

1999

John Dewey, Art and Public Life

Mark Mattern
Chapman University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/polisci_articles

 Part of the [Arts and Humanities Commons](#), and the [Political Theory Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Mattern, Mark. "John Dewey, art and public life." *The Journal of Politics* 61.01 (1999): 54-75.
DOI:10.2307/2647775

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact laughtin@chapman.edu.

John Dewey, Art and Public Life

Comments

This article was originally published in *The Journal of Politics*, volume 61, issue 1, in 1999. DOI: [10.2307/2647775](https://doi.org/10.2307/2647775)

Copyright

University of Texas Press

John Dewey, Art and Public Life

Mark Mattern
Chapman University

This article explores, criticizes, and extends John Dewey's arguments about art in relation to public life in a democracy. Dewey believed that art is a potent form of communication through which community is developed and political action undertaken. Although correct, Dewey erased conflict, negotiation, and contestation from art, and failed to address the crucial role of power in the world of art. Three distinct kinds of political action through art are developed: pragmatic, deliberative, and confrontational.

Dewey's vision of a public life of collaborative problem solving supported by communal relations is by now well known to most political theorists. What remains little known is that he connected this vision of public life to art. Dewey, who stands nearly alone among political theorists in not equating communication with speech, believed that art is the "most effective mode of communication that exists" ([1934] 1980, 286), "the most universal and freest form of communication" (270), and "communication in its pure and undefiled form" (244). Although these are exaggerated claims, they indicate Dewey's esteem for art and, given the centrality of communication in his political philosophy, suggest the hope he held for its role in a democratic politics. Political theorists have generally ignored Dewey's work on art; this may be a mistake in light of claims by others that it is "the capstone of his entire philosophy" (Zeltner 1975, 2) and the "central, guiding thought" of his philosophy (Alexander 1987, xiii), which "clarifies all the leading ideas of Dewey's philosophy" and "constitutes the most persuasive introduction to his thought he has so far written for nonphilosophers" (Hook 1939, 194).¹

The crux of Dewey's argument was that art, if closely tied to people's everyday lives, is a form of communication through which people learn about each other's similarities and differences, break through some of the barriers to understanding and awareness, and develop some of the commonalities that define

I would like to thank the staff at the John Dewey Center at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale for assisting me in the research for this article.

¹ More recently, Robert Westbrook (1991, 401) argued that Dewey's *Art as Experience* (1934) is "one of the most powerful statements" of his radical politics.

community. I believe that Dewey was right about art and its potential role in a democracy. However, Dewey's work on art suffers some of the same shortcomings as his work in political philosophy. Most notably, he erased conflict, negotiation, and contestation—in short, politics—from the world of art. Nor does he address the crucial role of power in the world of art, which can as easily create and sustain social barriers as break through them.² An additional problem with Dewey's argument, a problem that he recognized but failed to resolve, is that art as we normally understand the term is hardly connected to people's everyday lives. His analysis of "art as experience" and its communicative capacity hinges precisely on whether or not art is closely tied to people's everyday lives. Unfortunately, in his time as in ours, most art gathers dust in museums and occurs in performance halls far removed from the average person's daily life.

However, the same criticism cannot be made of art forms found in popular culture nor of some kinds of public art. These are characterized precisely by their everyday character, by the degree to which they infiltrate people's daily lives, for better or worse. These include, for example, popular music and film, murals, community and guerrilla theater, popular fiction and poetry, billboard art, and community-based art fairs and projects. If we broaden the meaning of art to include these forms of popular art, then art is potentially better able to play the communicative roles that Dewey envisioned. This broadening is consistent with Dewey's own presumptions about the nature of art. Reflecting the same commitment to an egalitarian, participatory democracy that informs his other work, Dewey developed a view of art and aesthetics that is deeply democratic in its implications. He argued against prevailing views of art as the domain of an elite with specialized knowledge and skills, and attempted to develop a view in which artistic and aesthetic experience is widely available and accessible. Dewey opposed "invidious" distinctions between high, or "official," and low, or popular, arts, arguing that all rankings of higher and lower are "out of place and stupid. Each medium has its own efficacy and value" ([1934] 1980, 187, 227). Broadening the meaning of art to include popular forms is also consistent with trends in the world of art—which, in recent times, has seen "increasingly blurred distinctions" between high and low, elite and popular, nonprofit and commercial art forms (Dubin 1992, 7).

In this article, I pursue two related goals. The first is primarily interpretive in nature. Especially if one considers the importance attached to Dewey's work on

²Dewey has been amply criticized for removing conflict from his vision of public life. See, e.g., Damico 1978 (61–63) and Westbrook 1991 (81–82). For criticisms of Dewey on the subject of power, see, especially, Diggins 1992 (153) and Mills 1966. See Westbrook 1993 for a rebuttal of Diggins and a partial defense of Dewey on the subject of power. See, especially, West 1989 (106, 102) for examples of criticisms of Dewey for relying too heavily on science and education as forms of empowerment and denying the constructive power of confrontation. See, e.g., Habermas 1970 (69), Ryan 1992 (275–76), and Westbrook 1991 (315–18) for criticisms of Dewey for failing to link power to specific political institutions and organizations.

art by the theorists noted above, Dewey's work on art has received too little attention by political and social theorists. In recent times, the two prominent exceptions to this trend are Robert Westbrook (1991) and Alan Ryan (1995), both of whom devote considerable space to Dewey's work on art. Both, however, focus almost exclusively on the "consummatory" dimension of Dewey's work on art, or Dewey's quest to make all experience "artistic" or "aesthetic" in character. This was, unquestionably, Dewey's primary intent in *Art as Experience* (1934). Yet, there is another, strategic, dimension to Dewey's work on art that merits attention; and it is this aspect of his work that I will explore in this article. Dewey argued that the communicative capacity of art can be harnessed in the quest for community and the robust public life that he envisioned. This work, barely suggestive and deeply problematic at times though it is, deserves to be introduced more fully to political theorists interested in his work. My second goal is to improve and expand on Dewey's work in order to contribute to a widening of the way that we think about contemporary issues in democratic theory, especially public life and citizenship. Culture, especially popular culture, is still often dismissed as superfluous to serious politics. Like Dewey, I believe that making good on the democratic ideal requires attention to all aspects of our way of life. Art, like other aspects of our social environment, is partly constitutive of citizen identity and capacity, and it offers potential avenues for participation in the public life of a democracy. Dewey recognized these connections to politics, and explored them in both fruitful and rudimentary ways. They remain to be extensively explored by political theorists.

In the following section, I begin following the links between art and public life laid down by Dewey. In his main work in political philosophy, *The Public and Its Problems*, Dewey articulated a vision of a public life of collaborative problem solving supported by communal relations at both local and national levels. In this vision of public life, communication in multiple forms—especially in the forms of inquiry and traditional forms of media, but also in the form of art—represented for Dewey a means of translating common concerns into common goals, of working through obstacles to collaboration, and of discovering or creating the commonalities of community. As Dewey put it, "There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men [and women] live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common" (1916, 4). Given the central role of communication in his vision of public life, communication became for Dewey "the only possible solution" ([1927] 1985, 155). In the first section that follows, I address Dewey's arguments about art as a form of communication; in the second, I discuss Dewey's arguments about art as a potential means of developing community; and in the third, I use Dewey's limited but suggestive work on art and political action to outline three potential frameworks for understanding political participation in the world of art.

Art as Communication

Dewey's account of art as a form of communication rests on solid sociopsychological foundations. Since art is "prefigured in the very processes of living" ([1934] 1980, 24), Dewey tied his work on art and aesthetics to the same generic account of an ongoing interaction between humans and their physical and social environment that forms the basis of all his mature work. Human identity, Dewey argued, is formed through meaningful interactions with their social world, at the same time that humans transform their world. An individual artist's character and personality is thus linked to her or his history of social experiences. Often wrongly attributed to some disembodied flash of inspiration, individual artistic expression is actually deeply grounded in prior experiences that are "wrought into [the] being" (89) of the artist, and are embodied in the present in the form of memories and meanings that are recovered and given new life in an act of expression. These memories and meanings are the "nutriment" for creative expression (89). As one interpreter of Dewey put it, art carries a "load of association" with it (Ames 1953, 149). If human identity is tied to a particular social context, as Dewey argued, then the experiences and memories expressed in a work of art are not those of an isolated individual. Art potentially expresses the experiences of many people, since the artist's identity is connected to a particular group of people and since, presumably, the artist has had many of the same experiences common to others.

In emphasizing the common and social determinants of art, Dewey left ample room to theorize the communicative capacity of art. If art expresses common memories and meanings, then it is tied at least partially to public and objective social circumstances, or to the shared experiences of people in an objective social and physical environment. According to Dewey, "the impression the artist has does not consist of impressions; it consists of objective material rendered by means of imaginative vision. The subject-matter is charged with meanings that issue from intercourse with a common world. The artist in the freest expression of his [or her] own responses is under weighty objective compulsions" ([1980], 306). The messages of art are thus at least partially publicly accessible. They are not merely tied to a subjective and private world of the artist. It is the public, common quality of art that gives art its communicative capacity.

Unlike ordinary language that only signals experience, art is a form of direct experience. According to Dewey, art can express meanings that are not accessible through words, and it does this through creation of a new experience. While scientific and intellectual language "gives directions" toward the quality of experience, art—including poetry, literature, and drama whose artistic effects are produced wholly or partly through language—directly creates or re-creates that quality of experience (215–16). This is perhaps more clear of music than other art forms, since it is more directly physical than others. Listeners experience music with their bodies, as sound waves. "Sound agitates directly" and has the "power of direct emotional expression" (237–38). According to Dewey, "the

sounds emitted by musical instruments stir the atmosphere or the ground. They do not have to meet the opposition that is found in reshaping external material" (158). "Music," he said, "gives us the very essence of the dropping down and the exalted rising, the surging and retreating, the acceleration and retardation, the tightening and loosening, the sudden thrust and the gradual insinuation of things" (208).³ This physicality of music allows musicians to turn their moods and emotions into sounds that are readily and directly shared by listeners. Meanings can be shared between performer and listener without recourse to language, in a way that produces immediate quality of experience. Of course, a powerful image in a movie, or a moving passage in a work of literature or poetry, can produce these same immediate qualities of experience.

Despite emphasizing the social roots of art, and despite acknowledging that art "denotes a quality of action and of things done" (229), Dewey focused almost exclusively on works of art as texts removed from their social context. His *Art as Experience* is full of interpretations and analyses of specific art texts, while nearly empty of discussions of the broader social context in which these art texts circulate and that defines a larger communicative arena in which these art texts acquire meaning.⁴ The communicative significance of art extends beyond its textual meaning to include the active work that is ongoing in a social context in which its meanings are created, contested, and changed; and to include the social relationships and practices that swirl around the art piece. For example, the full communicative significance of the AIDS Quilt can only be appreciated as an art form in action. As it circulates and grows, it draws people into participation, and creates spaces for interaction and social networks of production and consumption. As a text removed from this process of production and use, the Quilt says much about the lives and sentiments of participants; yet, its full meaning can only be appreciated in terms of the wider context of its circulation. Similarly, the communicative significance of '60s rock music included its role in creating and

³ Dewey's reference to "the exalted rising, the surging and retreating, the acceleration and retardation, the tightening and loosening, the sudden thrust and the gradual insinuation of things" strongly suggests sexual meaning, whether he intended it or not. It is no accident that music often accompanies romantic and erotic social practices. Music *affects* us: it plays to our affective selves. This includes, of course, our gender and sexual identities. See, especially, McClary 1991 for a discussion of "music, gender and sexuality." See also Williams (1961, 66–69), who argued that "rhythm is a way of transmitting a description of experience, in such a way that the experience is re-created in the person receiving it, not merely as an 'abstraction' or an emotion but as a physical effect on the organism—on the blood, on the breathing, on the physical patterns of the brain . . . it is more than a metaphor; it is a physical experience as real as any other." Artist Leon Golub (quoted in Dubin 1992, 3) argues that "a description is flatter and less sensory. If you say 'suck' [it's less powerful than] if you see such an action portrayed."

⁴ This criticism applies only to Dewey's treatment of specific works of art or, in other words, to art in the conventional sense of the term. As I have already noted above, Dewey's primary intent in *Art as Experience* was to theorize art as a character of experience imbued with consummatory value. In this latter, broader sense, *Art as Experience* is precisely about social context. Yet, in analyzing specific works of art, Dewey made little or no effort to interpret them as works in motion within a communicative context.

sustaining a countercultural and political movement associated with drug experimentation, generational rebellion, and opposition to the Vietnam War. It helped create various communicative arenas, ranging from large concerts such as Woodstock to informal gatherings in listeners' homes to dance halls in high schools and colleges, which nurtured this movement and within which this movement could develop and occur. Both of these art forms—the AIDS Quilt and '60s rock music—opened social and public spaces within which communicative interactions, necessary for the creation and sharing of meaning and the development of commonalities of identity and orientation, could occur.⁵

While unnecessarily limiting the scope of art as a form of communication, Dewey also overstated the clarity and certainty with which art communicates. Art typically communicates more obscurely and ambiguously than he appeared to admit. He recognized, but downplayed, problems of interpretation, disagreement, and variable intent. Different art forms are more or less clear in meaning. At one extreme, the lyrics of many country-and-western songs express direct, simple sentiments that are hard to misunderstand. At another extreme, much public art is abstract, meaning that it is “not public in the sense of shared aesthetic vocabulary, symbolism, or worldview between artists and their audiences” (B. Hoffman 1992, 115). More fundamentally, at least some abstract and modernist art is intended to be *in* the world, not necessarily to say anything meaningful *about* the world (Griswold 1992, 111). In between these extremes are multiple forms of art whose meaning is more or less accessible. While the average person may have difficulty interpreting the meaning in a painting by Cezanne or Renoir (two of Dewey's favorite illustrations), most people can more readily interpret the meaning of a popular movie or a mural. This is not necessarily a problem inherent in Cezanne or Renoir; as Dewey noted ([1934] 1980, 98) it is partly a matter of artistic and aesthetic education. Of course, not everyone receives the same aesthetic education, resulting in varied abilities to understand any given work of art or range of aesthetic experience. As Dewey argued, in his time (as in ours), the prevailing “museum conception” of art ensured that most people would receive little practical education in so-called fine art and its significance. Severed as it is from most people's daily lives, its meaning is likely to grow more opaque. The meaning in popular forms of art is more accessible to average people precisely because the art forms are more closely tied to their daily lives.⁶

⁵ See Weinstein 1989 on the AIDS Quilt. On '60s rock music see, e.g., Denselow 1989; Frith 1981, 1984; James 1989; and Street 1986.

⁶ It may be tempting to argue as well that popular culture is more accessible because it is simple and crude. Theodor Adorno, for example, argued that popular music is unoriginal and uninventive, banal and vulgar, constituting the “dregs of musical history,” offering its listeners a “training course in passivity,” and “undermining . . . autonomy and independence of judgment” ([1962] 1976, 24–30). Adorno's dismal view of popular music reflected his reductionist reading of the relationship between capitalism and popular culture, a relationship that he conceptualized entirely as unidirectional, with popular music capable only of reflecting, not determining, the course of history. Dewey rightly steered clear of this kind of argument.

Aesthetic education or not, at least some works of art will remain opaque in meaning, as the discussion above about abstract and modernist art suggests. Also, even given significant aesthetic education, people perceive different messages in art, none of which are necessarily the message(s) intended by the artist. Different individuals interpret the same work of art in different ways, and appropriate the same art for different purposes. As Dewey argued, even the artist sees different meanings in his or her creations ([1934] 1980, 108). If there is room in a work of art for different interpretations, one conclusion to draw is that people will often disagree over its meaning. If people disagree over the meaning of a work of art, then it can be appropriated for different, sometimes contradictory, uses within and between communities. Of course, making an accurate interpretation of a work of art is often not a goal and not the point of its use. Art forms are frequently appropriated selectively for parochial ends. In one perverse illustration, Great Britain's Conservative prime minister Margaret Thatcher once led a group of Conservative youth in a revised version of John Lennon's "Imagine," rewritten to reflect Conservative ideology (Pratt 1990, 5). Rap music is often treated selectively to suggest that it is universally misogynistic and violent. This leads to universal denunciations of rap music by some, and possibly fans racism in the United States by serving as a rationale for blanket criticism of the African-American communities to which rap music is tied.⁷

Finally, while correctly emphasizing the degree to which art is a reflection of human experience, Dewey appeared to assume that a single work of art can unproblematically communicate the identity and experiences of a diverse group of people. If, as Dewey argued, art captures human experience and renders it meaningful for others, then a legitimate window into the identity and history of a people is its art. Although we can never experience the Parthenon the way an Athenian citizen experienced it, according to Dewey, we can nevertheless learn much about Athenian citizenship from it. The Parthenon helps us better understand and appreciate "the bustling, arguing, acutely sensitive Athenian citizens, with civic sense identified with a civic religion, of whose experience the temple was an expression" ([1934] 1980, 4). Yet, we should not assume, as Dewey apparently did, that the Parthenon speaks for all Athenian citizens (not to mention the Athenian noncitizens such as women and slaves who constituted a majority of the population). We should always ask of public art, as did art critic Lucy Lippard (1989, 210), "which public?" As a window into the lives and experiences of any people, a work of art must be considered partial and contestable. Each work of art represents a claim, one among others, to speak for the group; each must be seen as one expression among others that may legitimately express the identity and experiences of a group of people.

⁷ For a discussion of these themes about rap music, see Spencer 1991 and Leland 1992.

Art, Community, and Diversity

In *Art as Experience*, Dewey extensively linked art to community. He sometimes appears to have anticipated the arguments of later critics who would object to community because, they believe, the common in community is hostile to multiple differences.⁸ Throughout his philosophy, including his work on community, he stressed the heterogeneity and diversity of human experience.⁹ At the same time, he gave these same critics ample cause for concern in his work on art. Dewey strongly emphasized throughout his work on art its unifying and integrating potential, using terms such as “holism,” “integration,” “coherence,” “fusion,” and “unity”—in short, precisely the kind of language that would make these critics shudder. Although Dewey can be partly defended, his dominant emphasis on unity and integration opens doubts about his understanding of art and the communities to which art is tied.

Dewey’s emphasis on unity and integration can be seen in the relation that he establishes between art, identity, and community. Since art is a powerful form of communication, and since “communication is the process of creating participation,

⁸ A common liberal objection to community, exemplified by Hirsch (1986), is that it represents a host of encroachments on individual freedom. It involves a dangerous and stifling adherence to a single, substantive good, assumes a homogeneity of identity and interests, and requires an insidious moral education in order to instill a common commitment to a single, substantive good that unifies the community. A common postmodern feminist objection to community, as articulated by Young (1990, 300–303), is that community “privileges unity over difference” and this unacceptably “generates borders, dichotomies, and exclusions.” At the heart of their criticisms—much of it directed at communitarians such as MacIntyre (1981) and Sandel (1982)—is the concern that community is hostile to diversity and plurality. For other examples of the debate between liberals and communitarians, see Avineri and de-Shalit 1992; Bell 1993; Chapman and Shapiro 1993; Downing and Thigpen 1986; Herzog 1986; and Reynolds and Norman 1988. For other postmodern and feminist challenges to community, see Phelan 1989; Duggan 1992; and Stein 1992. For theorists who have attempted to conceptualize community in terms consistent with diversity, see, especially, Boyte and Evans 1984; Boyte 1984, 1989; Mattern 1998; and Mouffe 1991, 1992.

⁹ Dewey argued that diversity is one of three “irreducible traits found in any and every subject of scientific inquiry.” Since Dewey viewed all human experience, including ethical and moral experience, as a fit subject of scientific inquiry, he saw diversity as a ubiquitous characteristic of social life. If we acknowledge the ubiquity of diversity, he argued, “we shall be saved from the recurrent attempts to reduce heterogeneity to homogeneity, diversity to sheer uniformity.” The other two “irreducible traits” are interaction and change. By implication, the specific character of social life evolves over time as “diverse existences” interact with others and change in the process. (See Dewey 1915b, 6–7). This explicit awareness of diversity in all social life motivated Dewey’s commitment to a conception of philosophy that emphasizes the historical and contingent rather than the universal and essential. An emphasis on the historical and contingent is more consistent with an attention to diversity than is an emphasis on the universal and essential. The focus of reflection and analysis shifts from discovering what is universally present in human experience to the elements that make human experience unique in different historical and social situations. See Dewey’s *Quest for Certainty* (1929) and *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920) for examples of his antifoundationalist and antiuniversalist conception of philosophy. See, especially, Rorty 1982 for a contemporary philosopher who develops these strains in Dewey’s thought.

of making common what had been isolated and singular" ([1934] 1980, 244), Dewey saw art as potentially contributing to the development of community by creating and reinforcing commonalities through shared experience. Art represents a form of shared experience through which commonalities are created, developing "in the direction of greater order and unity" (81); moreover, experience "becomes a conscious common possession, or is shared, by means of works of art more than by any other means" (286). The common materials of memory and experience enter into art, and art makes these materials common. A work of art expresses to people their common experiences and shared histories and, perhaps, common concerns. Together, these have the effect of integrating and reinforcing a group's identity by clarifying and reinforcing the meaning of group life. If the artist succeeds at creating a work of art that integrates seemingly disparate and unrelated experiences of members of the social group, he or she potentially creates new shared meaning in the life of this social group. This gives people a sense of relatedness that might not have existed before. Art, according to Dewey, thus makes people more "aware of their union with one another in origin and destiny" (271).

Contemporary murals illustrate Dewey's argument. According to muralist Judy Baca, "The Great Wall of Los Angeles," a series of murals stretching along the Los Angeles River, "talked about who those people were, what they cared about, and what they were mad about. They talked about the issues in their community" (Neumaier 1985, 67–68). The murals helped create and reinforce shared memories and a shared sense of "who we are" among the multiethnic and multi-class groups involved in creating the murals. As Dewey argued, the process is reflexive: the murals express common experiences and, in viewing them, people commonly reexperience their sentiments, ideas, and beliefs. These present experiences reflect back on the identity of the participants. According to Dewey, this helps make an identity more "internally cohesive" and potentially contributes to the development of community as individuals acquire and maintain an awareness of common experiences, memories, beliefs, and commitments. Although murals generally have a relatively localized impact, other works of art could also be cited that illustrate this argument on a broader, more inclusive basis. For example, the AIDS Quilt presumably develops a common awareness among participants of shared interests, commitments, and sentiments; it creates a communicative arena where participants become more "aware of their union with one another in origin and destiny" (Dewey [1934] 1980, 271).

This process of communal identification occurs across different communities as well as within a particular community, according to Dewey. Art, Dewey argued, is the best form of communication that can occur "in a world full of gulfs and walls that limit community of experience" (105). Art "strikes below the barriers that separate human beings from one another" (270). Art helps people of different worlds recognize common experiences, and also helps them understand and adapt to different forms of experience of different peoples:

[T]he art characteristic of a civilization is the means for entering sympathetically into the deepest elements in the experience of remote and foreign civilizations. . . . They effect a broadening and deepening of our own experience, rendering it less local and provincial as far as we grasp, by their means, the attitudes basic in other forms of experience. . . . Works of art are means by which we enter, through imagination and the emotions they evoke, into other forms of relationship and participation than our own. (332–33)

This process of bridging diverse communities through art is not, for Dewey, simply a matter of appreciating differences and learning from them, although that is also true. Consistent with his social psychology, which emphasized identity-changing interactions between human and environment, he believed that the encounters through art between members of different cultures change all involved in the experience, as people adapt to new forms of experience. According to Dewey, “we understand [art created by other peoples] in the degree in which we make it a part of our own attitudes. . . . [O]ur own experience is reoriented” (334). When people make the art of others “part of their own attitudes,” and when they “reorient” their own experience in response to the experiences of others, they are changing who they are. This process of adaptive interaction potentially creates an element of commonality as different experiences are shared through art and these “enter into attitude.” And, “when the art of another culture enters into attitudes that determine our experience genuine continuity is effected. . . . A community and continuity that do not exist physically are created” (336). Art helps create new elements of commonality in the form of shared meanings and understandings, encouraging behavior that takes this into account. According to Dewey, these are the bases for forging community across differences. If art accomplishes the task that Dewey assigns to it, it contributes to the development of a “great community” (Dewey [1927] 1985) that ties different peoples together.

Emphasizing as he did the unifying and integrating work of art, it may seem paradoxical that Dewey’s account of art also suggests social differentiation and the opening of communities to difference. This is partly a logical implication of his view of the genesis of art in social experience. As we saw earlier, Dewey argued that human experience occurs in the context of a concrete social and physical environment, and human identity is tied to the interaction between humans and this environment. Presumably, this environment varies according to cultural and historical settings, and so too must the character and quality of experience. Different experiences produce a different universe of memories and meanings and, ultimately, identity. These differences are expressed in many ways, including artistically, and the expressions serve to reinforce and re-create the identity of individuals and groups tied to concrete social and physical conditions. If this is correct, then not only does art express and reinforce common elements from experience, it also produces and reinforces differences within communities and demarcates communities of experience from each other. It expresses and reinforces individual and group differences, differences tied to at least partially unique social and cultural settings.

This conclusion must be qualified in an era of mass communication. Today, people in widely different social and cultural environments often experience similar or identical art forms. This is especially true for electronically communicable forms of popular culture such as television and rock music originating in the United States and Great Britain. The logic of Dewey's argument suggests that exposure to these forms of popular culture will at least partially homogenize, rather than differentiate, human experience and identity. Although this is a serious concern and a likely outcome in many instances, two responses can be made. First, art production and consumption remains highly differentiated in most parts of the world. Multiple forms of localized art persist and, sometimes, flourish alongside dominant art forms. Second, artists continually invent new forms that sometimes dethrone dominant forms. This can be seen in the modern history of American popular music. Rap music, for example, emerged within and alongside more dominant forms; today, it is a dominant form of American popular music. Meanwhile, multiple other forms of popular music flourish alongside and on the margins of American culture.

Dewey also assigned critical and visionary roles to art that make communities more open to differences. If, as Dewey argued, art communicates meanings derived from the past and present everyday life of a people, then each work of art embodies assumptions and beliefs that a people hold about themselves and about their lives. In experiencing a work of art created within a particular community, members of the community are potentially challenged to view their lives in a new light if the artist has taken elements from experience and selectively reconfigured them, presenting experience in a new light. This work of art potentially forces a reconsideration of accepted and sanctioned beliefs, assumptions, and practices. The "function of art," Dewey argued, "has always been to break through the crust of conventionalized and routine consciousness" ([1927] 1985, 183) in order to see more clearly and more critically.

According to Dewey, art also potentially plays a visionary role in bringing other worlds into focus. Art helps people see new worlds that they did not know existed as they are introduced to new experiences expressed through art. If art vividly expresses the experiences, history, and identity of a people, then it opens the possibility for the sharing of experiences, for understanding the interests and identities of others, and for greater communication among different people. Art breaks through "gulfs, walls, and barriers" that other forms of communication cannot penetrate ([1934] 1980, 105, 244). Seeing how others live also potentially provokes a reexamination of one's own beliefs and practices. In experiencing a work of art from another culture or community, people are potentially challenged to rethink their assumptions and beliefs about themselves and their lives as they encounter new horizons.¹⁰

¹⁰Several contemporary researchers have made a similar argument. Bastien and Hostager (1987), Chernoff (1979), Erenberg (1989), and Small (1987) all argue that a musical tradition embodies values and assumptions about humans and human relationships, and thus models a particular society. These values and assumptions are challenged and sometimes changed as musicians interact with each other and with musicians working in other traditions.

In short, Dewey assigns to art the task of challenging people to think more critically and self-reflectively about themselves and their lives and at the same time of opening new alternatives and possibilities for consideration.¹¹ Art contributes to people's capacity for "critical judgment," and it does this through an "expansion of experience" (324–25). Dewey called this the "moral function" of art: "to remove prejudice, do away with the scales that keep the eye from seeing, tear away the veils due to wont and custom, perfect the power to perceive" (325). This moral function of the artist involves a "refusal to acknowledge the boundaries set by convention." Although this may result in "frequent denunciations of objects of art as immoral," Dewey insisted that "one of the functions of art is precisely to sap the moralistic timidity that causes the mind to shy away from some materials and refuse to admit them into the clear and purifying light of perceptive consciousness" (189).

It is clear that, in Dewey's time and ours, some artists press beyond the "boundaries set by convention," and they are duly denounced for their transgressions. In recent times, two examples are Andres Serrano's "Piss Christ," a photograph depicting a crucifix in a jar of urine, and Robert Mapplethorpe's homoerotic photographs.¹² A more prominent example is the television show *Ellen*, in which the main character, played by Ellen DeGeneris, "came out" as a lesbian during the 1997 season. While each of these fueled additional censorship efforts by conservatives, each played a positive role of forcing controversial issues into a public arena. "Ellen," for example, dramatically undermined attempts to suppress discussion of homosexuality in public arenas. It is less clear that the process "saps the moralistic timidity" of critics; indeed, some art appears to have an opposite effect of decreasing open-mindedness and fueling bigotry and prejudice. At a minimum, it forces critics to publicly justify their positions and raises the possibility that their views will be subjected to the "purifying light of perceptive consciousness."

Dewey's emphasis on the integrative and unifying roles of art reflects a more general emphasis in his political philosophy, and it is tempting to view his ideal model of art as a metaphor for his ideal of social life in general. Dewey argued that one measure for beauty in art is "unity in variety," and that "mutual adaptation of parts to one another in constituting a whole is the relation which, formally speaking, characterizes a work of art" (161, 134–35). This is a dynamic unity, marked by rhythm and development, tension and resistance (161, 166).

¹¹ These critical and visionary roles that Dewey assigned to art are also two of the roles assigned by contemporary researchers to "anthropology as cultural critique"; and toleration, respect for differences, and modesty in asserting universal claims are several of the values and commitments associated with this practice of anthropology as cultural critique. For a discussion of these themes see, especially, Marcus and Fischer 1986. See Mitchell (1992, 1–5), who discusses these same roles for art in terms of "critique" and "utopia." See also A. Hoffman (1985, 136), who argues that "creativity is needed to reach people snowed under by ruling-class images, and only artists can manage the breakthrough. Artists are the collective eyes of the future."

¹² For descriptions and discussions of these works of art see, especially, Dubin 1992 (96–101, 170–92).

Similarly, he idealized a view of a relatively harmonious public life supported by community in which diverse individuals and groups are dynamically adapted¹³ to one another. Dewey made the analogy between art and social life explicit in a letter to Horace Kallen in 1915. In the letter, Dewey expressed his concurrence with Kallen's (1915) orchestra metaphor as an appropriate ideal for handling diversity, but added the caveat that the instruments create "a symphony and not a lot of different instruments playing simultaneously" (Dewey 1915a). Two years later he wrote that the theory of an American melting pot "always gave me rather a pang" (1917, 289), but nevertheless advocated social "unity created by drawing out and composing into a harmonious whole the best, the most characteristic which each contributing race and people has to offer" (288–89). Dewey's references to an ideal of social unity and to a harmonious whole, and his preference for social life that models a symphony, all point toward an ideal of social life in which differences—ubiquitous though they may be—present no insurmountable obstacles to agreement and collective action.

Dewey rightly argued that art must be more than an assemblage of different parts tied together in an "extraneous" way, and that the parts must be "related" dynamically ([1934] 1980, 161). A common thread is needed to link the different elements in a work of art together in order for the work of art to be meaningful and sensible. The same holds for members of a democratic community. There must be an element of commonality at the level of identity in the form of similar commitments and democratic skills and dispositions. However, Dewey wrongly emphasized, as a universal ideal, harmony and resolution among the various parts of a work of art and among the members of a community. Dewey's model of art and his model of community both retain space for diversity, but both notably lack some of the inevitable consequences of diversity such as conflict, disruption, competition, and disharmony. In communal life, these are precisely some of the elements that are constitutive of politics. Genuine community life, like art, may at times be more cacophonous than harmonious. Diversity often entails incompatible interests that cannot simply be "adjusted," and this generates competition and conflict that pose stubborn obstacles to the integrative work of art. Diversity also opens the possibility and necessity of more conflictual forms of political action through art than Dewey envisioned.

¹³Dewey often used the concepts of social adaptation and social adjustment to explain how diversity and its tensions are resolved in a plural democracy. For example, in his *Democracy and Education* (1916, 86–87), Dewey argued that in an extensive nation with a "great diversity of populations, of varying languages, religions, moral codes, and traditions," different interests and claims must be "readjusted" to each other. In *The Public and Its Problems* ([1927] 1985, 191–92), Dewey argued that the real problem of the relationship between different individuals and groups is not some inherent opposition but rather "is that of adjusting groups and individuals to one another," of "readjusting social relationships." In *Freedom and Culture* ([1939] 1989, 123), Dewey argued that the "problem of harmonious adjustment between extensive activities, precluding direct contacts, and the intensive activities of community intercourse" remained a pressing one. Both of these concepts of adaptation and adjustment suggest a relatively harmonious, mechanical process that bears little resemblance to the actual world of politics.

Political Action and Power in Art¹⁴

Dewey's work suggests two kinds of political action through art, though he left both largely undeveloped. These are community organizing for collaborative problem solving, or what we might call a pragmatic form of political action; and discussion and debate among members of communities over defining commitments and practices, what we might call a deliberative form of political action. A third, confrontational kind of political action emphasizing resistant, militant, and oppositional political practices does not appear in Dewey's work.

Dewey also had little to say about power in the world of art. He was well aware that the art of his time fell short of fulfilling the roles he assigned to it. The primary reason for this failure, he argued, was that art had been severed from its roots in everyday life and banished to museums. Tying art more closely to everyday life will not alone, however, ensure a more democratic role for it. A consideration of the role of power in both enabling and undermining the democratic uses of art remains necessary. The social and communal role of art depends at least partly on the variable capacity of different individuals and groups to control its production, meaning, and use. One outcome of the constitutive presence of power in the world of art is that the democratic role of art is often derailed, or tenuous at the outset.

First, combining his emphasis on art as communication with his political philosophy as articulated in *The Public and Its Problems* ([1927] 1985), Dewey hinted at a *pragmatic* use of art to organize a community for the purpose of promoting awareness of a shared problem and of building the support and commitment necessary to address the problem. This form of community-based political action is characterized by collaboration and cooperation in defining and addressing common concerns and problems. It entails participation by members of the community, who are drawn simultaneously into the art project and the pragmatic task of problem solving. It involves power sharing among community groups and individuals, and developing collaborative relationships among different groups and individuals.

Some murals epitomize this pragmatic effort to organize communities for problem solving. According to muralist Judy Baca, "the thing about muralism . . . is that collaboration is a requirement. . . . The mural is not just a big picture on a wall. The focus is on cooperation in the process underlying its creation" (Neumaier 1985, 70–73). Baca and other muralists work closely with neighbor-

¹⁴ The three kinds of political action that I tie to artistic practices are partially adapted from Boyte (1991), who uses the categories of deliberative, pragmatic, and insurgent (or protest). I call the third category confrontational rather than insurgent or protest in order to better cluster together a genre of political action that includes opposition and resistance as well as protest. Given space constraints, the discussion in this section will necessarily be suggestive rather than thorough. See my *Acting in Concert: Music, Community, and Political Action* (1998) for a more comprehensive treatment of political action and power as they appear in popular music.

hood residents in defining issues and concerns, and subsequently rely on members of the communities to design and paint the murals. As Baca notes, the process itself is important in creating support for the project and knitting different people together in a common purpose. On a national level, the AIDS Quilt can be viewed as an example of a pragmatic effort to organize a “great community” of Americans who are aware of the problem of AIDS and committed to addressing it. This quilt is a work of participatory art that, unfortunately, grows as people die and more names are added. Its different parts circulate throughout the United States drawing attention to the issue of AIDS, increasing awareness and, it is hoped, support for an increased effort to solve the problem of AIDS.¹⁵

Each of these examples epitomizes the Deweyan approach to community-based problem solving, using art practices as the focal point for community organizing. In each case, members of the community are drawn into the work of art, which depends for its success on participation by members of the community. Each also epitomizes Dewey’s approach to empowerment, which emphasizes drawing on the resources of the community and organizing them into a collective effort. This approach “multiplies the power that you have by taking the best of other people and putting it all together in one thing” (Judy Baca, quoted in Neumaier 1985, 73).

Second, Dewey suggested the use of art for political *deliberation*. As we saw, Dewey attributed a role of social criticism to the artist. Social criticism can be viewed as an invitation to reconsider, discuss, and debate established beliefs and practices. By implication, Dewey saw art as a stimulus to the debate and discussion that he saw as vital to a healthy democracy. Dewey also intimated that art could help make debate and discussion more informed and intelligent by opening new vistas, and by helping “perfect the power to perceive” ([1934] 1980, 325). Unfortunately, Dewey did not develop the implications of these references and intimations of art as a road to, and medium of, informed discussion and debate. On the contrary, he steered away in emphasizing the unifying and integrating work of art and deemphasizing the differences and disagreements that necessitate political deliberation.

David Nelson’s 1988 *Mirth and Girth* illustrates the deliberative role of art. This painting by Nelson, a student at the Art Institute of Chicago, attacked Chicago’s

¹⁵ Other examples of pragmatic political action through art include the University of Minnesota’s Water Policy Project, in which various artists promote awareness of water pollution and organize the support necessary to address it; Joseph Beuys’s “7,000 Oaks,” in which 7,000 large basalt stones that are arranged in a triangular pile pointing to an oak tree are offered for sale, with the proceeds of each used to plant an oak tree, and in which “the real work of art here is the community’s replanting of Kassel” (North 1992, 11); the multiple projects that emerged during 1978–80 between various communities and artists sponsored by the federal government’s Comprehensive Employment and Training Act’s (CETA) Artist Project, most of them “created in close communication and (in the best cases) collaboration with grassroots community groups” (Maksymowicz 1992, 149–50); Judy Chicago’s “Dinner Party” and “Birth Project,” both involving collaboration among hundreds of participants including many nonartists; the large megaconcerts such as Farm Aid and Rock against Racism, which organize support for various problem-solving causes (see, esp., Denselow 1989); and Tim Rollins’s “Learning to Read through the Arts” project in the Bronx, in which dyslexic and emotionally troubled students were taught to read in part by drawing (see Rosser 1989).

ex-mayor Harold Washington. Popular especially among African-Americans, Washington had died of a heart attack in November 1987 during his second term as mayor. Washington was portrayed by Nelson as an overweight man in women's underwear, holding a pencil in one hand. Given that the painting's title was also the name of a group of overweight gay men in Chicago, the painting also implied that Washington was homosexual. (The pencil was a vicious reference to the pencil dropped by Mayor Washington when he had his heart attack; aides thought he was stooping to pick up the pencil when he doubled over in pain from the heart attack.) Within hours of being hung as part of a student exhibition, the painting was "arrested" by a group of black Chicago aldermen.

The painting's meaning was clear to anyone familiar with racially charged events and politics in Chicago; and the way the event unfolded was inseparable from power relations in Chicago. Many Chicago Blacks "saw the painting as part of a pattern of assaults, not as an isolated incident" (Dubin 1992, 33). The image itself was racist in a context of ongoing efforts by whites to emasculate black men. It also provoked a racist response among some, including prominent *Chicago Tribune* columnist Mike Royko, who, in a column shortly after the incident, mocked ebonics, speculated that the black aldermen who removed the painting had never before visited the Art Institute, called them "alderboobs," and insinuated that they should be lynched: "If anything, I find a painting far less offensive than an alderman. A painting is nothing more than an inanimate object. You just hang it on a wall and it sits there. Some aldermen are inanimate, too, but you can't hang an alderman that way, although it would be fun" (Dubin 1992, 36). Black reaction was itself steeped in sexist and homophobic rejection of feminine and homosexual imagery.

The event exploded into public view in part because of immediate media interest, prompted by the urgency of besting rivals during a ratings sweep period. The painting sparked community-wide discussion and debate over First Amendment rights; over whether or not a "higher moral order" should trump the First Amendment; over the responsibility of artists to their communities; and over racism, sexism, and homophobia in Chicago and elsewhere. Having attained a certain level of institutional power in Chicago, black aldermen used it to pressure the Art Institute of Chicago by threatening them with a loss of city funding. The institute ultimately agreed to remove the painting, and also to attempt to increase minority representation in its student body and on its faculty.¹⁶

¹⁶See discussions of *Mirth and Girth* by Becker (1989, 231–53), Dubin (1992, 26–43), B. Hoffman (1992, 119), and Raven (1989, 23). Another example of art that provoked extensive debate and discussion was Richard Serra's "Tilted Arc." Installed in New York's Federal Plaza in 1981, it sparked a seven-year debate (over the appropriateness of the work of art for the space, over the role of public opinion in the determination of public art, and over whether or not the public employees at the site should have had a voice) that culminated in its removal in 1989. On the "Tilted Arc," see B. Hoffman 1992 and Storr 1989. See Mitchell's (1992, 29–48) interpretation of Spike Lee's film *Do the Right Thing* as an invitation to discussion and debate over racial and ethnic relations; one could also add the relative merits of Martin Luther King's versus Malcolm X's strategies for change as topics raised by the film.

The debate and discussion provoked by “Mirth and Girth” occurred as a result of, but not directly in, the actual art text. Sometimes, however, the debate and discussion characteristic of deliberation occurs directly *in* art, as is the case with rap music¹⁷ or the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Generally, memorials play a role of remembrance, and are not noted for provoking debate. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial is an exception. Created by Maya Lin, this work places “viewers in a public space that is articulated in terms of political controversy so that to view the piece is not simply to experience space but also to enter a debate” (North 1992, 25). The memorial positions itself at the center of controversy surrounding the United States’ involvement in Southeast Asia; it opens up the controversy and facilitates it. Public debate itself becomes a work of art. People enter the work of art physically as they descend into it and as their reflection on the polished marble attests. The memorial is shaped like an open V; the arms of the V point to the Washington Monument and Lincoln Memorial, respectively, and each is reflected on the polished surface. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial thus asks people to reexamine their beliefs and commitments in light of the values represented by the Washington and Lincoln memorials. It asks us “not just to remember [the Vietnam War], it admonishes us to write the next chapter thoughtfully and with reflection on the country’s values” (Griswold 1992, 104). It is fundamentally “interrogative” in asking viewer-participants to “question, without forcing any simple answers” on them (108). The Vietnam Veterans Memorial also provoked debate more indirectly as some questioned the spirit of the memorial, which does not glorify American veterans or their involvement in the Vietnam War, and the appropriateness of awarding the design to an Asian-American.

The Vietnam Veterans Memorial accomplishes much of what artist Maya Lin intended in the way of provocation and debate. Of course, art does not necessarily provoke the kind of discussion and debate intended by the artist. Serrano’s “Piss Christ” poses questions such as how human was Jesus? Is divinity compromised through association with banality? Was Christ being defiled, or the urine sanctified? It can also be read as an implicit critique of the commodification of Jesus and Christianity more generally. These questions were lost on conservative critics. “Piss Christ” also illustrates the role of power in determining public reaction to a work of art. The public heard little about the artist’s intent and the questions that he meant to pose; but it heard much about the conservative reaction to the piece. Well-funded conservative and religious lawmakers successfully controlled the public discussion that occurred and its presentation in the media. The media defined the issues selectively, emphasizing certain aspects of the story while burying other aspects.

Perhaps Dewey’s single most glaring political failure was his apparent inability to understand why people might turn to *confrontational* forms of political

¹⁷ See, especially, Rose (1994), who attributes a “dialogic” role to rap music which resembles my discussion of a deliberative role for art.

action such as opposition, resistance, and subterfuge. While Dewey made important contributions to a politics of deliberation and collaboration guided by inquiry and education, he offered little basis for understanding the dynamics of political movements that are more conflictual, oppositional, and confrontational in nature. These political struggles often arise in response to the failures of collaboration, of rational persuasion and moral exhortation, and of education and inquiry, to produce change. They also arise in circumstances of power inequality when some people, especially marginalized people, turn to confrontational forms of political action because they have little other choice: they are locked out of decision-making arenas, and they have too little opportunity for developing collaborative relations with people in power. They also arise in situations of irreconcilable interests—a scenario hardly recognized by Dewey.

In such circumstances, people use art to marshal the energies of one community in a confrontation with another community whose interests are viewed at least partly as contradictory. This form of political action is characterized by heightened militancy, perception of incompatible interests, perception of zero-sum power relations and of zero-sum outcomes, and perception of relatively clear distinctions between the forces of right and wrong. Art under these circumstances is used by members of one community to oppose another community, to further separate two communities rather than bridge them as Dewey hoped. A politics of confrontation has a potentially positive role to play in a democracy as a way of enlisting support for the political agenda of a particular community, for publicizing a political issue, for drawing citizens into active participation in the public life of a community, and for galvanizing action on specific issues.

Protest music, guerrilla theater, and billboard art illustrate this kind of political action in art. In each case, artists typically decry the injustices and oppression endured by certain individuals and groups and extol the virtues of favored alternatives; express their opposition to the exploitation and oppression exercised by dominant elites and members of dominant groups; and draw sharp distinctions between the forces of right and wrong as they perceive them. They attempt to advance the cause of members of a favored group by promoting sympathy and support. These confrontational actions are not intended to open dialogue and debate, nor to build collaborative working relationships. They are attempts by one group to oppose and undermine the efforts of other groups, to win in an essentially zero-sum contest, to best the opponent(s). If they succeed in advancing their agenda, they do so because they successfully mobilize community resources, put pressure on government and corporate officials, and harness media power and public sentiment.

A work of art depends for its effectiveness on visibility; and visibility is more attainable given economic or political power. Corporations can flood visual space with their messages, while less powerful groups and individuals attempt to infiltrate public space using subterfuge. Billboards, for example, are typically

imposed on a community from above, literally and figuratively, without consultation or consent by members of a community. They represent authority from above. Billboard artists attempt to overturn this power relationship by appropriating the billboard, turning it into a “weapon of the weak” (Scott 1985).¹⁸

These different kinds of political action sometimes overlap in a single work of art. In addition to the pragmatic role that I emphasized above, murals are often confrontational in their portrayals of oppositional and militant themes; and they can play a deliberative role in prodding discussion and debate among members of a community. A large megaconcert intended pragmatically to organize support for addressing a problem such as world hunger may include musicians whose lyrics emphasize confrontational themes and who challenge listeners to reconsider their beliefs.

Art and Democracy

Art is an integral component of democracy, not simply its incidental adornment. As a communicative arena where politics potentially occurs, art offers many opportunities for political participation. Especially at a time when participation is declining in mainstream and institutionalized political arenas, other venues such as art increase in their potential importance. Many people already use art and related practices for political purposes; their efforts have drawn considerable attention from researchers in disciplines other than political science. As a vehicle for political expression, art is a source of power for many. This is especially true for relatively marginalized individuals and groups who frequently find themselves locked out of mainstream and institutionalized political arenas. Art, especially in popular cultural form, is relatively accessible, familiar, and subject to democratic control in that opportunities for its production and consumption remain relatively independent of constraints and imperatives that characterize contemporary politics in mainstream and institutionalized arenas.

We are surrounded by art. For better and for worse, art dominates the everyday lives, and significantly determines the identity, of most people; it should be scrutinized for its democratic or undemocratic implications. At its best, art offers opportunities for revitalizing public life and for expanding the meaning and practice of democracy. Dewey’s lifelong interest in making of democracy a whole way of life propelled him into the arena of art. Today, political theorists might well follow his example.

¹⁸On protest music see Greenway 1977; Mondak 1988; and Rodnitzky 1976. See Durland 1989 and A. Hoffman 1985 on guerrilla theater. On billboard art see Dunn and Leeson 1985; King 1985 (198–203); and Maksymowicz 1992 (154–55). Other examples of confrontational political action through art include that by graffiti artists and the “La Lucha Murals”—26 individual and collective works on New York’s Lower East Side portraying themes denouncing intervention in Central America, apartheid in South Africa, and gentrification of the local community (Cockcroft 1989).

Manuscript submitted 14 October 1997

Final manuscript received 13 April 1998

References

- Adorno, Theodor W. [1962] 1976. *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*. Reprint. New York: Seabury.
- Alexander, Thomas. 1987. *John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience, and Nature: The Horizons of Feeling*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Ames, Van Meter. 1953. "John Dewey as Aesthete." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 12(2): 145–68.
- Avineri, Shlomo, and Avner de-Shalit, eds. 1992. *Communitarianism and Individualism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bastien, David, and Todd Hostager. 1987. "Jazz as Social Structure, Process, and Outcome." Discussion Paper #77, Strategic Management Research Center, University of Minnesota.
- Becker, Carol. 1989. "Private Fantasies Shape Public Events: And Public Events Invade and Shape Our Dreams." In *Art in the Public Interest*, ed. Arlene Raven. Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press.
- Bell, Daniel. 1993. *Communitarianism and Its Critics*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Boyte, Harry. 1984. *Community Is Possible: Repairing America's Roots*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Boyte, Harry. 1989. *Commonwealth: A Return to Citizen Politics*. New York: The Free Press.
- Boyte, Harry. 1991. "The Pragmatic Ends of Popular Politics." In *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun. Boston: MIT Press.
- Boyte, Harry, and Sara Evans. 1984. "Strategies in Search of America: Cultural Radicalism, Populism, and Democratic Culture." *Socialist Review* 14(3): 73–99.
- Chapman, John, and Ian Shapiro, eds. 1993. *Democratic Community*. New York: New York University Press.
- Chernoff, John Miller. 1979. *African Rhythm and African Sensibility*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cockcroft, Eva Sperling. 1989. "The La Lucha Murals: Making a Political Art Park." In *Art in the Public Interest*, ed. Arlene Raven. Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press.
- Damico, Alfonso. 1978. *Individuality and Community: The Social and Political Thought of John Dewey*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Denselow, Robin. 1989. *When the Music's Over: The Story of Political Pop*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Dewey, John. 1915a. Letter to Horace M. Kallen, 31 March 1915, Horace M. Kallen Papers, American Jewish Archives, Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati.
- Dewey, John. 1915b. "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry." In *John Dewey: Middle Works: 1899–1924*, vol. 8, ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: University of Illinois Press.
- Dewey, John. 1916. *Democracy and Education*. New York: Macmillan.
- Dewey, John. 1917. "The Principle of Nationality." In *John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899–1924*, vol. 10, ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: University of Illinois Press.
- Dewey, John. [1920] 1962. *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. Reprint. Boston: Beacon.
- Dewey, John. [1927] 1985. *The Public and Its Problems*. Reprint. Athens, OH: Swallow.
- Dewey, John. [1929] 1980. *The Quest for Certainty*. Reprint. New York: Perigee.
- Dewey, John. [1934] 1980. *Art as Experience*. Reprint. New York: Wideview/Perigee.
- Dewey, John. [1939] 1989. *Freedom and Culture*. Reprint. Buffalo: Prometheus.
- Diggins, John. 1992. "Power and Suspicion: The Perspectives of Reinhold Niebuhr." *Ethics and International Affairs* 6:141–62.
- Downing, Lyle, and Robert Thigpen. 1986. "Beyond Shared Understandings." *Political Theory* 14:451–72.

- Dubin, Steven. 1992. *Arresting Images: Impolitic Art and Uncivil Actions*. New York: Routledge.
- Duggan, Lisa. 1992. "Making It Perfectly Queer." *Socialist Review* 22(1): 11–31.
- Dunn, Peter, and Loraine Leeson. 1985. "The Changing Picture of Docklands." In *Cultures in Contention*, ed. Douglas Kahn and Diane Neumaier. Seattle: Real Comet Press.
- Durland, Steven. 1989. "Witness: The Guerrilla Theater of Greenpeace." In *Art in the Public Interest*, ed. Arlene Raven. Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press.
- Erenberg, Lewis A. 1989. "Things to Come: Swing Bands, Bebop, and the Rise of a Postwar Jazz Scene." In *Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War*, ed. Lary May. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Frith, Simon. 1981. *Sound Effects: Youth, Leisure, and the Politics of Rock 'n' Roll*. New York: Pantheon.
- Frith, Simon. 1984. "Rock and the Politics of Memory." In *The '60s without Apology*, ed. Sohnya Sayres et al. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Greenway, John. 1977. *American Folksongs of Protest*. New York: Octagon Books.
- Griswold, Charles. 1992. "The Vietnam Veterans Memorial and the Washington Mall: Philosophical Thoughts on Political Iconography." In *Art and the Public Sphere*, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1970. *Toward a Rational Society*. Boston: Beacon.
- Herzog, Don. 1986. "Some Questions for Republicans." *Political Theory* 14:473–93.
- Hirsch, H. N. 1986. "The Threnody of Liberalism: Constitutional Liberty and the Renewal of Community." *Political Theory* 14:423–49.
- Hoffman, Abbie. 1985. "Museum of the Streets." In *Cultures in Contention*, ed. Douglas Kahn and Diane Neumaier. Seattle: Real Comet Press.
- Hoffman, Barbara. 1992. "Law for Art's Sake in the Public Realm." In *Art and the Public Sphere*, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hook, Sidney. 1939. *John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait*. New York: John Day.
- James, David. 1989. "The Vietnam War and American Music." *Social Text* 8(2): 122–43.
- Kallen, Horace M. 1915. "Democracy versus the Melting-Pot." *Nation* 100 (February 25): 220.
- King, Peter. 1985. "The Art of Billboard Utilizing." In *Cultures in Contention*, ed. Douglas Kahn and Diane Neumaier. Seattle: Real Comet Press.
- Leland, John. 1992. "Rap and Race." *Newsweek* 119 (June 29): 46–52.
- Lippard, Lucy. 1989. "Moving Targets/Moving Out." In *Art in the Public Interest*, ed. Arlene Raven. Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press.
- McClary, Susan. 1991. *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- MacIntyre, Alisdair. 1981. *After Virtue*. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Maksymowicz, Virginia. 1992. "Through the Back Door: Alternative Approaches to Public Art." In *Art and the Public Sphere*, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Marcus, George, and Michael Fischer. 1986. *Anthropology as Cultural Critique*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mattern, Mark. 1998. *Acting in Concert: Music, Community, and Political Action*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Mills, C. Wright. 1966. *Sociology and Pragmatism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mitchell, W. J. T., ed. 1992. *Art and the Public Sphere*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mondak, Jeffery. 1988. "Protest Music as Political Persuasion." *Popular Music and Society* 12(3): 25–38.
- Mouffe, Chantal. 1991. "Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community." In *Community at Loose Ends*, ed. Miami Theory Collective. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Mouffe, Chantal. 1992. "Citizenship and Political Identity." *October* 61:28–32.
- Neumaier, Diane. 1985. "Judy Baca: Our People Are the Internal Exiles." In *Cultures in Contention*, ed. Douglas Kahn and Diane Neumaier. Seattle: Real Comet Press.

- North, Michael. 1992. "The Public as Sculpture: From Heavenly City to Mass Ornament." In *Art and the Public Sphere*, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Phelan, Shane. 1989. *Identity Politics: Lesbian Feminism and the Limits of Community*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Pratt, Ray. 1990. *Rhythm and Resistance: Explorations in the Political Uses of Popular Music*. New York: Praeger.
- Raven, Arlene, ed. 1989. *Art in the Public Interest*. Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press.
- Reynolds, Charles, and Ralph Norman. 1988. *Community in America: The Challenge of Habits of the Heart*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Rodnitzky, Jerome. 1976. *Minstrels of the Dawn: The Folk-Protest Singer as a Cultural Hero*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Rorty, Richard. 1982. *Consequences of Pragmatism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
- Rose, Tricia. 1994. *Black Noise*. Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press.
- Rosser, Phyllis. 1989. "Education through Collaboration Saves Lives." In *Art in the Public Interest*, ed. Arlene Raven. Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press.
- Ryan, Alan. 1992. "The Legacy of John Dewey." *Dissent* 39 (Spring): 273–78.
- Ryan, Alan. 1995. *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism*. New York: Norton.
- Sandel, Michael. 1982. *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scott, James C. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Small, Christopher. 1987. *Music of the Common Tongue: Survival and Celebration in Afro-American Music*. London: John Calder.
- Spencer, Jon Michael, ed. 1991. *The Emergency of Black and the Emergence of Rap*. Chapel Hill: Duke University Press.
- Stein, Arlene. 1992. "Sisters and Queers: The Decentering of Lesbian Feminism." *Socialist Review* 22(1): 33–55.
- Storr, Robert. 1989. "Tilted Arc: Enemy of the People?" In *Art in the Public Interest*, ed. Arlene Raven. Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press.
- Street, John. 1986. *Rebel Rock: The Politics of Popular Music*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Weinstein, Jeff. 1989. "Names Carried into the Future: An AIDS Quilt Unfolds." In *Art in the Public Interest*, ed. Arlene Raven. Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press.
- West, Cornel. 1989. *The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Westbrook, Robert. 1991. *John Dewey and American Democracy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Westbrook, Robert. 1993. "An Innocent Abroad? John Dewey and International Politics." *Ethics and International Affairs* 7:203–21.
- Williams, Raymond. 1961. *The Long Revolution*. London: Cox & Wyman.
- Young, Iris. 1990. "The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference." In *Feminism/Postmodernism*, ed. Linda Nicholson. New York: Routledge.
- Zeltner, Philip. 1975. *John Dewey's Aesthetic Philosophy*. Amsterdam: B. R. Gruner B.V.

Mark Mattern is assistant professor of political science, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866.