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Soviet Stooge or Spanish Socialist? The Political Ideology of Juan Negrín

Jessica Jones

On 30 April 1938 in Barcelona, Spain, Juan Negrín gave a speech delineating his aspirations for the Spanish Republic. In this speech he laid out Thirteen-Points, which were designed to influence the Western democracies and the moderate soldiers in General Franco's territory of the Spanish Nationalists. Since he was in Barcelona, Juan Negrín gave his speech in Catalan. The speech was immediately translated into various languages spoken in Spain. The Thirteen-Points were created with many goals in mind. The first four points were an offer of peace and in the remaining points; Negrín outlined a socialist government for the Spanish People. Negrín's program for implementing the Thirteen-Points was designed for both propaganda value and a pattern for arbitration, which were both more moderate than that of the Popular Front; which formed an electoral coalition and pact that was signed in January 1936 by various left-wing political organizations. Negrín hoped for a negotiated peace, but his Thirteen-Points may have enticed Franco to continue the fight instead. During Negrín's rule, his colleagues, individuals from other political parties, and later historians have argued that he was a pawn of Joseph Stalin. However through analysis of Juan Negrín's Thirteen-Point program, as well as the reactions from supporters and opponents alike, it is evident that both his ideologies and goals were not subject to being a puppet of Stalin.

Before his political leadership and influence in the Spanish Civil War, Juan Negrín was a professor of physiology at the Medical Faculty of Madrid's Central University. He was born in 1892 to a wealthy businessman, which gave him the opportunity to study at the German University of Leipzig, where he become a professor in 1922. In 1929 Negrín joined the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Party; PSOE), which was founded with the purpose of representing the interests of the working class in all of Spain. The PSOE's main objective was to achieve socialism, which helped form the ideals of Negrín's future program and government. In a review titled Juan Negrín; A physician and a prime minister (1892-1956) posted on the Valencia University website, it states, "Negrín joined the Spanish Socialist Party in May 1929 and, from the proclamation of the Republic, he concentrated on politics, dropping out from medical practice and academic activity. He was elected a member of parliament during the three republican terms, aligning himself with the 'central' action of the party, headed by Indalecio Prieto, a very close friend to him until the end of the civil war."[1] Over the next few years, Negrín was a supporter of Indalecio Prieto as he headed the PSOE.

In January 1936 a pact was signed by Spain's Second Republic for various left-wing political organizations to unite under the instigation of Manuel Azaña; this unified government organization was commonly called the Popular Front. Negrín supported the Popular Front government, which included the PSOE, the Unión General de Trabajadores (Workers General Union; UGT), and Partido Comunista de España (Communist party of Spain; PCE), the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (Workers Party of Marxist Unification; POUM), and the Republicans. In September of the same year, Francisco Largo Caballero, Prime Minister of Spain and a
leader of the PSOE and UGT, appointed Negrín Minister of Finance. As Minister of Finance during the Spanish Civil War, Negrín took a controversial decision to transfer the Spanish gold reserves to the Soviet Union in return for arms to continue the war. The decision was controversial due to critic's arguments that this action placed the Republican government under the control of Joseph Stalin. However, Negrín saw it as a necessary measure for the Republic to continue to fight by receiving Soviet support or otherwise be overtaken by Franco and the fascists. In 1936, as the Spanish Civil War began, Largo Caballero had negative feelings toward the Soviet Union and Stalin. Author Michael Alpert discusses the Soviet position in Moscow, 1936, and writes, "Soviet interests were hampered in Spain by the revolutionary stance of the Socialist leader, Francisco Largo Caballero, by the Anarchists, who refused any compromise with the bourgeoisie, and, lastly, by the particular bête noire of the Comintern the POUM."[2] Alpert also claims that the Soviets were interested in helping the Republic from the beginning, "The USSR expressed public sympathy for the Republic, combined with official reticence A meeting was held on the 26th in Prague to discuss channeling funds to Spain."[3]

The May Riots of 1937 led to an overwhelming crisis in the Republican government and severely damaged the Popular Front government. Negrín highly criticized Largo Caballero and his handling of the riots, which, in Negrín's opinion, led to many unnecessary deaths. The President at the time, Manuel Azaña, agreed with Negrín about the riots and on 17 May 1937, Azaña encouraged Negrín to help form a new government by accepting the position of Prime Minister. Historians believe from that point on Negrín had become a communist sympathizer, which helped Stalin to obtain more control over the policies of the Republican government. Juan Negrín formed his new government with the guidance of communist and socialists policies; however, the main problem for the Republic was not Negrín's sympathy toward communists. According to historian Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, Azaña "believed that Negrín's energy and determination made him the necessary man to take up the reigns of government Negrín had a much greater intellectual grasp of international diplomacy and could more effectively and with more conviction plead the Republic's case to the likes of Britain, as he himself was a firm believer in liberal-democratic principles."[4] Becoming Prime Minister in the middle of the Spanish Civil War was a difficult task for Negrín; however, President Azaña had faith in Negrín and his principles, which laid the foundations of his socialist policy. Azaña also believed Negrín was the man best able to improve the Republic and receive the necessary assistance to end the war.

Before appointing Negrín, President Azaña had previously discharged Largo Caballero. In May 1937, while Caballero was Prime Minister and Minister of War, he resisted pressure from the Communist Party, refusing their demands to suppress the POUM. As soon as Negrín was appointed, he proceeded to form a new cabinet. He appointed members of the PCE to important military and civilian posts. In addition, Negrín gave the Communists control of propaganda, finance, and foreign affairs; this lead historian to believe Negrín was a Communist sympathizer. In addition, Michael Alpert writes, "Communist front organizations, such as the World Committee against War and Fascism and the International Workers' Aid, called for solidarity with Republican Spain."[5] Republican Spain was supported greatly from these organizations from the beginning.

The Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939 was divided between the Spanish Republic and the Nationalists. The Spanish Republic, on the left, included the interests and aid from the Soviet Union, the International Brigades and Mexico. The Nationalists on the right exceeded the left in aid with support from Italy, Germany and Portugal. As Spain's last prime minister during the Second Republic, Negrín was the leader of the left and was responsible for the success of Communist policy during the last years of the civil war. Many leaders
during the war and scholars today debate Negrín's motive for seeking aid from the Soviet Union and ultimately debate the motives of the Comintern in the Spanish Civil War.

The Comintern was an international Communist organization that was founded on March 1919 in Moscow. The Comintern fought for the means to overthrow the international bourgeoisie and sought for the creation of an international Soviet republic as a transition stage to the complete abolition of the State. Negrín wanted the support of the Soviet Union during the Spanish Civil War. In Burnett Bolloten's book, The Spanish Revolution; The Left and the Struggle for Power during the Civil War, Bolloten quotes Walter Krivitsky, a Soviet spy. Krivitsky says, "Dr. Negrín, of course, saw the only salvation of his country in close cooperation with the Soviet Union."[6] As a result of Negrín's Declaration of his Thirteen Points, many have debated the true motives for involvement of the Comintern in the Civil War.

Negrín's First Point aims, "To ensure the absolute independence and complete integrity of Spain." David T. Cattell suggests on a review of The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War by E. H. Carr, "Once the Soviet Union decided to intervene these agents began to interfere directly in the politics, military command, and strategy of the Spanish Republican government. They increasingly manipulated not only the government but also the various political groups fighting on the side of the Republic. The most important of these was the publication of Palmiro Togliatti's Opere, vol. IV in 1979. Togliatti played a leading role as a Comintern agent manipulating events in Spain and reporting to Moscow."[7] Negrín was a man of resistance and determination. He only sought aid from political parties and revolutionaries who he knew would help the Spanish Republic. In order for Juan Negrín "to ensure the absolute independence and complete integrity of Spain," he believed close cooperation with the Soviet Union was necessary. Others disagreed completely with this belief and it has now become one of the most highly debated topics of Spanish Civil War history.

Documents discovered in 1990 in the Soviet Military Archives in Moscow have given historians a better understanding and a clearer view of the nature and roles of the Comintern during the Spanish Civil War. The interpretations of these documents in comparison to other documents and autobiographies are at times confusing and do not assist Negrín and his Thirteen Points. Andy Durgan's article concerning the Comintern and the International Brigades reads, "Their [Comintern] participation was also part of a wider policy engineered by Stalin both to win an alliance with the Western democracies and to maintain his influence in the international labour movement. The International Brigades, like the rest of the Communist movement, were subordinated to this aim."[8] This statement clearly goes against Negrín's Second Point, stating, "The liberation of our territory from the foreign military forces of invasion and from those who have entered Spain since July, 1936, and who under the pretext of technical collaboration, are intervening or attempting to dominate the economic and juridical life of Spain in their own interests." According to these documents, Stalin and the Comintern were looking for their own interests in Spain after the end of the war. Negrín sought help from the Comintern and Stalin. He was aware, due to the concern of others that Stalin and the Comintern might be only assisting the Republic for their own personal gain after the war. He had faith that the Republic would be strong enough to instill his clear intentions, presented in his Thirteen-Point Program. In the end, it did not matter what Stalin's motives were, because Negrín made his own war aims clear through his speech on 30 April 1938 to Spain and other parts of Europe.

Historians question whether the Soviets were fighting to help the Republic in the revolution against Franco and Fascist dictatorship or for their own self-seeking commune motives. Negrín wanted the support of the Comintern and Stalin to help him achieve the aims of his Thirteen Points; however the history is clear that,
Stalin and the Communists were helping Spain for their own personal motives. *The Spanish Civil War, The Soviet Union, and Communism* by Stanley Payne, "offers the first comprehensive narrative of Soviet and Communist intervention in the revolution and civil war in Spain." Payne's use of a broad range of Soviet and Spanish primary sources gives readers the opportunity to see another perspective of the Soviet and Communists intentions in Spain. He documents Soviet strategies, the activities of the Comintern, and the role of the Communist Party in Spain during the war. Background is drawn to analyze the transition of the "Third Period," the period from 1928 to 1935, to the Popular Front age. Furthermore, he focuses, in great detail, on Stalin's decision to intervene in Spain.

Payne's argument throughout the text concludes that the motives of the Soviet Communists were not counterrevolutionary in Republican Spain. Thus, Payne argues that the Soviets were not, as assumed by most, working secretly against the Leftist movement. Many reviews have been presented on Payne's work with many agreeing with his use of primary sources. One such reviewer from the University of Florida, George Esenwein, discusses Payne's work with a positive tone. Esenwein writes,

The most provocative thesis advanced by Payne is his argument that the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and the Soviet communists did not, as so often is assumed in Civil War historiography, play a counterrevolutionary role in Republican Spain. This is because Payne insists that most historians have either consistently overlooked or misread the communists' own strategy for pursuing revolutionary goals in the era of the Popular Front. The author points out, for example, that it was the particular circumstances of the mid-1930s that impelled the communists to jettison their highly unsuccessful, head-on confrontational tactics of the so-called 'Third period.'

Esenwein continues to discuss Payne's strategies about the Soviet's motives and transitions. Although Esenwein agrees that Payne's work is new and compelling, he also has his doubts. Esenwein writes, "Yet, in making his case for interpreting their strategy as "revolutionary," the author does not fully account for the fact that, in context, communist policies and practices could legitimately be interpreted as counterrevolutionary." When reviewing Payne's book, readers gain central knowledge on his argument, but as Esenwein suggests, one will not have concrete perspectives to acknowledge his interpretation as true. Furthermore, in disagreement with Payne, Esenwein does not use Negrín's Thirteen Points to prove the Soviet Union's counterrevolutionary tactics, such as Point Eleven, which states, "The Spanish army shall be free from all hegemony, bias or party " Payne insists that historians have overlooked or misread the communist's strategy; however, when comparing this to Negrín's Points, one can conclude that Payne was not looking at the whole picture and was rather sympathizing with the Soviets.

Further research proves that the Comintern was not fighting for the interests of Negrín's Thirteen Points or the motives of the Spanish Republic. Daniel Kowalsky references George Orwell, a British writer who fought for the POUM in the Spanish Civil War, in his article, *Stalin and the Spanish Civil War*. Kowalsky argues that most historians have accepted that the Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War continued in order to generate superior controversy over other conflicts during this time, including the burgeoning origins of World War II. Kowalsky considers the sources he has to state the debate about the USSR and uses Orwell to say, "in an equally famous book, Orwell's condemnation of the communists' destruction of anarchist militias in *Homage to Catalonia.*" Here, Kowalsky argues that Orwell, along with the POUM, blamed the communists for the internal conflicts of the Spanish Republic. This contradicts Negrín's Thirteen Points, including Points Eleven through Thirteen, with Point Thirteen stating, "Complete amnesty for all those
Spaniards who wish to co-operate in the tremendous work of reconstruction Spain and making her once again a great nation." The Comintern was not working in the best interests of Spain, but rather purposefully causing problems within the Spanish Republic.

The set of documents from the Moscow archives reveal that the Soviet Union sought not only to "swindle the Spanish Republic out of millions of dollars through arms deals but also sought to take over and run the Spanish economy, government, and armed forces in order to make Spain a Soviet possession, thereby effectively destroying the foundation of authentic Spanish antifascism."[13] The Yale University Press editor, Radosh, uses the account by George Orwell in Homage to Catalonia to support his thesis and furthermore ties its relations to the film Land and Freedom (Tierra y Libertad) by Ken Loach. Radosh uses both sources to note the various hostility, which certain groups, including the POUM, held against the Soviet Communists. The actions of the Comintern proved to not be in accordance with Negrín's Thirteen Points. Negrín, however, believed that the aid of the Comintern would help win the war against the Nationalists, with hope that his Thirteen Points would be put into affect.

As Negrín took on his role in government he appointed Marcelino Fernandez, a member of the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia; PSUC), to head the Royal Spanish Carabineers; also known as the frontier guards. This decision greatly disturbed Indalecio Prieto, whose friend, Victor Salazar, was the presumptive leader of the Royal Spanish Carabineers. Leftist critics believed the appointment of Fernandez was a noticeable act of opposition by the Socialist administrator. When Negrín became Minister of Finance in September 1936 it was understood by the government at that time that he would transform the Royal Spanish Carabineers into an elite division under the exclusive control of the moderate Socialists.

As Negrín made the decision to give more power to the communists, many of his colleagues began to criticize his judgment. According to Palmiro Togliatti, the Italian Communist Party leader, Negrín furthered the cause of the Communist Party because it was, "the only party that loyally supported [him]."[14] Togliatti reported that the Socialists, Republicans, and Anarcho-Syndicalists accused Negrín of being "an agent of the Communists."[15] Negrín's colleagues were fearful of the Communist influence on Negrín's decisions and policies. Another very debatable topic in this argument involves the question of why the Communists were willing to help Negrín and the Republic in the first place. Historians and many Spaniards incorrectly believed that the appointment of the Communist Marcelino Fernández to head the Carabineers was a significant contribution to the Communists ultimate objective: the control of the states armed forces.

Rafael Méndez, one of Negrín's most devoted friends and a socialist, claimed that Negrín "was to break up the Communist military units quickly once the war was over. These units he supported and even allowed to grow because the Soviet Union was our only source of supply."[16] This claim is supported in Negrín's First Point, the goal of which was, " to ensure the independence and integrity of Spain. Spain is completely free from any foreign interference, no matter the nature and origin of such interference." Burnett Bolloten furthers this argument, and writes, "It is true that Negrín, to the manifest irritation of Togliatti, had on occasion shown restraint and circumspection in dealing with the Socialist executive "[17] Negrín sought support from Stalin; however, he was aware of potential negative results. Méndez continued to discuss Negrín's motivations for receiving help from the Communists and Bolloten discussed how Méndez claimed that after the Munich Crisis, in late summer of 1938, Negrín told the British ambassador and the head of the British secret service in Republican Spain that, " if Britain and France would sell the Republican government...
the war material it needed to win the war, not only would he remove the two Communist ministers from the
government but he would outlaw the PCE and replace the Communist officers holding command positions in
the army with non-Communists."[18] Negrín wanted to be the Republic's leader who worked hard to receive
the necessary support to win the war. Bolloten quotes Negrín from July 1938, "I am not carrying on the war
against Franco in order to see the revival of a stupid and parochial separatism I am waging the war because
of Spain and for Spain; because of her grandeur and for her grandeur. Those who believe otherwise are
mistaken. There is only one nation: Spain!"[19] Negrín sought support from those countries that supplied his
government with the necessary means to help strengthen Spain as an independent nation with integrity.
None of Negrín's Thirteen-points implied that Spain would be a pawn of the Stalinist Communist State,
which many critics from both the left and right claimed.

As Negrín created his government in May 1937, he advised Rafael Méndez, who was then the Director
General of Carabineers, that the elite division should be "impenetrable to Communist infiltration."[20]
Through the support of Méndez, Negrín sought artillery support against the Nationalists. The critics did not
fully understand Negrín's motivations behind allowing the Communists to take on important leadership roles.
It is important to note that this information is based only on Méndez's word, but it is also vital to recognize
that at this time Negrín was still close to his friend and mentor, Indalecio Prieto.

One critic of the Socialist Party that opposed Negrín's support from the Communists was Luis Araquistain, a
senior adviser to the Prime Minister Largo Caballero. Before Negrín became Prime Minister, Araquistain was
in France as an ambassador for the Popular Front Government, where he was purchasing arms for the
Republic. When Negrín took office, Araquistain returned to Spain, but the Communist Party sought to
remove him and have him imprisoned. Araquistain described Negrín's government as the "most cynical and
despotic in Spanish history."[21] Araquistain was unable to understand Negrín's ideologies and thus believed
Negrín was creating a government that would become a communist state.

April 1938 proved to be a time of major political moves for Juan Negrín. Salvadó writes, "Negrín was a
pragmatist seeing the pursuit of victory."[22] At this time, Negrín was aware that the war could not be won
without the Western democracies changing their position. By April 1938, Negrín had also taken over the
ministry of Defense and had removed Indalecio Prieto from the government. The Republic's most critical
task was to concentrate all of its main efforts on sustaining long-term defensive capabilities. Having
amicable relations with the Communists was imperative. Leaders of the leftist organizations did not grasp
Negrín's ideologies; however, Negrín was attempting to gain the support of western governments by
announcing his plan to de-collectivize Spain's industries.

Negrín's government was still controversial, as he relied heavily on the Communists to deprive the
Anarchists of power and to curry favor with Stalin to acquire weapons and equipment. The Anarchists
organized three main confederations after General Francisco Franco's failed coup in July 1936 when the
Spanish Civil War began. The Anarchists were active in keeping the country running and holding back the
Francoists until they were attacked by Negrín's Republican Government and their Communist allies. What
many people found controversial was Negrín's decision to transfer the Spanish gold reserves from the Bank
of Spain to the Soviet Union in return for weapons to continue the war. At the time, these reserves were
worth $500 million. Critics argued that this decision placed the Republican Government under Stalin's
control. They only saw one side of Negrín's decision that the reserves were being used for more war rather
than to help the country after the war and, thus, they were fearful. They did not believe that Negrín's

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objective for the gold reserves was to receive help to win the war and create a country that would be self-governing and independent. In addition, Salvadó wrote, "As Negrín eloquently told Western diplomats in October 1938, he would get rid of the Communist minister as soon as the Allies provided the military supplies which so far were only coming from Russia."[23] With the support of Russia and socialists groups, Negrín was able to create the new government that the people had expected from the previous administration. Unfortunately, the Republic was defeated due to many reasons, including the disorganization and persistent reluctance of the Left to collaborate and fight as one unit against the Nationalists.

Negrín's new government sought help everywhere in 1938. In spring 1938 the Republic's military faced a debacle and a division of its territory into two parts, which led to a political crisis. The Popular Front had to be reinforced and foreign governments were convinced that the crisis could be resolved by large-scale arms deliveries. Valencia University website writes, "Under the internationalization circumstances of the civil war, the real materialization of resisting until the end would have been impossible without foreign help. As a consequence, Negrín's policy led to international dependence on the USSR and the unprecedented protagonism of the Spanish Communist Party."[24] The Spanish Communist Party at the time wanted to get rid of Indalecio Prieto, Minister of National Defense, whom they saw as a liability. Negrín was convinced that he could not afford to lose external support and was determined to emphasize the importance of an all-out-resistance policy, and thus asked Prieto for his resignation. Bolloten writes, "Méndez was not only a Negrinista but a friend of the Communists. It may be for this reason that in September 1937, only three months after Méndez had been appointed Director General of Carabineers, Prieto-then in the midst of his conflict with the PCE over the control of the army-had Negrín remove him and replace him with Víctor Salazar, his close political associate."[25] Prieto believed this supported his argument of Communist hegemony. Negrín's government was formed on 5 April 1938, with the first order reorganizing the Republican forces to cope with the division of the Government zone into two sections: the Eastern or Catalan Zone and the Central-Sought Zone bounded by the triangle of Madrid, Valencia and Cartagena.

As Negrín quickly led the recovery of Republican Spain, his government received support from foreign countries. The French military attaché, Lt- Colonel Morel, was the first individual to notice and compliment the progress made by Republican Spain. Recognition was given to the new Under-Secretary for War, the Communist, Colonel Cordón, who was working to reorganize the Republican armies. Spaniards and other foreign countries saw this as evidence of Negrín becoming a pawn of Communism. It is important to note that although Negrín was greatly supported by the Communists he continually sought aid from any nation that would help him to achieve his goals.

Alpert discusses that the Spanish Republic looked for support from the United States. He writes, "Outside the League of the Non-Intervention Committee, hopes had been placed in the USA."[26] Unfortunately, the Republic would not receive support from the United States due to an embargo imposed on arms shipments to Spain in January 1937. In addition, the United States claimed neutrality. Alpert mentions, "The 'Radio Priest', Father Charles Coughlin, spoke of '200 Loyalist-Communist' groups in Washington alone, working, as he put it, for the 'crimson cross of Communism'."[27] This information is very intriguing in the sense that outside countries also believed that the Republic was highly influenced by Communists. This information reveals also that the Communist groups in the United States strongly supported the Communists in Spain and were ready to fight alongside the Communists in the Spanish Republican army. Spaniards who feared that Negrín and the Republic would become a pawn of Communism may have been greatly startled by this information. Unfortunately, the political organizations at this time did not recognize Negrín's objectives for...
his government and why he sought help from Communists. They simply believed that as the Communists slowly exerted their influence over Negrín and his government, they would eventually take over the government for themselves, making Spain a puppet of Stalin. One reason for the Communists in the United States wanting to help the Republic was to fight against the Nationalists objectives.

Mexico supported Negrín’s government before it was created. Alpert writes, "From Mexico, which has been supportive of the Republic, some 2.2 million US dollars' worth of arms were shipped to Spain in 1937 Some 330 Mexicans, of whom only a few survived, fought in Spain. Mexican sympathy for the Republic, particularly at international diplomatic level and the League of Nations, effectively isolated Mexico, not only from the USA but also from most Latin American countries."[28] The support from Mexico, a Democratic Republic, is evidence that Negrín sought help from any country willing to give the Republic the support it needed in order to end the war. In addition, Alpert writes, "The Negrín Government also made efforts to gain Vatican support, capitalizing on the Catholicism of the Basques."[29] Negrín wanted to help the Church and asked Manuel de Irujo, the Basque Nationalist and Minister of Justice, to release the priests from prison. Negrín wanted to improve Spanish society while receiving the necessary support to end the war. Negrín’s main objective was not to simply end the Spanish Civil War, but shape a free and independent Spain. He sought any support from whoever would help him achieve this aim without becoming their pawn. This he demonstrated through his Thirteen-Point Program, as he set up a socialist government for the people of Spain as an independent nation.

Russian arms shipments first reached Spain on 16 October 1936. On that day, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin sent José Díaz, Secretary General of the Spanish Communist Party a message, "[ ]the liberation of Spain is not the private concern of the Spanish but the general concern of all advanced and progressive humanity."[30] This message contradicted the previous Soviet and Comintern pronouncements that had stressed the USSR's neutrality in the Spanish Civil War. Alpert argues, " It had now become imperative for the Soviet leadership to persuade the democracies of the danger that the new Germany and Italy posed to European peace in general."[31] It is a very debatable argument on why Stalin and his followers were willing to help support the Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War. One argument embodies Alpert’s description above; the USSR wanted to keep the world safe from the dangers of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. In contradiction, some argue that the USSR was in Spain for their own personal gains, which they would claim once victory was secured. This was the main fear instilled within the Spaniards when they foresaw Juan Negrín becoming a pawn of Stalin. This gives great importance to Negrín’s Thirteen-Point program and the underlying meaning of each point. It is evident that Negrín was attempting to dispel the rumors of Soviet control and assure all Spaniards of their independent and socialist future.

In spring 1937 the Soviets were desperate to suppress the revolutionary activity of the Anarchist CNT and the Marxist POUM in Catalonia. The Communists believed that the POUM was attacking the USSR and attempting to divide the Popular Front. This is one of the main faults of the Republic and causes for their defeat. The government at this time was unable to provide structure to the Republican armies and have each group cooperate. Negrín attempted to persuade Franco to end the war in his first four points of his program because he foresaw the struggle on his own home front. The Communists may or may not have had pure objectives to help the Republic; however their presence only caused the Republic more trouble.

For Negrín to prove to his critics that his motivations were pure and that he was not a pawn of the communists he spoke of his Thirteen-Point Program on 30 April 1938 and published them on 1 May 1938.
The First Four Points aimed to motivate Francisco Franco, leader of the Spanish Nationalists, to surrender to the Spanish Republic and end the Spanish Civil War. They assured the Spanish people that at the end of the war Spain would be completely free from foreign interference, with absolute independence and integrity. In addition, Spain would be liberated from foreign military forces and from all industrial partnerships that had intervened or attempted to dominate economic life in Spain for their own benefit. The Spanish people would be represented through a pure democracy, with the right of universal suffrage and national will. Furthermore, the first four points aimed to create a government in which the people were guaranteed full rights. All Four Points embody the first sentence of the First Point, which represents Negrín's peace offering to Franco and the Nationalists in order to end the Spanish Civil War. The remaining points of the program strove to establish a socialist government for the Spanish people. These points include the recognition of sovereignty and independence, civil liberties, land reform, social reform and amnesty for all Spanish citizens.

Negrín's Thirteen-Points put forth significant goals for the Spanish people. Negrín's ideology can be seen throughout these points. It is helpful to interpret Negrín's points as demonstrating evidence of his intent to be independent of Communist influence from Stalin.

The First Point in the program is very important as the introduction to the remainder of Juan Negrín's Thirteen-Point Program. Negrín's language in the first point is direct and clear. It states:

To ensure the independence and integrity of Spain. Spain is completely free from any foreign interference, no matter its nature and origin. This includes the mainland and island territories, which are to be kept intact and safe from outside interference. Other countries, aware of Spain's traditions and its history, will strengthen the ties and promote universality, which have always characterized the people.[32]

Negrín wanted a government, which would ensure the people of Spain that their country was guaranteed complete sovereignty and integrity. Assuring absolute independence included having no restriction, exception or qualification, and perfectly embodying the nature of independence. He sought that Spain be whole, undivided and unified, as well as absolutely independent. These few words captured the attention of listeners everywhere; as they were focused on the change Spain would take in order to achieve these aims. Furthermore, Negrín's government would not allow any interference from any other countries, no matter what their intentions were. This statement coincides with the first statement of the first point, because not allowing any foreign interference leads Spain to be an absolute independent nation.

This First Point is very important as it is the introduction to the remainder of Negrín's Thirteen-Point Program. Negrín's use of language for the First Point uses jargon that his audience would clearly understand and be excited about. After Negrín states that Spain will be free from foreign interference, he then defines the territories. Listeners and readers are able to fully understand Negrín's point. After noting his aims, he continues on the First Point by stating how the Spanish are characterized universally, which is how all Spaniards are defined and classified. He states other countries that are aware of Spain's traditions and its history, will strengthen their ties. This statement does not intend to strengthen ties between allies, rather it raises the idea that other countries that are aware of Spain's identity, will help to strengthen the character of the Spanish people. It also includes those countries that had thus far remained neutral in the conflict. These characteristics are defined by the people and the government, but are not listed in Negrín's Thirteen-point program.
The Second Point of Juan Negrín's program promises is deliverance from foreign military forces,

The liberation of our territory by foreign military forces that have invaded, as well as those elements that have come to Spain since July 1936 through the pretext of technical collaboration, which involved or attempt to dominate the natural progress of Spanish legal and economic life.[33]

Author, Burnett Bolloten writes, "To avoid misunderstanding, the Communist organ Mundo Obrero made it clear that this paragraph was directed at German and Italian military forces and technicians and at those 'who have been placed at the head of all kinds of foreign industrial enterprises established by the invaders in the rebel zone (14 May 1938)."[34] This addition to the original speech is important in deconstructing the second point. The article that appeared in Mundo Obrero was issued to avoid any "misunderstanding" with the Communists. The organ wanted to assure the Communists that Negrín's government was not placing blame on them, but rather the German and Italian military forces and technicians. Mundo Obrero wanted to clarify this in order to keep peace between Stalin and Negrín.

The Second Point clearly states that any foreign military force that is on Spanish territory must leave in order for Spain to be liberated and achieve absolute independence. It also clearly states that this includes any foreign military force that had been on Spanish territory since July 1936 and after. Furthermore this point aims to liberate Spain from all industrial partnerships that have either simply intervened or attempted to dominate the economic life of Spain for their own benefit. This second point helps to define more of Negrín's First Point

The Second Point does raise more questions for listeners and readers. The people may be concerned that some of these partnerships have actually been positive and helpful for the Spanish economy. However; Negrín states that Spain's economy will be liberated from those partnerships that are not helping them and only benefiting foreign industry. Negrín aims to free Spain from suppression, self-serving use, and abuse from other countries. If a partnership is affecting the Spanish economy in a positive manner, Negrín will be more than pleased to keep that industry growing for the development and benefit of Spain.

Point Three discusses Negrín motivation for a People's Republic, and states,

The People's Republic, represented by a strong state that is anchored on principles of pure democracy, to exert its action through a government with full authority that awards the vote, through universal suffrage, and is the symbol of a strong executive branch, always dependent on the directions and purposes that characterize the Spanish people.[35]

Deconstructing this first sentence is critical to understanding Negrín's Intentions of Point Three. Today, according to The American Heritage Dictionary, a "People's Republic" is defined as, "A political organization founded and controlled by a national Communist party."[36] Historically it was a title used by a Marxist-Leninist governments. The ideology behind using this title is that Marxist-Leninists govern in agreement with the interests of the vast majority of the people. This idea is controversial because in order to have pure democracy, one powerful leader cannot run a state. This leads to a corrupt government between the leader and the people. Negrín was motivated to create a People's Republic that was run through pure democracy rather than totalitarian dictates, as in Stalinist Russia. In order to create such a state, Negrín wanted to
pursue a government that would rest directly in the hands of the people, with the guidance of representatives. Negrín's representatives in government would exert full authority to award the vote of the people. Negrín's use of language in Point Three is repetitive in order to get his point across. He uses the phrase "universal suffrage" to connect with the people and inform them of his motivations to create a pure democracy with the right to vote for all Spanish people. Negrín also notes that the People's Republic will have an executive branch to ensure that all points of his program will be enforced. In Spain, the executive branch of government would be vested in Negrín, as the Prime Minister, for him to oversee his points and continue to give the Spanish people what they needed to ensure the independence and integrity of Spain;

Negrín's third point is straightforward. It is meant to ensure that the Spanish People are given universal suffrage and are represented by individuals who will respect this right. The Spanish government would be a "People's Republic." This title aimed to identify with the Spanish people, as written in the last sentence of point three.

Point Four of Negrín's program clearly demonstrates Negrín's objective to be independent of not only Stalin's direction, but also free of any other influence. It states, "the social and legal structuring of the republic will be the work of the national will, freely expressed through a plebiscite, which will take place as soon as the war is over, conducted with full guarantees, without restrictions or limitations, and to ensure those in the opposition will not confront reprisals." The Spanish republic that Negrín was re-creating would be structured by the work of the national will. This also reflects Point Three of the program, which states that the people have the right to vote and be represented. The Spanish republic that Negrín was re-creating would be structured by the work of the national will. This is a continuation of point three of the program, which states that the people have the right to vote and be represented. The vote of the Spanish people will lead to the structuring of the republic; which will be a republic that the people want. When Negrín says, "freely expressed through a plebiscite," it is understood that he means a direct vote of the Spanish people in regard to some important public question. The plebiscite will include a social and legal structuring of the republic and will happen as soon as the Spanish Civil War ended. This is important for the people to understand because Negrín could not act on these while the war was going on. However, once the war was over, he guaranteed the people the opportunity to express themselves through a plebiscite without restrictions or limitations.

The remainder of the points in Juan Negrín's program intended to establish a socialist government for the Spanish people. After pressing for mediation in the first four points, Negrín's Fifth Point begins by offering respect. Point Five acknowledges the many different regions of Spain and asserts the need for regional autonomy. It states, "Respect for the regional freedoms, without undermining Spanish unity; protecting and promoting the development of the personality and particularity of the distinct parts of Spain that instructs the historical makeup of the country, far from separating the nation, constitutes the best welding of these integrated elements."

Negrín sought to unify Spain while also recognizing the differences within the country.
Point Six assures the right of all-Spanish citizens. Through these rights, Negrín offers the people freedom of religion and practices. "The Spanish state will guarantee the fulfillment of rights for citizens in civic life and social life, freedom of conscience, and ensures the free exercise of religious beliefs and practices."[41] Bolloten adds another interesting point after the translation, he writes, "According to Andrés María de Irujo this point was inspired by his brother Manuel de Irujo, a practicing Catholic and, at the time, Basque National minister without portfolio."[42] Andrés María de Irujo was Secretary of the Ministry in 1937 when his brother, Manuel de Irujo was Justice Minister. This information generally sparks interest in readers and historians because the point is inspired by Catholic influence. Juan Negrín's war aims were greatly inspired by others because he aimed to create a government that embodied the needs and concerns of the Spanish people.

Point Seven discusses property and the accumulation of wealth:

The State shall guarantee legal and legitimately acquired property, within the limits imposed by the supreme national interest and the protection of products. The property and legitimate interests of foreigners who have not assisted the rebellion will be respected with a view to the indemnification of the involuntary damages caused in the course of the war. For the study of these damages, the Government of the Republic created the Foreign Claims Commission.[43]

Here, Negrín documents his aim to create a Socialist Government, rather than a Communist state. Within a communist state, the government controls all production and property in general. Negrín clearly offered property owners protection and support. This point is further supported by German playwright and poet, Ernst Toller, who helped to disseminate the Thirteen-Point Program abroad by broadcasting it to the United States from Radio Madrid, and controlled by the PCE. He declared, "You may own a shop, a department store. You may own a textile factory or a jeweler's. Nobody will interfere with your work."[44]

Negrín continues with Point Eight, acknowledging the biggest obstacle to the development of the country; "Profound agrarian reform to liquidate the old aristocratic semi-feudal property, meaning that lacks human national and economy feelings and has always been the major obstacle for the development of the great possibilities of the country. The stability of the New Spain will be based on the enlarged and solid democratic peasantry owner of a land that works."[45] Here, again, it is evident Negrín was striving to create a democracy to help all workers and land owners.

Point Nine defines Point Eight further and states, "The State shall guarantee the rights of the worker through an advanced social legislation, in accordance with the needs of the Spanish economy."[46] This embodies a socialist philosophy by empowering the workers.

Point Ten simply states, "It will be the primary and basic concern of the state in improving basic cultural, physical and moral integrity of the people."[47] In order for this to be achieved, it would be the priority of the Spanish people to uphold their integrity.

In the conclusion to Negrín's Thirteen-Point Program, points Eleven and Twelve discuss the Spanish Army and supporting the League of Nations. Point Eleven affirms, "The Spanish Army at the service of the nation itself will be free from all hegemony in a subordinate role and the people will see that it is an instrument for
the defense of their liberties and independence." [48] This point gives support to Negrin's future claim in October 1938, when he informs Western diplomats that he will get rid of Communist ministers at the end of the war. Point Twelve discusses faithfulness to treaties,

The Spanish government reaffirms the doctrine of constitutional renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. Spain, faithful to all packs and treaties will confirm its political representation in the Society of Nations. And Spain will collaborate in the concert of nations to guarantee the collective security and general defense of the country. In order to contribute in an efficacious manner to this policy Spain will develop and intensify all possible means of defense. [49]

Negrín is clear and precise on his war aims in this point. He assures the rest of the world that his government will be committed to all covenants and will continue to strengthen their defense.

The final point of the program provides amnesty for any Spaniard who wants to help reconstruct Spain. This point also attempts to work on the emotions of the audience by stating,

After a bloody struggle like the one affecting our land we seek a resurgence of the old virtues of heroism and the ideals of the race and eliminate the treason so that our nation will reject totally the idea of vengeance and reprisal and labor in a common act of sacrifice and work for the future of Spain that we are obliged to fulfill for all their children. [50]

This wording indicates Negrín's hope to attract Spaniards to his new government, which will be free of Communism and other foreign influence once the war is over.

After stating his war aims and having them published on 1 May 1937, Negrín immediately took action to reconstruct the Republic and initiation his program. He continued to acknowledge his points in every speech he gave and was supported by many. This is extremely important in demonstrating his desire to be free of Soviet control. His actions reflect his vision portrayed in his Thirteen-Point Program.

Author Bolloten wrote that, "Meanwhile, the thirteen war aims became the programmatic frontispiece of the Negrín government." [51] Negrín used his points in all types of propaganda and political decisions. Bolloten quotes Louis Fischer, Negrín's chief propaganda agent abroad; "The Thirteen Points became the cardinal principles of the Republic. Negrín frequently referred to them in speeches. They were communicated officially to foreign governments and pro-Loyalist propaganda abroad often took them as its text." [52] Negrín's aims were supported all over, including in a radio address that was aimed at foreign opinion. It was also reported in the weekly propaganda bulletin The News of Spain, which was edited by Herbert R. Southworth, a supporter of Juan Negrín for fifty years. Juan Negrín declared in the radio address and bulletin,

We wish to assure the independence of Spain and the liberty of the Spanish people We want the legal aspects of the Spanish State within the bounds of tolerance, liberty and individual guaranteed to be outlined by the Spanish people themselves through a plebiscite. We assure everyone that once the war is over there will be full amnesty. We want a strong firm government of democratic origin Our proposals are guaranteed by a government which has known how to restore order, create an army, unify the people, defend its
territory and which has been the first government in authority for many generations that has succeeded in lining the authority with the aspirations of the people.\textsuperscript{[53]}

With the support of the Communists, Negrín was able to utilize more propaganda and aid. After his Thirteen-Point Program was published, Negrín referred to it frequently to emphasize every point. His government did well within the year but struggled until the end once Franco and the Nationalists took over. Negrín argued "to fight on because there was no other choice, even if winning was not possible, then to salvage what we could-and at the very least our self respect."\textsuperscript{[54]} In addition, he said, "Why go on resisting? Quite simply because we knew what capitulation would mean."\textsuperscript{[55]} Negrín wanted the best for the Spanish people, and sought any means necessary to achieve his war aims produced in his Thirteen-Point Program.

Juan Negrín's Government achieved a degree of unity within the Republic of Spain, which was considered a revolution itself in Spanish history. On 31 October 1937, Negrín announced that he was transferring the central government to Barcelona. This transfer led Catalonia to be increasingly under central control. The most serious criticism of Negrín's Government came from the Anarchists who still pursued an agenda to create a syndicalist State after the Civil War. Their criticism was national and linked Largo Caballero and his Socialists. In contrast, Madrid, the inherited land of the Communist party, had no apparent regional problems in October 1937 due to the Communists being the proponents of central control.

After his war aims were announced and published, Negrín not only successfully overcame the regional differences in Spain, but also was also able to strengthen his position in relation to political opposition. On 1 October 1937, the General Union of Labor (Unión General de Trabajadores; UGT) elected Rodríguez Vega as their new Secretary-General in place of Largo Caballero, who had held the position since 1925. The Communists used his removal from the position to blame Caballero for all the defeats in the Civil War. Caballero became lost and isolated in a country he thought was his home. On 17 October, he gave a speech in Madrid to criticize Negrín's conduct of the war. He stated, "The Government had permitted this speech to be made so that, if possible, Largo Caballero could make himself appear foolish."\textsuperscript{[56]} The speech did not prove him foolish and as a result, the government prohibited Caballero from any further activities. He accused Negrín of being a dictator; however, the Government had no more to fear of him. The removal of Largo from his position itself was a victory for Negrín and the Socialists who supported him.

Negrín's biggest threat and that of the Communist Party, unfortunately, did not come from Largo Caballero. Rather, the real threat was from Indalecio Prieto, who dominated the Defense Ministries. Prieto had developed into a fervent anti-Communist over time. During this time the Communists were no longer increasing in power and prestige, as they had been throughout the time of Largo Caballero. For example, one memorable event during Negrín's administration was the dissolution of the POUM, which is something Caballero had greatly opposed. This demonstrates the relatively weak position of Largo Caballero.

In the summer of 1937, the Communist party had begun to make complex negotiations for their unification with the Socialists. In addition, they created a working pact between the two parties, which was published on 17 August 1937. Hugh Thomas, author of The Spanish Civil War, writes, "This repeated the declared war aims of Dr. Negrín's Government, and added an agreement that the extreme revolutionary Left should be purged. It approved close co-operation between the parties both at home and internationally."\textsuperscript{[57]} This corresponds to Negrín's Thirteen-Point Program, which states that Spain will be purged of hegemony and any corruption to the Government.
At the end of October 1937, Negrín ended all discussions concerning unity between the Communists and Socialists, believing that creating this force would be more suitable for the Nationalists rather than Republican Spain. This did not stop the Communists from pursuing unity with the Republic, which they successfully established in a moderate program that allied all youth parties, including the Anarchists in November 1937. Some view this as a Communist attempt to gain more power; however, Negrín was moderating the Republic and keeping to his word.

The Spanish Civil War came to an end on 1 April 1939 with a defeat for the Spanish Republic. Due to Negrín's resistance to Communist control many problems arose for the Republic. The Republic had parallel political forces, and in the long run, did not collaborate as one. Eventually, the internal political problems of the government and the Popular Front finally collapsed. Valencia University website, La Nau, writes,

In fact, the fundamental problem, loyalty-wise, was the evolution of the war and the fact that this was unfavorable to the Republic all along. As military defeats were taken in, in some political forces -republicans, nationalists, and socialists opposed to the Negrinist faction of the Socialist Party- but also among the military, the idea spread that it was them who had to take over the Republic's government [58].

The internal struggles of the Republic led to corruption and deceit. The future power of Negrín's Thirteen-Point Program would not be possible due to the Republic's inability to unite. Furthermore, La Nau writes, "In his immediate exile, Negrín did not manage to control the centrifugal tendencies of republicans and socialists, and his government, in office until 1945, was contested by different sectors. It is unavoidable to say that Indalecio Prieto became his most implacable critic. On Negrín's death, however, he deeply regretted not having made up with him."[59]

During the month of June, 1939, a collection of seven letters was exchanged between three Spanish Republican leaders in Mexico City. The three leaders include; Juan Negrín, the last Prime Minister of Republican Spain and head of the Spanish government in exile, Senor Don Indalecio Prieto, and Senior Don Francisco Mendez Aspe, former Republican Minister of Finance and Economy. "These letters form perhaps the best available background for an understanding of the issue that came to a head at Paris when the rump Standing Committee of the Spanish Cortes met on July 26"[60] The language between the three leaders gives readers an understanding of the hostility Prieto had against Negrín. It is interesting to research these letters after exploring the Communist support for the Republic in the Spanish Civil War and arguing that Juan Negrín was not a pawn of Communism.

The orders of the letters are as follows:

1. Letter from Dr. Juan Negrín to Senor Don Indalecio Prieto, 16 June 1939
2. Letter from Senor Don Indalecio Prieto to Dr. Juan Negrín, 17 June 1939
3. Letter from Senor Don Francisco Mendez Aspe to Senor Don Indalecio Prieto, 24 June 1939
4. Letter from Senor Don Indalecio Prieto to Senor Don Francisco Mendez Aspe, 24 June 1939
5. Letter from Dr. Juan Negrín to Senior Don Indalecio Prieto, 23 June 1939, with a postscript dates 25 June 1939

6. Letter from Senor Don Indalecio Prieto to Dr. Juan Negrín, 26 June 1939

7. Letter from Dr. Juan Negrín to Senor Don Indalecio Prieto 28 June 1939

Of the series, the first letter, which Negrín wrote to Prieto contains a telling monolog. The letter is professional in tone and he clearly states his intentions. As noted earlier, Negrín was chosen as head of the government in March 1938 and in April 1938, he announced his Thirteen-Points. At the same time, in April 1938, Negrín excused Prieto from his position in office. From that moment forward, Prieto developed bitter feelings toward Negrín. Their relationship had never been supportive, due to Prieto's desire for power over Negrín. Unfortunately, Prieto would never see that power once President Azaña appointed Negrín to create a new government in early 1938. The first letter addressed to Prieto from Negrín proves Negrín's desire to be on good terms with Prieto, but alludes to Prieto having opposing feelings. Negrín wrote, "On my arrival in Mexico I found a letter in which you said that you considered that our friendship—already severely strained by the end of April 1938—was completely broken since April 1939. Allow me to observe that perhaps you are referring to your personal feeling of friendship toward me, not to mine toward you, which continue to be the same."

Negrín continues on throughout this paragraph to locate the problems Prieto has with him. Negrín discussed when he believed the "rift in our friendship" began, was when Negrín dismissed Prieto from the Ministry of Defense position. Negrín proceeds to inform Prieto that he believed removing Prieto from office was in the best interests of the country. Lastly, Negrín notes that Prieto mentioned he would feel neither offended nor oppressed as he was dismissed from the government. Clearly, Prieto had different feelings that he was hiding from Negrín at the time.

As Negrín's letter continues, he persists on discussing Prieto's feelings once he was dismissed from office. Negrín wanted to get to the heart of the problem that Prieto was placing in front of him. Negrín's use of language is cordial yet strong. He uses phrases such as, "my dear friend", and "personally grateful", to capture Prieto's attention and hopefully prove to Prieto that their friendship is important to him. Negrín wrote, "Once you were out of the Government (which I assume was still the Government to you) you made the decisions or gave advice which, however justified or even praiseworthy they might have been in case of danger or urgency, represented, by and large, an assumption of authority that you yourself would have tolerated from no one."

Negrín realized Prieto was against the change in government and was bitter of his loss of position. Furthermore, Negrín's main goal in the first letter is to cement their friendship, he wrote, "But so far as I am concerned, I am not interested in entering into polemics or discussions of what is past. I am concerned with cementing a friendship, which you alone have attempted to definitely destroy."

Negrín, at this point, is laying aside his personal emotions in the interests of friendship. His use of language clearly points a finger at Prieto for the destruction of their friendship; however, Negrín is open to rebuilding it.

Before writing the letter, Negrín had faced rejection from Prieto through any other form of communication. Negrín's use of a letter became the only means for getting Prieto's attention. At the beginning and end of this first letter, Negrín mentioned his desire to have a direct consultation with Prieto. Negrín also informed Prieto that he understood Prieto did not want to speak with him. Negrín wrote, "You refuse to talk to me. It
appears that you allege the existence of a certain incompatibility. If you think it exists, you ought not to refuse to state the reasons to my face. It is always more efficacious to discuss things openly, than to lend a ready ear to gossip, lies and distortions that can poison the firmest affections."[65] Negrín was very persistent in speaking with Prieto and conversing in an open discussion, face to face, in order to help them work through their differences rather than create more, or so Negrín hoped.

The letter Negrín wrote in addressing his concerns toward Prieto proves that Negrín's new government, which he formed in April 1938, troubled Prieto. Although the first letter does not address any hostilities to Negrín's government and his Thirteen Points, it establishes the problems caused when Negrín created the new government for the Spanish Republic.

As Negrín concludes his letter, he pleads one last time to meet with Prieto. He writes, "For all those reasons I beg you to abandon your intransigent attitude, and to accept an interview of whose satisfactory outcome I am certain, if the good will and the good faith which are mine are shared by you."[66] Negrín's persistence attests his main goal to meet with Prieto and resolve their problems.

Negrín's Thirteen Points reconstructed the government he established in April 1938. Prieto had shown resentment to Negrín since they both had been in office together. Prieto and Negrín first met in 1931 in Cortes, where Negrín represented the Canary Islands. Later, after being dismissed from office, Prieto gave his portrayal of Negrín, and stated, "We became very friendly, but later we became political adversaries. The differences that gave rise to our enmity were due to the fact that, while head of the government, he allowed himself to become subservient to the Communists, a subservience that has been fully proved, although he insisted on denying it."[67] This statement provides evidence of Prieto's opposition toward Negrín and his government. It is apparent Prieto was against the Communists and felt that while Negrín received support from them, it would destroy the Republic. This noticeably goes against Negrín's First Point, which states the independence of Spain. Negrín sought to form a government for a free country not under the influence of Communism. He received help from the Comintern, under Stalin, which set fear into certain people, such as Prieto.

Negrín's first letter addressed to Prieto sets the underlying goal; Negrín would like to meet with Prieto to discuss the differences they have and to rebuild their friendship. Negrín was a positive political leader who looked for advice from his adversaries, including Prieto. Although this letter does not mention anything about Negrín attempting to rebuild their friendship due to their break from their differences over the support of the Communists, it is evident that this is the fundamental issue.

The collection of letters did not resolve any issues between Negrín and Prieto. Their issues continued to thrive and author Gerald Howson writes,

During the 1950's certain Republican leaders in exile who had been responsible for arms procurement during the civil war, notably Indalecio Prieto (the Minister of the Navy and Air Force and later the Minister of Defense) and Luis Araquistain (the Republican Ambassador in Paris under Largo Caballero), began to claim that the Soviets had cheated the Republicans, for the value of the materials sent must have been well below the money that the Soviets had deducted from the $518 million to cover its cost.[68]
It is evident that many Spaniards had hard feelings towards Juan Negrín far after the war had ended, but after researching his aims that he outlines in his Thirteen-Point Program, it is plausible that he sought to create a positive Peoples Republic without being a puppet of Stalin and Communist ideals.

As Prime Minister of the Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War in 1938, Juan Negrín’s ideologies and philosophies characterized his aims for a People's Republic of Spain. His Thirteen-Point Program, speeches, letters, and actions give evidence to argue that he wanted Spain to be an absolute independent nation and not a pawn of Stalin and Communism. As read and interpreted from the record, Negrín clearly aims to assure absolute independence and the integrity of Spain. As we have shown, the first point of the Thirteen-point program is designed to incorporate the other twelve points and excite the Spanish People to his vision of a Peoples Republic; a democratic government. Negrín’s program illustrates his positive aims for the Spanish Republic and shows evidence that he was not a puppet of Stalin.


[3] Ibid., 49.


George Esenwein. *Europe: Early Modern and Modern.*

[Ibid., 6.](#)
[Ibid., 11.](#)
[Ibid., Yale University Press.](#)
[Burnett Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution; The Left and the Struggle for Power during the Civil War*, 609.](#)
[Ibid., 609.](#)
[Ibid., 609.](#)
[Ibid., 609.](#)
[Ibid., 610.](#)
[Ibid., 613.](#)
[Ibid., 610.](#)
[Ibid., 610.](#)
[Spartacus Educational. *Juan Negrín*. http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/SPnegrin.htm.](#)
[Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, *The Spanish Civil War*, 144.](#)
[Ibid., 144.](#)
[http://www.uv.es/cultura/e/expjuannegrining.htm. La Nau; Vice-Chancellor's Office for Culture. May 1, 2009.](#)
[Burnett Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution; The Left and the Struggle for Power during the Civil War*, 610.](#)
[Ibid., 161.](#)
[Ibid., 162.](#)
[Ibid., 163.](#)

1. Asegurar la independencia absoluta y la integridad total de España. Una España totalmente libre de toda injerencia extranjera, sea cual sea su carácter y origen, con su territorio peninsular e insular y sus posesiones intactas y a salvo de cualquier tentativa de desmembración, enajenación hipoteca, conservando las zonas de Protectorado asignadas a España por los convenios no sean modificados con su intervención y asentimiento. Consciente de los deberes anejos a su tradición y a su historia, España estrechará con los demás países los vínculos que imponen una común raíz del sentido de universalidad, que siempre ha caracterizado a nuestro pueblo.

2. Liberación de nuestro territorio de las fuerzas militares extranjeras que lo han invadido, así como de aquellos elementos que han acudido a España desde julio de 1936 con el pretexto de una colaboración técnica, que intervienen o intenten dominar en provecho propio la vida jurídica y económica española.

3. República popular, representada por un Estado vigoroso que se asiente sobre principios de pura Democracia, que ejerza su acción a través de un Gobierno dotado de la plena autoridad que confiera el voto ciudadano, emitido por sufragio universal, y sea el símbolo de un Poder ejecutivo firme, dependiente en todo tiempo de las directrices y designios que marque el pueblo español.

4. La estructuración jurídica y social de la República será obra de la voluntad nacional, libremente expresada mediante un plebiscito, que tendrá lugar tan pronto termine la lucha, realizado con plenitud de garantías, sin restricciones ni limitaciones, y asegure a cuantos en el tomen parte contra toda posible represalia.

Point four of Juan Negrín's Thirteen-point Program.
Les 13 Points Pur Lesquels Combat L’ Espagne, Declaration Faite Par Les President. April 1938. 5. Respeto de las libertades regionales, sin menoscabo de la unidad española; protección y fomento del desarrollo de la personalidad y particularidad de los distintos peque integran a España, como la impone un derecho y un hecho histórico que, lejos de significar una disgregación de la nación, constituyen la mejor soldadura entre los elementos que la integran.

Ibid., 6. El Estado español garantizará la plenitud de los derechos al ciudadano en la vida civil y social, la libertad de conciencia, y asegura el libre ejercicio de las creencias y prácticas religiosas.

Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War Revolution and Counterrevolution, 642.

Les 13 Points Pur Lesquels Combat L’ Espagne, Declaration Faite Par Les President. April 1938. 7. El Estado garantizará la propiedad legal y legítimamente adquirida, dentro de los límites que imponga el supremo interés nacional y la protección a los elementos productores. Sin merma de la iniciativa individual, impedirá la acumulación de riqueza que puede conducir a la explotación del ciudadano y sojuzgue a la colectividad, desvirtuando la acción centralizadora del Estado en la vida económica y social. A este fin, cuidará del desarrollo de la pequeña propiedad y garantizará el patrimonio familiar y se estimularán todas las medidas que le lleven a un mejoramiento económico, moral y racial de las clases productoras. La propiedad y los intereses legítimos de los extranjeros que no hayan ayudado a la rebelión serán respetados, y se examinarán, con miras a la indemnización que corresponda a los perjuicios involuntariamente causados en el curso de la guerra. Para el estudio de esos daños, el Gobierno de la República creó ya la Comisión de reclamaciones extranjeras.

Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War Revolution and Counterrevolution, 645.

Les 13 Points Pur Lesquels Combat L’ Espagne, Declaration Faite Par Les President. April 1938. 8. Profunda reforma agraria que liquide la vieja aristocrática propiedad semifeudal, que al carecer de sentido humano, nacional y económico, ha sido siempre el mayor obstáculo para el desarrollo de las grandes posibilidades del país. Asiento de la nueva España sobre una amplia y sólida democracia campesina, dueña de la tierra que trabaja.

Ibid., 9. El Estado garantizará los derechos del trabajador a través de una legislación social avanzada, de acuerdo con las necesidades de la visa y de la economía españolas.

Ibid., 10. Será preocupación primordial y básica del Estado el mejoramiento cultural, físico y moral de la raza.

Ibid., 11. El Ejército español al servicio de la nación misma estará libre de toda hegemonía, dependencia o partido y el pueblo ha de ver en él el instrumento seguro para la defensa de sus libertades y de su independencia.

Ibid., 12. El Estado español se reafirma en la doctrina constitucional de renuncia a la guerra como instrumento de política nacional. Español, fiel a los pactos y tratados, apoyará la política simbolizada en la Sociedad de Naciones, que ha de presidir siempre sus normas, ratifica y mantiene los derechos propios del Estado español y reclama como potencia mediterránea un puesto en el concierto de las naciones dispuesta siempre a colaborar en el
afianzamiento de la seguridad colectiva y de la defensa general del país. Para contribuir de una manera eficaz a esta política, España desarrollará e intensificará todas sus posibilidades de defensa.

[50] Ibid., 13. Amplia amnistía para todos los españoles que quieran cooperar a la intensa labor de reconstrucción y engran-decaimiento de España. Después de una lucha cruenta como la que ensangrienta nuestra tierra, en la que han resurgido las viejas virtudes de heroísmo y de idealidad de raza, cometerá un delito de traición a los destinos de nuestra Patria aquel que no reprima y ahogue toda idea de venganza y represalia en aras de una acción común de sacrificio y trabajo que en el porvenir de España estamos obligados a realizar todos sus hijos.


[52] Ibid., 644.

[53] 26 October 1938. Ibid., 645.


[57] Ibíd., 491.


[60] A collection of seven letters exchanged between Spanish republican leaders in Mexico City during the month of June, 1939, 1. UCSB Mandeville Special Collections Library.

[61] A collection of seven letters exchanged between Spanish republican leaders in Mexico City during the month of June, 1939, 3. UCSB Mandeville Special Collections Library.


[63] Ibíd., 4.

[64] Ibíd., 4.
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[65] Ibid., 5.

[66] Ibid., 5.

[67] Burnett Bolloten, *The Left and the Struggle for Power during the Civil War*, 444.
