Title

Language Games of Reciprocity

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

11-2008

Abstract

This paper attempts to explicate the meaning of reciprocate in economics. I first show using innate universal concepts that the definition of reciprocate appears to be circular. This circularity problem vanishes, however, when the context of the interaction is introduced as the inextricable link between the act of reciprocating and the intention to reciprocate. Applying Wittgenstein's concept of a language game, I also discuss the claim that social preferences have no agency. Rather, it is an individual's observable action that constitutes agency in reciprocity. My thesis is that social preferences emanate from the actions of social individuals and not vice versa.

Comments

This article was originally published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, volume 68, issue 2, in 2008.

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Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

Elsevier