On the Concept of Self-Hatred: A Misnomer

Ilana Maymind

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/religious_studies_articles

Part of the Jewish Studies Commons
On the Concept of Self-Hatred: A Misnomer
Ilana Maymind, Ohio State University

Terminology is the root of all unhappiness.
~ Anton Kuh

Introduction

Jewish existence is often said to be marked by two contradictory perils: hatred and acceptance. Reflecting on the historical past, I note that, at its extreme, hatred led to mass extermination (the Holocaust), whereas acceptance, ironically, had the potential to result in self-attribution through the massive loss of Jewish self-identification (assimilation). As a result of hatred, Jewish life was characterized by centuries of segregation and oppression, which of course affected the construction of Jewish identity. The advent of Jewish inclusion resulting from Enlightenment thought brought to light the issue of an identity grounded in conflict and hardship. For German Jews in particular, the opportunity to enter society at large forced the question of their perception as being European or German in addition to being Jewish.

The promise of freedom and the expectation of equality of the Enlightenment’s and subsequently the emancipation ushered in a heightened need to redefine and reconstruct not only one’s place in society but also one’s own identity. The promise of the emancipation included a separation between the public and private with the certain strings attached. A Jew became accepted into the larger society with the expectation that his religiosity will take a secondary role, particularly in public. In other words, Jew was expected to be a Jew at home and a French citizen in public. This idea of a ‘cosmopolitan’ Jew implicitly introduced the idea of self-rejection that in some cases was interpreted as self-hate. Given the dialectics of rejection and acceptance, I focus here on the connection between emancipation (acceptance in terms of freedom and equality) and assimilation and, further, between assimilation and self-hatred. I propose that in many cases, “self-hatred” is a misnomer and the application of the label suggests the tendency for the outsiders to assign to a particular group certain sui generis features. When these features cannot be properly located, their absence is interpreted as a rejection of belonging to this particular group and as the negation of one’s religious identity. Yet, this self-negation may have nothing to do with the person in question, but may instead be a perspective imposed from outside. On the other hand, I suggest that, in some cases, the idea of “self-hatred” may increase one’s involvement in issues of social justice by redirecting the focus on world brotherhood rather
than merely on one’s own people. For the purposes of this paper, I am using the following definition of assimilation: “the decline, and at its endpoint the disappearance of an ethnic/racial distinction and cultural and social differences that express it.”

**Self-Hatred**

Joseph Chayim Brenner (1881–1921), an often overlooked Jewish existentialist, argues for the existence of Heidegger’s *gewordenheit*, which he interprets as Jewish “thrownness” or “givenness.” In his view, Jews are thrown into specific circumstances and conditions. His concept of thrownness predates the discussion of this concept by Martin Heidegger, who discusses it in *Being and Time*, published in 1927. For Brenner, thrownness is predicated upon the idea that Jewish existence is created ex nihilo but begins in the past rather than in the present. For Brenner the thrownness or givenness is predicated upon the fact that Jewish existence is not ex nihilo but begins in the past. In other words, for Brenner, it is the present that animates the past and not vice versa. Nonetheless, Jewishness is not a choice but a basic datum directly related to previous generations, their experiences, and history; thus, Jewishness is “coerced” upon the Jews as a facticity of their existence. This facticity is internal and has nothing to do with the ideology called religion. Brenner distances Judaism from religious ideology, moving it instead toward ethnicity.

He proposes a distinction between ideology and existence. Existence, contrary to any set of ideas (theories), is pre-conscious and instinctive. In Brenner’s view, it is immoral to build on ideas as a foundation for existence, since a moral attitude cannot be divorced from the existence of real people. Endorsement of Jewish ideas, including the ideology of Judaism, rather than Jewish life, rejects the day-to-day life of concrete people. Jewish existence is not merely an additional layer added to one’s personality. For him, Jewish existence, which he terms a “form of life,” is expressed largely through one’s knowledge of Jewish literature and the Hebrew language. He does not fully resolve the question of the affirmation of Jewish givenness without recognition, as distinct from affirmation of the cultural givenness of the past, which includes Judaism as a religion. Nonetheless, he points out the possibility of accepting oneself as a Jew without heeding the Ten Commandments, which, as we will see, is often presented as a means of self-negation and rejection of being a Jew in toto. Brenner replaces theological faith with faith in Jewish people living Jewish “forms of life.” Assimilation, in his opinion, is adopting other (not
Jewish) forms of life, and whether one converts or not is irrelevant, since being a “good Jew” is independent of one’s religiosity. According to Brenner, the fact that Heine and Borne converted into Christianity, did not make them less Jews than Lasalle who stayed Jewish without experiencing any affinity to Judaism.

The phenomenon of self-hatred is often akin to the term “traitor” to one’s own people. In a number of cases, self-hatred is perceived as a rejection of Judaism, or in Brenner’s terms, “ideology,” or if not full rejection, at least disagreement between neo-Orthodox Jews and the then newly formed Reform movement. For others, the idea of self-hatred is an invention by disenchanted Jews. The notion of emancipation presented certain challenges, especially for those who rejected the idea of the distinction between one’s public and private image: to convert (assimilate) by abandoning Judaism (secularize) or to remain an observant Jew. Was there a third option?

Theodor Lessing (1872–1933), in *Jewish Self-Hatred* (1930), connects self-hatred to one’s own religious indifference. In his eyes, self-hatred originated from the moment of the command “to heed the message of revelation.” Even before this, from the instance when Abraham followed the divine call and left his native town of Ur, “one’s choice [whether to heed the call] would never be an inconsequential matter.” After Abraham, the choice was limited to either following the path of the commandments or to breaking faith, and severing the relationship with the covenantal people. There was no other option: “the third path was not allowed.”

For Lessing, self-hatred comes into existence when one is unwilling to follow the insulated path of the covenant but does not see any alternative other than to distance oneself from Judaism entirely. As a result, one “begins to hate the covenantal people.” Unable to be part of one’s own people, but also incapable of fully extricating oneself from them, one turns to hating oneself. Lessing chooses a different “third path” born out of the experience of “otherness” and marginalization. He not only redeployed his self-perception but also redefined the world in terms of a universalist ideal. Self-hatred is converted into a redeeming force and a possibility for redemption of the world. As a double outsider within one’s own culture as well as within the larger “host” culture, Lessing’s complicated relationship to his own heritage leads him to strong support of progressive causes and results in his identification with the “disadvantaged and mistreated.” Lessing analyzed the biographies of six Jewish thinkers who in one way or another fit the same pattern: Paul Ree, who influenced Nietzsche; Arthur Trebitsch, who advocated
political antisemitism; Otto Weininger, who influenced “intellectual anti-Semitism”; Maximilian Harden, who advanced Germany’s “hypernationalism”; Max Steiner; and Walter Cale, who ended their own lives prematurely.11 And yet, in some cases, Jewish self-hatred assumed a redemptive force colored in the romantic terms of “the demand for love of humanity and the longing for happiness.”12 The focus was placed on humanity as a whole rather than on one’s own particular group.

Arguing for national identification, Lessing advanced the idea of “international values.” He claims that the Jewish experience is conducive to promoting these ideals because of “supranational values” originating in the Jewish status of “otherness,” as “guests” in their host cultures. The persecution that Jews experienced encouraged reflection on “their own defects,” as Paul Reitter notes, and “(in his [Lessing’s] view, this is a legacy of the prophetic tradition).”13 This self-reflexivity has a further implication: “a mission of the greatest consequence,” namely, an ability that can be used to “save the world.”14 Contrary to Brenner, ethnic self-identification holds a rather insignificant role in this conception of a Jew. To better understand Lessing’s vision and address its implications, we first turn briefly to the history of nineteenth-century German Jews.

**German Jews—History**

Tracing the history of Jews in Berlin and the German states is paramount to understanding the process of (re)formation of Jewish self-identity, since it involves consequences for self-identity more broadly. For many German Jews, the desire to be accepted led to the renunciation of all traces of particularism and the ideas of universal messianism. But what does it mean to renounce particularism? For these Jews, Judaism became redefined in terms of ethical values focused on world brotherhood. The focus on particularistic values was transposed to values of universal meaning. This also led to many outward changes starting with religious services (e.g., turn to the vernacular language) and other outer manifestations (e.g., dress code, dietary habits, etc.). From the very moment of leaving the ghetto with the hope of inclusion, Jews felt a certain need to de-Judaize their religious rituals.15

In Prussia, the Edict of 1812 granting Jews general privileges led to Jewish educational and religious reforms. Three years later, a synagogue service was established in Berlin with “prayers in German, an organ, a choir, and an edifying German sermon,”16 and the changes were met with
great acceptance by the congregants. This effort to modernize Jewish services was opposed by local politicians, however, who feared that a Jewish service that appeared similar to a Christian service presented the danger of enticing members away from their own religion.

Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786), whose ideas influenced many Reform thinkers, had argued against abandoning commitment to the Commandments because their inclusive perspective already propagated a universalistic worldview. He insisted that, in Judaism, salvation is independent of a particular revelation. Further, he argued that Judaism is rational and hence inherently modern. Mendelssohn writes:

> Let every man who does not disturb the public welfare, who obeys the law, acts righteously toward you and his fellowmen be allowed to speak as he thinks, to pray to God after his own fashion or after the fashion of his fathers, and to seek eternal salvation where he thinks he may find it. Permit no one in your country to search someone else’s heart or to judge someone else’s thoughts.¹⁷

This vision of Judaism was embraced by many Jewish thinkers, especially by those for whom Judaism was a natural religion built on the premise of reason rather than on an exclusive promise of salvation. Mendelssohn’s vision of Judaism aimed to promote the idea of tolerance and paved the road to a pluralistic vision of religion and an inclusive Judaism. In Jerusalem he writes: “The supreme Being has revealed [religious doctrine and tenets] to all rational creatures through concepts and events inscribed in their souls with a script that is legible and intelligible at all times and in all places.”¹⁸ For some Gentiles, Judaism’s adherence to its customs, and particularly to dietary laws, negated universalist principles of rationalism. Jews were expected to remain differentiated from non-Jews by retaining their particularity and by staying within the confines of orthodoxy. Abandoning their particularism was seen as unattainable or even as an abomination. It is noteworthy that, for the Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz (1817–1891), modern Jewish history started in the eighteenth century with Mendelssohn. Yet, as we will discuss, despite influencing some Reform thinkers, Mendelssohn remained an observant Jew. He managed to free himself from ghetto-like isolation and to integrate his Judaism into modernity without giving up his commitment to his religious life as a Jew. It is interesting that German historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–1896) also respected Mendelssohn, but for different reasons. For him, Mendelssohn represented the first talented Jew who was capable of transcending the narrowly focused particularism of the Jews.
Containing Judaism within the parameters of a strict orthodoxy was supported not only by local political governance but also by those who converted from Judaism. I note that among converts was composer Felix Mendelssohn, Moses Mendelssohn’s grandson, who, according to Treitschke, was testimony that a Jew can attain full fame only if he is capable of fully transcending his Jewishness and entering German life without any qualifications. For other converts, such as lawyer and politician Frederick Julius Stahl,\(^{19}\) the Jewish community’s vitality and its ability to modernize contradicted his own claim of Jewish moribundity and inflexibility. For him, there is only one form of Judaism—orthodoxy—which is preferable to “a philosophically oriented, modernized Jewish faith.”\(^{20}\) In his eyes, this “modernized” Judaism lost its connection to the authentic Jewish faith.

The political journalist Ludwig Borne (1786–1837)\(^{21}\) and poet Heinrich Heine (1797–1856)\(^{22}\) similarly rejected the reformed approach. Yet, for Graetz, the first Jewish historian to write a comprehensive history of the Jewish people, Borne and Heine remained Jews despite their conversion to Christianity. Graetz viewed their conversion as merely an external factor comparable to Moses Mendelssohn’s abandonment of the old Judeo-German dialect (Yiddish). For Graetz, Borne’s harsh view of Judaism was unrelated to Borne’s own genuine convictions. Rather, Borne’s criticism of Judaism was indebted to Friedrich Schleiermacher, known for his anti-Jewish positions. Overlooking Borne’s own articulations, Graetz views him as a Jew “in spite of himself.”\(^{23}\) Heine, in turn, is seen by Graetz as even more of a Jew than Borne. He attributes Heine’s criticism of Judaism to the innately Jewish propensity for self-criticism. According to Graetz, Heine criticizes “the imitativeness of the Jewish religious reforms.”\(^{24}\) Apparently, Heine viewed religious reformers as “accommodationists” attempting to merely mimic Christianity, and rather than choosing this approach, he converts to Christianity. Here again, Graetz dismisses Heine’s critical stance as a result of Hegelian influence. For him, Heine’s conversion was “opportunistic” and he describes him as feeling “guilty about officially forsaking Judaism.” Heine’s *Confessions* stirred a commotion, especially when on his deathbed he was presented as “returning” to Judaism; he responded that he never denied his Judaism, hence there was no need to “return” to it. In Graetz’s view, Heine’s writing was rooted in Jewish history and resembled the style of Abraham Ibn Ezra, Yehuda Al-Harizi, and Emmanuel of Rome. Graetz avoids applying the term self-hatred to either Borne or Heine because in his eyes, neither was able to fully distance himself from Judaism. Ironically, this view is shared by
Treitschke’s antisemitic position that Jews belong to a “race” and hence cannot stop being Jewish. This also matches Brenner’s view of thrownness and givenness. The issue, though, might be precisely in the desire to distance oneself rather than in the actual success of doing so. The conditions placed on the Jewish community that would have allowed their inclusion would have completely abrogated their self-identification. The general requirements were as follows: To abandon the Hebrew language, to forego circumcision, to give up adherence to dietary laws (kashrut), to transfer services to Sundays, and to change or fully abandon the Talmud.

After the Revolution of 1848, the political climate in the German Confederation started to change to allow more inclusion. As a reflection of this change, even those who held more orthodox views (e.g., Samson Raphael Hirsch or Leopold Zunz) were swayed to a more liberal stand. Gradually, the process of Jewish acculturation (and assimilation) also increased. In the 1850s, the modern Jew acquired the epithet “liberal” Jew, and Judaism assumed the form of “nonconfessional political liberalism.” As a result, “the Jews who were thrown into non-Jewish society by state centralization and Enlightenment ideology, Germans during the Napoleonic era were forced to reorient themselves to a profoundly changed situation.” Jewish self-identification continued to undergo profound change, from a ghetto mentality to a universalist view. However, even such most liberal German Jews as Adolf Fischhof’s views were colored by German-centricity which in effect hampered his universalism.

In the meantime, the desire to fit in and to shed Jewish particularism led to many changes. Not only did religious services continue to be altered to resemble Christian services, but the Jewish overall profile, including occupational status, became modified as well; Jews felt compelled to distance themselves from occupations traditionally perceived as “Jewish,” e.g., commerce but also journalism. As the inclusion of the Jews in the larger society gained more currency, so did the process of assimilation, so that by the 1870s not only had a large number of German Jews became highly assimilated, but a very small percentage felt inclined to live according to Jewish law. Secularized (and assimilated) Jews attempted to blend into the society. In the meantime, secular Jews, who represented a majority of German Jews, came to be perceived as a threat to German society.

To better understand the dynamics of the German-Jewish relationship, we should consider the idea that German self-perception was influenced by a Volk (folk) mentality. The concept of a Volk, developed by Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), maintained that a shared German
history extended back to the prehistoric Teutonic past. This single German racial stock could under no circumstances include Jews. When history itself contradicted the idea that Bavarians and Prussians came from the same “stock,” the idea was emphasized even more strongly. Further, the differentiation between the concepts of Kultur (culture) and Zivilization (civilization) had a negative impact on the German perception of Jews. Writing in 1845, the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) envisioned an ideal Germany free from Jews. He wrote: “I see only one way to grant them [Jews] civil rights . . . cut their heads off one night and plant new ones in their shoulders that contain not a single Jewish idea.”

While the Volk idea attributed Kultur to German qualities of loyalty to a common past and tradition, Zivilization was viewed as something foreign, an unwelcome sign of modernization, cosmopolitanism, and opportunism. Jews were identified with the destructive force of Zivilization. Yet, for Herder, “in their philosophies,” Mendelssohn, and before him, Spinoza, “did not seem . . . ‘Jewish.’”

It is noteworthy that—in contrast to the German view of modernization as at least partly negative and opportunistic—Jews identified modernization with the emergence of individual freedom, urbanization, acceptance of secularism, and other progress, including industrial. From the moment of the Enlightenment’s promise of inclusion came hope for opportunity not merely for Jewish advancement, but for “travelling together in the direction of moral improvement and rational behavior will . . . have the added benefit of closer relations between Jew and Gentile.”

The place of the Jews in German society continued to be contested, and this change in self-identification came to be perceived as a sign of a weakened loyalty that concerned not only Jewish religious leaders, but also Germans. In 1873, Wilhelm Marr published The Victory of Jewry over Germanism, and in 1879 founded Antisemiten-Liga (the Antisemitic League) with the single purpose of “saving our German fatherland from complete Judaization and to make life tolerable there for the descendants of the original inhabitants.” Taking a racial view of Jews, he argued that Jews could not be converted to Christianity and that Reform Jews were most dangerous because of their lack of transparency.

Adolf Stoecker, the Prussian court preacher, also focused on liberal Judaism as an abomination and argued that rather than reforming Judaism, the most logical step would be to abandon it. To this end, he organized, in 1878, the Christian Social Worker’s Party; in 1879, his highly successful lecture entitled “What We Demand of Modern Jewry,” described Jewish hopes for assimilation as a threat to the German nation. Germans were urged to protect the nation
by avoiding any contact with Jews and by preventing any Jews from entering the public sector. He advocated instituting strict quotas and reorganizing the nation’s economic structure to preserve German culture by ensuring that it remained Germanic and Christian.

The ideas espoused by Marr and Stoecker were shared even by those who stood at the center of intellectual life. In “A Word about Our Jewry,” Treitschke, a professor of history at the University of Berlin, argued that any prejudice against Jews resulted from the sheer number of Jews populating the German states. He was angered by Graetz’s *History of the Jews in the Nineteenth Century*, which, in his view, justified the virulent antisemitism spreading through Germany. While he reluctantly accepted the possible shedding of Jewishness, and subsequent assimilation, he was adamant that those who emigrated from other countries could never blend in. For German Jews to be accepted, assimilation should be “complete and unqualified, not [the] creation of a German-Jewish synthesis that would make a mockery of the entire German cultural tradition.” Theodore Mommsen, a historian of comparable stature to Treitschke, defended Jews as German citizens. And yet, his position hardly differed from Treitschke’s. Mommsen urged Jews to hasten their complete assimilation, leaving no trace of any distinctiveness. For him, as for many other Germans, Jews were not seen as capable of becoming part of *Volkish Kultur*.

After all the long years of exclusion, many German Jews regarded themselves as nothing but Germans and desperately wanted to belong at any cost, including conversion. Some Jews hid their Jewishness, while others argued that there was no contradiction between their German and Jewish identities. Their Judaism was simply a religious persuasion that could not prevent them from feeling loyal and dedicated to German ideals. This is clearly contrary to Brenner’s perception of who is a Jew, as discussed above. Recall that Brenner was making the same argument. Yet in his view, religion is irrelevant and conversion has no impact on one’s essence.

We have already noted the environment of rather palpable hostility riddled with a strong ambience of confusion. The issue of assimilation was central to this environment of ambivalence. To shed additional light on the complexity of the issue of assimilation, I briefly turn to Franz Boas (1858–1942), a German Jew and founder of the relativistic, culture-centered school of American anthropology. His student years from 1877 to 1881 in Germany were colored by *Volkish* ideology and the antisemitism stemming from it. The almost palpable, clearly noticeable goal was to clean *Volkish* culture from any polluting influences coming from Jewish cosmopolitanism. Given this environment, a number of German Jews, including Boas, opted for
emigration. He left Germany by the age of twenty-six and immigrated to the United States. He was a latecomer to the American Jewish community, since many German Jews had left Germany after the collapse of the 1848 revolution. Boas prided himself “an enlightened universalist who had transcended both ethnic provincialism and supernatural religion.”

Boas’s timing in coming to the United States was much closer to the mass immigration of East European Jews fleeing oppression in the Russian empire following the 1881 assassination of Tsar Alexander II. The attitude of the German-Jewish community was antagonistic toward the new Jewish immigrants because of their manifest Jewish religiosity. Concurrently, the broad American population viewed these immigrants as uncultured and offensive. Thus, to be associated with these East European Jews posed a threat to German-American Jews. Boas was determined to preserve only his German identity, as he believed in the absence of any specifically Jewish essence and thus a Jewish identity was not worth preserving.

In Boas’s eyes, the way these Jews practiced Judaism was incompatible with the principles of humanism and individual freedom. Following German differentiation between *Kultur* and *Zivilization*, it is quite ironic that Boas was critical of the adherence of East European Jews to traditional ways of practicing Judaism. Contrary to Germany’s high esteem of tradition, Boas dismissed adherence to one’s tradition as an inability to abandon the dogma that holds one in chains. Writing in clear terms of the Enlightenment’s privileging of intellectual and rational thought, Boas was dismissive of any signs of affect.

Given his doubts about the very existence of the objective reality of a particular ethnic identity—which in effect contradicts his professional interests—Boas did not feel any need to assimilate. It was sufficient for him to simply dissociate himself from identification with other Jews. In the speech “Race and Progress” he argued against becoming assigned to a group that does not give one any sense of meaningful belonging. This “assignment,” he argued, can neglect one’s individuality. It becomes even more problematic when each individual is still looked upon as a member of the despised group. By and large, Boas seems to demonstrate the internalized external perceptions of his early years in Germany.

Assimilation was a necessary emancipation from “clan” mentality into independent individuality and a direct entryway into acceptance. Distancing himself from a despised group whose characteristics were explicitly and outwardly manifested seemed to be Boas’s solution to prevent being despised himself. For him, assimilation became merely the process of melting into
one’s adopted culture as a means of elimination of any ethnic antagonism. In his view, if there are no specific groups identifiable by their “otherness,” there will be a “lack of objects” of hate and discrimination. Assimilation (by which he meant melting into the culture) provides an entrance into the larger society and an exit from one’s own. Dispensing with any archaic traditions is a step in the direction of ethical humanism conceived in terms of world brotherhood. The Boas example is a clear demonstration of ambivalence, tension, and confusion related to the issue of self-identification. His solution was a reduced identification with or distancing from both his own ethnic group and from religion. Boas can hardly be considered a self-hating Jew because he did not see himself in terms of his ethnic or religious Jewishness, yet his discomfort with the manifested Jewishness of other Jews leaves this question open. For Boas, contrary to Brenner, Judaism as a culture or nationality was not a sufficient draw to retain his identification as a Jew. In rejecting Judaism as a religion, he felt no need to keep the ethnic identification. Yet, his experience of marginalization and his observation of the marginalization of others made him interested in the issue of “otherness.”

By and large, the hopes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries resulted in neither inclusion and reconciliation nor public support. By the end of the nineteenth century, the majority of German Jews supported political liberalism and yet, while some Jews benefitted from a somewhat circumscribed inclusion, this never fully trickled down to the Jewish community at large. Eventually this support became problematic especially for those Jews who still maintained some religious affinities. Orthodox Jews rejected any commitment to universalism and liberalism, viewing the bond between liberalism and religious indifference as the road to complete assimilation. In 1910, Felix Goodman wrote an article warning that political liberalism erased the Jewish religion. Being a liberal Jew amounted to supporting progressive liberal causes and a vaguely defined universalism through the neglect of Jewish causes. These efforts continued until the new wave of anti-Jewish hostility erased the distinction (in their eyes) between those Jews who remained observant and those who rejected Judaism; regardless of this choice, they were lumped together under the same label “a (despised) Jew.” Liberal Jews’ commitment to pluralism was not met with the same commitment by German society. Despite some different rhetoric, neither liberal Germans nor Christian conservatives, and not even anti-Christians, envisioned Jews as full-fledged members of German society with equal rights. The difference
among these groups was in either demanding the full eradication of Jewishness or in proposing some demeaning compromise.

In addition, there appeared a negative impact of the “selective” approach of favoring some individual Jews: By granting limited rights presumably based on “merit,” but often related to higher socio-economic status, this “preferential” treatment contributed to the feeling of being immune from discrimination. Moreover, it led to a bifurcation between “privileged” Jews who often gravitated to assimilation and those who remained marked by their “Jewishness.” Hannah Arendt argues that assimilated Jews lost the ability to “distinguish between friend and enemy, between compliment and insult.” And, she adds, they started to “feel flattered when an antisemite assures them that he does not mean them, that they are exceptions—exceptional Jews.” Because of the desire to be selected as one who deserves the “exception,” these Jews felt compelled to conceal anything that could identify them with Jews en masse.

The benefits granted to Jews after 1812 were slowly being chipped away. Yet, the period of almost sixty years, from 1871, when the newly established Second Reich had granted Jews, among other citizens, full political equality, affected Jewish self-conception. Nonetheless, a number of German Jews questioned the true intent of the German states. Given the requirements placed on the Jewish community, they were doubtful that there was ever a sincere desire to see any Jewish reform. The requirements continued to stigmatize Jews and were designed to prevent them from assuming any positions of public authority. In response to restrictions in the political sphere, some Jewish leaders proposed absolute separation of the political and religious realms. For instance, Zacharias Frankel (1801–1875), a Bohemian-German rabbi and historian, maintained that emancipation should first and foremost affect political rights. Abraham Geiger (1810–1874), who later became one of the central architects of the Reform movement, despite disagreeing with Frankel on a number of other issues, shared this position. In his view, Jewish emancipation was predicated upon acceptance of the ideas of emancipation by the society in which the Jewish community was embedded. If in turn, there was nominal support in terms of acceptance, which, in effect, amounted to nothing but erasing Jewish particularity, emancipation would be nothing but empty rhetoric.
Wissenschaft Des Judentums

The question of Jewish identity suggests the need to rethink the relationship between Jewish identity and Jewish learning. Wissenschaft des Judentums (Studies of Judaism) was a response to this reconsideration. The Wissenschaft des Judentums (WJ) in Berlin during the 1820s was a movement built on the premise of the systematic pursuit of knowledge and scholarship. An encyclopedic entry from 1820 defined Wissenschaft as “the embodiment of knowledge systematically turned into a whole, in contrast to a mere aggregate.” It was the first attempt to produce serious critical studies of Jewish history and culture, and the Hebrew Bible. Hegel did not even consider Jewish history to be significant in relation to its tragic events. He wrote that “The tragedy of the Jewish people is not a Greek tragedy[;] it cannot evoke fear or compassion, since both of them arise from a necessary false step of a beautiful creature, while that [destiny of the Jews] can only arouse repugnance. The destiny of the Jewish people is the fate of Macbeth, who had to be crushed by his own beliefs.” Through rigorous scholarship (Wissenschaft), the movement would demonstrate that post-biblical Judaism continued to shape world culture, and its scholars argued that Judaism was no longer a distinctive culture, but part of the larger world culture. Wissenschaft des Judentums scholars, despite attempts to embody the elusive notion of academic objectivity, revealed a romanticized version of the Jew as one who is attractive to his non-Jewish neighbors and functions at very high levels without being compelled to extricate himself from a Jewish environment.

Assuming an apologetic tone, WJ became branded as “the Enlightenment-inspired ecumenism.” Yet, Nils Roemer argues that this ecumenism was somewhat limited since early historians of Wissenschaft des Judentums rejected the degenerate Ashkenazic past, which they rationalized as being an outcome of continuous persecution. They were much more comfortable with the Sephardic tradition. Its vision shared the quest for a unique national spirit influenced by Kant’s Critique of Judgment and G.W. F. Hegel’s “the whole animated by an absolute spirit.” Immanuel Wolf in his 1822 essay, “On a Concept of a Science of Judaism,” wrote that Wissenschaft des Judentums was composed of two overlapping (yet somewhat contradictory) goals: an intellectual and professional validation of Judaism that allowed for a modernized Judaism, but without completely obliterating traditional Judaism. The overall goal was to find meaningful ways for Judaism to creatively integrate with modernity rather than to flee from it.
Another important goal for these scholars was to demonstrate that Jewish identity is compatible with a scientific approach to learning and functioning. The analysis of Jewish sources was reconceived in terms of scientific analysis, which for many WJ scholars inadvertently led to “[t]he overthrow of rabbinism and the emergence of religious reforms.” Immanuel Wohlwill, assuming a certain essentialist focus, argued that “the freer, scientific attitude forces its way through the weed-infested underbrush of ceremonialism, grown mechanical and mindless through millennia of habit—and it perceives, still present within, the same divine idea, just as it had once clearly revealed itself.” The overall goal of critical analysis was to rebuild Judaism for a newly conceived emancipated Jew. Elements that could not withstand criticism, an inherent feature of WJ, would crumble and disintegrate and what remained would represent a modern and reinvigorated Judaism that was compatible with reason and overall embodied the intellectual characteristics of the modern world. This approach was not uniformly embraced, but was viewed by some as an undermining of Jewish unity, the sanctity of Jewish tradition, and, by extension, Jewish identity itself.

The adherents of the neo-Orthodoxy of Samuel Raphael Hirsch accepted Wissenschaft des Judentums only insofar as it preserved the continuation of “Talmud study, the reverent study of the sacred texts.” In his opinion, “true Jewish scholarship … was a Wissenschaft des Lebens, and living scholarship; it has taught traditional Jews how to lead their lives and it was also the Wissenschaft der Juden in the sense it belonged uniquely to Jews.” For the Orthodox, the Jewish Theological Seminary in Breslau, led by Frankel, represented “insidious sources of contamination” indisputably connected to assimilation.

The detrimental effects of assimilation concerned Hirsch, who viewed religion as the sole basis for Jewish identity. In his view, not observing the Law led to a guilty conscience. The suspended commitment to Judaism meant breaking the chain of generational transmission and losing the ability to understand one’s own tradition. A guilty conscience was a direct route to self-negation. The link between assimilation and self-hatred can be surmised and it can be claimed that certain aspects of Wissenschaft des Judentums were primarily assimilationist. For instance, Moritz Steinschneider (1816–1907) noted that modern Jewish Studies were ready to provide Judaism with a “decent burial” with Judaism absorbed into the larger world. Similarly, Eduard Gans (1798–1839), Hegel’s dedicated student, stated that “the Jews must completely incorporate themselves into [the social and cultural fabric of Europe].”
By the end of the twentieth century, Wissenschaft des Judentums in Germany showed definitive signs of decline. After World War I, the movement was criticized by three different sources. First, scholars believed that the movement undermined Jewish identity by neglecting to investigate the roots of the Jewish past. Second, Jewish intellectuals led by Franz Rozenzweig (1886–1929) were concerned that estrangement from religious faith would translate into alienation from Jewish life and distance highly assimilated German Jews even further from Judaism. In their opinion, Jewish Studies should be neither apologetic nor focused on edification, but centered on the sources of Jewish life needed to create self-understanding and to sustain Jewish identity. Lastly, the most severe criticism was voiced by the Zionists. Ahad Ha’am (1856–1927), founder and proponent of cultural Zionism, viewed Jewish scholarship as a “monument to our spiritual enslavement.”

Concern over preservation of Jewish identity and worry about assimilationism were present in these three groups. It is highly ironic that it was Nazism that introduced its own Wissenschaft des Judentums in the form of Rassenforschung (racial research). As the Nazis began to close down the institutions of Jewish learning, assimilation was in effect ended.

In a nutshell, the tension that persisted within Wissenschaft des Judentums amounted to the question of whether its goal was “Wissenschaft or Judentum,” or, in even cruder terms, critical study or Torah learning. Abraham Geiger chose a different approach, arguing that the goal was to strengthen Judaism by liberating it from rigidity and historical inaccuracies. Making Judaism relevant to contemporary thought and sensibility was not conceived in terms of a “burial” of Judaism.

**Reform Movement**

Reform Judaism, one of the most influential movements within Judaism, emerged in Germany in the 1830s and 1840s as the brainchild of Wissenschaft des Judentums. It aimed to integrate Jewishness within the larger culture and to harmonize the tension between Jewish beliefs and Enlightenment ideas. Undoubtedly, the Reform movement included a large number of progressive thinkers and great leaders. German-born Kaufmann Kohler (1843–1926) presents an interesting example, particularly because of his views on social justice. Similarly to Mendelssohn, he argued for Jewish universalism. Kohler’s view of ethics informed his vision of Reform Judaism as an ethics of duty and responsibility; for him, Jewish ethics were premised on the idea that “life is full of moral promise,” and, because morality is purposeful, it implies
responsibility and demands justice. Viewing justice as the pillar of Jewish ethics, Kohler did not conceive of it in terms of love:

[W]e cannot love all men alike. Love is almost always partial. It overlooks faults, condones wrongs, and spoils character. No state, no human commonwealth can be built upon love. Justice is the only principle of social equality. It asserts the rights of all.56

When injustice does occur, justice will be ensured as “a command and a condition of a divine readjustment.”57 Nonetheless, the idea of “world” brotherhood is organic to his conception of justice. He writes: “Except in a few historical references, the Decalogue appeals to the consciousness of man and not to the Jew only.” Kohler argues that “Love thy neighbor as thyself,” does not apply only to the Jew:

On the contrary, the Talmud expressly states that the basis of that law is the chapter of Genesis which declares that man was made in the image of God. And to avoid all misunderstanding the Law reiterates the command: “Love ye stranger, for strangers ye have been in Egypt.”58

Thus, in its main premises, Judaism is akin to cosmopolitanism and “stands for a religion broader than sect and for a humanity wider than nation.”59

In “The Faith of Reform Judaism,” Kohler opines that viewing Reform Judaism as “a sort of diluted Judaism” is a superficial assessment; rather, Reform Judaism is a response to the necessity to adjust and thus is a living religion. Talmudic Judaism, Kohler argues, failed to protect Jews from hostility, persecution, and attacks. The ancient code became “dead letters” and needed to be creatively reinterpreted. The ideas and hopes envisioned by Mendelssohn and his followers were “to the thousands of Jews what the flame is to the moth” and did not help to preserve Judaism or to prevent massive apostasy. Reform Judaism offered hope, as the prophet Isaiah stated, “Though there be left but the tenth of it and even this will be seared, the stock, the holy seed thereof, remains.” Kohler envisions this stock as the holy seed, as “the perennial spirit, the ever living truth.”60

Kohler refers to Abraham Geiger, who defined Judaism in terms of phases: “Prophetism, Mosaism, Pharisaism, and Rabbanism,”61 each of which worked in accord with existing conditions, adjusting as necessary. The phases represented transformations in belief and practice, suggesting flexibility as “the real genius of the Jewish race,” which “manifested itself neither in the law...... nor in those mystic visionaries pointing to the coming of a Messiah.”62 This is
contrary to Orthodox Judaism’s grave mistake of overlooking Judaism’s greatest achievement: a compromise between the prophetic ideas of justice, righteousness, truth, and mercy, namely, “the uniting force of mankind.” To see the law as frozen in time contradicts the very traditions of Judaism, which maintain the option to reinterpret the law in accordance with the needs of the time. Where Orthodoxy fails to give credit to reason, Reform Judaism claims it to be “the light of God, shining for all ages,” and no longer sees itself as a national religion with a tribal God. The main focus is now universal and placed on the brotherhood of man.

For Kohler, Reform Judaism “Occidentalizes” Judaism, so that it is no longer an “Oriental” religion. Occidentalizing Judaism means modernizing and westernizing it and allowing Jewish people “to be perfectly at home in our Western civilization and to be at one with their fellow citizens, not an alien and a stranger with a foreign tongue.” In line with modern thought, Reform Judaism rejects the Orthodox wall of separation that prevents assimilation. In Kohler’s articulation, viewing assimilation as an enemy of Judaism is an error. He writes: “In assimilating the cultural elements of Babylonia and Persia, of Hellas and Rome, of Arabia and Spain, of Italy, Germany, and France, [the Jews] went ever anew through the process of regeneration.” This regeneration is beneficial not only for the Jewish people but for making the Jew “a vital and vitalizing factor for the culture and the world-view of the people in whose midst he lived.” Assimilation is not a loss of one’s identity and does not include self-negation but rather is the process of adding without subtracting: “Only when the Jew came in close touch with other civilizations, as was the case in Alexandria and in Spain, and again in these modern days, did he realize the real grandeur of his ancestor [sic] heritage and become its zealous sponsor and propagator.” In his articulation, assimilation has no connection to self-hatred argued by others.

Kohler’s vision of Reform Judaism applies to American Jews. Echoing the concern of German Jews, Kohler writes that an American Jew is “a full citizen and patriot” and only in this form can he “bring the message of Judaism to the surrounding world.” A Jew must be accepted as a full citizen to be able to focus on world brotherhood. The greatest goal of Reform Judaism is to strive for “unification, education, and elevation of human race.” In a slightly apprehensive but hopeful tone, Kohler asks: “Will Judaism have no share in this great transformation of man in the course of decades or centuries?” For him, to be accepted does not require negating one’s own identity, and his hope is centered on America.
Germany of 1933 and After

Returning once again to Germany, we note that sixty or so years of proximate political equality gave the German Jews a false sense of inclusion (and security), which contributed to their disbelief in marks of a looming catastrophe. This process had a continuing impact on the formation of Jewish self-perception. We recall that it is the Enlightenment’s promise of integration that encouraged Jews to consider assimilation and a change in their self-identification. Indisputably, the sense of exclusion, marginalization, and insecurity contributed further to a troubled self-perception. This self-perception affected their willingness (or unwillingness) to be part of the Jewish community, to consider Judaism as having any relevance to their lives, or to perceive Jews as sharing a common destiny. A case in point might be Arendt’s portrayal of Stefan Zweig (1881–1942), an Austrian novelist, playwright, and journalist, as the prototype of an “exceptional Jew.” Blinded by his own success and sheltered by his intellectual environment, Zweig could not differentiate between friend and enemy. Even as late as 1940, Zweig continued to admire Karl Lueger (1844–1910)—a leader and cofounder of the Austrian Christian Social Party—as a kindly person who, despite being antisemitic, remained helpful and friendly to his former Jewish friends.

The German environment of 1933 and after provides additional insights into the construction of Jewish self-identity. With Hitler’s ascent to power in 1933, the need to represent the Jewish community and to address political issues became imperative. The Reichsvertretung der Judischen Landesverbande (RL; Reich’s Deputation of German Jews) was organized, renamed after 1935 to Reichsvertretung des Juden in Deutschland (Reich’s Deputation of Jews in Germany). Initially, the RL leadership believed that the Jewish community would be able to engage in some form of dialogue with the Nazis. On June 6, 1933, Leo Baeck prepared a resolution that outlined the expectation that the Jewish community would be treated according to law and on the basis of human dignity, arguing that humane treatment of Jews by the Nazi regime would benefit not only German Jews but Germany as well. This request was rejected. In 1935, the RL issued statements protesting economic discrimination against Jews. Recognizing the utter futility of further such attempts, the statements of protest—psychological rather than political in nature—were published and made accessible to a Jewish audience only.

The Jewish response to discrimination varied across sectarian lines, but provides a window into differing self-perceptions within the Jewish community at this time. Orthodox rabbis viewed
discrimination behaviorally as God’s punishment for having abandoned observance of the Commandments. Inadvertently echoing the German government’s position, they voiced opposition to conversion and to mixed marriage. On the other hand, Heinrich Stern, leader of the Berlin Reform Congregation, believed that assimilated Jews would not be subject to persecution. Other Jewish leaders were willing to internalize the blame as deserved, and some proposed to make Jewish gatherings less obvious and noticeable. Stern advocated voluntarily accepting the status of reduced equality.

Some Jews, uninterested in religious ideology, turned to political Zionism as a means of self-expression. Zionists advocated emigration that, at the outset, corresponded to Germans’ desire to rid Germany of the Jews. On the other extreme, as Polish-born German-American rabbi and writer Joachim Prinz (1902–1988) demonstrates, some Jews, aiming to demonstrate their loyalty to the Reich, joined the League of National German Jews (Verband Nationaldeutscher Juden; VNJ) led by Max Naumann (1875–1933), founder of this league. It advocated the elimination of Jewish ethnic identity through assimilation. Perhaps slightly ironic is the fact that in 1935, the league was outlawed by the Nazis. Keeping in mind the Nuremberg Laws, however, outlawing the league seems to follow the “logic” of Nazi intentions. The VNJ was composed of “fanatics, super patriots, passionate anti-Zionists, and in a very real sense anti-Semitic [people]. They were self-hating Jews who thought they could save themselves by making common cause with the Nazis.” The approach of the National Socialist Jews to other Jews raises the question of the former’s own self-perception as Jews and once again questions the accuracy of the term “self-hatred” in toto. The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 officially reversed all the rights granted to the Jews, and Jewish organizations no longer made the case that Jews were Germans. The Germans and the Jewish people reverted to being distinct entities, and the Jewish people could no longer be viewed as German Jews, but only as Jews in Germany. At this juncture in history, the question of assimilation simply lost its currency.

**Conclusion**

When the term “self-hatred” is given to assimilated, cosmopolitan Jews, this becomes a misleading term. It elides the complexity of historical circumstances, is misleading in its attention to assimilation, and is essentializing in troubling ways, as Brenner and others demonstrate. Identity lies in the interstices of assimilation and a semblance of preserved
“Jewishness,” defined in a variety of ways. In order to interrupt the process of self-negation, Lessing and others discussed in this essay turned to “world brotherhood” as a deployment of the “third path.” They believed that it was through “world brotherhood” that the idea of self-hatred could be creatively redeployed. The new collective consciousness could be termed “worldly” rather than merely “Jewish” consciousness. The ideals of Reform Judaism followed the hopes that inspired Lessing and others. Wissenschaft des Judentums, despite its faults, shortcomings, and disagreements, built a foundation for liberty and justice. Reform Judaism came to focus on larger liberal values. For Reform and secular Jews, it was a “third path” that did not result neither in negating their commitment to the covenant and the covenantal people nor forsaking their relationship with Jewish people. Brenner also offered an option distant from any notion of self-hatred. He rejected religion because he believed it to be based broadly on deceit and uncritical thought, arguing that redemption comes instead as a result of liberation through human self-consciousness. Human worries, anxieties, and despair can be productively redeployed when humans acknowledge the surrounding reality as it is: life is accepted with all its imperfections. As a result, the emphasis is placed on human beings rather than on a transcendent deity. The focus is always immediate and concrete and includes existing along with other human beings. Brenner’s concept of “givenness” negates the idea of self-hatred. Rather than hating oneself for being born into a specific environment or ethnicity or religion, one’s focus is placed on larger humanity.

Lithuanian-born French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1906–95) once wrote, “The traumatic experience of my slavery in Egypt constitutes my very humanity, a fact that immediately allies me to the workers, the wretched, and the persecuted people of the world.” The experience of marginalization and “otherness” sensitizes one to the “other,” without negating one’s own identity. The idea of self-hatred misses the desire to see oneself as a “citizen of the world,” focused on “world brotherhood.” This desire does not negate anyone’s Jewishness but simply points to the complexity of the relationship between identity and assimilation. Building on the premises of Reform Judaism and the hopes of Lessing and others, turning to “common humanity” or to “world brotherhood” did not result in self-negation. Attaching the label “self-hatred” to those who focus on “world brotherhood” is a misunderstanding of this process.
Endnotes

5 Sagi, *To Be a Jew*, 126.
9 Ibid., 175.
11 Goldschmidt, *The Legacy of German Jewry*.
13 Ibid., 115.
14 Ibid., 117.
15 The first congregation that made these changes was in the Netherlands, at Adath Jeshurun in Amsterdam in 1796.
18 Mendelssohn, *Jerusalem and Other Jewish Writings*, 97.
19 Born Joel Golson. He changed his name to a German-sounding name of Stahl (steel).
21 Born Loeb Baruch. Similarly, changed to a Germanic name.
22 Born Chaim (Harry) Heine.
24 Ibid., 70.


36 Glick, “Types Distinct from Our Own,” 551.

37 Glick, “Types Distinct from Our Own,” 546.


39 Glick, “Types Distinct from Our Own,” 560.


44 Ibid., 710.


46 Ibid., 129–130.

47 Ibid., 131.

48 Ibid., 131.
49 Ibid., 132.
55 Ibid., 237.
56 Ibid., 244.
57 Ibid., 245.
58 Ibid., 249.
59 Ibid., 250.
60 Ibid., 326–327.
61 Ibid., 327.
62 Ibid., 328.
63 Ibid., 332.
64 Ibid., 331.
65 Ibid., 332.
66 Ibid., 332.
67 Ibid., 333.
68 Ibid., 333.