Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2015

Abstract

Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states (moves) of nature. However, in many practical applications one is attempting to predict the move of a strategic rival. This is particularly important in aggressor–defender contests. This paper reports an experiment where the defender may have the advantage of observing a prediction market on the aggressor's action. The results of the experiments indicate that: the use of prediction markets does not increase the defender's win rate; prediction markets contain reliable information regarding aggressors’ decisions that is not being exploited by defenders; and the existence of a prediction market does not alter the behavior of the aggressor whose behavior is being forecast.

Comments

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, volume 117, in 2015. DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.019

The Creative Commons license below applies only to this version of the article.

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Available for download on Sunday, September 30, 2018

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