Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2009
Abstract
Despite the historical importance of ideology-based, economically inhibitive laws, we know little about the economic factors underlying their origin. This paper accounts for the historical emergence of one such law: the Christian ban on taking interest--a doctrine that shaped the evolution of numerous financial contracts and related organizational forms. A game-theoretic analysis and historical evidence suggest that the Church's commitment to providing social insurance for its poorest constituents encouraged risky borrowing, which the Church attempted to limit by banning interest. The analysis highlights the applicability of the rational choice framework to seemingly irrational actions and laws, the role of nonmonetary sanctions in circumventing commitment problems, and the importance of economic forces vis-à-vis ideology.
Recommended Citation
Rubin, Jared. "Social insurance, commitment, and the origin of law: interest bans in early Christianity." Journal of Law and Economics 52.4 (2009): 761-786.
DOI:10.1086/595796
Peer Reviewed
1
Copyright
University of Chicago Press
Included in
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Christianity Commons, Economic History Commons, Ethics in Religion Commons, History of Christianity Commons
Comments
This article was originally published in Journal of Law and Economics, volume 52, issue 4, in 2009. DOI: 10.1086/595796