Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-19-2012
Abstract
Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics (E2D) claims that expressions have a counterfactual intension and an epistemic intension. Epistemic intensions reflect cognitive significance such that sentences with necessary epistemic intensions are a priori. We defend E2D against an influential line of criticism: arguments from epistemic misclassification. We focus in particular on the arguments of Speaks [2010] and Schroeter [2005]. Such arguments conclude that E2D is mistaken from (i) the claim that E2D is committed to classifying certain sentences as a priori and (ii) the claim that such sentences are a posteriori. We aim to show that these arguments are unsuccessful as (i) and (ii) undercut each other. One must distinguish the general framework of E2D from a specific implementation of it. The framework is flexible enough to avoid commitment to the apriority of any particular sentence; only specific implementations are so committed. Arguments from epistemic misclassification are therefore better understood as arguments for favouring one implementation of E2D over another, rather than as refutations of E2D.
Recommended Citation
Elliott, Edward, Kelvin J. McQueen, and Clas Weber. "Epistemic two-dimensionalism and arguments from epistemic misclassification." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 91, no. 2, 2013, 375-389. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2012.693112
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
Australasian Association of Philosophy
Comments
This is an author-prepared version of an article that was accepted for publication in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, volume 91, issue 2, in 2012, after peer review. The final version of record is available online at DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2012.693112.
This version may differ slightly from the final version of record.