Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2011

Abstract

This paper addresses three concerns with ascending price Combinatorial Clock Auc- tions (APCA); price guidance toward e ciency relevant packages, computational bur- den, and susceptibility to collusive bidding. We propose a descending price Combi- natorial Clock Auction (DPCA) with a newly devised pricing strategy to alleviate all of these concerns. Mimicking bidding behavior of human subjects found in previous laboratory experiments, agent-based simulations of a DPCA show improvements in ef- ciency resulting from better price guidance and a reduction in computational burden when compared to an APCA.

Comments

Working Paper 11-19

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