Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for order-statistic coordination games. Subjects play the minimum- and median-effort coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show the precedent for cooperative behavior spills over from the median game to the minimum game when the games are played sequentially. Moreover, spillover occurs even when group composition changes, although the effect is not as strong. We also find that the precedent for uncooperative behavior does not spill over from the minimum game to the median game. These findings suggest guidelines for increasing cooperative behavior within organizations.
Cason, T.N., Savikhin, A., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2009). Cooperation spillovers in coordination games. ESI Working Paper 09-06. Retrieved from http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/136