid state explains the role of Inkatha as a Third Force.²⁵ Stiff looks at similar examples of Inkatha Third Force activity as Ellis (such as the Caprivi Operatives and the Trust Feed Massacre), but he provides a much more an in depth analysis of

²² Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” 262-263.

²³ Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” 263-264.

²⁴ Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” 274-276.

²⁵ Stiff, *Warfare by Other Means*, 156-183.

these cases as well as how local low level security officials operated extensively and without informing the higher levels of government. Additionally, Stiff begins a limited effort to discuss the agency or motivation of those operating under the Apartheid state security forces (such as Inkatha members).²⁶

Other scholars have more recently joined the conversation. In *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa*, Douek focuses on Third Force violence during the transition period in South Africa in the early 1990s. Writing in 2020, Douek provides the most robust and intriguing argument about the extent of Third Force activities and the Apartheid security state's involvement. He goes beyond linking Inkatha (and other operatives and organizations) to the Apartheid state and argues that Military and Security Branch members established parallel structures and loyalties within the government.

In some ways Douek undermines Ellis and Stiff's arguments that the government knew and controlled the activities of its security branch. Instead, Douek describes the immense ability of the security branch to conceal the full extent of its operations and its ability to evade oversight. This ensured when other sections of government became aware of security branch activities, they lacked a full understanding and typically proved powerless or unwilling to reign it in.

Douek also argues that this securocrat shadow government used Third Force violence not only to try and curb the ANC but to hold onto power to spoil any democratic elections. Thus, government factions were actively trying to subvert President F. W. de Klerk and members of his "peace faction" with Douek arguing some diehard members of the "shadow government"

²⁶ Stiff, *Warfare by Other Means*, 180-193.

considered a coup.²⁷ In contrast, Ellis largely rejected the notion of an organized coup.²⁸ While Douek's discussion of Inkatha had more examples and analysis of these events, his arguments largely parallel Ellis and Stiff. Each author provided a through discussion on the motivations of the Apartheid state and some Inkatha leadership (largely meaning Chief Buthelezi) motivations but with little review of what motivated individuals in Inkatha.

Similarly, some historians, such as S. Nombuso Dlamini, in her work "The Construction, Meaning and Negotiation of Ethnic Identities in KwaZulu-Natal" published in 1998, concentrated on the "Zulu-ness" of Inkatha to explain its role as an ethno-nationalist group. Dlamini stresses the importance of the ethno-nationalism of Inkatha as a motivation for the violence. This in-group/out-group style thinking predates the late Apartheid era conflict in KwaZulu, but it continued to be utilized by Inkatha. To this end "Zulu-ness" can be seen as both a manufactured rationale and also a preexisting cultural thought process that had created violent opposition between Inkatha and their opponents.²⁹

Gerhard Maré and John Wright have posed a similar argument in "Ethnicity, Society and Conflict in Natal" published in 1994. They contend Inkatha capitalized on separating themselves into a separate ethnic group and argued that Inkatha narrowed the definition of what a Zulu was into a political alignment. Mare and Wright described this definition as "ethnic bourgeois in alliance with big capital" and Inkatha targeted those outside this mold.³⁰

Their argument does not recognize Inkatha had a mass support beyond the bourgeoisie class, and Inkatha made frequent concessions to mobilize labor. Furthermore, while ethnicity

²⁷ Douek, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa*, 73-100.

²⁸ Ellis, "The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force," 262.

²⁹ S. Nombuso Dlamini, "The construction, meaning and negotiation of ethnic identities in KwaZulu-Natal," *Social Identities*, October 1998, Vol. 4.

³⁰ Gerhard Maré and John Wright, "Ethnicity, Society and Conflict in Natal," *Review of African Political Economy* 21, no. 59 (1994), 122.

affected Inkatha's popularity and violent actions, it was not the sole reason for the violence of the 1980s and 90s, particularly in the case of KwaZulu-Natal. The ethno-nationalist nature of Inkatha was not absolute as many Zulus also participated in the ANC and UDF. Inkatha's focus on ethnicity better explains urban violence in areas like Pretoria, Johannesburg, and surrounding townships. Large groups of ethnic Zulu migratory workers housed in hostels in non-Zulu majority areas created tensions along ethnic lines which exploded into ethnic violence.

Gary Kynoch expertly covers this understanding of violence in his book *Township Violence and the End of Apartheid: War on the Reef* published in 2018. Kynoch focuses on the violence on the Reef (areas around Johannesburg) and aptly covers the motivators of ethnicity and belonging in this multicultural setting.³¹ This thesis will apply a similar methodology by looking at individual cases and factors as Kynoch does, but in the region of KwaZulu-Natal. In KwaZulu-Natal, most Africans belong to the Zulu ethnic group making ethnicity a much smaller factor. Instead, different conclusions must be drawn to the cause of violence. Outside of Kynoch's discussion on ethnicity as a factor, he discusses what motivated individuals (or at least the large number of Inkatha supporters as opposed to the few leaders). This thesis will take a similar approach to understanding violence but localized to KwaZulu-Natal. Like Kynoch's work, a case study will be utilized that encapsulates the argument and points of this thesis. However, the focus in this case study will be on a static group of people, as opposed to a specific locale as Kynoch does.

Other historians, such Gerhard Maré, Georgina Hamilton, and Chris Lowe, have looked at the motives of Inkatha's leadership, namely Chief Buthelezi, as an explanation for the violence. Chief Buthelezi is a figure who was at the center of South African politics and

³¹ Gary Kynoch, *Township Violence and the End of Apartheid: War on the Reef* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2018).

historiography in the 1980s and 90s.³² Maré, an influential historian in South Africa's later Apartheid history, was among the first and most prolific writers about Inkatha specifically. His and Hamilton's work, *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa* published in 1998, has set the stage for this thesis with his top down approach to Inkatha and their motives. This top down approach has proven that Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha are inseparable, and Chief Buthelezi was undeniably a driving force in Inkatha policy. Chief Buthelezi's cult of personality cannot be ignored in order to have any serious discussion about Inkatha.³³ Maré has also effectively argued for the motivations of Inkatha's leadership in the framework of Apartheid as a whole and in key areas like homeland governance, disinvestment, and collaboration with the State.³⁴ This top down approach does not, however, explain the motives of Inkatha's numerous followers and why they chose to engage in violence.

Chris Lowe has focused even more closely on Chief Buthelezi and has come to many of the same conclusions as Maré on his motivations in his work, "Buthelezi, Inkatha, and the Problem of Ethnic Nationalism in South Africa" published in 1990. Lowe dives into Chief Buthelezi's role in homeland governance and his cultural role in Zulu society as explanations for Inkatha policy.³⁵ For these reasons, Chief Buthelezi will be discussed throughout this thesis, but counter to these authors, he will not act as a stand in for the motivations of Inkatha as a whole. While Chief Buthelezi is an influential figure, he is but one part of Inkatha's propaganda apparatus which will be discussed at length in this thesis. Furthermore, the motivations of one man do not adequately explain why others fight for him or on his behalf.

³² Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa* (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1988).

³³ Chris Lowe, "Buthelezi, Inkatha, and the Problem of Ethnic Nationalism in South Africa," *Radical History Review*, Vol. 1990, issue 46-47.

³⁴ Gerhard Mare, "Inkatha and Regional Control: Policing Liberation Politics," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 45/46, 1989, 179-189.

³⁵ Lowe, "Buthelezi, Inkatha, and the Problem of Ethnic Nationalism in South Africa."

Still others, such as Laurence Piper in his work, “Nationalism without a Nation: The rise and fall of Zulu nationalism in South Africa’s transition to democracy” published in 2002, explored Inkatha through the lens of political science. Piper explores how violence evolved from political motives and became a viable strategy to achieve the organization's political goals. Violence was an effective method of controlling territory and the people on that territory. These were both crucial for Inkatha to extract the necessary money, manpower, and above all voting support it needed in the transition era.³⁶ However, these political factors did not always motivate (or even occur to) those that directly participated in the violence and this analysis often falls into the same trap of limiting the focus to the leadership of Inkatha.

Almost all of this previous scholarship takes a top-down approach that often does not consider the individuals needed to operationalize violence. This study joins a growing number of scholars seeking to understand the nature of political violence through previously unconsidered factors, such as Jill Kelly, who has focused on land and intrapersonal relationships in her work *To Swim with Crocodiles: Land, Violence, and Belonging in South Africa, 1800-1996* published in 2018.³⁷ Similar to these new approaches to Inkatha and the complex narratives in South Africa during this period, this thesis will adopt a view “from below,” paying close attention to individual rationales while maintaining how these relate to the broader organization of Inkatha.

³⁶ Laurence Piper, “Nationalism without a Nation: The rise and fall of Zulu nationalism in South Africa’s transition to democracy, 1975-1999,” *Nations and Nationalism*, January 2002, Vol.8.

³⁷ Jill E. Kelly, *To Swim with Crocodiles: Land, Violence, and Belonging in South Africa, 1800-1996* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2018).

Chapter 2: Political Propaganda and Indoctrination

“They would talk about peace, but covertly they would be speaking about violence”- Daluxolo Luthuli

Relatively little has been written about Inkatha’s use of propaganda besides Inkatha’s education system *Ubuntu* (this will be discussed later in this chapter). What has been written about Inkatha’s utilization of propaganda is often limited to discussions on the utilization of ethno-nationalism. For example, scholars will stress Zulu culture, Zulu history, and Zulu imagery as used by Inkatha.³⁸ These discussions of Inkatha’s education program also have a tendency to solely focus on the Zulu cultural aspect of the education, however there is a more diverse historiography in this particular area.³⁹ While Inkatha utilized all of these and more, this argument fails similarly to previous scholarly works mentioned which characterized Inkatha as a monolithic Zulu organization that all Zulus adhered to.

Past scholarship in this area only begins to discuss propaganda in a more nuanced way when analyzing Chief Buthelezi’s speeches. While Chief Buthelezi’s speeches are important as he is the leader of Inkatha and the KwaZulu homeland government they are only part of the whole. Chief Buthelezi was (perhaps unsurprisingly in hindsight) shrewd enough to not outright state his position, particularly in the case of violence. Chief Buthelezi was also well versed in the art of spin. For example, he claimed that Inkatha is the successor to the ANC-in-exile while at the same time denouncing the ANC for their armed struggle against the Apartheid government

³⁸ Daphna Golan, "Inkatha and Its Use of the Zulu Past," *History in Africa* 18 (1991), 113-26.

³⁹ Doug Tilton, "Creating an 'Educated Workforce': Inkatha, Big Business, and Educational Reform in KwaZulu," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 1 (1992), 166-89; Gerhard Maré has also commented on education in several articles on Inkatha. For an article dedicated to Inkatha’s education program, start with Gerhard Maré, "Education in a 'liberated zone': Inkatha and education in KwaZulu," *South-North Cultural and Media Studies* Vol. 5, Issue 1, 1988.

all in the same speech without losing coherence.⁴⁰ His speeches can thus often not stand on their own and must be considered in a wider context (with a few rare exceptions).

This thesis will begin by looking at how Inkatha used propaganda to motivate its supporters and justify the use of violence to them. This was primarily achieved by pushing the cause of violence onto their political opponents and defending any actions by Inkatha fighters as justified self-defense. The utilization of propaganda saw widespread use by Inkatha as conflict escalated and continued to rage between Inkatha and the ANC/UDF in the 1980s. The organization moved quickly to present its side of the story and construct an oft-repeated narrative that sought to explain the violence and push the blame away from themselves.

Inkatha's Propaganda Apparatus

Inkatha had a relatively robust apparatus to engage in its propaganda work and seemed to understand the important role of propaganda in the confusing atmosphere of violence and competing ideologies in KwaZulu-Natal. Precisely because KwaZulu-Natal was majority one ethnic group (for Africans) and a hotbed for many kinds of political activity made Inkatha's propaganda and arguments therein all the more important. By studying Inkatha's propaganda and attacks we get a window into understanding why people were motivated to participate in the Inkatha cause.

Inkatha utilized the KwaZulu homeland government heavily to give its message legitimacy and reach. The KwaZulu Ministry of Communications acted as a mouthpiece for Inkatha and the media it produced will be discussed at length in this chapter (particularly its periodical *Clarion Call*). Additionally, Inkatha realized that for its propaganda and political messaging to have the most impact, it had to control the medium that reached the most people.

⁴⁰ Chief M. G. Buthelezi, "Why I established Inkatha", in *Inkatha and the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa*, Inkatha Pamphlet Collection, Hoover Institution, JQ2099 K915

That is why Inkatha chairman Oscar Dhlomo bought out the Zulu language newspaper *Ilanga*.⁴¹ *Ilanga* was (and still is) one of the most widely read newspapers in South Africa. As a Zulu language paper (at one point the only Zulu language paper) it had the exact demographic Inkatha wanted to reach.

The buyout of *Ilanga* was not a complete propaganda victory because Dhlomo and Inkatha were faced with opposition from the existing staff on the paper who went on strike and condemnation from several other newspapers. This brought national attention to the sale and criticism that Dhlomo along with the rest of Inkatha was going to transform the paper into a “political rag.”⁴² Dhlomo and Chief Buthelezi countered claims by other newspapers by stating that the buyout should be celebrated as a “black coup” over white-owned media and stated their goal of maintaining journalistic integrity in *Ilanga*.⁴³ In response the striking workers and other newspapers were quick to ask- why else would a political organization attempt to buy out a widely circulated newspaper if they did not intend to use it for themselves? All the workers that continued the strike were eventually fired or rejoined the newspaper. The positions of the fired workers were filled by writers from the KwaZulu Ministry of Communications and, against the previous promises of Dhlomo and Chief Buthelezi, the first issue under their control immediately displayed overwhelming support for Inkatha. On top of this an editorial and ad for writers wanted in the first issue tried to spin the issue as Inkatha and the paper providing jobs.⁴⁴

⁴¹ *Ilanga* means sun, day, or daytime in isiZulu.

⁴² Daily News Reporters, “Takeover: *Ilanga*’s news staff go on strike,” *The Daily News*, 04/16/1987, APCS, PC126/3/11.

⁴³ Daily News Reporters, “Takeover: *Ilanga*’s news staff go on strike.”

⁴⁴ “*Ilanga* battles without staff”, *The Natal Mercury*, 04/18/1987, APCS, PC126/3/11; An ad in the paper for new writers directly criticized liberals and radicals that supported disinvestment (something Inkatha eagerly opposed) and placed the newly Inkatha supporting newspaper offering jobs as a more productive foil.

Despite the opposition, Inkatha remained in control of the paper (even contemporarily Inkatha owns a stake in the newspaper) and had access to its large number of readers.⁴⁵ Inkatha's ability to recognize and control a critical medium shows a certain awareness of propaganda that is not often afforded to Inkatha. The deception, shrewdness, and nuance used in their attempt to control the narrative was not unique to the battle over *Ilanga*. The argument and methods used by Inkatha were recurring and will be put in focus throughout this chapter.

In the late 1980s, the KwaZulu homeland government appointed the Inkatha Institute to investigate the problem of violence in the region and its causes. This organization claimed to be independent and non-partisan, but was clearly politically aligned with Inkatha, as noted by its contemporary detractors.⁴⁶ The Inkatha Institute was another mouthpiece for Inkatha but this time staking its legitimacy in the supposed impartiality of academia and think tanks. This was likely to counter criticism Inkatha was facing from academics who frequently aligned with the UDF. The Inkatha Institute carried out its own study and came to the conclusion that the violence was perpetrated by unemployed and rebellious youth, referred to as comrades (the term used by ANC/UDF supporters). In describing these youths, the Inkatha Institute stated, "They kill political persons indiscriminately but also indulge in murdering ordinary people in the townships."⁴⁷ Furthermore, the youth were described as an "onslaught," against the general public and communities were simply fighting back against an unwanted invasion by these comrades. Here, Inkatha did two things which were subtle but effective.

⁴⁵ Sapa, "Ilanga owners accuse strikers," *Independent Online*, 04/11/2012, <https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/ilanga-owners-accuse-strikers-1273901>; As the article shows the paper's owner and purpose appears to be in flux.

⁴⁶ Carmel Rickard, "John Aitcheson on KwaZulu-Natal Violence Statistics," May 3, 1990, Carmel Rickard Cassette Donation, Killie Campbell Africana Library.

⁴⁷ KwaZulu Ministry of Communications, "Pietermaritzburg Peace Plan And now will the agony end?", *Clarion Call*, Special Edition, 1988, Killie Campbell Africana Library, KCJ2937, 10

Firstly, Inkatha stated the target of the comrades was the community and it was motivated by economics and gang warfare. This made the comrades seem motivated by personal gain and affected by the deteriorating economy of South Africa. This is intended to give the reader the impression that the UDF and its supporters did not truly have a political motive or platform. Even if they did, one of their major pillars- disinvestment- was only worsening the economy and this worsening economy caused the upsurge in violence. Inkatha had creatively painted the UDF as both the cause and perpetrators of violence. Secondly, it gave Inkatha an opportunity to expand its support. By characterizing itself and the community as equally affected, Inkatha presented the idea that a joint effort to fight against the UDF was a logical progression to stop the violence. This assertion was aided by the fact that ANC/UDF membership and supporters were largely radical youth who wished to rebel against traditional norms. Inkatha was making an appeal to traditional ideals and preserving a conservative version of the community. Through this claim, Inkatha additionally suggested that either the violence was being directly perpetrated by the ANC/UDF or that these youths were motivated by them and could not be controlled by the leadership of these organizations.

Indeed, a spokesperson for the Inkatha Institute said as much when he described the violence being committed by comrades, and Inkatha continued to directly attack various leaders of the UDF for sponsoring or encouraging violence.⁴⁸ In effect, Inkatha sought to again tarnish the motives of the UDF and its members. This explanation and characterization of the violence became part of the Inkatha party line and was repeated frequently in speeches, press interviews, in party periodicals, and by sympathetic news outlets. Inkatha, of course, provided the remedy to

⁴⁸ Rickard, "John Aitcheson on KwaZulu-Natal Violence Statistics."; KwaZulu Ministry of Communications, "Pietermaritzburg Peace Plan And now will the agony end?", 13

these problems later in this same periodical with articles on their own union, UWUSA (which was anti-disinvestment and “pro jobs”) and Inkatha’s “Peace Plan.”⁴⁹

By placing the blame for the initiation of violence on the ANC and UDF, Inkatha was better able to explain their involvement as reactive, and therefore justified. This was especially important as Inkatha officials and members were increasingly implicated in violence during the mid-1980s.⁵⁰ Inkatha could not overtly claim responsibility for these members and support their actions publicly because it ran counter to Inkatha’s platform as an ostensibly non-violent organization. The organization skirted this issue by stating that violence committed by its members was justified when it was in self-defense. They had already begun using this argument in tandem with the Inkatha Institute report, which claimed that communities were acting in self-defense against the violent youth.⁵¹

Chief Buthelezi's position as both a traditional and political leader meant his words had power and as such defended Inkatha’s position by stating, “We reserve the right to defend our persons and our property against the onslaughts which are now being mounted against us.”⁵² This allowed Inkatha to maintain its platform of non-violence (of a sort) while also providing a way to legitimize the violence its supporters committed. This became a cemented part of Inkatha policy as both its leadership and supporters started to use the phrase, “A political eye for an eye and a political tooth for a tooth,” which became increasingly popular in the late 1980s and

⁴⁹ KwaZulu Ministry of Communications, “Pietermaritzburg Peace Plan And now will the agony end?”, 16-17, 20-24

⁵⁰ Legal Resources Centre, *Names of Inkatha Functionaries and Police Officers Involved in Violence*, May 1986, KZ/Inkatha Politics, PC16/3/19.

⁵¹ Rickard, “John Aitcheson on KwaZulu-Natal Violence Statistics.”

⁵² KwaZulu Ministry of Communications, “South Africa: World Spotlight,” *Clarion Call*, Vol. 4, 1985, Killie Campbell Africana Library, KCJ2938.

continued into the 1990s (in effect, the word political was only used for propaganda, and the phrase was largely shortened to just “an eye for an eye”).⁵³

The mantra of an “eye for an eye” and its line of thinking provided an avenue for Inkatha leadership to indirectly encourage the commission of violent acts and for Inkatha supporters to justify their violent actions. While the phrase was probably initially intended to relate to political rhetoric and policy actions, it quickly became related to politically motivated violence as well.

An example of this line of thinking can be seen when Inkatha Youth Brigade members were pressured by journalists in 1988 to describe their ideas of self-defense. The Youth Brigade members had a much looser idea than, for example, the legal definition. “An eye for an eye,” in the way that these Inkatha Youth Brigade members described it, meant that the defense of honor and status was of extreme importance.⁵⁴ For example, a verbal sleight by a political opponent against Chief Buthelezi could be grounds for physical violence to some Inkatha members (and this exact scenario would play out more than once). The idea of “an eye for an eye” also meant to supporters that they were justified if they wanted to get even. For example, if an Inkatha member was killed by a UDF supporter, Inkatha could feel justified in wanting to kill this man, or any other UDF supporter, and define it as a form of defense.⁵⁵ This only contributed to the cycle of violence that plagued KwaZulu-Natal.

⁵³ KwaZulu Ministry of Communications, “Inkatha and Violence,” 1983, Inkatha Pamphlet Collection, Hoover Institution, JQ2099 K9I5.

⁵⁴ Carmel Rickard, “Interview with Inkatha (IFP) Youth Brigade- Carmel with Mary de Haas,” 1988, Carmel Rickard Cassette Donation, Killie Campbell Africana Library, KCAV42481.

⁵⁵ Rickard, “Interview with Inkatha (IFP) Youth Brigade- Carmel with Mary de Haas.”

Ubuntu and Indoctrination

After black school children led the Soweto Uprising in 1976, it became clear to all groups and organizations involved in South Africa that the youth would have an extensive role to play.⁵⁶ Inkatha was no exception to this and moved quickly to integrate young people into the “cultural liberation movement” and later the party (as seen in the Youth Brigade mentioned above). Additionally, Inkatha used its wide powers inside KwaZulu to educate children according to their principles and indoctrinate them along Inkatha’s party line. Inkatha developed its own syllabus called *Ubuntu* in early 1978 and began to implement it later that year.⁵⁷ Besides its obvious slant towards Zulu nationalism and its pro-Inkatha nature, the outline for the syllabus rather innocently included classes on community, health, history, and religious studies.⁵⁸ A closer look at the exact contents of the syllabus and how it was to be implemented in the troubled times of the 1980s reveals a much different story.

In information produced about the Inkatha syllabus, the KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture stated that the “syllabus is not static” and that it must conform to “the aims and objectives of the National Cultural Liberation Movement” (meaning Inkatha).⁵⁹ This

⁵⁶ The Soweto Uprising was a mass protest the Apartheid regime’s “Bantu education”. The incident directly leading to the protest was the regime’s attempt to implement Afrikaans as the official language in education for Black Africans which was flatly rejected. Beyond this however African students were protesting segregated and sub-standard education and facilities as well as the entire system of Apartheid.

⁵⁷ Ubuntu is the isiZulu word for humanity, also sometimes translated as unity. The word exists in several Bantu languages and is even written the same in Xhosa. Beyond the name for Inkatha’s syllabus, the word has long existed in relation to a philosophical belief centered around community and peace. This philosophy has been utilized by various African leaders such as Nelson Mandela. Jacob Rugare Mugumbate and Admire Chereni describe Ubuntu as a “collection of values and practices that people of Africa or of African origin view as making people authentic human beings. While the nuances of these values and practices vary across different ethnic groups, they all point to one thing – an authentic individual human being is part of a larger and more significant relational, communal, societal, environmental and spiritual world.” Jacob Rugare Mugumbate and Admire Chereni, “Now, the theory of Ubuntu has its space in social work,” *African Journal of Social Work*, Vol. 10, No. 1: Special Issue on Ubuntu Social Work, April 2020.

⁵⁸ SA Institute of Race Relations- Natal Region, *The Inkatha Syllabus*, 1978, Education and Inkatha syllabus, APCS, PC126/20/7.

⁵⁹ KwaZulu Dept of Education and Culture, *Syllabus for Primary and Secondary/High Schools*, 1978, Education and Inkatha syllabus, APCS, PC126/20/7, 1.

point is doubly stressed as the document states, “many adults seem to hold divergent beliefs about Inkatha.... These are passed on to the young and cloud the youth’s minds. This syllabus...will clear many doubts and thus create unified ideas to match with the goals of Inkatha.”⁶⁰ Inkatha clearly intended to use this syllabus to combat opposing views on the organization and targeted children specifically for political education and indoctrination.

Furthermore, the content of the syllabus demonstrates the true motives of Inkatha with its politically charged history and traditionally focused community classes. The history sections of the syllabus focused on the importance of ethnic Zulus in South African history and placed Inkatha center stage in the struggle against Apartheid. Little mention is given to other liberation movements unless they are portrayed through a pro-Inkatha lens. For example, the ANC only receives brief mention, and the focus is on Albert Luthuli, a Zulu, heading the organization until his death. The ANC-in-exile is largely omitted and Inkatha is portrayed as the successor to Luthuli’s ANC.

The syllabus also placed Chief Buthelezi in the same context as that of King Shaka and other influential Zulu leaders, even though he was already seen as a controversial figure during this period.⁶¹ Students were also taught war cries and Inkatha songs, which became increasingly politically charged as the organization used them at rallies and other events, often leading to violence.⁶² All students had to learn and perform these songs regardless of whether or not they agreed with their content. Similarly, teachers were required to teach the syllabus regardless of their personal beliefs.⁶³ The syllabus also increased its focus on political education for students

⁶⁰ KwaZulu Dept of Education, Syllabus, 2.

⁶¹ KwaZulu Dept of Education, Syllabus, 3; For an American equivalent- this would be like a school telling children that a current president is just as great as George Washington or Abraham Lincoln.

⁶² KwaZulu Dept of Education, Syllabus, 3-5.

⁶³ KwaZulu Dept of Education, Syllabus, 17-19.

as they aged, focusing on the greatness of Inkatha and installing “Inkatha discipline.”⁶⁴ Similarly, students were encouraged to join the Inkatha Youth Brigade and participate in their events.

Students were also taught self-defense, a term with a debated definition as explained above.⁶⁵

Tensions arose from both students and teachers who did not agree with the syllabus, in whole or in part. Particularly in the 1980s, the syllabus became a point of conflict due to the political nature of its contents, adding more fuel to the fire of unrest already present in schools in South Africa during this period. Schools became battlegrounds as Inkatha Youth Brigade members fought their fellow classmates, who were often organized in youth and student organizations aligned with the UDF. Inkatha officials denied that acts of violence were committed by Inkatha Youth Brigade members, and instead often described these events as the Youth Brigade “maintaining the peace.”⁶⁶ Inkatha and the KwaZulu Assembly (KwaZulu homeland government) briefly considered giving teachers guns to enforce the peace in schools, but the idea was ultimately shut down.⁶⁷

A pamphlet, possibly authored by an Inkatha Youth Brigade member or supporter, was produced and spread in KwaMashu concerning the violence in schools and was directed largely towards parents.⁶⁸ The pamphlet claims that a separate group of unruly students were the cause of the violence in the area, and they acted in accordance with groups like the UDF and ANC. The pamphlet blames these students for theft, looting, and killing, and charges that these students are an affront to “the Nation” and family values.⁶⁹ The pamphlet pleads with parents to maintain

⁶⁴ KwaZulu Dept of Education, Syllabus, 13.

⁶⁵ KwaZulu Dept of Education, Syllabus, 10-17.

⁶⁶ Rand Daily Mail Reporters, “Teachers are told to join Inkatha,” *Rand Daily Mail*, 6/11/78, Education and Inkatha syllabus, APCS, PC126/20/7.

⁶⁷ Rand Daily Mail Reporters, “Anti-Inkatha teachers distress Buthelezi,” *Rand Daily Mail*, 6/11/78, Education and Inkatha syllabus, APCS, PC126/20/7.

⁶⁸ Weekly Mail Reporter, “Eight township violence cases pending in Natal,” *The Weekly Mail*, 06/05/1986, KZN Political Violence, APCS, PC126/8/5.

⁶⁹ Here “the Nation” is referring to the Zulu nation, not South Africa as a whole.

their traditional authority and closes with a call for the community to arm themselves and “beat up” these students and their allies. This call to action was followed by a list of names and addresses directly calling out those they deem to be “provokers of violence”.⁷⁰

Children were also indoctrinated outside of schools through the organization’s use of youth camps. These camps were open to both Youth Brigade members as well as the general Zulu youth population in KwaZulu (the camps were later opened to all Africans). The youth camps date back to the late 1970s, but their role changed over the course of the 1980s.⁷¹ Like many of Inkatha’s policies and organizations, the youth camps started innocently enough, described as a way to uplift the local population and encourage them to support the goals of Inkatha as a cultural liberation movement. To this end, the youth camps taught and promoted skills in agriculture, trades, construction, etc.⁷² Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha promoted these camps as an answer for unemployment and a way for the youth to be productive even if they had left school, were forced to abandon their education, or were otherwise unable to learn. This description and justification for the camps remained from the camps’ inception through the 1980s and worked well with Inkatha’s arguments that economic woes were the cause of violence. Additionally, by characterizing its youth as disciplined and forward thinking, Inkatha had another useful tool to attack the “unruly” youth of the UDF.⁷³

Despite talks of ending unemployment and raising up the youth, Inkatha’s youth camps, as well as the Youth Brigade itself, started to organize themselves on paramilitary lines. One

⁷⁰ Unknown author, *Students Who Want to Learn: Parents Who Want Their Students to Learn*, transcribed pamphlet, KZN Political Violence, APCS, PC126/8/5.

⁷¹ Suzanne Vos, “Gatsha’s Zulu Juegbond,” *Sunday Times*, 02/19/78, Inkatha Youth and Women’s Brigade, APCS, PC126/3/9, 15.

⁷² Daily News Reporter, “Inkatha Youth Reaffirms Policy of Non-Violence,” *The Daily News*, 08/17/81, Inkatha Youth and Women’s Brigade, APCS, PC126/3/9.

⁷³ Post Reporter, “Buthelezi’s answer to unemployment,” *The Post*, 01/15/80, Inkatha Youth and Women’s Brigade, APCS, PC126/3/9, 10.

reporter quoted that, “members of the movement addressed each other as comrade, that subcommittees of the central committee looked into things like defense and security, [and] that military-type uniforms were worn.”⁷⁴ The article also notes the worry of an Apartheid State official at this militant development and how Inkatha should maintain its professed policy of non-violence.⁷⁵ Despite these claims, the future would prove the article to be wrong on both accounts. Firstly, the state official need not worry- Inkatha’s main enemy was not the Apartheid State, but instead the UDF. Secondly, Inkatha youth supporters were not a force for peace, but directly engaged in violence against the UDF increasingly throughout the 1980s.

The organization of the youth into a paramilitary force was a direct response to school boycotts and student riots from 1978 to 1980. Fearful of radical youth not aligned with the organization, Inkatha created these camps and put greater focus on the Youth Brigade. These youths were trained as “warriors” and Chief Buthelezi stated that, “[they] were to be trained to maintain the peace and eradicate bad elements in the black community.”⁷⁶ As with talks of “self-defense” and “eye for an eye,” “maintaining the peace” and “eradicat[ing] bad elements” should be read as euphemisms for violence and justifications for the actions of the Inkatha Youth Brigade and members of these youth camps.

Political propaganda was a useful tool for Inkatha to justify its position on violence to fence-sitters and particularly to its supporters. By giving a pretext or rationale for the use of violence, Inkatha believed it could avoid scrutiny and circumvent any potential backlash from its supporters. Furthermore, this allowed Inkatha supporters to be more comfortable engaging in

⁷⁴ Post Reporter, “Inkatha’s Youth on the move,” *The Post*, 01/15/80, Inkatha Youth and Women's Brigade, APCS, PC126/3/9.

⁷⁵ Post Reporter, “Inkatha’s Youth on the move.”

⁷⁶ Daily News Reporter, “Inkatha Camp Call for More Youths,” *The Daily News*, 12/17/81, Inkatha Youth and Women's Brigade, APCS, PC126/3/9.

violence, and perhaps even encouraged other supporters who had not previously taken part in violence on Inkatha's behalf to do so. Inkatha found propaganda to be a particularly useful tool for youth, who they could indoctrinate. Through the Inkatha Youth Brigade, Inkatha syllabus, and Inkatha youth camps, the organization was able to create a cadre of dedicated supporters and fighters. However, Inkatha could not always convince everyone through propaganda, and in those cases, they relied on coercion.

Chapter 3: Coercion

Sticks, Stones, and Threats

On October 9th, 1987, the silence of the night was broken by group of armed men pounding on the door of the main hut of the Mkhize residence in Mpumuza, a rural area outside Pietermaritzburg. The men were led by David Ntombela a local induna (headman) and Inkatha chairman.⁷⁷ He wanted to see the older brothers of the Mkhize family, Mandla, Mangethe, and Mntu who (fortunately for them) were not home at the time.⁷⁸ Ntombela was angered that the older brothers had been refusing to come to Inkatha meetings and rallies and refusing to pay their dues to Inkatha.⁷⁹ After searching all the huts on and around the Mkhize kraal, Ntombela and his men turned to leave and the Mkhize family returned to their huts to go to sleep. Ntombela either changed his mind or waited until the Mkhize family was caught off guard and turned around. The mother of the Mkhize family was outside her hut when Ntombela and his men quickly returned. Ntombela told the mother of the family to lean against the wall then shot her. The men with Ntombela quickly burst into the secondary hut killing the eldest sister. The rest of the family ran for their lives into the bush or to neighbors' houses. Ntombela and his men then left satisfied that the Mkhize family had gotten the message.⁸⁰

This story and those like it played out frequently across the Natal midlands in the 1980s. Threats of violence kept the local population in line and failure to support Inkatha came with very real consequences as seen in the Mkhize family's case. Similar coercive activities can often

⁷⁷ Induna is the isiZulu word for headman or councilor and is a traditional role but also carries power in local areas under the KwaZulu government.

⁷⁸ Supreme Court of South Africa, *Mandla W. Mkhize and Mangethe Mkhize vs David Ntombela and others*, 11/01/1987, KZN Political Violence, Legal Papers, APCSA, PC126/8/9, 47-48.

⁷⁹ Supreme Court of South Africa, *Mandla W. Mkhize and Mangethe Mkhize vs David Ntombela and others*, 10-20.

⁸⁰ Supreme Court of South Africa, *Mandla W. Mkhize and Mangethe Mkhize vs David Ntombela and others*, 48-50.

be seen at the local leader level, wherein a local chief, headman, *Induna* (plural *iziNduna*) or other influential leader used his power over those under him to force them to join Inkatha and engage in violence on Inkatha's behalf. Another example of this can be seen in the 1987 indictment brought against Christopher Zuma, an Inkatha official and local leader near Pietermaritzburg, by another family, also with the last name Mkhize (no relation). Zuma consistently abused his position of power to harass and threaten local families into joining Inkatha. Those that did not join faced beatings or murder, not only of themselves, but also their relatives. Zuma also used the theft of property, particularly the stealing of cattle, to coerce those under him. These same tactics were used by Zuma to force these unwitting supporters to engage in violence.⁸¹

One witness and victim, Mxolisi Hadebe testifies, "I was told that they were recruiting members for Inkatha and that those who did not join would be assaulted. I was also told if I did not join my house would be burnt. As a result of these threats, I said that I was willing to join Inkatha even though this was untrue."⁸² Other witnesses of the indictment testified that they or others they knew were forced to join "raiding parties" which targeted supporters or sympathizers of Inkatha's main political rival, the UDF. One of the applicants explained that he was a previous supporter of Inkatha, but the recent acts of violence led to his desire to revoke his membership. He was worried, however, that his lack of support for these violent acts and his wish to leave Inkatha would make him a target, and he feared for his family's safety.⁸³

Another common method Inkatha used to coerce its supporters into violence was by forcing them to take part in rallies. Particularly in the mid to late 1980s, Inkatha based its

⁸¹ Supreme Court of South Africa, *Hebron Bhekokwakhe Mkhize, et al vs Christopher Sichizo Zuma*, 11/02/1987, KZN Political Violence, Legal Papers, APCSA, PC126/8/9, 30.

⁸² Supreme Court of South Africa, *Hebron Bhekokwakhe Mkhize, et al vs Christopher Sichizo Zuma*, 30.

⁸³ Supreme Court of South Africa, *Hebron Bhekokwakhe Mkhize, et al vs Christopher Sichizo Zuma*, 30-40.

supporters into areas largely controlled by its political opponents and provoked conflict. These bused-in supporters were forced into a hostile environment and encouraged to fight on Inkatha's behalf. In an interview with reporter Carmel Rickard, two young Inkatha supporters recalled such a situation immediately after it happened to them. The two young men, one 18 and the other 19, explained they had no intention of engaging in violence and did not even suspect that they would be forced to fight. They were told that they were bused to Lamontville for the memorial service of someone who had died there. They were not given any further information and were wildly unprepared for the violent situation they were unwittingly placed into. The young men noted that others around them were armed with spears and shields. Initially, they did not think much of this, as it is part of the Zulu custom to carry these traditional weapons at ceremonies. However, looking back on the situation, they noted it was clear these men were prepared for conflict.

After the service, the two young men related that they were told to march through Lamontville, but they were met with resistance not long after entering the township. Several of the residents (likely UDF supporters) threw stones at the Inkatha supporters as they began their march, and things quickly turned into a violent street brawl. The two young men stated that they were frightened and ran. After running and hiding for most of the night they met an Inkatha official who stopped them from walking home. He ordered them to go back and fight. He told them to pick up stones and the scared young men initially agreed until they found a moment to run from him too.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Carmel Rickard, "Lamontville Interview, IFP Supporters," 1984, Carmel Rickard Cassette Donation, Killie Campbell Africana Library, KCAV42498. Note: This information was taken from cassettes that have not yet been digitized or transcribed. I could not record the playback, so I only have my notes. Due to this and the fact that this interview (and others) was done through a Zulu to English translator with paraphrase no direct quotes are available. This will apply for all references from the Carmel Rickard Cassette Donation in this thesis.

What these young men described is an episode in a wider event that would be known as the Lamontville Crisis, which began in 1984. Inkatha wanted to exert greater control over Lamontville by incorporating it into KwaZulu, but the residents resisted, creating violent clashes. These young men, as stated in the interview, obviously had no idea of the wider implications of why they were in Lamontville until it was too late. By obfuscating the purpose of their presence in Lamontville and forcing their supporters into a situation of violence, Inkatha's actions demonstrate a clear example of coercion. Additionally, the unnamed Inkatha official exerted a more direct form of coercion when he used his status to order the young men to go back and fight. This stated example, however, was not a unique occurrence.

An Institute for Black Research report on violence in Natal in 1985 contains a case which also took place during a rally in the midst of the Lamontville Crisis. In an interview with a resident of Umlazi, an Inkatha stronghold, the resident described how he was forced to go to Lamontville and engage in violence. The resident reported that around 100 armed Inkatha supporters came and forced him from a friend's home. He and others were forced to take up sticks or whatever weapons were available and go to the Umlazi stadium. Once at the stadium, he reports that, "We were then ordered to drink as much sorghum beer as our stomachs could take."⁸⁵ Afterwards a local Inkatha official, Winnington Sabelo, arrived and gave a speech calling on them to march on Lamontville and "kill everything including cats and rats. He said he was going to point out the houses which should be destroyed."⁸⁶

The interviewed man says he then managed to leave the group, as they were very drunk, but he subsequently witnessed the group robbing houses and stealing property. Anyone who

⁸⁵ Fatima Meer, ed. "Special Report: Unrest in Natal August 1985," Institute for Black Research, 1985, Killie Campbell Africana Library, 322.4 MEE/KC24176, 23.

⁸⁶ Meer, "Special Report," 23

resisted was severely beaten, some sustaining seemingly mortal wounds from spears. In some cases, even those that had their things stolen from them were forced to join the marauding group spreading violence further throughout the township. Inkatha leaders, such as Sabelo, made it a practice to force supporters to engage in violence, threatening their person or property if they did not comply. Additionally, everyone was ordered to drink beer until drunk, indicating that Inkatha used alcohol to induce the support and obedience of the men while also facilitating them towards violence.⁸⁷

Incidents similar to those above continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s and were in no way limited to the Lamontville Crisis. A man named Mshyeni Ndovu gave a statement of how he was forced to participate in an Inkatha rally in the mid 1980s. Like the Umlazi resident above, Ndovu recounts how he was told to grab a stick and follow other armed Inkatha men led by Mandla Shabalala. Ndovu describes how he was threatened with a beating if he did not comply. Ndovu stated that, “anyone who refused to come along was beaten with sticks by certain people who appeared to be in charge.”⁸⁸ He was then forced onto a bus with several others armed with sticks and various traditional weapons. Ndovu and the bus eventually ended up in Congella. Ndovu makes it clear that once he got off the bus, he was going to be expected to fight, which worried him greatly. Once the bus started to arrive in Congella, people (presumably UDF supporters) started to stone the bus. Someone shot at the bus and Ndovu was struck in the arm and stomach and was later taken to the hospital.⁸⁹ Ndovu managed to avoid being forced into fighting in a street brawl typical of Inkatha rallies at this time but only at great personal cost to his health, and not by choice.

⁸⁷ Meer, “Special Report,” 24

⁸⁸ Mshyeni Ndovu, *Mshyeni Ndlovu Affidavit*, March 1986, KZ/Inkatha Politics, APCSA, PC16/3/19, 4.

⁸⁹ Ndovu, *Mshyeni Ndlovu Affidavit*, 1-3.

Besides these examples of rallies that were engineered to cause violence, people were coerced into violence in “everyday” settings, often close to the homes of the victims and perpetrators. A collection of statements from various people affected by Inkatha’s violence from the township of Newcastle describes some of this “everyday” violence and the coercive tactics used to achieve it. By simply refusing to participate in Inkatha activities, the Dlamini family had unknowingly made themselves targets and an example to others who might think of retracting their support. Dudu-Zile Dlamini recounts how his family was targeted by a local leader and Inkatha official, resulting in the death of the father of the family and one of the brothers. Dudu-Zile testified that:

I think there were a number of reasons why we were attacked. First of all, my mother was an Inkatha member for a while but then decided to leave. She said she was not satisfied with the organization. Secondly, at a certain time there were a number of vigilantes moving around the township looking for men who would join their mob. They wanted my father to join but he decided not to participate.⁹⁰

Even those who were supporters of Inkatha were often forced to engage in potentially violent situations. One such supporter was a civil servant for KwaZulu, who was forced to participate in a march from the capital of KwaZulu, Ulundi. Inkatha youths and KwaZulu police working for Inkatha forced several groups of people to join the march. The civil servant was not told where they were going or how long the march would be. The nature of the march was clearly hostile, as members were armed and held signs with slogans attacking political enemies of Inkatha. At one point, someone attempted to leave the marching column but was immediately attacked and stoned by youths (possibly Inkatha Youth Brigade members). Another person was

⁹⁰Prof. Sibankulu et al, *Newcastle Statements*, 1985-1987, KZ/Inkatha Politics, Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives, PC16/3/19.

injured but was forced to keep marching. The civil servant broke her ankle and was allowed to leave before seeing the conclusion of the march.⁹¹

Inkatha vigilantes also took advantage of dire situations among those living in the urban and semi-urban areas of what is today, KwaZulu-Natal. Vigilantes was the name often given to Inkatha supporters who attacked comrades, usually in these settings. The term vigilantes came from the belief that they were merely attacking criminals, as Inkatha had labeled comrades as such. Reports show that these vigilantes often ran protection rackets for those without permanent housing (often referred to as squatters). Furthermore, the squatters complained that the vigilantes forcefully recruited members and instead of offering protection, they often forced these recruited members to join in on attacks on Inkatha's political opponents in other parts of the township.⁹²

⁹¹ Prof. Sibankulu, *Newcastle Statements*.

⁹² Meer, "Unrest in Natal", 53-55.

Chapter 4: Opportunistic Violence and the Struggle to Survive

Raids, Looting, and War

Coercion was clearly a major factor in Inkatha sponsored or directed violence in KwaZulu-Natal, however many Inkatha supporters did not have to be coerced. Instead, the promise of loot, payment, and/or status lead Inkatha supporters to choose to engage in violence out of their own volition. It is perhaps unsurprising that so many would kill and attack for gain rather than be faced with violence if they did not.

Inkatha supporters had used violence for personal gain since the beginning of the 1980s and often looted and stole when they engaged in various kinds of violence and killings on Inkatha's behalf. By the mid to late 1980s, not only did the violence grow, but so did the number of lootings and thefts. In part, this was caused by the economic downturn experienced in South Africa in the mid-1980s. Slowed economic growth, in addition to sanctions and divestment from major countries and corporations in the West lead to large unemployment and economic instability that South Africa has never truly recovered from.⁹³ Subsequently, engaging in violence for personal economic gain became more appealing and more prevalent among Inkatha supporters. Additionally, because of the economic stagnation some participated more out of desperation. The desire for basic goods could push Inkatha supporters to violence in a variety of instances. This situation was most apparent in the direct theft and looting that occurred wherever Inkatha leadership organized acts of violence, most commonly called raids.

Raids were an effective tool for Inkatha to deal with their opponents, but also proved to be opportunities for Inkatha supporters to personally benefit. Looting was a common occurrence

⁹³ For discussion on disinvestment as well as Inkatha's reaction to it Gerhard Mare's work on Buthelezi is a good starting point. Maré, Gerhard and Hamilton, Georgina, *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa* (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1988).

in Inkatha fighting, as seen in the above example of the Umlazi man forced to participate in a raid where looting had a prevalent role. Looting, in this case, could be interpreted as a form of payment for participation and a potential tool for attracting more supporters to the Inkatha cause.

The interviewed Umlazi resident noted that groceries were a prime target for looting. He stated, “I also observed that members of Sabelo’s group were moving from house to house robbing people of their property and especially groceries. Any resistance was mercilessly crushed.”⁹⁴ The perceived value of such everyday items indicates the severe impact the economic downturn had at the time and gives further credence to the idea of looting as a necessary- or at least deeply motivating- action for these participants. Furthermore, the Umlazi resident noted that, “even the people from whom the groceries had been taken...were not taken to the police station. Instead, they were ordered to join the group, so that they moved around in the townships terrorizing the residents.”⁹⁵ Evidently, even those that did not want to be there or were even directly affected by the violence still participated in the looting.

The Seven Days War, which was described in the introduction of this thesis, encompasses the most accounts of looting occurring during a single event. These seven days of intense violence saw organized Inkatha supporters attack their UDF opponents in the rural and semi-urban areas around Pietermaritzburg from approximately March 24/25 to March 31, 1990 (however, fighting continued in some areas for over a month).

Sibongile Mkhize was interviewed in 1996 about her involvement and experiences during the Seven Days War, and she commented on the widespread looting. First, she made special mention of the theft of cattle during the chaos (cattle were particularly important to the economic lifeblood of many rural areas). Mkhize noted that most of the cattle were consolidated at chiefs’

⁹⁴ Meer, “Unrest in Natal”, 23.

⁹⁵ Meer, “Unrest in Natal”, 23.

houses, who most often were Inkatha supporters, and the rest were sold off. She went on to say that those who attempted to retrieve their cattle were attacked. Mkhize noted that upwardly mobile homes were particularly targeted because they were viewed to have things of value inside. She continued by stating, “If you go to these Inkatha homes today, you will see about 5 televisions, 4 fridges, and 3 lounge suites with leopard skins or lion skins. Even if you had money, why would you buy 3 lounge suites or 5 televisions? In the whole thing the Inkatha people gained and we lost.”⁹⁶ In all, these raids and violent attacks were directly beneficial to those who participated and certainly motivated some Inkatha supporters to be involved.

Another report on the violence of the Seven Days War includes a chronological time frame and several first-hand accounts, where looting is mentioned several times.⁹⁷ For example, a resident of the township of Taylor’s Halt stated that he was told he should go to Inkatha meetings, but he refused. Later, his home was completely looted and destroyed.⁹⁸ A female resident was intimidated into giving up some food but was otherwise unhurt.⁹⁹ Another entry in the report notes that a resident of Gezubuso, “had her television set, radio cassette, and husband’s clothes stolen.”¹⁰⁰ Several other entries in the report make note of stolen and looted items of varying value, indicating that looters took what they could in the midst of violence. Similar to Mkhize’s account of the violence, special attention is paid to cattle theft (or “rustling”) in the report. Cattle rustling is an old practice in KwaZulu due to the symbolic importance and prestige of a large cattle herd. Cattle is also perceived as materially valuable because cattle are a mainstay of the rural economy to this day.

⁹⁶ Lou Levine, “Faith in Turmoil: The Seven Days War,” *Msunduzi Journal*, Vol. 3, 2012, KCJ4294, 14-16.

⁹⁷ John Aitchison, *The Seven Days War: 25-31 March 1990 The victim's narrative*, Centre for Adult Education, May 9, 1991, KZN Political Violence, APCS, PC126/8/5.

⁹⁸ Aitchison, *The Seven Days War*, 6.

⁹⁹ Aitchison, *The Seven Days War*, 12.

¹⁰⁰ Aitchison, *The Seven Days War*, 15.

Violence as a Job

Beyond the everyday fighters, full members with special status in Inkatha and low- and mid-level Inkatha leaders could benefit directly through fees and goods paid for engaging in violence. Similarly, local chiefs allied with Inkatha benefited not just through salaries and perks paid out by the KwaZulu government and Inkatha, but also through violence. Christopher Zuma (mentioned in Chapter 2), during the seeking out and attacking UDF supporters, also used his status as a local chief to extort membership fees out of those under him and was also accused of theft of both household goods and cattle. Zuma essentially used his position to become a racketeer. One young man described that he was forced by men loyal to Zuma to join Inkatha and pay a membership fee against his will.¹⁰¹ In another instance, a former male Inkatha member, who was targeted for wanting to leave the organization, stated, “During the course of that night, [Zuma], together with his followers, broke into our house, looted its contents and stole and butchered our cow.”¹⁰²

Almost identical types of racketeering and motives played out in another township near Pietermaritzburg. Several local Inkatha officials and a chief used their status to extort fines and fees and threatened those that refused with violence. Some members of the community attempted to organize in response to what they described as the oppressive nature of Inkatha. In retaliation, the local leaders and Inkatha officials killed members of one of the families attempting to lead this new organization. Those affected claimed that they were hit with unfair fines and forced “donations” to Inkatha, all of which were backed by the threat of violence.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ The Supreme Court of South Africa, *Hebron Bhekokwakhe Mkhize, et al vs Christopher Sichizo Zuma*, 27-30.

¹⁰² The Supreme Court of South Africa, *Hebron Bhekokwakhe Mkhize, et al vs Christopher Sichizo Zuma*, 24.

¹⁰³ Supreme Court of South Africa, *Mandla W. Mkhize and Mangethe Mkhize vs David Ntombela and others*, Nov 1st, 1987, KZN Political Violence, Legal Papers, APCSA, PC126/8/9, 20-25.

In some cases, the violence itself became a paying job for some Inkatha members. KwaZulu government Member of Parliament, Inkatha official, and professed *impi* (a Zulu term for army) leader Thomas Shabalala was no stranger to violence and extortion. Shabalala claimed that, “With this [pistol] I will leave hundreds of UDF supporters dead on the battlefield.”¹⁰⁴ Shabalala used his status and position to extort a monthly fee from the Lindelani township. This fee was used to pay Shabalala’s monthly “salary” as well as an “army of 208 ‘cops’ under his control.”¹⁰⁵ Payments towards the police likely not only contributed to Shabalala’s free reign, but also served as payment for the police to directly engage in the violence on Inkatha’s behalf. This kind of arrangement was not unusual, since police often sided with Inkatha and reports of police helping Inkatha were common.¹⁰⁶ The KwaZulu Police who were administered by the KwaZulu homeland government, and thus Inkatha, acted as a paid army for Inkatha’s goals (this will be discussed in greater length in the last chapter).¹⁰⁷ Men around Shabalala also stated that they were awaiting payment for a raid they carried out against a student meeting (likely a youth or student organization with links to the UDF). Fees for living in “Inkatha areas” allowed local leaders aligned with Inkatha to personally enrich themselves and also pay men to carry out raids and political hits against anyone or any organization that would challenge their rule.

Misizi Jethro Hlope was in a similar situation working for Samuel Begezizwe Yamile in the late 1980s and later told the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that he aided Yamile in carrying out violence during the Clermont conflict.¹⁰⁸ Hlope worked with a hit squad that was

¹⁰⁴ Sibusiso Mngadi, “War cries of an angry Amabutho,” *The City Press*, 06/01/86, KZN Political Violence, APCS, PC126/8/5.

¹⁰⁵ Mngadi, “War cries of an angry Amabutho.”

¹⁰⁶ Aitchison, *The Seven Days War*, 1.

¹⁰⁷ Douek, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa*, 86.

¹⁰⁸ The Clermont conflict was a similar situation to the Lamontville Crisis in that Inkatha wanted Clermont to be incorporated into KwaZulu and extend their influence and power in the area. Inkatha leadership and paramilitary operatives worked to target specific leaders that opposed this incorporation.

targeting people that opposed Inkatha. It was Hlope's job to point out these people as he knew what they looked like and where they stayed. Hlope claimed that he never directly engaged in murder, however. Regardless, for his involvement Hlope was paid by becoming a full card-carrying member of Inkatha, employment as a Special Constable in the KwaZulu Police, and 600 Rand. Hlope also witnessed Yamile paying others R100 to stay silent on their knowledge or involvement in murder and assassination. Over the course of his testimony, it is also unclear the extent to which those killed or targeted were done so for political or personal reasons. Since Yamile was a local businessman and those targeted were also prominent members of Clermont it is possible that they were killed to remove market competition for Yamile. Due to the extent of the violence and the existence of similar cases of local Inkatha leaders abusing their power for personal gain, those killed were likely targeted for both political and personal/economic reasons for Yamile.¹⁰⁹

The Resource Struggle

Issues of access to limited resources also forced more cases of violence and highlighted the violence as part of the struggle to survive. In the atmosphere of the 1980s and 90s in KwaZulu-Natal, violence of any kind was often backed by political organizations such as Inkatha. Examples of this can most commonly be seen in urban township violence. In one township, tensions between squatters and permanent residents created a state of conflict. The large influx of squatters in self-constructed dwellings wanted access to various necessities. A man from the squatter side described that they simply wanted access to "water, roads, bus stops," etc. in the permanent housing section but were denied and attacked.¹¹⁰ Those living in the

¹⁰⁹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Misizi Jethro Hlope," *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, August 4th, 1997, Durban, Day 6; Hit squad activities will be further elaborated on and put in greater context in chapter 4 of this thesis.

¹¹⁰ Carmel Rickard, "Interview with resident of poor Inkatha area and issue of IFP-ANC violence," Thurs March 1989, Carmel Rickard Cassette Donation, Killie Campbell Africana Library, KCAV42495.

permanent housing sections countered, claiming that the squatters were using up already scarce resources and were trying to monopolize them for themselves using the threat of force.

Conflict over housing and necessities like water became political as organizations picked sides to bolster their ranks. Inkatha exerted influence over the squatters and promised them better conditions if they attacked the permanent housing section. Similarly, the permanent housing section was offered protection from the squatters and Inkatha by the ANC/UDF. Instead of using their influence to solve the problem, Inkatha backed a side to bolster their ranks, and the violence continued to escalate. The desires of the squatters were mobilized to further the goals of Inkatha and to create a situation where they would have a pool of manpower from which they could continually recruit. The permanent housing side remarked that Inkatha brought in outside help to continue the fight. One individual from the squatter side mentioned that he supported Inkatha because, "Inkatha owns my house," and the only way to stop the violence would be if everyone had permanent housing.¹¹¹

Disputes over resources also played out in cases such as the conflict over the Inanda-Phoenix Relief Fund. The Inanda-Phoenix Relief Fund was a community created and run project intended to help those affected by violence, initially for residents of the Inanda and Phoenix townships outside Durban, but the fund eventually grew to help those throughout KwaZulu-Natal.¹¹² One member of the executive committee of the relief fund was a man mentioned earlier, Winnington Sabelo. He was also a member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and an Inkatha official. Sabelo was charged with bias in how aid was distributed by some of those who applied for it. Those most affected by the violence, especially those who had their homes destroyed and

¹¹¹ Rickard, "Interview with resident of poor Inkatha area and issue of IFP-ANC violence," Thurs March 1989.

¹¹² Linda Vergnani, "Refugees fear relief fund officer's 'bias,'" *The Sunday Tribune*, 12/08/85, KZN Political Violence, APCS, PC126/8/5.

burned, were supposed to receive aid from an impartial board. Sabelo instead used his position to selectively give aid to Inkatha supporters and denied it to UDF supporters. Sabelo went even further by targeting UDF supporters who had applied for aid, making others fearful to even apply.¹¹³ Those affected by violence were then presented with a tough decision. Either they could join Inkatha, likely the organization that caused them to need aid or receive no aid at all.

Given the economic woes and expanding civil war in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1980s, it is not surprising that so many turned to violence for personal gain and for survival purposes. Inkatha was more than willing to capitalize on this situation, providing opportunities to loot and in some cases even full-time jobs predicated on the use of violence. However, it was most often the need or desire for wealth and goods that motivated these Inkatha supporters to participate in these raids.

¹¹³ Vergnani, "Refugees fear relief fund officer's 'bias,'" *The Sunday Tribune*.

Chapter 5: Caprivi Operatives and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Inkatha and the Apartheid State

Now that there is a clear understanding of the motives driving individuals to engage in violence on Inkatha's behalf, it's important to examine how these same motives impact the men committing violence in some of Inkatha's most political and high-profile killings. These motives will appear at various times throughout the struggle the Caprivi Operatives waged in the 1980s and 1990s and will overlap and coverage in several instances. By following the story of these men who were closely related to violence in KwaZulu-Natal there will also be an examination of these motives in the context of "Third Force" arguments. The case of the Caprivi operatives is likely the most blatant and infamous example of collusion between Inkatha and the Apartheid State.

Under P.W. Botha's leadership, Apartheid South Africa had engaged in its Total Strategy which intended to bolster the already advanced security state and contest black liberation movements at all costs. Part of this strategy involved working with (and sometimes outright creating) counter revolutionary movements to act as surrogates for Apartheid state violence. These surrogates were more acceptable methods of control in areas where white domination was becoming increasingly difficult. Initially, this strategy largely only applied to areas outside of South Africa such as the Apartheid governments backing, training, and equipping groups like UNITA and RENAMO in Angola and Mozambique, respectively.¹¹⁴ However, by the mid-1980s the Apartheid State began to apply the same policy inside South Africa. This policy was

¹¹⁴ UNITA was founded by Jonas Savimbi and fought for liberation against the Portuguese but then fought against the communist aligned MPLA in Angola's civil war. During this period, they received aid and support from the West such as the United States and South Africa. RENAMO was founded in 1975 as an anti-communist party and insurgency in Mozambique that was originally backed by Rhodesian intelligence and then received support and aid from South Africa.

motivated both by fear and past success. South Africa was beginning to lose ground beyond its borders in Angola but organizations like UNITA and RENAMO had proved useful to South Africa's interests. Inside South Africa, Inkatha fit a similar mold that the Apartheid state was looking for and they were already in conflict with the ANC/UDF.¹¹⁵ Additionally, if this project proved to be a success, the Apartheid state planned to use it in other homelands.¹¹⁶

On November 25th, 1985, Chief Buthelezi and the KwaZulu Police Commissioner, General Siphon Mathe meet with General Tiene Groenewald, the Director of Military Intelligence, in Ulundi. General Groenewald informed Chief Buthelezi and General Mathe that uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC, was planning to assassinate Chief Buthelezi and several high-ranking members in the KwaZulu government. General Groenewald also mentioned a plot by the ANC to destroy KwaZulu government buildings.¹¹⁷ Chief Buthelezi responded in this meeting that he needed greater protection both personally and a better security apparatus for KwaZulu more broadly. General Groenewald reported this back to the Chief of Staff of Intelligence who recommended that the government covertly train a defensive and offensive unit for counterinsurgency in KwaZulu. Chief Buthelezi plus high-ranking members of Inkatha met again with multiple members of Military Intelligence (MI) and the South African Defense Force (SADF) in Cape Town to iron out the details.

In all, 200 men would be picked by Inkatha and trained by the SADF. Initially they agreed on three groups- Intelligence, Defensive contra-mobilization, and Offensive contra-

¹¹⁵ Douek, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa*, 98-100

¹¹⁶ Stiff, *Warfare by Other Means*, 177

¹¹⁷ Stiff, *Warfare by Other Means*, 159-160; Stiff notes that the information given to Chief Buthelezi by Military Intelligence was called into question by the Deputy President of the ANC Thabo Mbeki. Mbeki refuted that the ANC ever tried to assassinate Chief Buthelezi and claimed that this was manufactured by the Apartheid state to get Chief Buthelezi "on side." Chief Buthelezi countered this by producing a letter and secret intelligence from Reverend Londa Shembe who had close covert links with both MK and the ANC. It is unclear if these documents are confirmed as genuine and Rev Shembe is unable to clarify as he was murdered in 1989 (Rev Shembe's family claim he would never betray the ANC).

mobilization- taken together they would provide targets and early warning to Inkatha, protect Inkatha VIPs and buildings, and carry out assassinations and attacks against the ANC/UDF. This would give Inkatha greater capabilities and power in KwaZulu-Natal while allowing the Apartheid government to support them covertly and indirectly while hampering black opposition. Military Intelligence code named it *Operation Marion*.¹¹⁸

Daluxolo Luthuli

In 1979 Daluxolo Luthuli was released from Robben Island after completing his ten years of hard labor he was sentenced to under the Terrorism Act.¹¹⁹ Daluxolo was the nephew of the famous Albert Luthuli who was previously a president of the ANC and a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, and the son of a very active ANC member, Japhtha Skhumbuzo Luthuli (Daluxolo Luthuli will be referred to by his first name for the remainder of this paper to avoid confusion). Daluxolo left South Africa as a teen to join MK as encouraged by his father. Daluxolo spent many years in the ANC camps abroad where he receiving training and served in the Wankie campaign where MK attempted to infiltrate into Rhodesia (modern day Zimbabwe) but was captured by white security forces when he attempted to sneak into South Africa. After leaving prison in 1979, Daluxolo was contacted by the ANC and asked to imbed himself into Inkatha. At this time the ANC and Inkatha had not yet had their major split (or at least the split was not in the stage of open violence), and it was thought that Daluxolo could continue helping MK by organizing young men and women inside Inkatha into joining MK abroad to receive training. Daluxolo would also report back to the ANC about activities inside Inkatha.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Stiff, *Warfare by Other Means*, 160-177.

¹¹⁹ Robben Island was one of the most infamous prisons in South Africa which housed Nelson Mandela and other high ranking revolutionary leaders and fighters. After Daluxolo was captured but before he was transferred to the prison system in South Africa, he experienced torture which he describes as brutal, humiliating, and a transformative experience.

¹²⁰ Thula Bopela and Daluxolo Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe: Fighting for a divided people*, (Alberton: Galago Publishing, 1999), 59-67; 156.

Daluxolo's father, who was also both an ANC and Inkatha member at the time, helped Daluxolo get membership in Inkatha. Early on, Daluxolo met Chief Buthelezi in person who remarked that many Zulus were transitioning from the ANC to Inkatha.¹²¹ Before long Daluxolo was in regular contact with Melchizedek Zakhele 'M. Z.' Khumalo who was Chief Buthelezi's personal assistant and possibly the second most powerful individual in Inkatha at time. Additionally, Daluxolo was regularly reporting back to his MK handler, Chris Hani in Lesotho.¹²² Daluxolo overtime began to have less frequent contact with Hani which he attributes to South African Military Intelligence attempting to assassinate Hani. After Hani was forced to flee Lesotho for Lusaka, Daluxolo lost all contact with MK but continued to work inside Inkatha.¹²³

Initially, Daluxolo was not very active in Inkatha but "he met people, attended meetings and gather[ed] information on how the IFP worked."¹²⁴ He started his political involvement in the Inkatha aligned and sponsored United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) as an organizer. During this time "Daluxolo immersed himself in UWUSA and IFP policy and began to think and act like an UWUSA shop steward."¹²⁵ During his time as an UWUSA organizer, Daluxolo followed through on the real purpose of UWUSA which was not to fight for workers' rights and protections (like most trade unions) but to organize workers behind Inkatha. Furthermore, the union was designed to pull workers away from ANC/UDF aligned COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) and impress upon them that COSATU was the enemy. Daluxolo stated plainly, "UWUSA's enemy was COSATU, not the employers."¹²⁶

¹²¹ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 186.

¹²² Chris Hani was the leader of both the South African Communist Party and uMkhonto we Sizwe.

¹²³ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 187-190.

¹²⁴ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 194.

¹²⁵ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 194.

¹²⁶ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 196-197.

The propaganda tactics used by Inkatha (as discussed earlier in this thesis) were used by Daluxolo as an organizer for UWUSA. Daluxolo would try to convince workers by arguing that COSATU, like the ANC, was communist aligned, and as such, once they were in power they would hand over South Africa to the Russians and Chinese who would loot the country of all its wealth. He elaborates by stating, “We also told them that by calling for disinvestment the ANC/COSATU alliance wanted to take away their jobs and let their families starve.”¹²⁷ These arguments did not always prove to be effective, however, especially among older members who had a great amount of trust in their COSATU leadership. In these cases, coercion was once again used as Daluxolo explains, “we resorted to terror and intimidation tactics.”¹²⁸ Daluxolo’s co-author Bopela expands on this, stating that there were numerous cases of Inkatha supporters and UWUSA members intimidating COSATU members into leaving and intimidating employers into banning COSATU unions. Additionally, Bopela describes a couple of high-profile murders of COSATU leaders who were targeted because they were both organizing for COSATU and because they were Zulu and seen as betraying their fellow Zulus.¹²⁹

Before long Daluxolo rose to a leadership position in Inkatha and later a seat on the Inkatha Central Committee. Between falling out of touch with his close comrade and handler Hanani and being increasingly active inside Inkatha, Daluxolo “became a true [Inkatha] follower and not a double agent for the ANC.”¹³⁰ The ANC called Daluxolo to Swaziland for a meeting where he gave them some information, but they expressed their displeasure with Daluxolo rising to such a senior position and stated that this was not Daluxolo’s mission. Daluxolo countered that he felt he could not refuse the position and he can now give the ANC top level information. It

¹²⁷ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 198.

¹²⁸ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 198.

¹²⁹ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 198.

¹³⁰ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 194.

appears that the trust was broken, however, because when Daluxolo was called to Swaziland again he did not attend and was tipped off by a friend that the ANC was possibly going to kill him.¹³¹

With the rise of the UDF in 1983 and increasing violence between them and Inkatha in the realms of students, workers, and increasingly everyday people, Daluxolo found himself increasingly involved in Inkatha's leadership. As he was working hard to propagandize workers to pull them away from COSATU and into UWUSA, he would have seen, heard, and participated in this atmosphere of violence. He increasingly not just identified with Inkatha but came to see the ANC/UDF as the enemy. Despite Daluxolo being no stranger to violence, the UDF's practice of necklacing (placing a gasoline-soaked tire around the body, usually the neck, of a suspected informant for SAP or SADF and igniting it leading to a painful and public execution) appalled Daluxolo, describing the practice as "barbaric."¹³²

In April of 1986 Daluxolo was approached by three Inkatha members: M. Z. Khumalo- assistant to Chief Buthelezi, Siegfried Bhengu- ex-MK fighter and Central Committee member, Mangaqa Mncwango- also a Central Committee member. Daluxolo was informed that Inkatha was creating an armed wing and he was to be appointed Chief Political Commissar of this new wing (this position would later evolve into commander of Inkatha's contra mobilization forces and eventually overall commander of the Caprivi operatives). Daluxolo accepted the position and swore to keep it a secret.¹³³ What Daluxolo did not know at the time is that he had just agreed to head a force of operatives and hitmen that would be trained and dependent on the SADF under *Operation Marion* as discussed between Chief Buthelezi and SADF/MI.

¹³¹ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 194-195.

¹³² Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 136, 199.

¹³³ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 200-201.

Caprivi

On April 16th Daluxolo was called to an urgent meeting at a camp near Ulundi. There Daluxolo found 50 other men as well as several members of Inkatha's leadership. He was informed by the leadership that these men were to be the first to undergo military training and he would go with them. They were to leave immediately, Daluxolo did not even get to pack a bag or say goodbye to his fiancée. Daluxolo and the men were covertly transported to the Louis Botha Airport (Durban International today) in a furniture removal truck. They boarded an SA Air Force C130 transport plane and took off to an unknown destination. A rumor started that they were going to Israel to be trained by Mossad. No one knew how far Israel was from South Africa, so after five hours of flight time and arriving in an arid environment, they believed that they truly had arrived in Israel.¹³⁴ They arrived in darkness and were driven through the early morning to their camp where they were ordered to dismount. At first light it became clear that their camp was only brush and there was nothing around besides four huts which were occupied by white instructors.¹³⁵

It was only later that Daluxolo realized they had landed on the Caprivi strip in modern day Namibia. Specifically, Hippo Base which was part of the Military Intelligence's overall San Michelle base which was used for training guerillas and counterrevolutionary groups.¹³⁶ The group of 50 men set to work building their base and were soon joined by 3 more staggered

¹³⁴ The rumor that the Caprivi operatives were trained by the Israelis did not seem to dissipate until after the late 1990s TRC hearings about the operatives. Because of this in some of these hearings and in other testimony the Caprivi operatives are sometimes referred to as Israelis or Israelites. It is unclear if this rumor was kept alive intentionally or unintentionally. Regardless, I will refer to these men as the Caprivians or Caprivi operatives unless taken from a quote.

¹³⁵ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 201-202.

¹³⁶ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 201-202. The San Michelle base was also used for training other guerilla forces backed by Apartheid South Africa such as UNITA and RENAMO. Daluxolo occasionally meet officers from both UNITA and RENAMO while training in Caprivi, but the Inkatha men were forbidden from visiting the other camps that housed UNITA and RENAMO fighters.

groups of about 50 men bringing the total number of men up to 202. Each group of 50 men chose a man to be their leader and were assigned a white instructor to provide their specialized training. The white instructors claimed to be private contractors and gave *noms de guerre* like JJ and JP.

Daluxolo described the beginning of their instruction as “a six week course in basic discipline, drill, physical training, and political indoctrination.”¹³⁷ Every man was given and trained with a G3 and an AK-47 rifle because the G3 was the standard issue rifle for KwaZulu Police, and the AK-47 was used by the ANC/UDF and was an increasingly common weapon in South Africa.¹³⁸ Beyond their standard issue rifles the men were taught how to operate a number of weapons from both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, as well as explosives. They also received extensive instruction in “guerilla and counter-guerilla warfare”.¹³⁹ Daluxolo describes his role at this stage by stating, he “didn’t train the men himself, but interpreted where necessary, helped to explain things, motivated the men and demonstrated what the instructors wanted done.”¹⁴⁰

For the last part of their training the 202 men then broke into 4 groups to receive specialization in an area chosen based on their physical and mental traits as well as performance in the various areas of training so far. Daluxolo as well as the white officers choose which men would be placed in which groups. The largest group was the so called Contra-Mobilization group which had 100 men and was led by Joyful Mthethwa. This group engaged in propaganda for

¹³⁷ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 202.

¹³⁸ Specific rifles often portrayed allegiance in the confused warfare of KwaZulu-Natal, for example the G3 and the South African produced R series rifles showed that the user likely bought or received this weapon from the police or the state meaning they were more likely to be aligned with Inkatha as a surrogate for the state. The reverse of this is seen in the AK pattern rifles supplied to the ANC by communist aligned countries which in turn made their way into South Africa to ANC aligned movements like the UDF. When the Caprivi operatives would be taking on a legitimate role as police, they had to be trained with the G3. While the AK-47 was often used when they were engaging in their role as a paramilitary unit. By using the AK pattern rifle they provided an anonymity to the real identity and motive of the user and in some cases allowed the user to carry out false flag attacks or portray criminal instead of political intent.

¹³⁹ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 203.

¹⁴⁰ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 203.

Inkatha in generic forms such as giving speeches, lectures, and providing pamphlets to “expand Inkatha’s support base and promote its image as a liberation organization.”¹⁴¹ Their propaganda duties also extended to recruiting further organizers. The Contra-Mobilization group also further helped the Caprivi operatives by identifying rival leaders and organizers to be targeted such as those in the UDF as well as internal ‘trouble-makers’ who opposed Inkatha or hampered its growth.¹⁴²

The Contra-Mobilization group would report these targets to the Defensive group which specialized in intelligence and was made up of 30 men headed by Sitwell Mkhwanazi and Phumlani Mshengu. Daluxolo referred to the defensive group as the most important because it was the “eyes, ears, and brain” for the Caprivi operatives.¹⁴³ The Defensive group took in rumors, observations, and hearsay. After taking in this information, the Defensive group would in turn verify it and transform it into workable intelligence. The Defensive group was also trained to engage in their own spy work and intelligence gathering to collect useful information.¹⁴⁴

Part of this information collection was also to identify targets which would then be eliminated by the Offensive group. The Offensive group consisted of 40 men led by Leslie Mkhulisi and Peter Msane who were chosen for their physical acumen as much as their ruthlessness. Daluxolo describes that these men were called *oTheleweni* (ruthless killers in isiZulu) and calls the Offensive group “men who placed a low premium on life and would eliminate the party’s enemies without batting an eyelid.”¹⁴⁵ Because the Offensive group would

¹⁴¹ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 203.

¹⁴² Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 203.

¹⁴³ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 204.

¹⁴⁴ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 204.

¹⁴⁵ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 204.

be eliminating targets their members were the top performers in weapons, explosives, and physical training. Their specialized training would consist of home invasion, abduction, ambushing, and booby-traps.¹⁴⁶

The final group of 32 men would make up the VIP Protection Unit and were led by Bheki Zikalala. This group would be responsible for the protection of various VIPs inside and associated with Inkatha. This group was chosen from the men that excelled in driving (particularly in terms of protecting the VIP), handguns, and marksmanship. This is the only group whose activities were entirely legal as having armed bodyguards in South Africa was not only legal but common practice among politicians and VIPs.¹⁴⁷

Over the course of their training and especially when Daluxolo attended the officers' meetings, it became clear to him that their white instructors were not in fact private contractors as they claimed but SADF officers. Daluxolo's suspicion was later confirmed when he learned that all the white instructors he had met were either SADF, MI, or both. For example, one instructor Major Jake Jacobs (*nom de guerre* JJ) was a recce operator and experienced specialist in training RENAMO fighters.¹⁴⁸ Although Daluxolo was near certain that the men training him were SADF officers he was not fazed by this and wrote that at the time he felt "it made no difference to the eventual result, so he just got on with it."¹⁴⁹ Beyond this Daluxolo doesn't directly expand on why at the time he was unbothered by the fact he was being trained by men

¹⁴⁶ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 204.

¹⁴⁷ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 204.

¹⁴⁸ Recce (slang for reconnaissance) is the colloquial term for the South African Special Forces. This group was involved in a wide range of conflicts in Southern Africa during the Cold War and operated inside South Africa as both a counter-terrorism unit and secretive tool of Military Intelligence to stoke conflict in majority black areas during the 1980s and 90s. For more information see *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa* by Daniel L. Douek.

¹⁴⁹ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 202.

from the same organization he fought against in Zimbabwe or part of the Apartheid state which Inkatha claimed to against.

What Daluxolo does explain, shortly after writing that he came to this realization, is that while undergoing training he and the other Caprivi operatives received political indoctrination and each month M. Z. Khumalo would arrive with a salary of R400 (R500 for Daluxolo as an officer) and a message of satisfaction with the progress the men were making. Furthermore, the men were promised positions inside the KwaZulu Police after their training and Daluxolo knew he would have a continuing role as Political Commissar of Inkatha's new paramilitary wing.¹⁵⁰ With political indoctrination which reenforced that the ANC was the enemy, and a salary perhaps it is easier to see why SADF instructors "made no difference to the eventual result" to Daluxolo at the time.¹⁵¹

Brian Quna Mkhize was one of the Caprivi operatives under Daluxolo's command in the Contra-Mobilization unit and described a similar overall experience to Daluxolo. Brian Mkhize's experience is also exemplative of the general Caprivi operative's experience. Brian Mkhize grew up in KwaZulu and was early on in his life involved with Inkatha. Mkhize was one of many children during the 70s who was introduced and indoctrinated by Inkatha through its Ubuntu education system in KwaZulu. Additionally, both of Mkhize's parents were supporters of Inkatha with Mkhize's father even holding a position in the KwaZulu government as a Counsellor. In March of 1989 Mkhize was unemployed and was job searching when he was approached by Zakhile Mkhize. Zakhile Mkhize was Brian Mkhize's cousin and a local Inkatha leader in the Mpumalanga area. Zakhile offered Brian Mkhize a job in the KwaZulu Police Force and Brian Mkhize accepted. After going through a brief selection process to make sure he was an

¹⁵⁰ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 203

¹⁵¹ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 202

acceptable candidate for Caprivi, Brian described the same experience of suddenly arriving and training at Caprivi as Daluxolo.¹⁵²

Mkhize stressed that while he was at Caprivi, propaganda was a central part of his training, much of which he was taught either directly or at least in part by Daluxolo most days. Mkhize recalled that, “from the time we arrived at Caprivi, politics was our daily bread.”¹⁵³ Mkhize also made it clear that this propaganda training was not just on the politics and positions of Inkatha. Mkhize described that his training “emphasized that we should know it very well, whom we are fighting against and why we are fighting.”¹⁵⁴ Another point that Mkhize stressed helped him through the training was the fact that he and the other Caprivi Operatives each received R400 per month during his training at Caprivi. While he was largely unable to spend his money during his training at Caprivi (due to its remoteness), he did not have to pay for housing, clothes, food, etc. during this time. Mkhize said that this provided a large sum which he could utilize after the end of his training.¹⁵⁵ On top of this, Mkhize recalled that each man received a R2000 bonus for completing the training, a large sum in the 80s.¹⁵⁶

After receiving their training, the Caprivi operatives held a parade and demonstration of the skills and training they had learned in front of M.Z. Khumalo and various white South African military leaders. Chief Buthelezi did not attend this ceremony, which Daluxolo attributes to the bad press Chief Buthelezi would have gotten if anyone had found out that he was there

¹⁵² Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, April 14-16th, 1998, Richard’s Bay, Day 4, https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/documents/amntrans/richards_bay/54692.htm.

¹⁵³ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 4.

¹⁵⁴ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 4.

¹⁵⁵ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 4.

¹⁵⁶ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 5.

with white military leaders.¹⁵⁷ The ceremony was however videotaped and Daluxolo was informed by M.Z. Khumalo that Chief Buthelezi received a copy.¹⁵⁸

After this the Caprivi operatives were flown back to South Africa and from the airport were driven back to Nhlungwane Camp in KwaZulu. Here all the Caprivians meet Chief Buthelezi who personally welcomed them home and “thanked them for volunteering to defend [Inkatha].”¹⁵⁹ Chief Buthelezi continued to couch his language in terms of defense, even to his own men, to assure them of the justness of their cause as well as keep up appearances at this seemingly public event. If what M. Z. Khumalo told Daluxolo was true, then Chief Buthelezi would have certainly known that the training and intended use of the Caprivi operatives was not purely defensive. The Caprivians also meet various KwaZulu Police leaders who they would outwardly appear to be operating under as detective constables to disguise their operations as Caprivians. After these final festivities, the Caprivi operatives would either receive more training elsewhere in South Africa for six weeks or receive a month off before beginning their new work for Inkatha.¹⁶⁰ After receiving his additional training, Brian Mkhize started his position in the KwaZulu Police. In his case, he was initially placed near Pietermaritzburg as the area needed help against the ANC/UDF. The use of the KwaZulu Police as covers turned out to be a lucrative arrangement for the Caprivi operatives as they received both a continuing salary of R700 for their roles as Caprivians and a standard KwaZulu policeman’s salary on top of that.¹⁶¹

Soon after the “graduation” ceremony, Daluxolo and M. Z. Khumalo traveled to a meeting at a SADF military base in Mtubatuba with several high ranking military officers, some

¹⁵⁷ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, April 7, 1998, Durban Days 1-2, <http://sabctr.saha.org.za/documents/amntrans/durban/54690.htm>.

¹⁵⁸ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 203.

¹⁵⁹ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 205.

¹⁶⁰ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 205.

¹⁶¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 5.

of whom Daluxolo had met before but also some new faces. This group would become the Planning Committee and were intended to control the targets and operations of the Caprivi Operatives. The Planning Committee decided that three of the four Caprivi Operative groups were placed under the command of white officers who controlled their access to weapons and vehicles provided by the SADF, especially in the case of the Offensive group. Daluxolo assumed command of the Contra-mobilization group as this group was staying close to their homes and largely engaged in political propaganda work and intelligence gathering.¹⁶²

This meeting once again caused Daluxolo to question what he was doing, largely regarding Inkatha's willingness to work with, if not under, the white SADF (Daluxolo blankets them as the Boers). He raised these concerns with M.Z. Khumalo by asking, "why the white people who trained them in Caprivi were rejoining them in Natal. Were they going to direct operations and select targets? If that was so, how could the Caprivians be able to escape the reality that they were being commanded by SADF officers? Had the IFP become a surrogate organization of the Boers? If it had, was Chief Minister Buthelezi aware of this and did he approve?"¹⁶³

M. Z. Khumalo attempted to ease Daluxolo's mind by informing him that Chief Buthelezi was aware of the situation and did approve it. He also explained the reasoning of the Caprivians working under the SADF by stating, "They are giving us the money and weapons that enable us to fight, so we can't just brush them aside now that the training is over."¹⁶⁴ Daluxolo was not wholly satisfied by this explanation and worried about Inkatha's position as a liberation movement. He worried that Inkatha would instead be forced to attack those that had not attacked

¹⁶² Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 206-207.

¹⁶³ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 207.

¹⁶⁴ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 207.

Inkatha first. M. Z. Khumalo promised he would bring these concerns to Chief Buthelezi and “provide feedback” but it was unlikely he ever even raised these concerns.¹⁶⁵ After this Daluxolo was often excluded from Planning Committee meetings, he suspects this is because M. Z. Khumalo told the committee he was “asking awkward questions.”¹⁶⁶ Daluxolo’s concerns would turn out to be justified but this was a path that Inkatha took itself rather than one that was imposed by the SADF. Regardless, Daluxolo still largely kept his concerns to himself and continued with his duties with the Caprivi operatives. At this time, he still had a “disgust” of the UDF and felt they had attacked Inkatha and must be punished in kind.¹⁶⁷

The First Hit

In late 1986 M. Z. Khumalo wanted the Caprivi Operatives to get involved in offensive operations and requested action from the officers in Military Intelligence. The officers agreed and Daluxolo was told by Captain Opperman of MI that he should select four targets “whose death would have a positive impact on Inkatha.”¹⁶⁸ Daluxolo in turn ordered the Defensive group to compile a list of four targets with full dossiers. The prime target selected was Victor Ntuli who was a “UDF activist and... paymaster.”¹⁶⁹ On January 20th, 1987, Daluxolo and 11 other men (mostly from the Offensive group) arrived at a dry riverbed where they received AK-47s from Captain Opperman to carry out the hit. The men taped flashlights to their weapons to see in the dark, outlined how they were going to enter and sweep the house, and practiced one last time with their weapons. They were told by Captain Opperman to kill all occupants of the house.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁵ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 207.

¹⁶⁶ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 207.

¹⁶⁷ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 210, 138.

¹⁶⁸ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 207.

¹⁶⁹ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 207.

¹⁷⁰ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 208.

The men piled into a white Combi (small bus) and traveled to the Ntuli residence where they efficiently and brutally carried out the hit, spraying tens of bullets into each room killing as they went. In all 13 people were killed, mostly women and children who were relatives of Victor Ntuli, but not Victor Ntuli himself. Ntuli was spared as he was not even in the residence and had been in hiding for the past month. Despite missing their target and the killing of so many innocents the Caprivians and the security officers called their raid a success. South African Police arriving on the scene later helped cover up any evidence that might have implicated the Caprivi operatives or any government involvement.¹⁷¹

While the level of brutality of that night would be repeated too many times to count over the coming years, the involvement of MI and the SADF would wane. Captain Opperman later alleged that his superiors ordered an end to all *Operation Marion* activities. The reason for this stoppage is unclear but it could be that the high profile and brazen murder of innocents worried Military Intelligence. Over this period MI's control over the Caprivi operatives was slowly shifted to the South African Police who were providing the covers and "jobs" for the Caprivians during the day. By 1989 SAP buildings and Inkatha buildings across KwaZulu-Natal acted as bases of operations for the Caprivians. Additionally, the Caprivians increasingly only acted on instructions from Inkatha officials or operated in small groups entirely independently. One of the Caprivians confirmed that many of his instructions came from Inkatha during his TRC hearing when he stated that, "There was no difference between the KwaZulu Police, the IFP and the KwaZulu government. In my opinion they were one entity. I received instructions [to kill people] from Captain Langeni [KwaZulu Police], Mr. MZ Khumalo [KwaZulu government] and [Mr. Daluxolo] Luthuli [Inkatha]."¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ Stiff, *Warfare by Other Means*, 182-183.

¹⁷² Douek, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa*, 86.

Many Caprivians would only show up to Ulundi once a month to get paid and most of those actively operating were only engaged in fighting in their own local area.¹⁷³ The original groups and structure of the Caprivi operatives also began to break down, particularly by the 1990s. Men that were capable were pulled to areas where they were needed or operated in the same area for extended periods of time, relying on who was local rather than what group they belonged to. This meant that Daluxolo expanded his command over most Caprivians as he was the leader on the ground able to make decisions. This is in contrast to MI or even the SAP who tried to keep their direct involvement in Caprivi activities at arm's length. The Security Branch did not totally divest themselves from the Caprivi operatives and *Operation Marion*, however, as they still provided arms and ammunition on multiple occasions and continued to fund the Caprivians until at least 1991, likely longer.¹⁷⁴

This next section will largely pull its evidence from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa in the late 1990s. This commission was designed to help pull the Republic of South Africa together by encouraging the nation to hear and watch those affected by violence tell their story and allowing those who committed violence to give their testimonies to an open session that was also broadcasted on radio and television. For those who committed violence, the TRC allowed them to apply for amnesty for their crimes under the conditions that they told the full truth about their involvement and could prove that their crime was politically motivated. This thesis will be primarily pulling from these amnesty hearings from Inkatha supporters and Caprivians like Daluxolo. Because these men are applying for amnesty and attempting to prove that their crimes are completely politically motivated, this thesis will at times

¹⁷³ Stiff, *Warfare by Other Means*, 184.

¹⁷⁴ Stiff, *Warfare by Other Means*, 184; Douek, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa*, 89-90.

question these testimonies regarding what information they omit, lie about, or how it is otherwise presented.

This is not intended to negate or otherwise accuse the entire testimony of being false nor is this intended to be a critique of the Truth and Reconciliation process. After all, this thesis is still utilizing this information and operating under the same assumption of the committee that the majority of the information is truthful and will be challenged when necessary. Due to the nature of this violence, the TRC provides a valuable source of information that otherwise would not be available. Nevertheless, the information provided must be approached with a certain level of caution which must be pointed out before the discussion of Caprivi operative and hit squad activities unfold in this chapter.

Mpumalanga 1986-1987

After the attempted assassination of Victor Ntuli and massacre at the Ntuli residence, Daluxolo was ordered by Inkatha leadership to move to Mpumalanga and take control of the situation there. Daluxolo began his involvement in 1986 but was in full control of Caprivi operative activities in the area by 1987. Daluxolo was faced with a dilemma when he first arrived at Mpumalanga due to the intense violence and what he described as the undisciplined nature of Inkatha supporters there. This was causing an internal struggle in the local Mpumalanga Inkatha branch between Zakhile Mkhize and a Mrs. Qolo (her full name is never given). Mkhize was the Chairman of the Mpumalanga Inkatha branch and a member of the Inkatha Central Committee. His faction supported what Daluxolo described as the reckless violence against the UDF and anyone they saw as UDF supporting. Daluxolo described that they attacked in broad daylight, would attack whole families if even a single member supported the UDF, or even attack those that they saw as economically well off. Qolo and her faction supported ending the violence and

Daluxolo was generally supportive of her position. His position as political commissar likely influenced his opinion that the aggressive brand of violence used by Mkhize's supporters were harming the image of Inkatha not only in Mpumalanga but nationally.¹⁷⁵

Daluxolo and Qolo were summoned to Ulundi to meet with Chief Buthelezi as well as the KwaZulu cabinet to find that Mkhize was already there. Mkhize had complained to Chief Buthelezi and others in the KwaZulu/Inkatha leadership that Daluxolo and Qolo were letting Inkatha supporters be attacked by the UDF and not allowing them to defend themselves.

Daluxolo clarified his position by stating he was concerned with the lack of discipline among the Inkatha supporters in Mpumalanga and brought his concerns about the reckless actions of these supporters. Mkhize was forced to accept that some of his supporters did engage in these actions and Chief Buthelezi subsequently agreed with Daluxolo's position and ordered him to return to Mpumalanga to "fix things."¹⁷⁶

Daluxolo did as he was told and worked to install discipline, but by no means did he think his mission was to end the violence, nor did he intend to in this crucial battleground area during 1987. Instead, he encouraged violence to be carried out at night and targets to be more clearly defined. Daluxolo also forbade Inkatha supporters from speaking openly about the fact that almost all the police in the area were Inkatha members or at least Inkatha aligned.¹⁷⁷ He recognized the leadership's position that the violence was necessary to Inkatha's mission in Mpumalanga, but Inkatha must maintain the ability of denial to protect their popular support. In many ways, Daluxolo applied what he learned as a political organizer and at Caprivi and used it

¹⁷⁵ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Dalaqolo W. Luthuli," *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1, <https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/durban/dbn1.htm>.

¹⁷⁶ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Dalaqolo W. Luthuli," *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

¹⁷⁷ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Dalaqolo W. Luthuli," *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

to continue to persuade the Mpumalanga Inkatha supporters towards violence in a more “practical” manner.

Clermont and Pietermaritzburg

In the middle of 1987, M. Z. Khumalo at Ulundi pulled Daluxolo away from Mpumalanga to deal with urgent business in Clermont, a township near Durban (not to be confused with Claremont, the suburb of Cape Town). When he arrived in Clermont, Daluxolo was placed at the disposal of local leader Samuel Yamile who was the Clermont Inkatha Chairman and a KwaZulu Member of Parliament (later Deputy Minister). Yamile had been working to turn Clermont to an Inkatha stronghold but had faced fierce UDF opposition, so much so that an attempt was made on his life by a hand grenade attack. Other Caprivi operatives were also transported on kombis to Clermont to protect Yamile and his properties.

Yamile told Daluxolo that he was certain that the main man behind the attack was Zazi Khuzwayo who Yamile had been in conflict with for some time. Yamile even mentioned that he had attempted to have Khuzwayo killed many times before but had not succeeded. Yamile further justified Khuzwayo as the target by telling Daluxolo, “if we could kill Mr. Khuzwayo, it would be easy to convert Clermont into an IFP area.”¹⁷⁸ Daluxolo then went to work planning the hit but he would stay with Yamile while it was carried out.

Daluxolo utilized four Caprivi operatives that were assigned to protect Yamile to carry out the hit- Pumlanzi Mshengo, Nosboo ‘Spo’ Bengu, Bekhisiso ‘Alex’ Khumalo, and Vela Nquno. Pumlanzi Mshengo and Nosboo Bengu were supposed to be the ones actually killing Khuzwayo and were armed with .38 Special revolvers supplied by Daluxolo.¹⁷⁹ Bekhisiso

¹⁷⁸ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

¹⁷⁹ Daluxolo states that he supplied Mshengo and Bengu with revolvers because they do not leave cartridges behind so they could not be traced by the police.

Khumalo and Vela Nquno were supposed to stand guard and were armed with 9mm pistols supplied by Yamile. Hleganpani Yamile, Samuel Yamile's son, would drive the Caprivians because he was the only one who knew the area well (ironically, he drove them around in a hearse).¹⁸⁰ Another local, Misizi Hlope, also rode with them because he knew Khuzwayo well and could point him out to the Caprivians.¹⁸¹

Bekhisiso Khumalo described the hit-

“When we parked outside the post office, Msihi got out of the car as planned and went to check inside [Khuzwayo's] shop. He returned and told us that everything was okay. Because we had agreed that if he was there, he would be in his office. We got out of the car and Msihi disappeared. Then we went separately into the shop. I and Vela were the first ones to go in and pretended to be buying something. At that time, Pumlanzi Mshengo and Spo Bengu appeared, passed us and then disappeared. At that, when they passed us, we went to position ourselves by the entrance. I then heard gunshots. After that Pumlanzi and Spo emerged, passed us and then we followed them. When we left this place, when we already on the street, I heard gunshots behind me. When I looked back, I saw Vela's gun pointing upwards, then I realised that he was shooting in the air and I proceeded. Before I got to the car, I also heard gunshots. I turned back, but I couldn't see anything. I was the last one to get into the car. We then agreed that we should go straight to Mpumalanga. We then arrived at Mpumalanga and I am not sure who amongst us phoned Yamile's house to inform them that everything had gone well.”¹⁸²

Daluxolo then went to Mpumalanga to collect the Caprivi operatives and bring them back to Yamile's house. When he arrived, he decided that Mshengo and Bengu should stay in Mpumalanga for a bit in case their faces were recognized in Clermont, which could cause them to be targeted by the UDF. After returning to Yamile's house and explaining the hit was successful, Yamile was excited and gave Daluxolo and all the Caprivi operatives R100 as a thank you. Hlope was rewarded even further for showing his loyalty and helping Yamile in other

¹⁸⁰ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Bekhisiso Khumalo,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, April 9, 1998, Durban Day 3, <https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/documents/amntrans/durban/54691.htm>.

¹⁸¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Misizi Jethro Hlope,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, August 4th, 1997, Durban Day 6, Case No. 1779/96, <https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/durban/hlope.htm>.

¹⁸² Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Bekhisiso Khumalo,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 3.

instances. Hlope would receive membership into Inkatha, a job as Zulu Police Special Constable (kitskonstabel) with a 9mm pistol and identification to match, and after doing a few more jobs for Yamile he would act as his personal security and would receive a R600 salary in 1989. Hlope also noted that he was not always sure of the motive behind Yamile's choice of targets, many of whom Yamile had ordered the assassination of both before, during, and after the Caprivians were in Clermont. Hlope speculated that the reasons behind these hits may have been because these people were in competition with Yamile's business interests and he may have used Inkatha members and the Caprivians to advance himself financially, these statements could not be confirmed by Hlope however.¹⁸³

After the hit in Clermont, Daluxolo was then told by M. Z. Khumalo to bring some Caprivi operatives and go to the area around Pietermaritzburg controlled by local Inkatha aligned chiefs (amakozi, singular Inkozi or Nkosi). Daluxolo and his fellow Caprivians (largely from the contra-mobilization group) spent most of their time in Chief (Nkosi) Nqobo's area because he was losing support and land to the UDF. Another hit squad was already active in the Pietermaritzburg area led by KwaZulu Police Captain Hlengwa. This hit squad was mostly made of locals but also included Caprivi operative Bigboy Ndlovu who embedded himself into the local police and hit squad because he was born and raised in the area.¹⁸⁴

A group of KwaZulu MPs and Chiefs came to Chief Nqobo and expressed their frustration at his area being UDF dominated. Daluxolo explained that "the inkozi was told to call a meeting of the community. Those who did not attend the meeting, would have to leave the area and move to areas which were controlled by the comrades. I realised that the inkozi was in trouble because he was put in a situation where he didn't really belong in. He was being forced to

¹⁸³ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Misizi Jethro Hlope," *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 6.

¹⁸⁴ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Dalaqolo W. Luthuli," *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

call a meeting. Those who didn't attend these meetings, would be killed by hit squad, the Hlengwa hit squad in the night.”¹⁸⁵ At this same meeting Hlengwa was also ordered to use his hit squad to kill a local counsellor who was defiant of Chief Nqobo and declaring his support for the UDF. Daluxolo recalled that Hlengwa’s hit squad carried out numerous attacks while he was in the Pietermaritzburg area and also engaged in cattle rustling. Beyond the economic benefits of cattle rustling as discussed before, the stealing of cattle had a political purpose because the number of cattle was tied to power in Zulu custom. Thus, the stealing of cattle was intended to signal that the opposition was weak while the Inkatha backed chiefs were strong.¹⁸⁶

Daluxolo claims that he was not involved in any of Hlengwa’s hit squad activities at this time but instead was more directly engaged in propaganda and training activities. Daluxolo recalled, “I had come with the contra-mobilization group, it was to accompany the Nkosi when he went to meetings in different districts. Then the contra-mobilization would educate the youth about Inkatha and at the same time, they will train the youth on how to protect themselves and in the handling of guns so that they could assist the Nkosi when we left.”¹⁸⁷ Again we see Daluxolo applying his training at Caprivi not only to be utilized in propaganda efforts but also to train others in direct action and violence campaigns.¹⁸⁸

Mpumalanga 1987-1990

Daluxolo then returned to Mpumalanga from 1987-1988 and the situation there had only escalated since his absence. Inkatha continued to engage in public and ruthless violence in attempts to control the entire area and threaten the opposition into silence. Daluxolo described Inkatha as being involved in the “kidnapping, rape, stealing, burning and the shooting of, killing

¹⁸⁵ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

¹⁸⁶ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

¹⁸⁷ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

¹⁸⁸ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

of people in broad daylight.”¹⁸⁹ Because of Inkatha’s continued brazen actions and targeting of even those not aligned with the UDF, the UDF was instead beginning to swell in popularity. With more support from the community and experience from Inkatha attacks, the UDF’s resolve was beginning to harden. Daluxolo again attempted to enforce discipline in the local Inkatha supporters and move activities away from broad daylight attacks and the targeting of non-aligned individuals. And again, Daluxolo was no stranger to violence, and continued to organize and/or take part in numerous attacks and raids on the UDF controlled areas in Mpumalanga.¹⁹⁰

Not long after Daluxolo’s return to Mpumalanga a fellow Caprivi operative, Walter Ntalani, who was living and operating in the area had their home attacked by the UDF. While Ntalani was not harmed, his sister was killed. This brazen daytime attack against one of their own sparked Daluxolo and his fellow Caprivians in the area into action. Daluxolo collected several Caprivi operatives living in and around the area to retaliate immediately, especially because Ntalani was able to identify his attackers and he knew where they lived. The group moved out at night towards the house of Ntalani’s attackers. Upon arriving the group threw petrol bombs into the house and shot at the people running out of the burning building. Daluxolo was not certain if they survived or died under this hail of bullets. Satisfied that he and his group had had their revenge on their target he left command with David Ndlamini and Sibisi Nqolo. They continued to attack other houses in the area, although Daluxolo did not stay to see this.¹⁹¹

In another instance in Mpumalanga, Daluxolo provided several AK-47s and 9mm handguns to an Inkatha supporter who requested them to carry out a retaliatory attack against the UDF. When local police officers investigated the scene they found the AK-47 cartridges and

¹⁸⁹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

¹⁹⁰ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

¹⁹¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

went to Zakhile Mkhize asking about the guns so that they could “find” the AKs somewhere and cover up the crime for Inkatha. Mkhize pointed them towards Daluxolo who had provided the weapons. Daluxolo not wanting to give away that he had likely acquired the AK-47s through his activities as a Caprivi operative, refused to give any information or weapons to these policemen. The police then accused him of being an MK fighter and arrested him.¹⁹² Daluxolo was eventually able to clear his name by taking the police to talk to M. Z. Khumalo at Ulundi. The police continued to hold Daluxolo until M. Z. Khumalo brought the guns to them. Daluxolo was eventually released on bail but the charges against him were already filed.¹⁹³

In August 1988 the Planning Committee, which was still technically in control of the Caprivi operatives, was deeply worried that the charges against Daluxolo could uncover the relationship between Inkatha and the Apartheid state. Internally, high officers in the SADF were deeply worried that Daluxolo was going to tell everyone in prison about *Operation Marion* and threaten the National Party’s hold on to power and Inkatha as a whole. They requested Military Intelligence carry out an assassination on Daluxolo, but MI officials would not do it unless local police and Inkatha were on board. M. Z. Khumalo was greatly opposed and so the assassination option was dropped.¹⁹⁴ Daluxolo did not know of this potential assassination until after 1994. Instead, the Planning Committee met with Daluxolo in Durban and informed him that he would skip his next bail meeting and instead be sent into hiding on a MI base in Lesotho. During this

¹⁹² The fact the guns were AK-47s and thus the weapon most commonly used by MK likely pushed this accusation after Daluxolo’s refusal to hand them over. Daluxolo was given the AK-47s by MI to hide Inkatha’s and the state’s involvement in some of the killings creating an ironic twist to this accusation.

¹⁹³ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

¹⁹⁴ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 210.

time the Planning Committee would work behind the scenes to attempt to destroy the charges against Daluxolo and any evidence that could link the crime to Operation Marion.¹⁹⁵

Daluxolo was then moved to another camp in KwaZulu-Natal before returning to his same activities in Mpumalanga in 1989. While Daluxolo was in hiding the situation in Mpumalanga had only worsened. No longer was it Inkatha raids into UDF controlled areas and counter actions by the UDF but a state of civil war in Mpumalanga with near constant fighting. During this time Inkatha's local leader Zakhile Mkhize had been killed and a power vacuum opened up. Another Inkatha chairman, Sipho Mlaba, stepped into this role in large part due to MI officer Major Paul Berry who provided him with bodyguards, planning, and other support.¹⁹⁶ After Daluxolo had been commanding Inkatha forces in Mpumalanga during three particularly tough days of fighting he contacted Major Paul Berry about launching an attack at a UDF stronghold named 25 Rand. This neighborhood had been the source of numerous attacks against Mlaba's areas of influence in Mpumalanga. Major Paul Berry informed Daluxolo that the attack would have to be postponed so he could remove his men from the area. Daluxolo was confused by this and had the following conversation with the Major-

“Major”, Daluxolo asked incredulously, “you have men at 25 Rand?”

“Yes, I have, Commander Luthuli”, the major responded.

“What are they doing there, Major? The people who have mounted attack after attack against Mlaba's house live there. What's the role of your men?”

“Military Intelligence's role is to keep balance and ensure that neither side wipes out the other. If that happens the fighting will stop. In a nutshell, if the IFP gains the upper hand our men intervene on the side of the UDF and vice versa.”

Daluxolo stood there flabbergasted and speechless.

“You seem surprised Commander Luthuli. I felt sure you knew this.”

¹⁹⁵ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1; It appears the charges were either eventually dropped or in some way inhibited. Daluxolo was never arrested again regarding his missed bail meeting or his distribution of the AK-47s.

¹⁹⁶ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1; It is unclear if the Major's name is Paul Berry or simply the last name Pollberry this thesis will use Paul Berry for clarity. It is also unclear if this is even his real name as MI officers usually used noms de guerre.

“So the people at 25 Rand who’ve been attacking and killing our supporters could be your men?”

“It’s possible”, the major responded diffidently.¹⁹⁷

Daluxolo was filled with rage, but he quietly left his meeting with Major Paul Berry and went to talk with Mlaba. Daluxolo explained what he had learned from the Major to Mlaba, and the two men decided to call off their attack on 25 Rand. The two men then drank and thought through the night on what to do about their predicament in Mpumalanga. Eventually, the two men decided to “halt all anti-UDF operations” and move towards opening communication with the UDF.¹⁹⁸ The idea was to move towards some sort of settlement or at least a ceasefire rather than continue to play into the hands of MI and the Apartheid government. The men also decided to not contact Ulundi or any higher ups in Inkatha about their decision as they would likely try to force them back to fighting. They figured it would be harder for Inkatha officials to reverse the peace after it had been cemented and it was better to ask for forgiveness rather than permission.¹⁹⁹

Mlaba was able to convince Mr. Mbambo who owned a funeral parlor in Mpumalanga and represented Inkatha to start peace talks with his friend Boy Maqinga Mjola who represented the ANC/UDF. Despite some initial difficulties the talks were proving successful and Mlaba began to speak publicly and positively of the peace talks in the area. The Inkatha leadership, including Chief Buthelezi, was angered by this peace initiative as Inkatha was still in conflict with the ANC/UDF in other areas and did not want to appear weak. Despite this a ceasefire was called in Mpumalanga and Daluxolo was adamant in his testimony that it was the local people that made peace possible. He stated, “The peace initiative in Mpumalanga was organised by the

¹⁹⁷ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 247.

¹⁹⁸ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 248.

¹⁹⁹ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 248.

Mpumalanga community because they were tired of killing each other. That is the reason why the initiative succeeded, not really because the IFP showed its commitment or encourage [sic] Mlaba to pursue the peace process.”²⁰⁰

Despite Daluxolo’s earlier acquiescence to Inkatha’s close relationship to the Apartheid state and working alongside white officers, Daluxolo could not keep the cognitive dissonance at bay for much longer. Daluxolo’s loyalty to Inkatha leadership, his pride and identification in his Zulu-ness, and the political messaging of Inkatha all meant little when it was apparent that he and the men he commanded were being used as pawns. Daluxolo could not simply stop or give up, however. He knew all too well that those that stopped could and would be targeted- “made to ride the first bus” was the code they used for killing one of their own.²⁰¹ This was a serious threat. Several Caprivians had already meet that fate. This threat also likely affected many Caprivians, not just Daluxolo, and kept them in the fight even as they grew weary towards the end.²⁰² Daluxolo’s rank and closeness with the Inkatha leadership had largely protected him from that fate so far, but he knew that he was on thin ice. Daluxolo had been recalled to Ulundi to sit behind a desk instead of work in the field as punishment for his role in the Mpumalanga peace initiative and so that Inkatha leadership and Military Intelligence could keep a close eye on him.²⁰³

Another reason Daluxolo was recalled and remained in Ulundi during 1991 was due to the Goldstone Commission. In July 1991 the then *Weekly Mail* (today the *Mail & Guardian*) obtained internal state Security Branch documents which detailed the state’s close relationship

²⁰⁰ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

²⁰¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

²⁰² Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 2.

²⁰³ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 249; Daluxolo’s rank certainly would not protect him as MI had already pushed for him to be assassinated once but at this time Daluxolo was unaware of that fact.

with Inkatha, including many of the main objectives of *Operation Marion*, the transfer of money to fund Inkatha and other counter-revolutionary groups in South Africa and Southwest Africa (Namibia), and the training of the Caprivi operatives. This leak by the *Weekly Mail* and subsequent scandal is often referred to as “Inkathagate.”²⁰⁴ In no small part due to the *Weekly Mail*, F. W. de Klerk created the formally titled *Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation*, to investigate the political violence occurring in South Africa from 1991 to the election in 1994. Justice Richard Goldstone was selected to head the commission and so it is commonly referred to as the Goldstone Commission.²⁰⁵

Inkatha as a whole and its leadership was deeply implicated by the *Weekly Mail* report and decided that some of its members would testify at the Goldstone Commission. Daluxolo was one of those selected to testify but before he testified, Daluxolo had a meeting with M. Z. Khumalo, M. Armzemla- Secretary of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, and a Mr. Mkhize- a high ranking Inkatha official. At this meeting it was decided that Daluxolo and all Inkatha members would deny all allegations and lie whenever necessary. At his Goldstone Commission hearing Daluxolo claimed that he and all the other Caprivi Operatives only received training to be part of the KwaZulu Police. Daluxolo denied all involvement in hit squad activities and even went as far as denying knowledge of or having met people like Yamile. Daluxolo described that M. Z. Khumalo pushed the most for Daluxolo to lie to protect Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi. Daluxolo explained, “I could not have divulged the truth because I would have been killed.”²⁰⁶ This was even more pressing for Daluxolo because he was staying in Ulundi at the time- the

²⁰⁴ Douek, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa*, 89-90

²⁰⁵ Goldstone, et al, “The Goldstone Booklet,” *Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation*, Oct. 27, 1994, <https://hurisa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Goldstone-Booklet.pdf>.

²⁰⁶ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

heart of Inkatha operations.²⁰⁷ Despite his own inability to truthfully testify at the Goldstone Commission, Daluxolo still later facilitated the truth to come out.

eSikhawini Hit Squad, 1990-1993

Before he was recalled to Ulundi, Daluxolo worked with Captain Langeni, Prince Gideon Zulu (from the Zulu Royal Family), and other local Inkatha leadership to set up a hit squad in eSikhawini, a township south of Richard's Bay. Daluxolo collected Caprivians from surrounding areas and brought them to eSikhawini to be placed under the command of Captain Langeni who answered to Prince Gideon Zulu and the local Inkatha leadership. The first person Daluxolo asked was Brian Mkhize, who had worked under Daluxolo before (Daluxolo referred to him by his middle name Quna). Because Daluxolo was not involved in the eSikhawini hit squad's activities beyond its inception we will mostly follow Mkhize's report of events. Daluxolo also added Caprivi operatives Zweli Ndlamini and Israel Hlongwane who had been active around Durban and Pietermaritzburg and were recognized by Inkatha for their successful operations in those areas. Prince Gideon Zulu also called for Themba Xhosa who was previously operating in Johannesburg.²⁰⁸ This formed the heart of the eSikhawini hit squad, but Mkhize notes that members were added at later times, even those who were not Caprivi operatives.²⁰⁹

The situation in eSikhawini in the 1990s was similar to that of Mpumalanga in the late 1980s. eSikhawini and the surrounding area were divided by political influence and party with whole sections being dominated by Inkatha and opposing areas likewise dominated by the ANC/UDF. Certain shops and shibeens (also written shebeen, they are illicit or illegal bars owned and frequented by Africans in townships) in the area were also divided by political

²⁰⁷ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Dalaqolo W. Luthuli," *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

²⁰⁸ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Dalaqolo W. Luthuli," *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

²⁰⁹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Brian Quna Mkhize," *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard's Bay, Day 5.

influence with them often acting as congregating points. ANC supporters could not frequent Inkatha controlled shops and shibeens and vice versa. These areas would also be frequently targeted with violence and shootings because of their political affiliation, regardless of whether important political figures were in that location or not.²¹⁰

This was the kind of everyday violence and ongoing war that preoccupied the Caprivi operatives and Inkatha at large as they struggled for total control with the ANC/UDF. Conflict also provided Inkatha with a way to enrich itself and help offset some of the costs of the war it was waging. Mkhize described that, “J2 for example is known to be an IFP area. There is nobody who resides in that area who would not take out or pay a certain amount towards the IFP. People would pay and donate, people who were in charge of protecting the community, would be paid.”²¹¹ Caprivians, as well as Inkatha supporters at large, who engaged in violence in eSikhawini saw themselves as the protectors of these areas and as such used the community to pay them for that privilege. As elsewhere in KwaZulu-Natal, Inkatha engaged in a form of racketeering just under the guise of political alignment and protecting the people. Mkhize further states the purpose of collecting money was too, “buy guns and *indistinct* [supplies?] ... to strengthen the people and therefore anybody who resided in that section belonging to the organization would be expected to pay these monies, even though it would be against his or her will, but such a person would pay these monies and attend meetings because if that person did not do that, such a person would be attacked and ex-communicated.”²¹² Again we see the motives of opportunistic violence and coercion meld as Mkhize says that anyone who refused to

²¹⁰ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 5.

²¹¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 5; Sections of houses in townships were often denoted by a letter and then a number- in this case J2. Mkhize states the nearby section of J1 was ANC dominated.

²¹² Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 5.

pay was faced with the very real threat of violence. Additionally, some of the money went not only to the personal enrichment of the local Inkatha supporters but to continuing the cycle of violence between Inkatha and the ANC/UDF in eSikhwini.

Beyond the everyday violence of eSikhwini, the Caprivian hit squad was tasked with eliminating particular targets and attacking ANC/UDF stronghold/meeting areas. In 1992, Mkhize and his fellow Caprivians were tasked with assassinating several individuals which the local Inkatha leadership saw as “problematic.”²¹³ Four of these targets were actually KwaZulu Policemen who were selected because they appeared to be double agents, working for the ANC, or giving information to investigative bodies such as the Goldstone Commission. The evidence on which these policemen were accused of being double agents or informers was sometimes limited at best. For example, one man was accused of being a double agent because he was seen with a person affiliated with the ANC and it was rumored he was being paid by the ANC for information.²¹⁴ Another man was suspected because he was seen doing “anti-Inkatha” activities such as swearing at a portrait of Chief Buthelezi or being angered by Inkatha members utilizing state vehicles for transporting people to rallies. It was later put forth that he was giving information to the Goldstone Commission which confirmed him as a target for assassination.²¹⁵

Eliminating these fellow policemen was a high priority for local leadership and the Caprivi operatives because it jeopardized them directly. Mkhize explained, “we were no longer safe because we could be arrested and attacked.”²¹⁶ Besides the fact that it often affected them directly, the Caprivians were also likely selected to carry out these hits because the Caprivians were highly trusted by Inkatha leadership thus making them well suited for taking care of

²¹³ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 5.

²¹⁴ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 5.

²¹⁵ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 5.

²¹⁶ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 5.

internal enemies. “Regular” Inkatha supporters may not have been trusted to follow through on killing one of their own.

Mkhize and his fellow Caprivi operatives were also utilized to assassinate a number of important ANC members in eSikhawini and carry out attacks deep within ANC dominated areas intended to threaten and terrorize the people living there. Targets for assassination included ANC hitmen and a local ANC organizer.²¹⁷ As part of a general strategy of terror and show of force as pushed by Prince Gideon Zulu, Mkhize and his fellow hitmen were supposed to attack areas known to be frequented by the ANC/UDF and visible to the public. Mkhize, Joyful Mthethwa- another Caprivian, and Victor Buthelezi- not a Caprivian but a trusted policeman and bodyguard used by Inkatha leadership- organized themselves to attack a bus stop in eSikhawini that Mkhize refers to as the Gundani bus stop. Mkhize states that the Gundani bus stop was chosen because it was near a shibeen of the same name frequented by ANC supporters and many ANC supporters were going to be at this bus stop to be transported to an ANC rally happening the same day as the attack. Using a hand grenade and automatic weapons the three men unleashed hell on a bus and surrounding area killing and wounding an unknown number of people. Mkhize recalled that several people died, and more were injured. Captain Langeni was excited by this when Mkhize reported back to him after they had completed the attack.²¹⁸

The Caprivians were also rewarded in kind for carrying out these types of activities. For example, Mkhize explains that because of the level of trust he had with Inkatha leadership and the large number of operations he had completed on their behalf, he was able to get perks and gifts. One such gift was a car that was given to him by the KwaZulu government and a card to

²¹⁷ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 5; ANC hitmen and/or MK operatives would often be carrying out similar activities to Inkatha but obviously targeting Inkatha VIPs and operatives. Targeted assassinations and attacks on known Inkatha controlled areas were the norm.

²¹⁸ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 5.

pay for gas for the car. He was given the car to help him get around South Africa in the course of his job as a Caprivi operative, but he describes that he also used it for personal use and used the car for over 5,000 kilometers.²¹⁹ Mkhize described that he could get access to KwaZulu government vehicles easily even for mundane activities like moving furniture.²²⁰ Additionally, Mkhize mentions that he was able to receive money from Inkatha in many instances and for general use, not related to his “work” for Inkatha. Mkhize recalled in one case, “one day I wanted R2,300 to go and pay for my house at Dundee. A house that I had just bought. They easily gave me the money and I did not pay it back. And it was not even indicated that I should pay it back.”²²¹ After describing all these perks and gifts, Mkhize flatly told the TRC, “those are the kinds of things that motivated me to continue the struggle in which I was engaged.”²²²

Even though money, gifts, and perks came easy for Caprivians like Mkhize, the protection from arrest and killing he was supposed to be afforded by Inkatha and the KwaZulu government did not prove to be so forthcoming. The assassination of policemen and the high profile attacks the eSikhawini hit squad had been carrying out had put them further in the public eye and made them a main concern of the Goldstone Commission. The South African Police from outside KwaZulu began to investigate the assassinations of the policemen. This proved a big problem for Inkatha as they could not make the charges so easily disappear as they had before. Inkatha did not have the same power and sway with the SAP outside of KwaZulu and the SAP would likely not drop a case already being investigated by the Goldstone Commission. Between eyewitness testimony and bullet cases linking them to the crime scenes, most of the various hit

²¹⁹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 5.

²²⁰ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 6.

²²¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 6.

²²² Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 6.

squad members in eSikhawini were arrested except for Mkhize. At this time Daluxolo was sent to eSikhawini to take Mkhize to meet the Inkatha leadership and then take him into hiding.

Daluxolo took Mkhize to Ulundi where they met with Captain Lengani and M. R. Mzimela. Lengani and Mzimela suggested that Mkhize go into hiding, but Mkhize responded that he did not want to go into hiding because he would have to remain in hiding for a long time. Unable to sway him further Lengani and Mzimela told Mkhize that they would see what they could do to make the case against him disappear and get him a lawyer. Daluxolo then took Mkhize back to his home.²²³ Later, on the 18th of August 1993 Mkhize turned himself in at his own police station, not wishing to hide any longer.²²⁴

Despite the promises made to him by high levels of Inkatha leadership such as M. Z. Khumalo towards the beginning of his operations as a Caprivi operative and the more recent promises of Captain Lengani and M. R. Mzimela, little was done to help Mkhize. In the past, Inkatha leaders would have worked with their Apartheid state counterparts in MI and the SAP to make the case disappear/drop the charges but the officers who helped organize *Operation Marion* had been forced to be more covert since the 1990s, especially due to Inkathagate.²²⁵ This would have been especially true in Mkhize's case due to the fact that his case was part of the Goldstone Commission investigation and thus highly public. Furthermore, MI already expressed their willingness to leave Inkatha members holding the bag or worse have them assassinated (such as the close call Daluxolo had earlier), rather than risk exposure.²²⁶ Inkatha leadership faced with many of the same risks, decided to distance themselves and did not even bother to

²²³ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Dalaqolo W. Luthuli," *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

²²⁴ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Brian Quna Mkhize," *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard's Bay, Day 6.

²²⁵ Douek, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa*, 89-90.

²²⁶ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 210.

provide Mkhize with a lawyer. The leadership further publicly distanced themselves from the other Caprivians arrested and any Caprivi activities they themselves ordered and organized.²²⁷

Daluxolo did not want to sit idly by as his comrade and man he felt responsible for was left behind in prison and he wanted to ensure at the least he would have a good lawyer. Daluxolo explained that “I found difficulties because no one wanted to get closer to me and closer to them, and I concluded that I should get closer and on getting closer, I went to Mzimela and M. Z. Khumalo, pleading with them to assist. They pushed me from pillar to post, I ended up loosing [sic] courage.”²²⁸ Faced with no other option and his growing distrust of Inkatha and disgust at the leadership’s unwillingness to protect their own, Daluxolo decided on a personal meeting with Mkhize while he was in prison. Daluxolo informed Mkhize that the only way he could possibly get at least a better sentence was to cooperate with the Goldstone Commission, to tell them everything he knew. Furthermore, Daluxolo heard rumors of a reconciliation process and possibility for amnesty in the future and encouraged him to testify before that body too when he was able.²²⁹

Election or Civil War? 1994-1996

In 1994 South Africa was near to holding a historic election but also teetered on the brink of complete civil war. Inkatha seemed to be only cementing their position with the white right wing and preparing weapons and personnel for an expanded conflict. The Goldstone Commission began to release and publish its findings including the testimony of Mkhize about his Caprivi and hit squad activities. Inkatha leadership was outraged by the findings and angered by the betrayal and Daluxolo had to feign the same emotions.²³⁰ Daluxolo had seen the writing

²²⁷ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Richard’s Bay, Day 6.

²²⁸ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

²²⁹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

²³⁰ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

on the wall and Mkhize's testimony was another push towards Daluxolo abandoning Inkatha. Shortly after this, Inkatha leadership's trust in Daluxolo had run out. M. Z. Khumalo, who had previously worked so closely with Daluxolo, started a rumor that he was working with the ANC and the ANC were providing him with gifts so that he would defect. This was not true, claims Daluxolo, but regardless the rumor was gaining ground. It became even more apparent to Daluxolo that he was running out of time and that came with the very real risk that he could be the next assassination target. Daluxolo was in fact tipped off to this effect by some of his fellow Caprivians in early 1994.²³¹

Daluxolo was fortunate that his men had trust in him. Daluxolo was close with many of his fellow Caprivians who had even attended his wedding.²³² This trust also built since the men met at Caprivi because they had fought and killed with Daluxolo directly on the streets rather than the higher Inkatha leadership which seemed detached in Ulundi. By 1994 many were less willing to blindly follow Inkatha's leadership as the election grew closer, thus Daluxolo was spared assassination from one of his own. This did not mean, however, that he was safe. Daluxolo heard rumors that M. Z. Khumalo was in talks with MI to have him killed.²³³ Daluxolo needed to quickly come up with a plan. The obvious answer to Daluxolo was that he needed to get back in contact with the ANC who were appearing more and more to be the victors in the upcoming election and thus the new rulers of the country. Daluxolo could not easily walk up to the ANC and switch sides, however. He had spent years fighting against them and was well known to be a high level leader in Inkatha.

²³¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Dalaqolo W. Luthuli," *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1.

²³² Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 138.

²³³ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 249.

Daluxolo put out feelers to men under him that may have known people in the government investigative bodies and people that were ANC sympathetic or had ANC connections that Daluxolo was willing to talk. He started talking with officers working with the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), but things were moving slowly and there was still the risk that MI or others would catch wind of these talks.²³⁴ By a stroke of luck Daluxolo heard from a Inkatha member that a man he worked with was named Thula Bopela, the same name of a former MK fighter Daluxolo was close friends with and fought with during the Wankie Campaign in then Rhodesia in 1967. Daluxolo took a gamble and called the man who turned out to in fact be his friend from all those years ago. Daluxolo had some of his fellow Caprivians watch and surveil Bopela because while Daluxolo had been close friends with him, it had been many years. Daluxolo did not know if Bopela was still working for MK and worried that he might set Daluxolo up for an ambush if they tried to meet. Eventually Daluxolo agreed to meet Bopela.²³⁵

Daluxolo told Bopela all that happened to him since they were separated at the Botswana border and both men were arrested. Daluxolo explained how he got into Inkatha and why he continued to side with them after their split with the ANC, and how MI had been playing both sides to continue black on black violence. Daluxolo ended his retelling of events by informing Bopela about Inkatha's recent plan to work with right-wingers to push South Africa into a full civil war.²³⁶ Daluxolo then pleaded with Bopela to get him into a meeting with any ANC contacts he had left and vouch for him. Daluxolo promised he would provide the ANC with information and told Bopela "I'm the commander-in-chief of all IFP hit squads...If I tell my men

²³⁴ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "Dalaqolo W. Luthuli," *TRC Amnesty Hearings*, Day 1; The TEC was a multiparty body created in 1993 as part of state negotiations with the ANC to transition South Africa to full democracy and help organize the 1994 election.

²³⁵ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 250-251.

²³⁶ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 251-252.

to stop fighting the UDF, they'll obey me."²³⁷ After some more convincing and time alone with his old comrade, Bopela finally agreed, he would speak with Jacob Zuma, a high ranking ANC official at the time (and a future president of South Africa). Daluxolo thanked his friend and told him "I accept that I have betrayed the ANC, Thula... We should now focus on the future and decide what to do to frustrate the strategies of the apartheid government. We cannot allow them to roll back the liberation struggle. I'll leave it in your hands. See Zuma and explain things. Let him decide what should be done."²³⁸ The men shook hands but before he left Bopela asked "How can you be sure I won't kill you for betraying the cause?" Daluxolo responded "I know you well enough. If given the choice of killing me or stopping a counter-revolution, I think that both you and Jacob Zuma will opt for the latter. I could be wrong, of course."²³⁹ The two men laughed it off, still able to joke at the absurdity and weight of their predicament.

Bopela's service in the Wankie campaign impressed Zuma and gave his words weight when the two men first met. Bopela told Zuma of Daluxolo's story of how he had served in the Wankie campaign as well and how he had become the leader of Inkatha hit squad activities. Bopela also told him that Daluxolo knew of Inkatha's alliance with right wingers and elements of the security branch who wanted to start a civil war rather than abide by the upcoming election. Bopela went to explain Daluxolo's position, "He says he has convinced his men that they should pull out of the IFP and expose hit squad activity to the newspapers and the TEC [Transitional Executive Council]. He is willing to do this on condition that all ANC military activities against

²³⁷ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 253.

²³⁸ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 254.

²³⁹ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 254.

the IFP are also stopped.”²⁴⁰ Zuma thought for a long moment staring into the distance until he turned back to Bopela, finally agreeing to a meeting with Daluxolo.²⁴¹

At his meeting with Zuma, Daluxolo reiterated his position as outlined by Bopela, who was silent for most of the meeting having little to add. The two men talked for over an hour making headway and the beginning of promises. Daluxolo reiterated his wish to stop the Caprivians from further involvement in the violence and Zuma began to make assurances that the ANC would act accordingly and provide protection for Daluxolo, but nothing was yet certain. Everyone left the meeting and there was no contact for several days.²⁴² Eventually Zuma contacted Daluxolo again offering another meeting this time with President Nelson Mandela. Daluxolo was initially hesitant fearing that this was a trap to have him assassinated. Daluxolo agreed to the meeting only after he was assured it was safe and his friend Bopela could be there with him.²⁴³

Despite the apprehensions and cloak and dagger, the meeting between Daluxolo and Mandela went on without incident. Mandela showed his total trust and faith in Daluxolo. Bopela recalled, “For his part, Daluxolo was overcome with emotion and wept openly. It was an amazing moment. There was this great man, tall and upright, accepting the apologies of a man who had once been his soldier- but who had defected to the enemy. Now he had returned to the ANC fold. All was forgiven.”²⁴⁴

Daluxolo was safe at last and entered the witness protection program, staying in Denmark until the ANC ascended to power after the successful election. Inkatha at almost the last moment

²⁴⁰ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 262.

²⁴¹ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 262.

²⁴² Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 263.

²⁴³ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 263-264.

²⁴⁴ Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 265.

agreed to negotiations with ANC and participated in the elections. There were a variety of reasons for this decision but Daluxolo's defection and the unwillingness of most Caprivians to back Inkatha any longer certainly played a role. The civil war that many feared was coming had been avoided and the ANC won the election by a landslide. Daluxolo was able to return to South Africa and received amnesty after telling the TRC about his activities with Inkatha, Military Intelligence, and the Caprivi operatives. Daluxolo would later become a lieutenant-colonel in the new South African National Defense Force.

Daluxolo and his fellow Caprivi operatives are arguably some of the most important individuals in the epic that is the violent political struggle between the ANC/UDF and Inkatha. They are often written about but rarely named. Their actions are used in commentaries on Inkatha and the Security branch, but little has been written about the motives of these men themselves. Like the rest of Inkatha, the Caprivians are no monolith obeying every word of Buthelezi or blindly pushed forward by ethnic nationalism. The fact that many Caprivians under Daluxolo defected and still others were angrily left in the lurch by Inkatha leadership proves that the leadership did not have complete control. Furthermore, the number of Zulus, ANC aligned or non-aligned, killed by Caprivians proves that ethnicity was not factored in the vast majority of cases. Instead, we can again apply the motivators outlined throughout this thesis to the Caprivi operatives.

Daluxolo provides an example of a man convinced by Inkatha's propaganda ability. The fact that he was previously an ANC and MK member gives credence to Inkatha's propaganda apparatus which effectively vilified the ANC/UDF and provided the *raison d'être* to kill this enemy. Furthermore, Daluxolo was so involved that he became a propagandist himself further

confirming this point, as do the other Caprivians who commented on the importance of propaganda in their training.

Multiple Caprivians such as Brian Mkhize were likewise motivated by the opportunities, financial or otherwise, provided by working for Inkatha as a hitman. The promise of good, steady pay in the face of economic downturn proved to be alluring for some of the men to initially join. The pay increase after training and various financial incentives provided by full-time work in Inkatha motivated these men to continue killing even more. Those that were good at the violence Inkatha required were singled out for praise and given greater rewards ranging from cash to cars to help acquiring a house.

The carrot, of course, is always preferable to the stick which proved to be an ever present and powerful motivator that kept the Caprivi operatives in line. Caprivians were no strangers to killing off their own, one will recall the Caprivi operative's euphemism for this being "made to take the first bus." Inkatha leadership was also more than willing to outsource this killing if necessary to white security personnel who had no qualms assassinating blacks. The fear of death is a powerful motivator that kept many like Daluxolo from stopping or switching sides until they could be assured that they would be protected.

Conclusion

The deep dive this thesis has taken into one group that were but one part of the struggle for liberation and democracy in South Africa may give the reader pause. The fact is that despite it being a grand historical moment, the end of Apartheid is often lacking in detail to the average reader, even an academic one. This is in no small part due to the smaller role African history has in the profession but also because the relatively recent end of Apartheid. This recentness perhaps made it an unsuitable topic for many historians to tackle for some time. In spite of- or perhaps because of- these reasons this topic is one worthy of further examination, especially now. There are still many stories left in uncovering the end of Apartheid in South Africa and they should be told before their keepers forget them or they are lost to time. The prevailing myth of the peaceful end of Apartheid, particularly in the West, would on its surface make the language and lens of war seem strange to apply to this area. Hopefully the reader has seen that throughout this thesis the language of war was not applied after the fact but used every day in the struggle South Africans waged for years. This also exemplifies the need to study the social and societal aspects of this conflict. The violence explored in this thesis is deeply personal and it tore communities and even families apart. Taking a social approach and understanding why the supporters of Inkatha engaged in violence is intended not only to create a better understanding of Inkatha but also of the entire conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. Despite unclear battle lines and confusing friends and foes, the low level civil war of KwaZulu-Natal and covert war waged between various Security Branch forces and the ANC should not be understood in any other way.

It would have been impossible to take a purely historian focused approach to this thesis, many times the motives of Inkatha could only be best understood through the lens of a political scientist. On their face many of the actions of Inkatha do not make sense from the outside

looking in, but to a realist politician (which one could argue Chief Buthelezi was) the doublespeak and covert actions could all be justified in the name of political gains and survival. In mentioning doublespeak, skills in history, political science, and even literature all had to be applied in the service of researching and writing about propaganda. Metaphors and abstractions can have very real impacts in the fickle and confusing world of propaganda, an area of study relatively few have used in the study of Inkatha.

In the service of these goals and fields of study, this thesis seeks to explain why Inkatha members and supporters engaged in violence on behalf of a self-proclaimed non-violent organization. While it is not possible to answer this question completely, as it is individual to each member, the three categories described throughout this thesis demonstrate the wide range of motivating factors. For example, Inkatha's use of propaganda to blame its political rivals for violence and to justify its own violent actions as "defensive" signaled to its supporters that violence was acceptable and even necessary. While the aim of this propaganda was political, the justification of violence was sophisticated and aware enough to go beyond mere aggrandizement of the organization. Instead, Inkatha's propaganda was able to engage in complex manipulation allowing them to turn a large section of the KwaZulu population into supporters. And in turn able to convince these supporters of a vilified enemy worthy of being met with necessary violence. These justifications and Inkatha's embracement of policies like "an eye for an eye" certainly played a role in the vicious cycle of violence that characterized the low-intensity civil war in KwaZulu-Natal.

For those who were not swayed by the violent messages in Inkatha's propaganda, they could be forced to participate in the violence against their will. Both those that supported Inkatha and those who were whole-heartedly opposed were told to pick up a weapon and fight. Dire

consequences directed at their person, their family, or their property befell those that refused. Inkatha's base, as illustrated throughout this paper, was clearly not a monolith of Zulu nationals all fighting for the same end, and as such, modern scholarship has largely begun to move beyond this notion. Reaching beyond this characterization of Inkatha supporters, the extensive use of coercion puts into question how many supporters truly had agency in the face of violence. At the very least, the question now arises as to how much the Inkatha supporter base willingly agreed with or supported the organization's unofficial policy of violence.

Finally, there are those who were allured by what they might gain through violence or pushed towards the use of violence to survive. Working directly for Inkatha as a high status member or professional hitman was a road to money and power for some. Local chiefs, headmen, and Inkatha officials exerting their influence and power over those under them to engage in violence was common. This desire to amass wealth and power are prime examples of opportunistic trend that drove so much of the violence in KwaZulu-Natal. For others that joined in on Inkatha's lucrative raids the motives of survival and opportunism are seen in the theft of everything from groceries to television sets from those deemed to be the enemy of Inkatha. The vast range of items of seemingly low value taken shows that economic situation had taken its toll and survival motivated many. Still others sought personal enrichment in targeting affluent areas for luxury items. Violence in KwaZulu-Natal was rapid and brutal as is often expected in situations of political violence that spin out into low-intensity civil wars. This prevailing atmosphere of violence coupled with the economic downturn of South Africa in the 1980s and 90s makes it seem almost unavoidable that fighting for money or even groceries would motivate so many. The proverbial barrier of entry was lowered, and more fuel was added to the fire.

Discussing and understanding the motivations of Inkatha's supporters and why they choose or were forced to engage in violence are crucial because it paints a different picture than that of a purely political or top-down history of Inkatha. In many cases, it could be argued that politics didn't factor at all into the motivations of violence for some Inkatha supporters. To the man who stole to survive as part of an Inkatha raid, the political 'why?' may hardly seem relevant. This sentiment is glaringly apparent in the testimonies of those forced to fight against their will. Furthermore, the ability of Inkatha to rally support is woefully under-appreciated by those that describe them as a purely Zulu nationalist organization. Inkatha's use of propaganda demonstrated their understanding of what motivated their supporters. Such as the numerous times Inkatha manipulated their supporters' desires for personal and economic safety to recruit and encourage violence on the organization's behalf. Only by understanding the motivations of those who actually committed the violence is it truly possible to understand the nature of the violence in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1980s and 90s and Inkatha's dominating role in it.

Epilogue

Although this thesis's discussion of violence in KwaZulu-Natal ends just after the 1994 election, the violence did not. Particularly in KwaZulu-Natal, tensions and violence remained high due to Inkatha's attempts to influence the local election in 1996, to continue to exert control over the new local KwaZulu-Natal government. Inkatha had a strong enough showing in the 1994 general election to be part of the coalition government with their previously professed enemy, the ANC, yet Inkatha support continued to dwindle. Today, Inkatha remains a political player as the Inkatha Freedom Party but has limited seats in the national government and currently heads the opposition in the KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature.

Violence continues to be a problem in KwaZulu-Natal, as within the rest of South Africa; however, most of the violence today is primarily due to criminal activity. The large amount and easy access to weapons combined with continued economic hardship faced by so many means crime has remained a central issue in South Africa. Continued economic woes and corruption mean that South Africa still has a long road ahead of her. In the middle of writing this thesis, in July 2021, South Africa experienced the worst unrest since the end of Apartheid and much of it was centered in KwaZulu-Natal. Over 300 people died and over 3,400 people were arrested. Former President Jacob Zuma was arrested due to failing to appear in court for charges related to corruption during his presidency and his supporters took to the streets to protest.²⁴⁵ There appears to be some cloak and dagger among Zuma's supporters who encouraged the protests to turn to riots and the police are already investigating certain individuals with ties to Zuma.²⁴⁶

However, most of the experts and media agree that the majority of those involved were not politically motivated as seen by the general motive of looting and theft. South Africa has over half of its population living in poverty and a 32% unemployment rate.²⁴⁷ Descriptors of tribalism, racism, and politics have all be posited as motivators and while this may have been true in some cases, it is impossible to ignore the state of South Africa's economy as the overwhelming motivator for most. The targets of the riots being shops, malls, shipping trucks, and shipping containers further speak to this motive. The billions of dollars in damages and

²⁴⁵ "Where does South Africa go from here?", *The Economist*, July 24th, 2021, <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/07/24/where-does-south-africa-go-from-here>.

²⁴⁶ Liela Magnus, "Senior ex-intelligence agents and ANC members under probe for allegedly igniting Zuma riots", *SABC News*, July 13th, 2021, <https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/some-ex-intelligence-agents-and-anc-members-under-probe-for-alleged-involvement-in-igniting-zuma-riots/>.

²⁴⁷ Reuters Staff, "UPDATE 1-South Africa's unemployment rate reaches new record high in first quarter," *Reuters*, June 1, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/safrica-economy-unemployment-idUSL2N2NJ0NV>.

looting, the ongoing global pandemic, and continuing if not rising income inequality place South Africa on a tough course ahead.²⁴⁸ Let's hope she can weather the storm.

²⁴⁸ Reuters Staff, "South African court grants delay in Zuma's arms deal corruption trial," *Reuters*, July 20, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safrica-court-adjourns-zumas-arms-deal-corruption-trial-next-month-2021-07-20/>.

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