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## Yo Soy Latino: Does My Vote Matter?

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# Yo soy latino: Does my Vote Matter?

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## Introduction to Research

This study explores the relationship of Latino political efficacy between different US states, each state with its varied Latino presence.

The Latino population in the United States has the potential to be a political player in elections, but its population growth is not translating into an increase of political participation.

When variables are controlled for, Latino noncitizens are just as politically active as their counterparts via volunteering, donating to campaigns, and attending meetings, rallies, and groups.

## Mobilization

Candidates' policy stances and their ability to convey care and concern to the Latino community are important variables that guide Latino vote choice; a welcoming versus unwelcoming stance, the potential of their candidate to win, and personal outreach influences voter turnout.

The Latino community votes for the candidate they can connect with the most; they are more likely to trust people of their own racial group.

Latino voters don't turn out and vote when they believe there is no incentive: if they feel incumbents would be reelected; or the issues presented do not pertain to them.

## Partisanship

Partisanship evolves over time; young Latinos are more independent, while older Latinos have more established partisan connections. Over time, young Latinos sway towards the party in which their ethnic group is a part of.

When a candidate of their same partisan moves in the opposite direction, Latinos withdraw their support; rather than vote for the other party, most do not vote at all.

When Latino Republicans are the minority within the Latino community, strongly identify with the community, and know that the majority of Latinos support the Democratic Party, they drop their party preference to join the majority.

When both Latino Republicans and Democrats are not given Latino political preference, most vote according to partisanship.

## Efficacy

Second and third generation Latinos tend to have higher levels of political efficacy, political information, and interest in US politics than the first generation.

It is based on the amount of time Latinos live in the United States and are exposed to its customs, society, and culture; the more exposure they have, the more likelihood of there being an increase of ethnic awareness and support for ethnic institutions and behaviors.


## Hypotheses:

H 1: In Latino dense states, Latinos have a higher efficacy then states in which there is less Latino presence.

## Table 1 Interpretation

- "A6Politics" represents the level of interest Latinos have in politics and public affairs; it is divided between: not interested (1.00); somewhat interested (2.00); and very interested (3.00)
- "RealD5Efficacy" represents the amount of times Latinos reached out to their government officials among those that claimed they did. (.00) represents only once, and (1.00) represents that they have reached out to their politician more than once.
- The column labeled "States" represents 15 US states provided by the Geographic Region data, those of which only 8/15 are visually represented. The states are: Arizona (1), Arkansas (2), Georgia (3), California (4), Illinois (5), Colorado (6), Texas (7), Iowa (8), Florida (9), New Jersey (10), New Mexico (11), New York (12), North Carolina (13), Washington (14) and Nevada (15).
- The table measures the level of interest in politics and public affairs with the amount of times they tried contacting their politician in the selected US states.
- Heavy Latino dense states include: Arizona, California, Texas, New Mexico.
- States with little Latino presence include: Arkansas, Iowa, Georgia, and North Carolina

## Chart 1:



## Table 2:

| RealD5Efficacy | Level of Interest       | Level of Interest       |       |       | Total  |        |
|----------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
|                |                         | 1.00                    | 2.00  | 3.00  |        |        |
| .00            | Count                   | 137                     | 338   | 133   | 608    |        |
|                | % within RealD5Efficacy | 22.5%                   | 55.6% | 21.9% | 100.0% |        |
|                | 1.00                    | Count                   | 258   | 899   | 909    | 2066   |
|                |                         | % within RealD5Efficacy | 12.5% | 43.5% | 44.0%  | 100.0% |
| Total          | Count                   | 395                     | 1237  | 1042  | 2674   |        |
|                | % within RealD5Efficacy | 14.8%                   | 46.3% | 39.0% | 100.0% |        |

Figure 3  
The Distribution of the Nation's Hispanic Population, 2011  
Hispanic population share by county




Table 1:

| States | RealD5Efficacy | Level of Interest   | A6Politics |        |        | Total  |
|--------|----------------|---------------------|------------|--------|--------|--------|
|        |                |                     | 1.00       | 2.00   | 3.00   |        |
| 1.00   | .00            | Count               | 6          | 18     | 5      | 29     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 31.6%      | 29.5%  | 9.3%   | 21.6%  |
|        | 1.00           | Count               | 13         | 43     | 49     | 105    |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 68.4%      | 70.5%  | 90.7%  | 78.4%  |
| 2.00   | .00            | Count               | 13         | 28     | 79     | 120    |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 100.0%     | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
|        | 1.00           | Count               | 7          | 17     | 6      | 30     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 53.8%      | 44.7%  | 21.4%  | 38.0%  |
| 3.00   | .00            | Count               | 6          | 21     | 22     | 49     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 46.2%      | 55.3%  | 78.6%  | 62.0%  |
|        | 1.00           | Count               | 13         | 36     | 38     | 87     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 100.0%     | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 4.00   | .00            | Count               | 3          | 17     | 9      | 29     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 33.3%      | 30.4%  | 16.7%  | 24.4%  |
|        | 1.00           | Count               | 6          | 39     | 45     | 90     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 66.7%      | 69.6%  | 83.3%  | 75.6%  |
| 5.00   | .00            | Count               | 9          | 56     | 54     | 119    |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 100.0%     | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
|        | 1.00           | Count               | 32         | 51     | 19     | 102    |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 36.8%      | 24.6%  | 9.9%   | 21.5%  |
| 6.00   | .00            | Count               | 55         | 187    | 163    | 405    |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 63.2%      | 75.4%  | 90.1%  | 78.5%  |
|        | 1.00           | Count               | 87         | 248    | 181    | 516    |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 100.0%     | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 7.00   | .00            | Count               | 4          | 26     | 7      | 37     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 18.2%      | 22.8%  | 9.9%   | 17.0%  |
|        | 1.00           | Count               | 18         | 98     | 64     | 170    |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 81.8%      | 77.2%  | 90.1%  | 82.1%  |
| 8.00   | .00            | Count               | 22         | 114    | 71     | 207    |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 100.0%     | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
|        | 1.00           | Count               | 0          | 5      | 6      | 11     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 0.0%       | 16.1%  | 20.0%  | 17.5%  |
| 9.00   | .00            | Count               | 2          | 24     | 24     | 50     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 100.0%     | 83.5%  | 80.0%  | 82.5%  |
|        | 1.00           | Count               | 2          | 31     | 30     | 63     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 100.0%     | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 10.00  | .00            | Count               | 11         | 35     | 10     | 56     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 23.9%      | 26.1%  | 9.6%   | 19.6%  |
|        | 1.00           | Count               | 35         | 99     | 95     | 229    |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 76.1%      | 73.9%  | 90.5%  | 80.4%  |
| 11.00  | .00            | Count               | 46         | 134    | 106    | 286    |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 100.0%     | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
|        | 1.00           | Count               | 3          | 3      | 4      | 10     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 0.0%       | 21.4%  | 23.5%  | 29.4%  |
| 12.00  | .00            | Count               | 0          | 11     | 13     | 24     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 0.0%       | 78.6%  | 76.5%  | 70.6%  |
|        | 1.00           | Count               | 3          | 14     | 17     | 34     |
|        |                | % within A6Politics | 100.0%     | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

## Data

### Chart 1: Political interest against action

Cross Tabulation Results:

- Not interested in politics and public affairs
  - Did not take action: 84.4% | Took action: 15.6%
- Somewhat interested in politics and public affairs
  - Did not take action: 63.3% | Took action: 32.7%
- Very interested in politics and public affairs
  - Did not take action: 41.7% | Took action: 58.3%

## Table 2 Interpretation:

- The table shows Latinos who have contacted their government officials at least once. 1-3 are the levels of interest they have in politics or public affairs and we compare that with how many times they contacted their politicians.
- Row ".00" represents the variable of one time contact to their politicians; row "1.00" represents Latinos contacting their politicians more than once.

## Findings

### Chart 1:

Results showed an upward slope of those who contacted their politicians along with their increase level of interest. Likewise there is a downward slope of those who did not contact their politicians. In other words, the less interest in politics, the less likelihood Latinos contacted their politicians. A mean was made and was found that the percentage of Latinos who made contact increased as their level of interest increased (0.00 sig).

### Table 2:

Those who are somewhat interested in politics almost split in the middle in regards to number of times they made contact, which was to be expected. There was also an inverse correlation with Latinos who are not interested in politics and only made contact once to Latinos who are very interested in politics and made contact more than once. What is notable is that out of those who are very interested in politics, only 21% contacted their politician just once.

### Table 1:

Dividing 4 states into two groups (California and Texas, which have the most Latino density out of the 15 states; and Iowa and Arkansas, which has little Latino presence), of the Latinos who are very interested in politics, less than 10% of Latinos in both California and Texas contacted their politicians only once; whereas double the amount (23.5% in Iowa and 21.4% in Arkansas) stopped after one time.

## Conclusions:

- Based on Table 2, what was expected was that the percentage of the very interested to be significantly lower than Latinos who are not interested; instead they were roughly the same. An explanation can be that those who are very interested in politics lost efficacy after the first time they contacted their politicians, in which they simply stopped trying.
- It seems that in states where there is more Latino density, more Latinos contact their government officials more than once; I would say that Latinos feel less politically empowered when they reside in states with little Latino presence. In other words, their political efficacy increases when there is a larger Latino presence in the residing state.

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