Resource Adequacy: Should Regulators Worry?

Authors

Hernan D. Bejarano, Penn State UniversityFollow
Lance Clifner, George Mason University
Carl Johnston, George Mason University
Stephen J. Rassenti, Chapman UniversityFollow
Vernon L. Smith, Chapman UniversityFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2012

Abstract

Regulators have proposed various institutional alternatives to secure network resource adequacy and reasonably priced electric power for consumers. These alternatives prompt many difficult questions: Does the development of Demand Response reduce the need for new capacity? How effectively can a government-mandated Capacity Market foster efficient investment? How does centralized generator commitment (with revenue guarantees) compare to a system in which Generators voluntarily commit themselves with no revenue guarantees? If exclusive distribution contracts were replaced by unregulated retail competition, what would be the effects on investment and market prices? We use laboratory experiments to address these questions.

Comments

This article was originally published in Review of Network Economics, volume 11, issue 4, in 2012. DOI: 10.1515/1446-9022.1391

Recommended Citation

Bejarano, Hernan D., Lance Clifner, Carl Johnston, Stephen Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith. "Resource Adequacy: Should Regulators Worry?." Review of Network Economics 11.4 (2012).
DOI:10.1515/1446-9022.1391

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

Walter de Gruyter